The United States Constitution, I.: The Constitution Is a Pro-slavery Instrument, According to the Necessary Meaning of

Admitting, as we do, that the words of any written instrument constitute the only legal evidence of its meaning, we ask, What is the meaning of the following clauses in the Constitution of the United States?

Art. 1, sec. 2: “Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.”

This section distinguishes between free persons and slaves, because to the whole number of free persons are to be added three fifths of all other persons; that is, persons not free, or slaves. By excluding from the class of free persons those bound to service for life, without—as in case of Indians not taxed—assigning a reason for such exclusion, it declares them to be slaves, within the meaning of the Constitution.

This article, therefore, recognizes slavery as explicitly as if the word slave itself had been used, and gives to the free persons in a slave State, solely because they are slaveholders, a larger representation, and consequently greater political power, than the same number of free persons in a free State. A bounty on slaveholding!

Art. 1, sec. 9: “The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”

A person who migrates does so of his own accord; he cannot be held to be migrated by any other person. He is wholly a free agent. But a person who is imported does not import himself; he is imported by some other person. He is passive. The importer is the free agent; the person imported is not a free agent. The Virginia slave laws of 1748 and 1753 proceed on this distinction when they say “all persons * imported * shall be slaves.” Whenever we hear an importation spoken of, we instantly infer an owner, and property imported. This distinction between the force of the words migration and importation is, then, real.

That the Constitution also makes a distinction is evident, because only persons imported can be taxed. And that it adopts the distinction we have just pointed out is also evident, because this alone can afford us a sufficient reason why persons imported may be taxed, and persons who migrate cannot be.

By this clause, therefore, Congress was prevented, during twenty years, from prohibiting the foreign slave trade with any State that pleased to allow it. But by Art. 1, sec. 8, Congress had the general power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations.” Consequently, the slave trade was excepted from the operation of the general power, with a view to place the slave trade, during twenty years, solely under the control of the slave States. It could not be wholly stopped, so long as one State wished to continue it. It is a clear compromise in favor of slavery. True, the compromise was a temporary one; but it will be noticed, that Congress, even after 1808, was not obliged to prohibit the trade. Even now we are discussing the expediency of reopening the accursed traffic! whilst, in point of fact, until 1819 the laws of Congress authorized the States to sell into slavery, for their own benefit, negroes imported contrary to the laws of the United States! (Act Congr. 1807, c. 77, § 4, 6; 1818, c. 86, § 5 and 7; 10 Wheat. Rep. 321, 322.) So unmixed should be our satisfaction at the oft-repeated boast, that ours was the first nation to prohibit the African slave trade!

Art. 4, sec. 2: “No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.”

No one can be illegally “bound” to service, and one who is legally bound is legally “held” to that service. The expressions a person “bound” to service and a person “legally held” to service are, therefore, equivalent. This section evidently embraces, not only persons held to service for a term of years, but also those held to service for life, and therefore includes not only free persons, but those who are declared to be slaves within the meaning of the Constitution. (Art. 1, sec. 2.)

That the expression used in this section legally includes slaves is also evident on other grounds. The ordinance of 1787 calls a slave a person “from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed.” (Art. 6.) It is a criminal offence in all the States, except Maryland, Virginia, and Texas, to entice a slave to leave his master’s “service.” In Maryland, and Virginia, and other States, the owner has a civil action for damages against the person who thus entices away his slave. And the laws of all the States recognize the master’s right to enforce the labor of the slave.

If, however, it is a crime to entice a slave to leave his master’s “service,” and if such act subject a man to an action for damages by the owner, it is evident that the master must have a legal right to the “service” of his slave; for it is the infringement of this right which makes the crime and gives ground to claim damages. The slave is, therefore, a person legally held to service or labor. And as if to remove all doubt, the very expression is applied to slaves in the laws of all the States except Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Texas.

By this section, therefore, it is provided that no person held as a slave in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from his slavery, but shall be delivered up on claim of his owner. The laws of one State, whether they support slavery or any other institution, have no power in another State. Consequently, if a slave escape into a free State, he becomes free. This is the general rule of law. In virtue of it, thousands of slaves are now free on the soil of Canada. In virtue of it, a fugitive slave from South Carolina would be free in this State, were it not for this section in the Constitution. But this section declares that he shall not thereby become free, but shall be delivered up. Again: the Constitution makes an exception from a general rule of law in favor of slavery. It gives to slaveholders and slave laws a power which the general rule of law does not give. It enables a South Carolina slaveholder to drag from the soil of Massachusetts a person whom the general rule of law pronounces free, solely because South Carolina laws declare the contrary. It makes the whole Union a vast hunting ground for slaves!

Art. 1, sec. 8: “Congress shall have power * * * to provide for calling forth the militia * * * to suppress insurrections.”

Art. 4, sec. 4: “The United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and, on application of the legislature, or of the executive, (when the legislature cannot be convened,) against domestic violence.”

All insurrections and all cases of domestic violence are here provided for. To constitute an insurrection there must be a rising against those laws which are recognized as such by the Constitution; and, to make out a case of domestic violence, the violence must be exerted against that right or power which is recognized by the Constitution as lawful. But by Art. 1, sec. 2, and Art. 4, sec. 2, the Constitution admits that some persons may be legally slaves. Consequently, if these persons rise in rebellion, or commit acts of violence contrary to the laws which hold them in slavery, their rising constitutes an insurrection; such acts are acts of violence within the meaning of the Constitution, and consequently must be suppressed by the national power.

The self-styled owners are not the only slaveholders. All persons who voluntarily assist or pledge themselves to assist in holding persons in slavery are slaveholders. In sober truth, then, we are a nation of slaveholders! for we have bound our whole national strength to the slave owners, to aid them, if necessary, in holding their slaves in subjection!