The Military Statesman, Or a Specimen of the Doctrine of Enlarging the Bounds of Empire

The saying of Themistocles, if applied to himself, was indecent and haughty; but if meant in general, contains a very prudent observation, and as grave a censure. Being asked, at a feast, to touch a lute, he answered, “He could not fiddle; but he could raise a small village to a great city.” Which words, if taken in a political sense, excellently describe and distinguish two very different faculties in those who are at the helm of states. For upon an exact survey, we shall find some, though but very few, that, being raised to the council-board, the senate, or other public office, can enlarge a small state, or city, and yet have little skill in music; but many more, who, having a good hand upon the harp, or the lute, that is, at the trifles of a court, are so far from enlarging a state, that they rather seem designed by nature to overturn and ruin it, though ever so happy and flourishing. And, indeed, those base arts and tricks by which many counsellors and men of great place procure the favor of their sovereign, and a popular character, deserve no other name than a certain knack of fiddling; as being things more pleasing for the present, and more ornamental to the practitioner, than useful, and suited to enlarge the bounds, or increase the riches of the state, whereof they are ministers. Again, there are, doubtless, counsellors and governors, who, though equal to business, and of no contemptible abilities, may commodiously manage things so as to preserve them from manifest precipices and inconveniences, though they by no means have the creative power of building and extending an empire. But whatever the workmen be, let us regard the work itself; viz., what is to be deemed the true extent of kingdoms and republics, and by what means this may be procured—a subject well deserving to lie continually before princes, for their diligent meditation; lest, by overrating their own strength, they should rashly engage in too difficult and vain enterprises, or, thinking too meanly of their power, submit to timorous and effeminate counsels.

The greatness of an empire, in point of bulk and territory, is subject to mensuration, and for its revenue, to calculation. The number of inhabitants may be known by valuation or tax, and the number and extent of cities and towns, by survey and maps; yet in all civil affairs there is not a thing more liable to error than the making a true and intrinsic estimate of the strength and riches of a state. The kingdom of heaven is compared, not to an acorn, or any large nut, but to a grain of mustard-seed; which, though one of the least grains, has in it a certain quick property, and native spirit, whereby it rises soon, and spreads itself wide: so some states of very large compass are little suited to extend their limits, or procure a wider command, while others of small dimension prove the foundations of the greatest monarchies.

Fortified towns, well-stored arsenals, noble breeds of war-horses, armed chariots, elephants, engines, all kinds of artillery, arms, and the like, are nothing more than a sheep in a lion’s skin, unless the nation itself be, from its origin and temper, stout and warlike. Nor is number of troops itself of any great service, where the soldiers are weak and enervate: for, as Virgil well observes, “The wolf cares not how large the flock is.” The Persian army in the plains of Arbela, appeared to the eyes of the Macedonians as an immense ocean of people; insomuch that Alexander’s leaders, being struck at the sight, counselled their general to fall upon them by night; but he replied, “I will not steal the victory”; and it was found an easier conquest than he expected. Tigranes, encamped upon a hill, with an army of four hundred thousand men, seeing the Roman army, consisting but of fourteen thousand, making up to him, he jested at it, and said, “Those men are too many for an embassy, but much too few for a battle”: yet before sunset he found them enough to give him chase, with infinite slaughter. And we have abundant examples of the great inequality between number and strength. This, therefore, may be first set down as a sure and certain maxim, and the capital of all the rest, with regard to the greatness of a state, that the people be of a military race, or both by origin and disposition warlike. The sinews of war are not money, if the sinews of men’s arms be wanting, as they are in a soft and effeminate nation. It was a just answer of Solon to Crœsus, who showed him all his treasure: “Yes, sir, but if another should come with better iron than you, he would be master of all this gold.” And, therefore, all princes whose native subjects are not hardy and military, should make a very modest estimate of their power; as, on the other hand, those who rule a stout and martial people, may well enough know their own strength, if they be not otherwise wanting to themselves. As to hired forces, which is the usual remedy when native forces are wanting, there are numerous examples, which clearly show, that whatever state depends upon them, though it may perhaps for a time extend its feathers beyond its nest, yet they will mew soon after.

