The Trent Affair

“Midhurst, Dec. 3, 1861. (To Lieut.-Col. Fitzmayer.)— .... In reference to our latest complication with the United States, it is I hope possible the Government at Washington may disavow the act of their officer. If not, it will I expect be nothing more than a diplomatic and legal wrangle. I think, however, the American Government are very foolish to take such a course. I confess I have not much opinion of Seward. He is a kind of American Thiers or Palmerston or Russell—and Talks to Bunkum. Fortu nately, my friend Mr. Charles Sumner, who is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and has really a kind of veto on the acts of Seward, is a very peaceable and safe man.

“I look upon it as quite impossible that the North in addition to their life and death struggle at home can desire a rupture with this country. It is to assume that they are mad. Doubtless there are plenty of Irish and plenty of Southern sympathizers in the Northern States, who would be delighted with a war with England. But ninety-nine hundredths of the honest citizens of the North must above all things desire to avoid a quarrel with us at the present moment, and they will I fear only interpret our accusation of a contrary design as a proof that we wish to pick a quarrel with them.

“Nothing is more clear to me than that the world is underrating in this struggle the power of the North. I have paid two visits to that country at an interval of twenty-four years between the first and second trip. I do not believe anybody without two such visits can form an idea of the power and resources and the rapid town growth of that people. As for the Slave States I look upon them as doomed in any case to decay and almost barbarism. If Christianity is to survive, there can be no future for slavery. But those Free States where slavery is prohibited will in all human probability contain more than one hundred millions of people in the lifetime of persons now born. Is it wise with us who have an India, as they have their slaves, to give cause to that great future nation to remember with feelings of hatred and revenge our successors to remote generations? Ought not we most carefully and generously to guard ourselves against the possibility of being shown hereafter to have taken advantage of the North in the hour of its trial?

“Upon the whole I do not complain of our Government, nor do I think the Americans can fairly charge us as a nation with having failed to bear with fortitude and temper the great suffering the civil war has inflicted on our cotton trade. It is true we have our Times as the Americans have their Herald, and the twin incendiaries may pair off together.”

“Midhurst, Dec. 6, 1861. (To Mr. Bright.)—Your admirable address cannot fail to do good. But it is a mad world we live in! Here am I in the midst of extracts from Hansard, &c., to show up the folly or worse of the men who have been putting us to millions of expense to protect us from a coup de main from France, and now we see the same people willing to rush into war with America, and leave us exposed to this crafty and dangerous neighbour! Might we not be justified in turning hermits, letting our beards grow, and returning to our caves!...

“Has it occurred to you that this war is now nearly a year old, and the South has rather gained than receded on the Potomac, having stopped the navigation to the Federal capital? How long will foreign powers look on if nothing decisive be done? I doubt whether another year’s blockade will be borne by the world. What say you? If you agree, you should let Sumner know. My own conviction is that if there is to be no early compromise and settlement between North and South, and if the North do not voluntarily raise the blockade, there will next year be an intervention in some shape. A Bordeaux merchant came here to me a few days ago. He says the export of wine and spirits from that port to New Orleans was 30,000 tuns per annum, which is cut off to a gallon. He says also that their trade in liquors and fruits with New York, &c., is nearly destroyed by the Morrill tariff. He tells me the feeling is very bitter in France, and that the Emperor would be supported if he were to join England in breaking up the blockade. France has a far greater stake in the export trade to the South than England, owing to her old connexion with New Orleans.”

“Midhurst, Dec. 14, 1861. (To M. Chevalier.)—There is considerable reaction in the public mind, I think, on the American question. Some large public meetings have passed resolutions in favour of arbitration; and the religious congregations have been also making demonstrations for peace. I expect the Americans will propose either to restore the status quo, and let the United States Admiralty Courts decide, or else refer to arbitration. I hope the Emperor will offer his mediation if an opportunity occurs. Neither party will be in the humour to refuse. It is high time that we had a revision of these so-called international maritime laws. They are merely traps laid for nations to fall into wars. I do not believe in a war. Palmerston likes to drive the wheel close to the edge, and show how dexterously he can avoid falling over the precipice. Meantime he keeps people’s attention employed, which suits him politically. But I hope this game is nearly played out. I am quite sick of it.”

