A Seventh Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. The Commonwealth of Holland.

THAT the people in every city, and in every province or county within these three nations, elect to every city, province, or county of the same, a matter of twenty, thirty, or forty magistrats for life. That these magistrats being so elected, be the senat of that respective city, province or county.

That the senats, thus elected, thenceforth have and injoy the soverain power within their respective jurisdiction, for ever. That every senat annually elect two or four burgomasters or consuls, to be presidents of the same. That they also elect seven magistrats, or present fourteen persons to the governor of the province; and that he elect seven. That the seven so elected be judges, or have the executive power of the laws for their term, and within their respective jurisdiction.

That in case of affairs of more public and general concern, as war or peace, levy of men or mony, and the like, the governor of the province give information of the things to be consider’d, to the nobility, and to the senats of that province; therwith appointing a time and place for the assembly of the states provincial. That each of the senats, having debated the matter propos’d, delegat one consul, with som other senators well inform’d and instructed with their will and pleasure, to the assembly of the states provincial. That the nobility of the same province delegat som of their order likewise to the provincial states. That the delegats both of the nobility and of the senats give the vote of their principals according to instruction; and that neither the nobility, nor any senat or soverainty be otherwise bound, than by their own vote.

That the provincial estates elect one magistrat for life, or during pleasure, to be provincial governor: That they elect one or more other magistrats for life, or during pleasure, to be states general.

That the states general being elected, and well instructed by their provinces, have the direction of the whole league: That each give not his own vote, but the vote of his province; and that no province be otherwise bound, than by her own vote.

IF these models (in which I claim to be the first that has laid the whole, and the highest mysterys of the antient commonwealths, to the lowest capacity of vulgar debate) be not all in the mouths of great men, and in pamphlets, for chimæras or utopias, it is great chance: yet contain they no less than the whole revolution of popular prudence. Nor is it more certain, that no one of them would fit the present state of this nation, than that he or they, whose contemplation and understanding is not well vers’d in the most, or in the best of these, shall never fit a model of popular government to the present state of this nation, or of any other. In which assurance, I com to fulfil my promise in the Second Part, or to propose such a model as is fitted to the present state of this nation.