The First Part. (1)

I HAVE often thought it strange, that among all the governments, either past or present, the monarchical should so far in extent and number excede the popular, as that they could never yet come into comparison. I could never be persuaded but it was more happy for a people to be dispos’d of by a number of persons jointly interested and concern’d with them, than to be number’d as the herd and inheritance of one, to whose lust and madness they were absolutely subject; and that any man of the weakest reason and generosity would not rather chuse for his habitation that spot of earth where there was access to honour by virtue, and no worth could be excluded, rather than that where all advancement should procede from the will of one scarcely hearing and seeing with his own organs, and gain’d for the most part by means leud and indirect: and all this in the end to amount to nothing else but a more splendid and dangerous slavery. To clear this point, I consider’d how inscrutably providence carrys on the turns and stops of all governments, so that most people rather found than made them. The constitutions of men, som not fit to be masters of their liberty, som not capable, som not willing; the ambition of settled tyrants, who breaking their own bonds have brought in violent alterations; and lastly, civil discord have either corrupted or altered better settlements.

But these are observations rather than arguments, and relate to fact rather than reason. That which astonish’d me most was to see those of this heroic and learned age, not only not rising to thoughts of liberty, but instead thereof foolishly turning their wits and swords against themselves in the maintenance of them whose slaves they are: and indeed they can be no weak causes that produce so long and settled a distemper; tho’ some of those I mention’d, if not most of them, are the true ones.

He knows nothing that knows not how superstitiously the generality of mankind is given to retain traditions, and how pertinacious they are in the maintenance of their first prejudices, insomuch that a discovery or more refin’d reason is as insupportable to them, as the sun is to an ey newly brought out of darkness. Hence opiniativeness (which is commonly proportion’d to their ignorance) and a generous obstinacy sometimes to death and ruin. So that it is no wonder if we see many gentlemen, whose education inabled them only to use their senses and first thoughts, so dazled with the splendor of a court, prepossest with the affection of a prince, or bewitch’d with som subdolous favor, that they chuse rather any hazard than the inchantment should be dissolv’d. Others, perhaps a degree above these, yet in respect of some title stuck upon the family (which has bin as fortunat a mystery of kingcraft as any other) or in reverence to som glorious former atchievements (minding not that in all these cases the people are the only effective means, and the king only imaginary) think they should degenerat from bravery in bringing on a change. Others are witheld by sloth and timorousness, either not daring, or unwilling to be happy: som looking no further than their privat welfare, indifferent at the multiplication of public evils; others (and these the worst of all) out of a pravity of nature sacrificing to their ambition and avarice, and in order to that, following any power, concurring with any machinations, and supporting their authors: while princes themselves (train’d up in these arts, or receiving them by tradition) know how to wind all their humours to their own advantage, now foisting the divinity of their titles into pulpits, now amuzing the people with pomps and shews, now diverting their hot spirits to som unprofitable foren war (making way to their accurs’d ends of revenge or glory, with the effusion of that blood which should be as dear to them as their own) now stroking the people with som feeble but inforc’d law, for which notwithstanding they will be paid (and ’tis observ’d, the most notorious tyrants have taken this course) now giving up the eminentest of their ministers (which they part with as indifferently as their robes) to the rage and fury of the people; so that they are commanded and condemn’d by the same mouth, and the credulous and ignorant, believing their king divinely set over them, sit still, and by degrees grow into quiet and admiration, especially if lull’d asleep with som small continuance of peace (be it never so injust, unsound, or dangerous) as if the body politic could not languish of an internal disease, tho’ its complexion be fresh and chearful.

Those are the reasons which (if I conceive aright) have stupify’d the less knowing part of mankind. Now, how the more searching part have so odly miscarry’d, will fall under consideration.

