Renewal of the Charter of the East-india Company.

Such improvements in the national representation, as would insure an honest and enlightened government, would render unnecessary any great changes in the scheme of our Indian administration. Ministers, having the control of the affairs of India, are responsible for their management; and, provided the people of England had an adequate control over them, there would be little risk of misgovernment, either in Great Britain or her great dependency. But if a system is tolerated, which admits of the accession to power of corrupt and incapable men, the calamity is felt in every part of the empire. Hence, the happiness of the vast population of Hindustan, no less than that of the United Kingdom, is identified in the great question of parliamentary reform.

The government of India, it appears to us, must always be so constituted as to be subordinate to the general government. Equality would generate rivalry; rivalry, hostility; and this last be the source of mutual weakness and annoyance. All these evils are obviated by the supremacy of the Board of Control. The sovereigns of Leadenhall-street can never compete with the sovereigns of Downing-street; yet, though the dependence of the former is secured, it is not so far merged in the latter as to preclude them from the exercise of a distinct and separate administration.

Another advantage results from the existing system in the division of India patronage. Supposing the Company deprived of their territorial authority, by whom could the immense patronage of India be exercised? It was the principle of the India bills of Mr. Fox to vest the patronage of India in a Board, emanating from parliament and independent of the Crown; but, in the present constitution of the House of Commons, this was only adding to the power and emolument of the Aristocracy. Again, to vest India patronage in ministers would be not less objectionable; it would form an enormous addition to the overwhelming influence of the Crown. The Court of Directors, however, though they have some interests in common with the Oligarchy and executive government, are not directly identified with either; they are a different power, based on different interests; their constituency are neither pot-walloppers, burgage-holders, nor freeholders—they are proprietors of India Stock; and this is a qualification from which neither the peerage nor the House of Commons derive their ascendancy. Under this arrangement a diversion of influence is obtained, and the danger to public liberty, which might result from consolidating the patronage of India with that of the United Kingdom, is in some measure averted.

In our opinion, then, the Company ought to retain their political sovereignty, and for this plain reason—that we do not see by what other constituted authority their functions could be discharged with less danger to the community. But though we think the general plan of the Indian government cannot be greatly improved, we are not insensible to the defects in its practical administration. The different departments of the Company’s administration, we have little doubt, are more pregnant with abuse, if that be possible, than the borough system itself. But this is a question wholly distinct from that we have been investigating, and into the merits of which we are not prepared to enter. There are, however, a few points bearing on this branch of the subject so notorious, that we cannot forbear noticing them, trusting that they will receive modification in the approaching renewal of the Company’s charter.

For instance, it appears a monstrous abuse that the Directors, who are only chosen for four years, should virtually exercise their functions for life. Of the twenty-four directors, six are obliged to retire every year in rotation; but, instead of withdrawing entirely, they secede for one year only, being sure, as a matter of course, of being re-elected for another four years when the period of probation expires, and so on to the end of their lives, through the influence of their co-directors: for which purpose their names are enrolled on what is termed the “House List,” in Leadenhall-street.

The number of proprietors of India-Stock is about 2,200. In the choice of directors, £1,000 stock gives one vote; £3,000 stock two votes; £6,000 stock three votes; and £10,000 stock four votes. This is the principle of the select-vestry system, without the same justification. There is nothing analogous to it in the election of members of parliament, and it is as unsuitable in the choice of the governors of an empire, as if the members of the House of Commons were each to have votes proportioned to the magnitude of their rent-roll.

Among the prerogatives which the Company exercise, one is justly objectionable, namely, the power of denying to British subjects permission to reside in India. By the 53d Geo. III. c. 155, heavy penalties are imposed upon any British subject who shall proceed to India without license from the Directors or Board of Control. The local governments are also empowered, if they see fit, to send home any European residing there, even though in possession of a license. It is also enacted that no British subject shall reside in the interior, at a greater distance than ten miles from the presidencies, without a certificate of leave from the local authorities. Till a very late period, no European was allowed to hold lands either as proprietor or upon lease. By a recent regulation, however, of the present governor-general, the indigo planters have been permitted to take leases of lands from the natives for the cultivation of the plant.

Such restrictions are an arbitrary abridgment of the rights of locomotion and enterprise, for which we have never seen any adequate justification. No danger can possibly result from the free settlement of Englishmen in India. The whole European community scattered through this vast region, exclusive of those in the service of the company, does not exceed 3,000, and any increase in their number, so as to excite apprehension, is wholly improbable. Were it not so, the Company can have no right to exercise an authority injurious both to their fellow subjects and the native population, merely for the sake of perpetuating their own power.

