Dialectic and rhetoric

'that the whole faculty of speech (as Aristotle had said before) is divided into two parts, and that rhetoric is like the open palm, dialectic like the closed fist, because the rhetoricians speak more broadly, the dialecticians more compressed.

But while Epicurus despises dialectic, Torquatus — which alone contains both the whole knowledge of perceiving what is in each thing, and of judging of what kind each thing is, and of arguing by method and rule — he stumbles in speaking, as it seems to me at least, and distinguishes by no art the very things he wishes to teach, such as these very matters of which we were just now speaking.

For then we supposed it to be a part of the appetitive, but now, far from that, we say that, in the factions of the soul, it much rather marshals itself on the side of the reason.

And again, was he not sober by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it?

Must not this be a kind of civil war of these three principles, their meddlesomeness and interference with one another’s functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle?

It remains for me to divide the rational part of philosophy.

The greatest and most numerous authorities have said that there are three parts of philosophy: