Probability
“to eikos”
idea · 2 works · 2 mentions · 3 anchored passages
probability · likeness of truth · probable · the probable · to eikos
in the texts
Lucullus
The Carneadean criterion by which the wise man acts and answers questions, based on plausibility rather than certain comprehension.
the reproach is certainly lighter, in that we nevertheless say that certain things are probable.
'and whatever thing shall so touch him that the impression is probable and impeded by nothing, he will be moved.
'that it pleases the Academics that there are such dissimilarities of things that some seem probable and others the contrary;
Phaedrus
The doctrine, associated with Tisias and professional rhetoricians, that persuasive speech should aim at what is convincing to the audience rather than at truth.
now let Tisias himself tell us if he does not say that probability is that which most people think.
and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability.
Apparently after he had invented this clever scientific definition, he wrote that if a feeble and brave man assaulted a strong coward, robbed him of his cloak or something, and was brought to trial for it, neither party ought to speak the truth;