Chapter XV: In every sort of thing that is best which is most one.

Likewise I affirm that being and unity and goodness exist seriatim according to the fifth mode of priority. Being is naturally antecedent to unity, and unity to goodness; that which has completest being has completest unity and completest goodness. And as far as anything is from completest being, just so far is it from unity and also from goodness. That in every class of objects the best is the most unified, the Philosopher maintains in his treatise on simple Being. From this it would seem that unity is the root of goodness, and multiplicity is the root of evil. Wherefore Pythagoras in his Correlations placed unity on the side of good and multiplicity on the side of evil, as appears in the first book on simple Being. We can thus see that to sin is naught else than to despise unity, and to depart therefrom to multiplicity; which the Psalmist surely felt when he said, “By the fruit of their corn and wine and oil are they multiplied.”

Therefore it is established that every good thing is good because it subsists in unity. As concord is a good thing in itself, it must subsist in some unity as its proper root, and this proper root must appear if we consider the nature or meaning of concord. Now concord is the uniform movement of many wills; and unity of will, which we mean by uniform movement, is the root of concord, or rather concord itself. For just as we should call many clods concordant because all descend together toward the centre, and many flames concordant because they ascend together to the circumference, if they did this voluntarily, so we call many men concordant because they move together by their volition to one end formally present in their wills; while in the case of the clods is formally present the single attribute of gravity, and in the flames the single attribute of levity. For power of willing is a certain potentiality, but the species of goodness which it apprehends is its form, which, like other forms, is a unity multiplied in itself according to the multiplicity of the receiving material, just as soul, number, and other forms subject to composition.

These things being premised, we may argue as follows for the proposed exposition of the original assumption: All concord depends upon unity in wills; mankind at its best is a concord of a certain kind. For just as one man at his best in body and spirit is a concord of a certain kind, and as a household, a city, and a kingdom is likewise a concord, so it is with mankind in its totality. Therefore the human race for its best disposition is dependent on unity in wills. But this state of concord is impossible unless one will dominates and guides all others into unity, for as the Philosopher teaches in the last book to Nicomachus, mortal wills need directing because of the alluring delights of youth. Nor is this directing will a possibility unless there is one common Prince whose will may dominate and guide the wills of all others. If the conclusions above are true, as they are, Monarchy is essential for the best disposition of mankind; and therefore for the well-being of the world Monarchy should exist therein.