Chap. XX: Of Luxury

My reader may perhaps be surprized to find this subject formally introduced, after all I have said of it in the first book, under a definition which renders the term sufficiently clear, by distinguishing it from sensuality and excess; and by confining it to the providing of superfluities, in favour of a consumption, which necessarily must produce the good effects of giving employment and bread to the industrious.

This simple acceptation of the term, was the most proper for explaining the political effects of extraordinary consumption. I cannot however deny, that the word luxury commonly conveys a more complex idea; and did I take no notice of this circumstance, it might be thought that I had purposely confined the meaning of a general term to a particular acceptation, in order to lead to error, and with a view to conceal the vicious influence of modern economy over the minds of mankind; which influence, if vicious, cannot fail to affect even their political happiness.

My intention therefore, in this chapter, is to relax the mind of my reader, while I set before him my ideas concerning luxury, taken in the most extensive acceptation of the word, in such an order, as first to vindicate the definition I have given of it, by shewing that it is a proper one; and secondly, to reconcile the sentiments of those who appear to combat one another, on a subject wherein all must agree, when terms are fully understood.

For this purpose, I shall set out by distinguishing luxury, as it affects our different interest, by producing hurtful consequences; from luxury, as it regards the moderate gratification of our natural or rational desires. I must separate objects which are but too frequently confounded, and analyze this complicated term, by specifying the ideas it contains, under partial definitions.

The interests affected by luxury, I take to be four: first, the moral, as it hurts the mind; secondly, the physical, as it hurts the body; the domestic, as it hurts the fortune; and the political, as it hurts the state.

The natural desires which proceed from our animal oeconomy, and which are gratified by luxury, may be also reduced to four, viz. hunger, thirst, love, and ease or indolence. The moderate gratification of these desires, and physical happiness, is the same thing. The immoderate gratification of them is excess; and if this also be implied by luxury, no man, I believe, ever seriously became its apologist.

The first point to be explained is, what is to be understood by excess. What appears an excess to one man, may appear moderation to another. I therefore measure the excess by the bad effects it produces on the mind, the body, the fortune, and the. state. and when we speak of luxury as a vice, it is requisite to point out the particular bad effects it produces to one, more, or all the interests which may be affected by it: when this is neglected, ambiguities ensue, which involve people in inextricable disputes.

In order to communicate my thoughts upon this subject with the more precision, I shall give an example of the harm resulting to the mind, the body, the fortune, and the state, from the excessive gratification of the several natural desires above mentioned.

First, As to the mind, eating to exCess produces the inconvenience of rendering the perceptions dull, and of making a person unfit for study or application.

Drinking confounds the understanding, and often prevents our discovering the most palpable relations of things.

Love fixes our ideas too much upon the same object, makes all our pursuits and pleasures analogous to itself, and consequently renders them trifling and superficial.

Ease, that is, too great a fondness for it, destroys activity, damps our resolution, and misleads the decisions of our judgment on every occasion, where one side of the question implies an obstacle to the enjoyment of a favourite indolence.

These are examples of the moral evils proceeding from luxury in the most general acceptation of the term. While the gratification of these desires is accompanied by no such inconveniences, I think it is a proof, that there has been no moral excess, or that no moral evil has been directly implied in the gratification. But I cannot equally determine that there has been no luxury in the enjoyment of superfluity.

Secondly, The physical inconveniences which follow from all the four, terminate in the hurt they do the body, health or constitution. If no such harm follows upon the gratification of our desires, I find no physical evil: but still luxury, I think, may be implied in every acceptation of the term.

Thirdly, If the domestic inconveniences of the four species be examined, they all centre in one, viz. the dissipation of fortune, upon which depends the future ease of the proprietor, and the well-being of his posterity. When luxury is examined with respect to this object, the idea we conceive of it admits of a new modification. An exCess here is compatible with a very moderate gratification of our most natural desires. It is not eating nor drinking, love nor indolence which are hurtful to the fortune, but the expence attending such gratifications. All these are frequently indulged even to excess, in a moral and physical sense, by people who are daily becoming more wealthy by these very means.

Fourthly, Some political inconveniences of luxury have been already pointed out. The extinction of foreign trade is the most striking. But the loss of trade conveys no ideas of any moral, physical, or domestic excess; and still it is vicious so far as it affects the well-being of a state. Besides this particular evil, I very willingly agree, that as far as the good government of a state depends upon the application and capacity, as well as the integrity of those who sit at the helm, or who are employed in the administration or direction of public affairs, so far may the moral inconveniences of luxury mentioned above, affect the prosperity of a state. The consequences of excessive luxury, moral and physical, as well as the dissipation of private fortunes, may render both the statesman, and those whom he employs, negligent in their duty, unfit to discharge it, rapacious and corrupt. These may, indirectly, be reckoned among the political evils attending luxury, so far as they take place. But on the other hand, as they cannot be called the necessary effects of the cause to which they are here ascribed, that is, of moral, physical and domestic luxury, I do not think they can with propriety be implied in the definition of the term. They are rather to be attributed to the imperfection of the human mind, than to any other second cause which may occasionally contribute to their production. They may proceed from avarice, as well as from prodigality.

I hope this short exposition of a matter, not absolutely falling within the limits of my subject, will suffice to prove that my definition of luxury, describes at least the most essential requisite towards determining it; namely, the providing of superfluity with a view to consumption. This is inseparable from our ideas of luxury, but vicious excess certainly is not. A sober man may have a most delicate table, as well as a glutton; and a virtuous man may enjoy the pleasures of love and ease with as much sensuality as a Heliogabalus. But no man can become luxurious, in our acceptation of the word, without giving bread to the industrious, without encouraging emulation, industry, and agriculture; and without producing the circulation of an adequate equivalent for every service. This last is the palladium of liberty, the fountain of gentle dependence, and the agreeable band of union among free societies.

Let me therefore conclude my chapter, with a metaphysical observation. The use of words, is to express ideas; the more simple any idea is, the more easy it is to convey it by a word. Whenever therefore, language furnishes several words, which are called synonimous, we may conclude, that the idea conveyed by them is not simple. On every such occasion, it is doing a service to language, to render such words as little synonimous as possible, and to point out the particular differences between the ideas they convey.

Let us now apply this remark to the point under consideration. I find the three terms, luxury, sensuality, and excess, generally considered in a synonimous light, notwithstanding the characteristic differences which distinguish them. Luxury consists in providing the objects of sensuality, so far as they are superfluous. Sensuality consists in the actual enjoyment of them, and excess implies an abuse of enjoyment. A person, therefore, according to these definitions, may be very luxurious from vanity, pride, ostentation, or with a political view of encouraging consumption, without having a turn for sensuality, or a tendency to fall into excess. Sensuality, on the other hand, might have been indulged in a Lacedemonian republic, as well as at the court of Artaxerxes. Excess indeed, seems more closely connected with sensuality, than with luxury; but the difference is so great, that I apprehend sensuality must in a great measure be extinguished before excess can begin.