“Jan., 1862. (To Mr. Paulton.)—Palmerston ought to be turned out for the reckless expense to which he has put us. He and his colleagues knew there could be no war. From the moment they were informed of the course France, Prussia, and Austria were taking in giving us their moral support (and they knew this early in December), a war was, as they knew, impossible. Then came Seward’s despatch to Adams on the 19th December, which virtually settled the matter. To keep alive the wicked passions in this country as Palmerston and his Post did, was like the man, and that is the worst that can be said of it.

“I can’t see my way through the American business. I don’t believe the North and South can ever lie in the same bed again. Nor do I see how the military operations can be carried into the South, so as to inflict a crushing defeat. Unless something of the kind takes place, I, predict that Europe will recognize the independence of the South. I tell Sumner this, and tell him that his only chance if he wants time to fight it out, is to raise the blockade of the Mississippi voluntarily, and then Europe might look on.

But our friend Bright will not hear of anything against the claims of the North. I admire his pluck, for when he goes with a side it is always to win. I tell him that it is possible to wish well to a cause without being sure that it will be successful. However, he will soon find in the House that we shall be on this question as we were on China, Crimean, and Greek Pacifico wars, quite in a minority! There is no harm in that if you are right, but it is useless to deceive ourselves about the issue. Three-fourths of the House will be glad to find an excuse for voting for the dismemberment of the great Republic.”

“Nov. 29, 1861. (To Mr. Charles Sumner.)—I hear that the law officers of the Crown have decided that you are not within the law in what has been done. I leave your lawyers to answer ours. The question of legality in matters of international law has never been very easily settled. However, the only danger to the peace of the two countries is in the temper which may grow out of this very trivial incident. The Press will, as usual, try to envenom the affair. It is for us and all who care for the interests of humanity, to do our otmost to thwart these mischief-makers. You may reckon on Bright, myself, and all our friends being alert and active in this good work, and we reckon on the co-operation of yourself and all who sympathize with you. Though I said in my other letter that I shall never care to utter a word about the merits of a war after it has begun, I do not the less feel it my duty to try to prevent hostilities occurring. Let me here remark that I cannot understand how you should have thought it worth your while at Washington to have reopened this question of the right of search, by claiming to exercise it in a doubtful case and a doubtful manner, under circumstances which could be of so little advantage, and to have incurred the risk of greater disadvantages. The capture of Mason and Slidell can have little effect in discouraging the South, compared with the indirect encouragement and hope it may hold out to them of embroiling your Government with England. I am speaking with reference to the policy, and leaving out of sight the law of the case. But in the latter view we are rather unprepared to find you exercising in a strained manner the right of search, inasmuch as you have been supposed to be always the opponents of the practice. I was under the impression that our Government was told pretty plainly at the outbreak of the Crimean War that it would be risking the peace of this country with yours if we claimed the right of search in the open sea. I am not in a position to know how far this was the case. Can you tell me if there be any documents on the subject? If it were so, we should, of course, all unite in holding you to your own doctrine.

P.S.—Since writing the accompanying, we have the details of the capture of Mason and Slidell in our packet vessel. You may be right in point of law, though, perhaps, in technical strictness, the lawyers may pick a hole. But I am satisfied you are wrong in point of policy. There is an impression, I know, in high quarters here, that Mr. Seward wishes to quarrel with this country. This seems absurd enough. I confess I have as little confidence in him as I have in Lord Palmerston. Both will consult Bunkum for the moment, without much regard, I fear, for the future. You must not lose sight of this view of the relations of the two countries. Formerly England feared a war with the United States as much from the dependence on your cotton as from a dread of your power. Now the popular opinion (however erroneous) is that a war would give us cotton. And we, of course, consider your power weakened by your civil war. I speak as a friend of peace, and not as a partisan of my own country, in wishing you to bear this in mind.”

“Dec. 6, 1861.—Since writing my letter of yesterday’s date, I have read General Scott’s admirable letter. It contains a passage to the following effect: ‘I am sure that the President and people of the United States would be but too happy to let these men go free, unnatural and unpardonable as their offences have been, if by it they could emancipate the commerce of the world. Greatly as it would be to our disadvantage at this present crisis to surrender any of those maritime privileges of belligerents which are sanctioned by the laws of nations, I feel that I take no responsibility in saying that the United States will be faithful to her traditional policy upon this subject, and to the spirit of her political institutions.’”