The blessing of Judah and Issachar can never meet; so that the same tribe, or nation, should be both the lion’s whelp, and the ass under the burden: nor can a people, overburdened with taxes, ever be strong and warlike. It is true, that taxes levied by public consent less dispirit and sink the minds of the subject than those imposed in absolute governments; as clearly appears by what is called excise in the Netherlands, and in some measure by the contributions called the subsidies in England. We are now speaking of the minds, and not of the wealth of the people: for tributes by consent, though the same thing with tributes imposed, as to exhausting the riches of a kingdom, yet very differently affect the minds of the subject. So that this also must be a maxim of state, “That a people oppressed with taxes is unfit to rule.”

States and kingdoms that aspire to greatness, must be very careful that their nobles and gentry increase not too much; otherwise, the common people will be dispirited, reduced to an abject state, and become little better than slaves to the nobility: as we see in coppices, if the staddles are left too numerous, there will never be clean underwood; but the greatest part degenerates into shrubs and bushes. So in nations, where the nobility is too numerous, the commonalty will be base and cowardly; and, at length, not one head in a hundred among them prove fit for a helmet, especially with regard to the infantry, which is generally the prime strength of an army. Whence, though a nation be full-peopled, its force may be small. We need no clearer proof of this than by comparing England and France. For though England be far inferior in extent and number of inhabitants, yet it has almost constantly got the better of France in war: for this reason, that the rustics, and lower sort of people in England, make better soldiers than the peasants of France. And in this respect it was a very political and deep foresight of Henry the Seventh of England, to constitute lesser settled farms, and houses of husbandry, with a certain fixed and inseparable proportion of land annexed, sufficient for a life of plenty: so that the proprietors themselves, or at least the renters, and not hirelings, might occupy them. For thus a nation may acquire that character which Virgil gives of ancient Italy: “A country strong in arms, and rich of soil”—

“Terra potens armis, atque ubere glebæ.”

We must not here pass over a sort of people, almost peculiar to England, viz., the servants of our nobles and gentry; as the lowest of this kind are no way inferior to the yeomanry for foot service. And it is certain that the hospitable magnificence and splendor, the attendance and large train, in use among the nobility and gentry of England, add much to our military strength; as, on the other hand, a close retired life among the nobility causes a want of forces.

It must be earnestly endeavored, that the tree of monarchy, like the tree of Nebuchadnezzar, have its trunk sufficiently large and strong, to support its branches and leaves; or that the natives be sufficient to keep the foreign subjects under: whence those states best consult their greatness, which are liberal of naturalization. For it were vain to think a handful of men, how excellent soever in spirit and counsel, should hold large and spacious countries under the yoke of empire. This, indeed, might perhaps be done for a season, but it cannot be lasting. The Spartans were reserved and difficult in receiving foreigners among them; and, therefore, so long as they ruled within their own narrow bounds, their affairs stood firm and strong; but soon after they began to widen their borders, and extend their dominion further than the Spartan race could well command the foreign crowd, their power sunk of a sudden. Never did commonwealth receive new citizens so profusely as the Roman; whence its fortune was equal to so prudent a conduct: and thus the Romans acquired the most extensive empire on the globe. It was their custom to give a speedy denization, and in the highest degree; that is, not only a right of commerce, of marriage and inheritance, but also the right of suffrage, and of candidature for places and honors. And this not only to particular persons; but they conferred it upon entire families, cities, and sometimes whole nations at once. Add to this their custom of settling colonies, whereby Roman roots were transplanted in foreign soil. And to consider these two practices together, it might be said, that the Romans did not spread themselves over the globe, but that the globe spread itself over the Romans: which is the securest method of extending an empire. I have often wondered how the Spanish government could with so few natives inclose and curb so many kingdoms and provinces. But Spain may be esteemed a sufficiently large trunk, as it contains a much greater tract of country than either Rome or Sparta did at first. And although the Spaniards are very sparing of naturalization, yet they do what comes next to it: promiscuously receive the subjects of all nations into their army; and even their highest military office is often conferred upon foreign leaders. Nay, it appears that Spain at length begins to feel their want of natives, and are now endeavoring to supply it.

It is certain, that the sedentary mechanic arts, practiced within doors, and the more curious manufactures, which require the finger rather than the arm, are in their own nature opposite to a military spirit. Men of the sword universally delight in exemption from work, and dread dangers less than labor. And in this temper they must be somewhat indulged, if we desire to keep their minds in vigor. It was, therefore, a great advantage to Sparta, Athens, Rome, and other ancient republics, that they had the use, not of freemen, but generally of slaves for this kind of domestic arts. But after the Christian religion gained ground, the use of slaves was in great measure abolished. What comes nearest this custom is to leave such arts chiefly to strangers, who for that purpose should be invited to come in, or at least be easily admitted. The native vulgar should consist of three kinds; viz., husbandmen, free servants, and handicraftsmen, used to the strong masculine arts; such as smithery, masonry, carpentry, etc., without including the soldiery.

But above all, it is most conducive to the greatness of empire, for a nation to profess the skill of arms as its principal glory and most honorable employ; for the things hitherto spoken of are but preparatory to the use of arms; and to what end this preparation, if the thing itself be not reduced to action? Romulus, as the story goes, left it in charge to his people at his death, that of all things they should cultivate the art of war, as that which would make their city the head of the world. The whole frame and structure of the Spartan government tended, with more diligence, indeed, than prudence, only to make its inhabitants warriors. Such was also the practice of the Persians and Macedonians, though not so constant and lasting. The Britons, Gauls, Germans, Goths, Saxons, and Normans, for some time also principally cultivated military arts. The Turks did the same, being not a little excited thereto by their law, and still continue the discipline, notwithstanding their soldiery be now on its incline. Of all Christian Europe, the only nation that still retains and professes this discipline is the Spanish. But it is so plain, that every one advances furthest in what he studies most, as to require no enforcing. It is sufficient to intimate, that unless a nation professedly studies and practices arms and military discipline, so as to make them a principal business, it must not expect that any remarkable greatness of empire will come of its own accord. On the contrary, it is the most certain oracle of time, that those nations which have longest continued in the study and profession of arms, as the Romans and the Turks have principally done, make the most surprising progress in enlarging the bounds of empire. And again, those nations which have flourished, though but for a single age, in military glory, yet during that time have obtained such a greatness of empire as has remained with them long after, when their martial discipline was slackened.

It bears some relation to the foregoing precept, that “a state should have such laws and customs as may readily administer just causes, or at least pretexts, of taking arms.” For there is such a natural notion of justice imprinted in men’s minds, that they will not make war, which is attended with so many calamities, unless for some weighty or at least some specious reason. The Turks are never unprovided of a cause of war, viz., the propagation of their law and religion. The Romans, though it was a high degree of honor for their emperors to extend the borders of their empire, yet never undertook a war for that sole end. Let it, therefore, be a rule to all nations that aim at empire, to have a quick and lively sensibility of any injury done to their frontier subjects, merchants, or public ministers. And let them not sit too long quiet after the first provocation. Let them also be ready and cheerful in sending auxiliaries to their friends and allies, which the Romans constantly observed, insomuch that if an invasion were made upon any of their allies, who also had a defensive league with others, and the former begged assistance severally, the Romans would ever be the first to give it, and not suffer the honor of the benefit to be snatched from them by others. As for the wars anciently waged from a certain conformity or tacit correspondence of states, I cannot see on what law they stood. Such were the wars undertaken by the Romans for restoring liberty to Greece; such were those of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, for establishing or overturning democracies or oligarchies; and such sometimes are those entered into by republics or kingdoms, under pretext of protecting the subjects of other nations, or delivering them from tyranny. It may suffice for the present purpose, that no state expect any greatness of empire, unless it be immediately ready to seize any just occasion of a war.

No one body, whether natural or political, can preserve its health without exercise; and honorable war is the wholesome exercise of a kingdom or commonwealth. Civil wars, indeed, are like the heat of a fever, but a war abroad is like the heat of motion—wholesome; for men’s minds are enervated and their manners corrupted by sluggish and inactive peace. And, however it may be as to the happiness of a state, it is doubtless best for its greatness to be as it were always in arms. A veteran army, indeed, kept constantly ready for marching, is expensive, yet it gives a state the disposal of things among its neighbors, or at least procures it a great reputation in other respects, as may be clearly seen in the Spaniard, who has now, for a long succession of years, kept a standing army, though not always in the same part of the country.

