A Treatise on the Letting and Occupancy of Land.

Few things exercise so powerful an influence over the prosperity of agricultural countries as the nature of the contract entered into between the proprietors of estates and those to whom they let or assign them to be cultivated. Much of the superiority of English agriculture over that of France, and other Continental states, may be ascribed to the different customs which have been followed in this country with respect to the letting of land. And yet the tenure under which farms are held in a very large portion of the kingdom, might be materially improved. Nor do we well see how we can better fill up a few pages, than by briefly examining the conditions under which tenants may hold land, with the greatest advantage to themselves, the landlords, and the public.

When admitted to farms, tenants may hold at will, or from year to year, or under leases or other engagements, written or understood, for specified or indefinite terms. Of these methods, the superiority of the plan of letting lands, for specified rents, and a specified term of years, appears so very obvious, that it may be thought surprising it should ever have been disputed. Whatever their skill, or the amount of their means, agriculture will in great measure depend on the cogency of the motives which impel the cultivators to put forth their energies. And it is sufficiently evident that these will be greatly strengthened by securing tenants in the possession of their farms for reasonable periods; that is, for such periods as may enable them to adopt the processes, and to reap the profit of the outlays, required in good husbandry.

Where tenants have no such security, and may, as is at present the case in many parts of England, be turned out of their farms at any time, on receiving six months’ notice, without having any just ground for saying that they have been harshly or unjustly treated, it cannot be expected that they should undertake improvements. The hazard would be too great. They plough and sow according to the usual practice of the district; but they do nothing more. If they make any advances, they are such only as promise an almost immediate return. Those, how essential and advantageous soever, that require a few years before their cost is compensated, are never once thought of. It is almost needless to add, that agriculture, carried on by such tenants, makes no progress. They seldom have any idea of a better system; and, though they had, the tenure under which they hold would prevent its introduction.

No doubt, however, the term “tenants-at-will” is often most improperly applied. In a large portion of England, probably in two-thirds or three-fourths of the kingdom, the tenants are without leases. But it would be an abuse of the phrase to call the greater portion of them tenants-at-will. Owing to the customs in regard to occupancy in particular districts, to the practice followed on estates, and to the confidence placed in the character and promises of landlords, vast numbers of these tenants have no idea that they will be capriciously ejected, or that their rents will be improperly raised in the event of their undertaking any considerable improvements. This sort of tenure is extremely popular in England; and exists in various districts where agriculture is in a very advanced state, and where large sums have been expended by the tenants. But, notwithstanding its popularity, it is in many respects less advantageous than a tenure under leases of a reasonable length. There are, it is true, but few instances in which English gentlemen have degraded themselves by taking an unfair advantage of their tenants. But estates sometimes pass, by inheritance, from one line of proprietors to another with different views; and sometimes they are sold to those who may wish to subject them to an entirely new system. And, taking these and other contingencies into account, it cannot rationally be expected that the tenants will, speaking generally, be so liberal in their outlays upon improvements, as they would be if their possession were secured against all hazards for a certain number of years.

The interests of the public and of the landlords, as well as those of the tenants, are deeply involved in this question. It is needless, surely, to lay it down, that it is for the advantage of all parties that tenants should be industrious and enterprising. And no landlord who has a just sense of what he owes to himself and to society, will permit his estate to be occupied by slothful or inexpert tenants. But it is the vice of the system established in most parts of England, that it makes it very difficult for a landlord to get rid of such occupiers. He may be fully satisfied of their incompetency, but the rule of the estate has been to continue the old tenants; and were he to break through this rule, and to dismiss indifferent or bad tenants to introduce others of a superior class, he would be accused of acting harshly and unjustly; and would provoke a clamour and outcry, to which most gentlemen have the greatest dislike. And hence a main cause of the slovenly cultivation, and want of enterprise exhibited by the tenants of many estates and districts in England. But wherever leases are introduced, the connection between the landlords and tenants is limited to their endurance; and at their termination a landlord has it in his power, without provoking any remark or observation, to get rid of any incapable, troublesome, or unskilful tenant.

The difficulties which the prevalent English tenures throw in the way of those who may wish to get rid of questionable tenants, is not, however, their only disadvantage. It will be afterwards seen that the too low renting of land is, equally with its over-renting, an obstruction to improvement. And, despite the statements to the contrary, there is no doubt that, at this moment, a large portion of England is under-rented, the tenants being, in consequence, uninfluenced by one of the most powerful spurs to exertion. The same reasons which make so many landlords retain bad or indifferent tenants, hinder them from raising the rental of their estates to its proper level. They would be accused of treating their occupiers unjustly, of robbing them of the return due for outlays, and so forth. The plan of letting on leases for fixed periods gets rid of all these difficulties. The competition of the public raises rents to their fair value; and the occupiers must either exert themselves or go to the wall.

These results constitute a principal advantage of leases. In districts where they prevail, and where they are for proper terms, and embody the necessary conditions, there is universally a more efficient and improved system of husbandry than in districts where the tenants are rarely if ever changed. Such leases are eminently calculated to draw forth talent and enterprise; whereas under the favourite English tenure these are less in request, and those tenants who do not fall behind their neighbours are treated nearly as well as those who go forward.

The only plausible objection to the granting of leases for a specified number of years, takes for granted that the contract is really binding on the landlord only. When a farm is too low rented, the tenant, it is said, continues to enjoy this advantage during the lease; whereas, if it be too high rented, it is next to certain that the landlord will have to reduce the rent to what it is really worth. A transaction of this kind throws, it is contended, all the risk on the landlord, and gives all the advantage to the tenant; so that the only fair plan is to let from year to year, or at most for brief periods. But, though specious, this reasoning has no good foundation. The rents of farms held under leases, are, in the vast majority of cases, quite up to the mark, or beyond it, at their commencement. It may, however, happen that, after a few years of the lease have expired, a farm would let for more than the rent actually paid for it. If the rent be rated in money, it will of course be affected by changes in its value; and if it should decline, the rent will also decline. But when the rent consists of a fixed quantity of produce, convertible into money at the current prices of the day, it may reasonably be presumed, in the event of the farm becoming worth a higher rent, that this is a consequence of improvements effected by the tenant, which he would not have undertaken without the security afforded by the lease. And, unless this reasonable presumption be shown to be ill-founded, it follows, that in granting the lease the landlord made no sacrifice, but the contrary. He got all the rent which the farm was worth when let, while the security given by the lease, having stimulated the tenant to make improvements, the farm will bring a higher rent at its termination than it would otherwise realize.

It is, therefore, no more than equitable, that the extra profit derived from farms, held under leases of moderate duration, should belong to the tenants; for, if not in every case, it is certainly in the great majority of cases, the fruit of their industry, or skill, or capital. And though it be seldom practicable, or if practicable expedient, for landlords to compel tenants to pay the stipulated rent for farms, when it materially exceeds their real worth, there are no substantial reasons for impeaching the contract of lease, because of its being unfair. The inadequacy of a corn rent, convertible at the prices of the day, is in 99 out of every 100 cases, apparent only, it being occasioned by improvements effected by the tenant. Had there been no lease, or engagement equivalent thereto, these would not have been attempted, and the rent would not have appeared inadequate. All, therefore, that can justly be said in regard to the alleged want of reciprocity in leases, amounts to this, that if, through accident or simplicity, a landlord let a farm for less than it is worth at the time when the lease is effected, he will be unable to get the rent raised during its currency; while, if a tenant, from too great anxiety to get a farm, or exaggerated notions of its value, should promise more for it than it is really worth, it will, in general, be impracticable and unadvisable to hold him to his bargain. An inequality of this sort is really, however, entitled to but little attention. A tenant who has offered too high a rent for a farm, sustains, in most cases, a very serious injury before he gets it reduced, supposing, which is not always the case, that he succeeds in that object. But in the very rare case of a farm being let below its value, it is all but certain that the additional rent which might have been obtained for it is of trifling consequence to the landlord. The risks of parties so differently situated cannot be equalised. In truth, they are all, or mostly all, borne by the tenants; and it would hardly, in these circumstances, be equitable, even if it were otherwise desirable, for landlords to seek to compel them to abide by the letter of their engagements, and to go on paying greater rents than their farms are really worth. But it has been sufficiently shown, that while such conduct can hardly fail of being ruinous to the tenants, it is also highly injurious to the landlords. The latter had better borrow on the most usurious terms than attempt to eke out their incomes by sums abstracted from the capital of those engaged in the cultivation of their estates.

It is obvious, therefore, that leases for reasonable terms, and stipulating for fair rents, are beneficial alike to landlords and tenants. They give a sense of security to the latter, and inspire them with energy and enterprise. And while the improvements effected under their influence conduce, during their currency, to the advantage of the occupiers, they add to the permanent value of estates, and to their future rental. In almost every case, too, the granting of leases is immediately, as well as remotely, advantageous to the landlord. There is hardly an instance in which a farm will let for so much under an annual tenure as for a short lease, and under the latter the rent will be less than it would be were the lease extended to a reasonable term of years: Hence, in granting such lease, a landlord is not sacrificing present for the sake of prospective advantages; on the contrary, he is providing most effectually, not only for the future, but, in a still greater degree, for the instant increase of his income.

Length of Leases.—The expediency of granting leases being thus sufficiently established, their proper duration is the next point to be considered. This, however, is not a term which can be fixed by general rules. Pasture lands in good order may be advantageously let from year to year, or for short terms; and arable farms in a high state of cultivation and improvement, may be let for shorter periods than farms in an inferior condition. But, on the whole, it would seem to be the opinion of the most eminent authorities, that a term of nineteen or twenty-one years is, all things considered, the most proper for leases of arable farms in a medium condition. It is not, on the one hand, so extended as to tempt the tenant to delay commencing improvements, while, on the other, it is sufficiently lengthened to encourage him to make every fair exertion and outlay. And it has experience on its side, being the term most usually adopted in the best cultivated districts.

Supposing leases to be restricted to limited periods, such as seven or fourteen years, both of which are common terms in England, it is argued that it is possible, by the aid of proper conditions, not merely to hinder farms from being deteriorated, but to secure their improvement; and that such being the case, short leases must be advantageous to the landlords. But it is abundantly clear, that those who argue in this way, know little or nothing of the practical business of farming. It is, indeed, very generally allowed, that the shortness of the periods for which leases are usually granted in England, is one of the principal causes of their general unpopularity. It is needless to refer to those for seven years; for even fourteen years is too short a term to make it prudent for a tenant to make any very considerable outlays on unimproved or exhausted lands, or to subject them to proper rotations. Conditions may be inserted in the shortest leases to hinder farms from being over-cropped and otherwise mismanaged, and should never, indeed, be omitted. But it is visionary to suppose that any rules or regulations which it is possible to lay down, unless their observance be combined with the interest of the occupier, can be rendered an effective source of improvement. The most vexatious system of surveillance would not insure the faithful discharge of covenants unless the tenant supposed they contributed in some degree to his advantage. He might be taken bound to manure and fallow a certain portion of the farm, and to have another portion in green crop, etc., but if the lease were so short as not to allow him to reap the full benefit of these operations when properly executed, they would be performed slovenly and inefficiently, and with an eye only to appearances, or to the advantage to be derived from them during the existence of the lease. Everybody knows that the worst husbandry in England is found on farms held under short leases; and they are most frequently, also, at their expiration, out of heart, and in an impoverished condition.

It has sometimes been supposed that farming may be profitably carried on by subjecting land in a high state of improvement, to a severe course of cropping. But all competent authorities deny that such is the case; and contend that those farmers succeed best, who retain their lands in an improved state, and do not attempt to increase the returns of one year at the expense of those which are to follow. To insure this regular and only advantageous system of management, it is indispensable that leases should be of a reasonable length, and that the conditions preventing over-cropping and exhaustion, should be strictly enforced. But beyond this, all interference on the part of the landlord is mischievous. The industry and enterprise of the tenant will, under such circumstances, do all that can be done for the advancement of agriculture.

The endurance of a lease should not be made to depend on lives, or on any uncertain or contingent event, but should always be for a specified number of years. When otherwise, the security of the tenant is imperfect; and his operations are affected, in a greater or less degree, by apprehensions similar to those which influence tenants-at-will. Under a lease for a fixed term, the occupier knows what he is about. And by comparing the time which must elapse before any proposed outlay be compensated, with the length of the lease, he is able to estimate whether it would be for his interest to make it.

The expediency of granting leases for fixed and reasonable periods being thus established, we have next to inquire into the various methods of rating and estimating rents.

These may be classed under the following heads, viz., first, the rent may be paid in money; second, in a certain proportion of the produce; third, in a given quantity of produce—the amount in the last two cases being payable either in kind or in money at the current prices of the day; or fourth, on the corvée principle, by which the tenant engages to perform certain services for behoof of the landlord.