“Dec. 12, 1861.—The Times and its yelping imitators are still doing their worst, but there is a powerful moderate party. I hope you will offer promptly to arbitrate the question. There is one point on which you must absolutely define your platform. You must acknowledge the South as belligerents to give you a standing-ground on the Trent affair. Some of your newspapers argue that you have a right to carry off a rebel from an English vessel, which means that Austria might have seized Kossuth under similar circumstances. Were you to take such ground, there would be war.”

“Dec. 19, 1861.—Everybody tells me that war is inevitable, and yet I do not believe in war. But it must be admitted that there are things said and done on your side that make it very difficult for the advocates of peace on this side to keep the field. We can get over the sayings of your Herald that ‘France will not and England dare not go to war.’ Your newspapers will not drive us into war. But when grave men (or men that should be grave), holding the highest posts in your cultivated State of Massachusetts, compliment Captain Wilkes for having given an affront to the British lion, it makes it very hard for Bright and me to contend against the ‘British lion party’ in this country. All I can say is that I hope you have taken Bright’s advice, and offered unconditional arbitration. With that offer publicly made, the friends of peace could prevent our fire-eaters from assaulting you, always providing that your public speakers do not put it out of our power to keep the peace. I was sorry to see a report of an anti-English speech by your colleague at New York. Honestly speaking, and with no blind patriotism to mislead me, I don’t think the nation here behaved badly under the terrible evil of loss of trade and danger of starving under your blockade. Of course all privileged classes and aristocracies hate your institutions—that is natural enough; but the mass of the people never went with the South. I am not pleased with your project of sinking stones to block up ports. That is barbarism. It is quite natural that, smarting as you do under an unprovoked aggression from the slaveowners, you should even be willing to smother them like hornets in their nest. But don’t forget the outside world, and especially don’t forget that the millions in Europe are more interested even than their princes in preserving the future commerce with the vast region of the Confederate States.”

“Jan. 23, 1862.—It is, perhaps, well that you settled the matter of sending away the men at once. Consistently with your own principles, you could not have justified their detention. But it is right you should know that there was a great reaction going on through this country against the diabolical tone of the Times and Post. (I suspect stockjobbing in these quarters). The cry of arbitration had been raised and responded to, and I was glad to see the religious people once more in the field in favour of peace. Be assured if you had offered to refer the question to arbitration, there could not have been a meeting called in England that would not have endorsed it. The only question was whether we ought to be the first to offer arbitration. I mean this was the only doubt in the popular mind. As regards our Government, they are, of course, feeling the tendency of public opinion. A friend of mine in London, a little behind the scenes, wrote to me:—‘They are busy at the Foreign Office hunting up precedents for arbitration, very much against their will.’ I write all this because I wish you to know that we are not quite so bad as appeared at first on the surface.”

In the same letter, after arguing for the raising of the blockade by the North, he says:—

“All the reflection I have been able to give the subject confirms me in the view I expressed in my former letter. Propose to Europe a clean sweep of the old maritime law of Vattel, Puffendorf, and Co.; abolish blockades of commercial ports on the ground laid down in Cass’s despatch which you sent. Get rid of the right of search in time of war as in time of peace, and make private property exempt from capture by armed vessels of every kind, whether government vessels or privateers. And, as an earnest of your policy, offer to apply the doctrine in your present war. You would instantly gain France and all the continent of Europe to your side. You would enlist a party in England that can always control our governing class when there is a sufficient motive for action; and you would acquire such a moral position that no power would dream of laying hands on you. I think I told you that all our commercial and trading community have already pronounced in favour of exempting private property from capture by government ships, as first proposed by Mr. Marcy. In the ensuing session of Parliament I intend to make a speech on the subject of maritime law, in which I will undertake to prove that we, above all other countries, are interested in carrying out all the above three propositions of reform. With the exception of the aristocratic classes, who have an instinctive leaning for any policy which furnishes excuses for large naval and military establishments, everybody will be favourable to the change.”