First then, we need not take the pains to demonstrat how easy a thing it is for men of acuteness, not conversant in civil affairs, not only to miscarry in the apprehension, but even in their judgment of them: for they, instead of bringing the series and reason of things into rule and method, use on the contrary to measure them by their own presuppos’d speculation; and by that means becom incapable of weighing rightly the various incidences and circumstances of business. For it is to be observ’d, that the theorems of no art or profession are either more easily found, or of more difficult practice than those of policy; so that it is no wonder if men merely contemplative, fail so oft in the very laying of grounds, as we shall anon instance. Now how fruitful daintys error and absurdity are, we all know. But more especially the contentions of contemplative men are most numerous, various, and endless; for wrangling is with them an art, and they are indu’d with that ungenerous shame, never to acknowledge their mistakes. Moreover their principles are most times ill-grounded, and it is to be fear’d that in their superstructures they as often call in their imaginations as their judgment to frame arguments. Besides, these men fighting only with pen, ink and paper, seldom arrive at a means to decide the quarrel, by which he that gains the last word is suppos’d conqueror; or the other leaves almost as inglorious a conquest to the victor, as if he had bin overthrown.

That which I would infer from all this, is, that the generality of speculative men, for the most part guiding their understandings by those notions which they find in books, fall not seldom by this means into considerable errors. For all books, those I mean that are human, and fall directly under our consideration, either lay down practical things and observations of kingship, or som general and universal notions, or else controversially assert monarchy against som opposers. Now in the two latter there are generally found two grand and insupportable fallacys, the first whereof is, that they fraudulently converse in generals, and (to borrow the school-terms) speak of that in the abstract which they should do in the concrete: as for example, where they should assert the particular right of this or that prince, they cunningly or ignorantly lay out most of their discourse about monarchy in general, and often weary and amaze the dispute before they com to the true ground and stating of the quarrel, whereby the readers (diverted by such prepossession, and entangled by general notions of authority, power and government) seldom descend into the consideration of particulars, where the great scruple and difficulty for the most part lys. So that any king (be his access to the government never so fraudulent and unjustifiable) coms to be look’d on as sacred, authoritative, and by degrees begins not to blush at the attributes of sacred majesty, grace, and highness, or any other terms that the servil flattery and witty barbarity of courtiers can give to them: nay, som even of the wickedest of the Roman emperors could be content to be saluted with perennitys and divinitys; whereas if men would call their reason into counsel, they might find that these blazing stars were opac bodys, and did shine only by reflection: these men having no more luster than either the cabal of their own state and distance, or the wretched imposition upon the people, casts on them. For did man devest the authority from the person, they would then commonly find it inconsiderable, if not positively evil. And again, consider authority in itself as a thing fixt, real, immutable, and (when justly administer’d) sacred, they might find, that granting a prince to be the most regular, just person in all the world, yet many men as good join’d with him, intrusted, and concurring to the same end, might do much more good; and that to deny this, were to be as irrational as to deny that one person could do any good at all. But however, this I take to be certain and demonstrable out of their own principles, that kings being only to be consider’d in respect of the trust and power lodg’d in them, a number of men by as just means (not to say better) invested with the same trust and power, are every jot as sacred, and of as much divine right as any monarch is, the power being as essentially the same, united or divided, as if a commission be to one or three. It will follow then, that republics may be as just and authoritative as kingships; and then their radical argument of the jure divino of kingship is wholly enervated, and the other render’d equally as soverain. And I am to note (but this is only transiently) the poorness, or, to say better, the blasphemy of that argument which flourishes out kings as the types of divinity, and vainly lavishes some metaphysics, to prove that all things have a natural tendency to oneness; nay, the itch of some merry wits has carry’d them to run over most of the divine attributes (as some English lawyers have talk’d of the legal, I must say phantastical ubiquity and omniscience of our kings, tho’ we see the contrary; and som civilians have said much about the emperor before them) whereas they should consider, that the immense simplicity of God flows out in its several operations with ineffable variety, God being every where and the same, or, as the Platonists say, a center in every part of its circle, a spirit without quantity, distance, and comprehension; whereas man is a determinate narrow being, who doing one thing, ceases to do another, and thinking of one thing, is forc’d to quit his former thought. Now how fit he is to be a shadow of this archetype, let any judg, unless he could be refin’d from his corporeity, and inlarg’d into a proportionable immensity. Besides, I know not whether it be safe to think or no, That as God, who, for the most part, indues men with gifts sutable to the places to which he calls them, would in som measure pour out his spirit proportionate to these men, whereas most commonly we find them, notwithstanding their extraordinary advantages of society, education, and business, as weak men as any other: and good princes being sway’d by the advice of men, good and wise, and the bad seduc’d by men of their own inclinations, what are all monarchys but in reality optimacys? for a few only effentially govern under the name of one, who is utterly as unable as the meanest of those over whom he claims superiority.

The second fallacy is this, That men, while they labor thus to support monarchy, tell us not what kind of monarchy it is, and consequently gain nothing, tho’ we should grant them the former proposition be true. For what does it avail to tell me of the title of such a prince, if I know not by what title he holds? Grant it were visible to me that such a man was mark’d out by Providence to be my governor, yet if I cannot tell what kind of one, whether absolute, mixt, limited, merely executive, or only first in order, how shall I know to direct my obedience? If he be absolute, my very natural liberty is taken away from me; nor do I know any power that can make any man such, the Scripture setting just limitations and restrictions to all governors. If mixt and limited, I must know the due temper and bounds whereby he is to rule, or else he may usurp or be mistaken, and I opprest or injur’d. If executive, the power fundamentally resides not in him, but in the great council, or them intrusted by the people; then I adore only a shadow. Now if any prince of Europe can really clear up these mists, and shew the lines of his government drawn fairly, and his charter whole and authentic, like that of Venice and ancient Rome, for my part, I’ll be the first man shall swear him allegiance, and the last that will preserve him. But you will find that they will tell you in general about their office, and in particular of their claims of succession, inheritance, and ancestors; when but look three or four storys back, and you will meet either som savage unnatural intrusion, disguiz’d under som forc’d title or chimerical cognation, or else som violent alteration, or possibly som slender oath or articles, hardly extorted and imperfectly kept. Now if any man that will but run over these rules, and apply them to any history whatever (as we shall exemplify in that of Scotland, upon which for the present we have pitcht) and not find most titles ambiguous, the effects of former monarchys (for where, in a catalogue of forty kings, can you almost shew me three good ones, but things merely struggling to maintain their titles and domestic interest?) ruinous to the people, who for the most part consider them no otherwise than as to be rescu’d from violent confusion, not as they conduce to the positive happiness of a civil life; I say, all this will be found to be true, or my small conversation in books is extremely false. And truly I conceive reading of history to be the most rational course to set any judgment right, because it instructs by experience and effects, and grounds the judgment upon material observations, and not blindly gropes after notions and causes, which to him are tantum non inscrutabile; but of that anon. A vain mistake under this topic has bin an erroneous comparison and application of matters civil and military; for men observing that mixt councils about generals, plurality, equality of commands, frequent and sudden military alterations, have brought no small distempers and dangers to several governments and attemts; therefore they presently conclude, that in civils also it is the safest to continue a command in one hand for preventing the like disturbances. But here they are deceiv’d; civil matters consist in long debate, great consideration, patient expectation, and wary foresight, which is better to be found in a number of choice experienc’d heads, than in one single person, whose youth and vigor of spirit inables him rather to action, and fills him with that noble temerity which is commonly so happy in martial affairs; that must be guided always to improve occasions, which are seldom to be found again, and, which mistaken, are to be scarcely amended. Besides, the ferocity of daring spirits can hardly be bounded while they stand level; so that it is no wonder if they extinguish all emulations by putting the power into the hands of one, whereas in a commonwealth it is quite otherwise: and factions (unless they be cruelly exorbitant) do but poise and balance one another; and many times, like the discord of humors upon the natural body, produce real good to the government. That slender conceit, that Nature seems to dress out a principality in most of her works, as among birds, bees, &c. is so slender indeed (in regard they are no more chiefs than what they fancy them, but all their prepotency is merely predatory or oppressive; and even lions, elephants, crocodils and eagles, have small inconsiderable enemys, of which they stand in fear, and by which they are often ruin’d) that the recital confutes it; and if it were so, yet unless they cou’d prove their one man to be as much more excellent than the rest as those are, and that solely too, I see not what it would advantage them, since to comply with the design of Nature in one, they would contradict it in others, where she is equally concern’d. But these philological and rhetorical arguments have not a little hinder’d the severer disquisition of reason, and prepossess’d the more easy minds with notions so much harder to be laid aside, as they are more erroneous and pleasing.

These are the fundamental errors that have misled the judgment; now those which have misguided the conscience, have principally proceded from the misinterpretation of Scripture; and therfore seeming sacred, have bin less examin’d and doubted, as carrying the most authority. Thus in the Old Testament, there being such frequent mention of kings, which notwithstanding were given in wrath, they superstitiously maintain not only the necessity, but even the impunity of kings; whereas we know not their powers and limitations, and it is inconsequent to argue, That because Judea was so govern’d, we should follow the same pattern, when we find neither precept, consequence, nor necessity convincing us. And it is madness to think, that while the Divine Spirit so freely and vehemently exclaims against the iniquity of men, God would authorize it so far as to leave it in them only unpunishable who should exterminat and reform it. As for the antiquity from Adam, it is true, before his fall his dominion was large and wide, but it was over the beasts that after his fall learn’d to rebel against him; and œconomically, not despotically, over his wife and children. But what is this to civil government? In the New Testament (for I the brieflier pass over this head, in regard it has bin so copiously treated upon by those under whose profession it falls, and that it does not immediately conduce to my design) the principal argument has been the meekness of Christ and his compliance with civil powers, which certainly, if he had bin dispos’d to have resisted, say they, he could as easily have overthrown, as with a few cords whip the buyers and sellers out of the temple. But he, that was the wisdom of his Father, rather thought fit to build up his kingdom (which is not earthly, nor known of earthly men) in meekness and obedience to civil powers, which are perpetually chang’d and hurry’d at the will of the first mover, otherwise he would never have concern’d himself so much in giving dues to Cæsar, and to God what is God’s; intimating the distinct obedience owing by all men, as Christians, and citizens. When, granting monarchy the most and only lawful government, yet every one knows, that knows any thing of the Roman story, that Augustus had no more title to that government, than to any of those over whom he usurp’d, and that his access to the government was as fraudulent and violent as could be. Another error is the mistaking of the word Powers, when it’s clear the Scripture speaks of it in a latitude, as extending it to all sorts of established governments. Now men have falsly pretended, that those powers were only meant of kings; and what by an indiscrete collation of the places of the Old, and violent wrestings of others of the New Testament, they perfected the other grand mistake; which since it has bin already clear’d up, and, as we said, is but collateral with us for the present, we shall no further mention it.

As for the alleg’d examples and speeches of the primitive times, I see not much in them considerable: for tho’ insurrections against princes cannot be produc’d, or rather much is said against them, yet we are to consider, that the gospel of Christ (which was at that time not much defil’d by the world) engages not to any domination, but (wholly taken up with its own extacys, spiritual delights and expectations) neglects all other affairs as strange and dangerous. And moreover (though I know what has been said to the contrary) I cannot find, after well considering those ages, any probable ground how, if they would have rebel’d, they could have made any head. They were indeed numerous, but then they had legionarys among them; and who knows not what an ineffectual thing a people is (be it never so desirous) when overaw’d by the soldiery? And they were a people (as greatness to God and man is different) not considerable for their worldly power (for how few eminent commanders were converted in the first ages?) but out of his own mere choice, so that it was not strange if they could not do much. For God, as he chose the weakest means in planting the gospel, even fishermen; so in the primitive propagation he call’d the weaker men, tho’ Christianity afterwards grew ample and august, and kings were proud to give their names to it.

As for the fathers (supposing them free of their many adulterations, interpolations, and all those errors and incertaintys which the process of time and fraud of men has foisted into them) they are to be accepted only as witnesses, not as judges: that is to say, they may prove matter of fact, but none of their words matter of right; especially if we consider their writings, either homilys, commentarys, or controversys, which are ever directed to another end than this is, and they themselves (men secluded from business) are so much more unable to judg, and resolve civil controversys, in regard the unhappiness of the latter times has produc’d many controversys not known or thought of in those days, which not falling directly under their profession, cannot receive any light or authority from them.

Having thus consider’d kingship, and how well it has appear’d thro the false lights of the understanding, we shall now consider, whether, taking it by itself, its foundations be laid upon a cylinder or upon a cube: and this, I think, we are the likeliest to do, if we consider them in their rights and uses, or, to speak plainer, in their legality and policy; so that if we find that none of the ways of retaining their crowns can be authentic except one, and that one makes against them, we shall see we have no just causes of blind adoration or implicit obligation to truckle under any of their commands. And if again we discover that sort of government itself is not so profitable to the end of civil happiness, but rather diametrically opposit to it; we may suppose that men are either strangely obstinat, or else they might eradicat an error which not only offers so many prejudices to their understanding, but that has such an evil influence upon their external welbeing.

We have then to consider, that for one man to rule over many, there must necessarily be pretended some right, tho it be but colorable; for either he must be chosen by the people as their arbitrator and supreme judg, or else he must by force of arms invade them, and bring them to obedience, which he by force preserving for his sons or successors, makes way for a third claim, which is inheritance. A fourth som have invented, tho were it real, it is but a difference of the last, and I therfore shall mention it under that head. But to the consideration.

First therefore election, supposing the people, either finding themselves unable to weild their own happiness, or for preventing of disorder, make choice of one man to be set over them, it here instantly follows, that the authority is in the people, and flowing from them; for choice argues a power, and being elected a subordination to it; in the end, I mean, tho not in every act. Now there is none chosen but for som end, or for som intentions reciprocal betwixt both partys; for otherwise such a choice were but dotage, and consequently invalid: wherefor thus it will follow, that those who pretend to king it upon this topic, must either shew a formal election (which I think many kings are not able to do) or if he can shew one, produce also the conditions and ends for which he was chosen. Now all parts being either implicit or explain’d, let him exhibit the covenant, that it may be known whether he governs according to it or not; for if he transgresses, he forfeits, and the others are absolv’d from their promis’d obedience. If the agreement be unwritten or intentional, either party is relatively ty’d; and then if he dos any thing against the welfare of the people (that soveraign law and end of all governments) the people may not only justly suppose the former capitulation broken, but even endeavor, by what possible means they can, to restore themselves to their former rights: for why should the making of a compact prejudice any when it is once broken? And here comes in another fallacy, with which the assertors of royalty have so flourish’d, that an agreement between a people and one man should descend to his posterity; wheras it is to be consider’d, that the people chusing one man is commonly in consideration of his person and personal merit; which not being the same in his son (as commonly familys in the horizon are in the meridian, the founders being braver than any that follow after them) that very intent is frustrated and ceases; and the people providing for the happiness of a few years, which are determinable with incertainty of the latter part of the life of one man, run themselves and their posterity into an eternal inconvenience (for any thing they know) of bad governors. And if the people would never so formally agree with him, that in regard of his merits or felicity of actions, his son should be receiv’d in that place, yet would they not stand to it, that very pact expiring with the life of either. For my father may leave me notionally a slave in a tenure (a thing frequent with our ancestors) or, as civilians term it, a feodary, with which I am content, in respect of the advantage it brings me, or because my own estate is too little to be independent, and therefore I think it good prudence to be shelter’d under the protection of the greater; but my natural liberty, that is to say, to make my life as justly happy and advantageous to me as I may, he can no more give away from me than my understanding or eysight: for these are privileges with which God and Nature have indu’d me, and these I cannot be deny’d but by him that will also deny me a being. But to go on, Suppose a second generation should accept the son, and a third a grandson, yet this confirms not a fourth; and the people very impoliticly strengthen and confirm the power by continuance, and in a manner with their own hands lay the foundation of absoluteness; their governors themselves growing in interests, increasing in alliances and forces: so it is very improbable but that within a little they grow too big and formidable, and leave nothing of liberty except the name, and (if they be less cunning) not that. A pertinent example of this, and so near us that I cannot pass it, we see in young Orange and the Low Countrys at this day, who continuing his progenitors for their signal services, and him for theirs, are now punish’d for their generous and indiscrete rewarding of virtue, that their liberty was lately almost blown up before they well perceiv’d it to be undermin’d, and they are now at charge to maintain their own oppression. As for that formal election and stipulation, who sees not what a vain and ridiculous cheat it is they coming with swords in their hands to demand the scepter of a weak and stupid multitude, that appears only to gaze upon the ceremonys, and whose refusal were ineffectual? but it is a gracious piece of the cabal of tyranny to deceive the people with shadows, fantasms, and names of liberty.

As for those that intrude by force, they cannot certainly have the forehead to infer any right, they being but, as the pirate said to Alexander, public and more magnificent robbers. Certainly these are the Nimrods, the great hunters, God’s fcourges, and the burdens of the earth; and whether they be founders of empires, or great captains (as Boccalin distinguishes them) they ought rather to be remember’d with horror and detestation, than have that undue reverence with which they commonly meet.

Yet these are they that lay the foundations of succession, and from these do the successors claim, and enjoy with the less reluctance, because the regret of the violences, and hate of the first, daily wears out; whether it be by the continuance of peace that charms men into a love of ease, or the continuance of slavery enfeebles their minds, that they rather chuse to look at their present enjoyment than real happiness; so that it is not strange if the person of their oppressor becomes in time adorable, and he himself thinks that confirm’d and justify’d to him in process of time, to which in the beginning he had no right. Put if we consider the business a little higher, we might find, that since neither the people (as we have prov’d before) have power to make themselves vassals, and the intruders themselves cannot pretend any just title; their domination is merely illegal, and apt to be shaken off with the first conveniency, it being every whit as equitable, that these men should be judg’d enemys of mankind, and condemn’d to die the death of parricids for usurping a power, as Nero for abusing it. But I would fain ask the regious defenders, by what law they can maintain governments to be inherent in one, and to be transmitted to his ofspring? if they say by the law of God, I would demand again how they can make this law appear to me? if they say that the scripture contains the right and sacredness of kings, I ask them again, how they know that God extends that privilege and authority to this king? if they say, that he is involv’d in the general right, they do but run into a circle; unless they can show me, that all his approaches to the government were regular, and such as God was pleas’d with, or else God had by som sign and wonder declar’d his approbation of him; for without these two, they must make God the author of evil, which is impious, and pretend his commission for an unlawful act; and by the same right, any other (as a tyrant, for example) may pretend it to an action never so unjust, it being no inusual thing to borrow the face of divinity, even upon some foul impostures, as (to forbear further instances) Numa’s conference with Ægeria, Scipio’s retirement into the capitol, and Sertorius’s white hart.

Now if they pretend the law of nature, they must demonstrat to us, both that she endow’d men with inequal freedom, and that she shap’d out such a man to rule; whereas it appears on the contrary, that all men naturally are equal: for tho nature with a noble variety has made different the features and lineaments of men, yet as to freedom, till it be lost by som external means, she has made every one alike, and given them the same desires. But suppose she had intended such a family for government, and had given them som illustrious Marks, as we read of som that had, whether by the imagination of their mothers, or by deceit; yet then would nature fall into a double irregularity, first in deserting her method of making all free, and secondly in making her general work merely subservient, and secondary to her particular; which how contrary it is to that beautiful harmony of hers, I need not much insist. Now if they say, they are fathers of the people, and for that reason they call themselves the heads, inferring the people to be no more than a trunk, it’s only metaphorical, and proves nothing: for they must remember, that since father has a relation upon which it depends, and upon whose removal it vanishes, they themselves cannot bring any such: for by physical procreation they will not offer it; and for metaphorical dependence, it will com to nothing, we seeing people languish when their princes are fullest, and, like leeches, rather willing to burst than to fall off; and on the contrary, the people upon the removal of a prince cheerful and reliev’d. Now if there were so strict a union between these two, such a contrariety and antipathy could never appear; for certainly when any two persons endeavour to gain ground one upon another, there is an enmity, whatever is pretended. Besides, if these men would be fathers, it were then their duty to do like fathers, which is to provide for, defend and cherish; wheras on the contrary, it is they themselves that eat the bread out of the mouths of their children, and thro the groans of the poor. And wheras flattery has said, that what they draw up in vapours they send down in showers, yet are we sure that such rains are for the most part unfruitful, if not ominous and infectious. If they pretend the law of nations, it were well they would declare to us first what this law is, and whether generally agreed on or no by nations. If they say, yes, they must resolve whether explicitly or implicitly: if they say the former, let them produce them; if the latter, they must demonstrat, that all nations are agreed in such and such notions, and all men of these nations, since every one must be of equal capacity: when on the contrary, tho the understandings of most men, whom we know or have convers’d with, seem to agree in som general maxims, but unpolish’d, unnumbred, and unmethodiz’d, yet we see many nations differing from us in many things, which we think clearly, fundamentally, and naturally true; neither do climats and education only so diversify the minds of men, but even their understandings, and the different ways of thinking so distinguish even those of one country, that tho we may please our selves in thinking that all mens thoughts follow the fantastical method of ours, yet we might find, if we were perfectly conversant with all men of the world, and well read in their authors (as we are not with half of them, no, nor any one man with the twentieth part) that there are scarce four or five axioms, excepting as they make a part of the law of nature, would be universally receiv’d. Now (for I have bin the longer by reason that this imaginary law has been so held up by the civilians, and made the subterfuge of so many considerable disputes) if it be so weak as that we can scarce tell whether it has a being or no, for even that which we account the most sacred piece of it, the violation of publick messengers, the Tartar and Muscovite, unless restrain’d by fear, break it every day. What then are the arguments deduc’d from it? or if there was such a law, what would it avail such a particular man? for why should other nations impose a governor where they are not concern’d? And if they pretend this law as to the preservation and impunity of their persons, the same answer will serve again, with this addition, That they make an offender incapable of punishment, which is but to give them a commission to offend. Now if they run upon that distinction of suspending only, and not punishing (as if forsooth this kind of people must be preserv’d, tho by the ruin of mankind, to immediat vengeance) then I say, that suspension is really a punishment; and if his demerits can deserve that, I see not but that upon a proportionable increase, they may deserve dethronization or death, as clearly as two and two make four, and four more make eight. If they allege positive or municipal laws, and number homages, they are not much the nearer, since that all such laws are but rivulets and branches of them we before examin’d; and since we found that those speak so little in their favor, that which these do cannot signify much, especially since princes, who are ever watchful to improve all occasions of this nature, can either by terror or artifice draw assemblys, or the major part of them, to their own lure; nay, even the worst of them have not forgot to be solicitous in this case. But it must be remark’d, that whatever positive laws are repugnant to those general ones, they are injurious, and ought to be repeal’d. And truly it is a sad observation, that as monarchs grow, either out of the weakness of government, and (as I may say) its pupilage, as Romulus and Theseus did at Rome and Athens, or else out of the disease or depravation of it, as Cæsar again invaded Rome: so have the people bin never more fond of them, than when manners were at the highest corruption, which ever gave access of strength to them; nor have they more distasted them, than when their spirits and disciplin were the most brave and healthful: so fatally disagreeing are true liberty, which is the very source of virtue and generosity, and the impotent domination of a single tyrant, who commonly reigns by no other means than the discords of braver citizens, who can neither indure equality or superiority among themselves, and rather admit a general vassalage, than just equality; or by the vices of the baser sort, which naturally reconcile them and kings, and concern them both in a bad example. But suppose succession a thing sacred and inviolable, yet once break and interrupt it, it is little worth, either the usurper being to be acknowleg’d regular, or the whole series dash’d out of order. Nay, we see aspirers themselves either so blinded with their pretences, or with animosity, and so crying up their own titles, that it is almost impossible for any privat judgment to do right in this case, themselves thwarting one another; and it cannot be in the power of nature that both should be right. But who can instance one monarch whose crown is come to him by untainted succession? and what history will not confirm the example I shall anon bring? certainly tho succession were a thing that had not so little reason and reality, yet I see not why men should with such a strange pertinacy defend it. Matters of government ought to be manag’d by prudence; but succession puts them into the hands of fortune, when a child incapable or infirm, under the regiment of a nurse, must (possibly) be supreme governor, and those whom either their abilitys or virtues fit for it, subordinat or laid aside. But what if the person whom necessity has set at the stern be incapable, lunatic, weak, or vitious, is not this a good way to prevent controversys? yet this plainly enervats all good council, when a king should have need of tutors, and that a multitude of people should be commanded by one who commands not himself; and, when we scarce obey even excellent princes, to adore shadows and weak ones.

As for Boxhornius’s distinction of succession, wherin the next heir must necessarily succede by the original right of the former, I would ask him, whether the predecessor were a possessor or usufructuary? If the first, all our former arguments fall on him; if the latter, it makes not for his successor, the people being owners: and besides, the distinction is one of his own coining, never pretended before; upon the first controversy it is invalid, altho the first founder had a right, as we have prov’d the contrary.

Having, with what brevity I could, brought to an end my first intention, I shall now fall upon the second, which is the intrinsic value and expediency of this government, and som little comparison with others; but herein we shall be short, and only so far as concerns this. And indeed it is a business so ticklish, that even Mr. Hobs in his piece de cive, tho he assur’d himself that the rest of his book (which is principally calculated for the assertion of monarchy) is demonstrated, yet he douts whether the arguments which he brings to this business be so firm or not; and Malvezzi contrarily remonstrats (in his discourses upon Tacitus) that optimacys are clearly better than monarchys, as to all advantages. And indeed if we look on the arguments for monarchy, they are either flourishes, or merely notions; such are the reference and perfection of unity, which, say they, must needs work better and more naturally as one simple cause (besides that it stills and restrains all other claims) than many coordinat: wheras they never consider that tho among many joint causes there may be some jarring, yet like cross wheels in an engine, they tend to the regulation of the whole. What violent mischiefs are brought in by the contentions of pretenders in monarchys, the ambiguitys of titles, and lawless ambition of aspirers? wheras in a settled republic all this is clear and unperplex’d; and in case any particular man aspires, they know against whom to join, and punish as a common enemy. As for that reason which alleges the advantage of secresy in business, it carries not much with it, in regard that under that even most pernicious designs may be carried on; and for wholsom councils (bating som more nice transactions) it matters not how much they be tost among those who are so much intrusted and concern’d in them, all bad designs being never in probability so feeble and ineffectual, as when there are many eyes to overlook them, and voices to decry them. As for that expedition in which they say monarchs are so happy, it may as well further a bad intention, as give effect to a just council, it depending on the judgment of a single man, to whose will and ends all must refer; wheras a select number of intrusted persons may hasten every opportunity with a just slowness as well as they, tho indeed (unless it be in som military critical minutes) I see not such an excellency in the swiftness of heady dispatch, precipitation in councils being so dangerous and ominous. As for what concerns privat suitors, they may as speedily and effectually (if not more) be answer’d in staid republics, as in the court of a king, where bribery and unworthy favorits do not what is just, but what is desir’d.

With these and many others as considerable (which partly willingly, and partly in this penury of books, forgettingly I pass) do they intend to strengthen this fantastical and airy building; but as sly controverters many times leave out the principal text or argument, because should it be produc’d, it could not be so easily answer’d: so these men tell us all the advantages of monarchy, supposing them still well settled, and under virtuous men; but you shall never hear them talk of it in its corrupt state under leud kings and unsettled laws; they never let fall a word of the dangers of Interreigns, the minoritys and vices of princes, misgovernments, evil councils, ambitions, ambiguitys of titles, and the animositys and calamities that follow them, the necessary injustices and oppressions by which monarchs (using the peoples wealth and blood against themselves) hold them fast in their seats, and by some suspension of divine justice, dy not violently.

Wheras other governments, establish’d against all these evils, being ever of vigor and just age, settled in their own right, freed from pretences, serv’d by experienc’d and engag’d councils, and (as nothing under the moon is perfect) sometimes gaining and advantag’d in their controversys, which have not seldom (as we may see in old Rome) brought forth good laws and augmentations of freedom; wheras once declining from their purity and vigor, and (which is the effect of that) ravish’d by an invader, they languish in a brutish servitude, (monarchy being truly a disease of government) and like slaves, stupid with harshness and continuance of the lash, wax old under it, till they either arrive at that period which God prescribes to all people and governments, or else better stars and posterity awaken them out of that lethargy, and restore them to their pristin liberty, and its daughter happiness.

But this is but to converse in notions, wandring, and ill abstracted from things; let us now descend to practical observation, and clearly manifest out the whole series of time and actions, what circumstances and events have either usher’d or follow’d one race of kings, that if there were all the justice in the world that the government of a nation should be intail’d upon one family, yet certainly we could not grant it to such a one whose criminal lives and formidable deaths have bin evidences of God’s wrath upon it for so many generations.

And since no country that I know yields such an illustrious example of this as Scotland dos, and it may be charity to bring into the way such as are misled, I have pitch’d upon the Scotish history, wherin as I have only consulted their own authors, as my fittest witnesses in this case; so have I (not as a just history, but as far as concerns this purpose) faithfully, and as much as the thing would permit, without glosses represented it: so that any calm understanding may conclude that the vengeance which now is level’d against that nation, is but an attendant of this new introduc’d person; and that he himself, tho’ for the present he seems a log among his frogs, and suffers them to play about him, yet God will suffer him (if the English army prevents not) to turn stork and devour them, while their crys shall not be heard, as those that (in spite of the warning of providence, and the light of their own reasons, for their own corrupt interest and greedy ambition) brought these miserys upon themselves.