VI.: Increase of the Peerage.

The members of the Upper House, succeeding to legislative functions by hereditary right, are exempt from the salutary influence which controls the deliberations of a representative assembly. Their interests are purely oligarchical, and severed from the general interests of the community. It cannot, therefore, excite surprise that any augmentation in a body of exclusives like this—separated from the mass of society by education, by family pride, by privilege, and usurped power—should be viewed with dislike and apprehension.

Other reasons render an increase in the aristocratic branch of parliament inimical to general feeling. It has been ascertained that the nobility afford a striking illustration of Mr. Malthus’s theory of population. Possessing, in abundance, the comforts and conveniences of life, they are placed in those circumstances most favourable to a full development of the procreative principle, and it is a singular confirmation of the doctrine of the enlightened writer that noble families are actually as prolific as those of the United States of America. Peers are mostly marrying men. After visiting the European capitals, and committing a few follies and eccentricities, they usually settle down at about twenty-five or twenty-eight years of age, and the results, on the average, are a progeny of five children, or about twenty-five per cent. more than other people. The eldest inheriting the estate, the rest would be destitute, were not the parents, by means of their vote and borough-interest, able to quarter them on the public. Hence it is the people contemplate, with feelings corresponding to those entertained by an Irish absentee who sees the increase of his cotter tenantry, any unavoidable addition to the peerage; knowing that, in consequence of primogeniture and entail-laws, another family will be thrown upon them for support, and that their own chance of honourable promotion in the army, navy, civil departments, or other branch of national service, is impeded by new rivals, with whom exists no prospect of equitable competition.

Having explained one or two of the popular objections to an increase of the peerage, we shall briefly notice the extraordinary augmentation it has undergone during the reigns of George III. and George IV.

A creation of peers generally takes place on the accession of a new family, the commencement of a new reign, or when some political measure is to be carried. On the death of Elizabeth, the peers only amounted to fifty-six. James, being the first of a new dynasty, raised the number to one hundred and five; and Charles I. to one hundred and thirty-five; Charles II. created fifteen dukes, (six of whom were his natural children,) one marquess, thirty-seven earls, three countesses, two viscounts, and twenty-nine barons. At the Revolution of 1688, William III. to ingratiate himself with the great families, raised eight powerful earls to dukedoms; created eighteen earls, three viscounts, and nine barons. Anne increased the peerage to one hundred and seventy. The accession of the Hanover family rendered new creations necessary: George I. either created or elevated no fewer than forty-nine peers. George II. left one hundred and eighty-four. It is evident that the great increase of the peerage was in the reign of George III. being more than doubled. In 1777 a batch of peers was drafted from the Commons to the Lords, to effect a ministerial majority. This expedient was frequently resorted to by Mr. Pitt. In 1797 ten peers were made. He nearly created the order of marquesses: he made ten marquesses in England where there was but one, and nine in Ireland where there was none—all men eminent, of course, for their services. Knighthood was still more profusely lavished. In short, he was as prodigal in wasting the honours of the Crown as the money of the people, and for a similar purpose.

The peers created during the reign of George III. have been classified as follows:—

George IV. added 64 members to the Upper House. In this number are included individuals who have been raised to the peerage, or in whose favour an abeyance has been terminated, as well as peers of Scotland and Ireland who have obtained English baronies. No notice, however, is taken of Scotch peerages which have been recently restored, nor of the creations of peers of Ireland; of claims to English peerages which have been admitted, nor of elevations of English peerages to higher honours. The average rate at which peers have been created during the last two reigns has been about four per annum; and was the same rate of increase to continue for the next century, it would double the existing number of parliamentary lords.

Toryism being the ascendant school of politics during the last reigns, the character of the peers created was of course determined by that of the minister from whom the honours were obtained. The effect of this was strikingly evinced on the first introduction of the Reform Bill into the House of Lords. Of the old peers of the United Kingdom, there was a majority of two for the second reading of the bill. Of the new peers of the United Kingdom created subsequent to 1792, the majority was against the second reading of the bill, and their number was only balanced by the creations under the Whig ministry. The subject will be made clear from the following statement copied from a recent publication.

It thus appears that of 54 votes against the bill there were 43 which were the votes of—

The inference from which representation is that the bill was defeated in 1831 by the bishops, and the Irish and Scotch peers, who had obtained their promotions or been elected under Tory influence.

The necessity of an augmentation of the peerage to balance the anti-reform interest created subsequent to 1792, became manifest; it was not only essential to strengthen the ministry and carry the bill, but also to effect those ulterior improvements in public administration of which this great national measure is justly considered the parent.

The abolition of an hereditary peerage in France cannot fail to have the greatest influence on the future status of the ‘order,’ and will probably lead to the abolition of an institution in other countries so little consonant to the existing state of society. Because one man is a great lawyer, statesman, or commander, it is no pledge that his lineal descendant will be gifted with the same endowments as those which entitled his progenitor to the exercise of legislative functions. A senate, or upper chamber for life, consisting of individuals eminent for wisdom, experience, or national services, is a defensible institution; but to make them hereditary, and erect legislators into a caste, is quite as preposterous as to make the functions of the astronomer royal hereditary, or the colleges of surgeons and apothecaries. Such manifest irrationalities must speedily disappear from European communities.