The dominion of the sea is an epitome of monarchy. Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, writing of Pompey’s preparation against Cæsar, says, the designs of Pompey are like those of Themistocles; for he thinks they who command the sea command the empire. And doubtless Pompey would have wearied Cæsar out, and brought him under, had he not, through a vain confidence, abandoned his design. It is plain, from many examples, of how great consequence seafights are. The fight at Actium decided the empire of the world; the fight of Lepanto struck a hook in the nose of the Turk; and it has frequently happened that victories or defeats at sea have put a final end to the war, that is, when the whole fortune of it has been committed to them. Doubtless the being master of the sea leaves a nation at great liberty to act, and to take as much or as little of the war as it pleases, while those who are superior in land forces have yet numerous difficulties to struggle with. And at present, among the European nations, a naval strength, which is the portion of Great Britain, is more than ever of the greatest importance to sovereignty, as well because most of the kingdoms of Europe are not continents, but in good measure surrounded by the sea, as because the treasures of both Indies seem but an accessory to the dominion of the seas.

The wars of later times seem to have been waged in the dark, compared with the variety of glory and honor usually reflected upon the military men of former ages. It is true, we have at this day certain military honors designed perhaps as incentives to courage, though common to men of the gown as well as the sword; we have also some coats-of-arms and public hospitals, for soldiers worn out and disabled in the service; but among the ancients, when a victory was obtained, there were trophies, funeral orations, and magnificent monuments for such as died in the wars. Civic crowns and military garlands were bestowed upon all the soldiers. The very name of emperor was afterward borrowed by the greatest kings from leaders in the wars; they had solemn triumphs for their successful generals; they had donatives and great largesses for the soldiers, when the army was disbanded; these are such great and dazzling things in the eyes of mortals, as to be capable of firing the most frozen spirits and inflaming them for war. In particular, the manner of triumph among the Romans was not a thing of pageantry or empty show, but deserving to be reckoned among the wisest and most noble of their customs, as being attended with these three particulars; viz., 1. The glory and honor of their leaders; 2. The enriching of the treasury with the spoils; and, 3. Donatives to the army. But their triumphal honors were, perhaps, unfit for monarchies, unless in the person of the king or his son, which also obtained at Rome in the times of its emperors, who reserved the honor of the triumph as peculiar to themselves and their sons upon returning from the wars whereat they were present, and had brought to a conclusion, only conferring their vestments and triumphal ensigns upon the other leaders

But to conclude, though no man, as the Scripture testifies, can by taking care add one cubit to his stature, that is, in the little model of the human body; yet in the vast fabric of kingdoms and commonwealths, it is in the power of kings and rulers to extend and enlarge the bounds of empire; for by prudently introducing such laws, orders, and customs as those above mentioned, and the like, they might sow the seeds of greatness for posterity and future ages. But these counsels seldom reach the ears of princes, who generally commit the whole to the direction and disposal of fortune.

The other desideratum we note in the art of government, is the doctrine of universal justice, or the fountains of law. They who have hitherto written upon laws were either as philosophers or lawyers: the philosophers advance many things that appear beautiful in discourse, but lie out of the road of use; while the lawyers, being bound and subject to the decrees of the laws prevailing in their several countries, whether Roman or pontifical, have not their judgment free, but write as in fetters. This doctrine, doubtless, properly belongs to statesmen, who best understand civil society, the good of the people, natural equity, the customs of nations, and the different forms of states; whence they are able to judge of laws by the principles and precepts, as well of natural justice as of politics. The present view, therefore, is to discover the fountains of justice and public good, and in all the parts of equity to give a certain character and idea of what is just, according whereto those who desire it may examine the laws of particular kingdoms and states, and thence endeavor to amend them. And of this doctrine we shall, in our usual way, give an example, aphoristically, in a single title.