The multitude
group · 3 works · 5 mentions · 11 anchored passages
the multitude · the many · the crowd · men without experience of truth and reality · most people · people · the mass of mankind · the mob · the public · the whole world
in the texts
Republic
The general body of ordinary citizens and assemblies whose collective opinion is treated as untrustworthy and hostile to philosophy.
Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?
Why, when, I said, the multitude are seated together in assemblies or in court-rooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise.
It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge …
To Demonicus
The general body of common people whose opinions, suspicions, and praise shape a person's reputation.
for the multitude are ignorant of the truth and look only to reputation.
For you will thus be thought to approve them and emulate them, and as a result you will have greater esteem in the eyes of the multitude and a surer hold on the favor of royalty.
for the praise of a people is better than many possessions.
Crito
The general public or majority, whose opinions Socrates argues should not be esteemed on questions of right and wrong
But you see it is necessary, Socrates, to care for the opinion of the public, for this very trouble we are in now shows that the public is able to accomplish not by any means the least, but almost the greatest of evils, if one has a bad reputation with it.
Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say.
Then in other matters, not to enumerate them all, in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad, which we are now considering, ought we to follow and fear the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others?