Neither is there policy nor justice—if such principles can ever be disjunctive—in keeping in a state of civil and political disfranchisement that numerous and respectable class denominated “East-Indians.” These are Christian men, born of English parents, or the descendants of English parents; yet not being considered “British subjects” in the decisions of the Supreme Court, are withheld from the benefits of the laws of England. Their thraldom is most irksome and anomalous. In conformity with the tenor of parliamentary enactments relative to Hindustan, professors of the Hindoo religion are governed in their civil relations by Hindoo law; professors of the Mohummudan religion by Mohummudan law; and both Hindoos and Mohummudans are subject in criminal matters to Mohummudan law—both civil and criminal being modified by the regulations of the East-India Company. But the unfortunate East-Indians do not fall within the circle of any of these codes of jurisprudence. Not being Hindoos they cannot regulate social duties by Hindoo law; not being Mohummudans they cannot regulate them by Mohummudan law; and not being British-born subjects they cannot enjoy the benefits of English law. They are, in fact, placed without the social pale, and governed in the relations of life by whatever rule any judge may frame on the spur of the occasion. But this does not include the whole of their grievances: they are proscribed from all superior and covenanted offices in the Civil, Military, and Marine services; they are not considered eligible even to those subordinate employments in the Judicial, Revenue, and Police Departments, which are open without reserve to the Hindoo and Mohummudan. We cannot believe the charter of the Company will be renewed without these unjust distinctions being modified, and the East-Indian race considered, as they ought to be, by the double ties of civil rights and consanguineous claim, the connecting link between the parent state and native population.

Lastly, the operations of the Press in India require a more constitutional guarantee than the fiat of the governors and governor general. During the viceroyship of Lord William Bentinck, the literary and political press of Calcutta has made rapid progress, and has not been disturbed by the arbitrary interference of government. But this is too important an engine to be dependent on the uncertainties of individual character. Those who have embarked their property in the India press ought to have a more valid protection than a system of licenses and censorships, which may be granted or refused—enforced or suspended, as suits the varying purposes of the president and council.

Having shortly noticed the political part of the India question, let us come to the commercial branch of the subject. This is the main point of interest to the people of Great Britain. Comparatively to them, the future territorial government of Hindustan is unimportant,, but every inhabitant of the United Kingdom is deeply interested in a free trade to China; and we sincerely trust this interest will not be compromised—that there will be no renewal of the Company’s charter, without an entire abolition of their commercial monopoly.

A defence of some kind may be always devised by artful persons for every abuse and every oppression; but we cannot collect from the inquiries of the Parliamentary Committees that the least plausible case has been made out to justify the commercial privileges of the Company. There is nothing in the constitution of the Chinese government, in its peculiar policy, in the local usages of the natives, nor in their anti-commercial spirit to interdict the opening of the trade. Both the public officers of China and the people are a thrifty race, and the same motives of interest which actuate the British merchant, concur to induce them to desire a more extended mercantile intercourse with this country.

Why then should this spirit—the mutual interests of two empires—be cramped by the costly and cumbersome incubus of Leadenhall-street? The Court of Directors have sufficient to engage their attention in the discharge of their political functions, without being fettered by mercantile pursuits; and the sooner they divest themselves of the remnant of their commercial character, the better for both England and Hindustan. The Company has become a great political government, and is no more adapted to the pursuits of commerce than the imperial parliament.

The trade with China neither requires the capital nor united action of a privileged association. The French, the Dutch, the Swedes, the Danes, the Austrians, and Americans, all resort to Canton, and none of them carry on the intercourse through the intervention of an exclusive company. The Dutch trade, which is the most important, used to be conducted by a privileged company, but it is now thrown open. The free trade of the Americans with China has greatly augmented since 1814;—and, what is most extraordinary, they actually export to Canton British manufactures—manufactures which the English merchant is interdicted exporting, and which the Company cannot export with a profit, owing to their circuitous and costly mode of transacting business—to the unfitness of their institutions for commercial purposes.

But any over-weening conceit in which the Company may have indulged as to the superior advantages resulting from their exclusive management of the China trade, must be destroyed by their existing differences with the Chinese authorities. It is not the Americans, nor the Dutch, but their own establishment at Canton which is embroiled with the native government. So far as information has yet been communicated, the fault appears all on their side; the Chinese, by the reduction of one-third of the duties on British ships, in 1830, and by taking off an additional duty imposed on cotton, have manifested a strong desire to cultivate the friendship of England. These concessions, however, have been met by a series of insults and encroachments on the part of the Company’s servants, which are the more provoking, because they appear to have been wanton, puerile, and unnecessary. For instance, they have persisted in the use of sedan chairs, and the introduction of “foreign women” into Canton, contrary to the express usages of the country, and the rules laid down by public proclamations. The dignity and firmness with which the gentlemen of the “Select Committee” endeavoured to support these innovations have been quite in keeping with the innovations themselves. They first issued a “protocol”—yes, by the powers, a protocol in China!—intimating their determination to suspend all commercial intercourse with the Chinese, August 4th, 1831: but this announcement failing to make the expected impression on “the Celestial empire,” they issued another, intimating their intention not to suspend commercial intercourse at the period mentioned. We believe the desire of the “Select” now is to have a couple or two of British frigates at their disposal, to bombard Canton; or—if that be possible—to throw a few Congreve rockets into Pekin, or against the Great Wall. But the Emperor may be perfectly easy on this head; if his Celestial Majesty knew as well as we do how essential an ingredient his tea-plant is in the dividends of the East-India proprietors, he would laugh—if such a movement be consistent with Chinese gravity—at the fulminations of Messrs. Lindsay and his brethren, who appear to have performed, at the British factory, the parts of Captain Bobadil and Ben Jonson’s “Angry Boy” with marvellous precision.

After such experience of the mercantile abilities of the Company, and of their address and wisdom in managing their Chinese intercourse, we imagine it cannot be any longer a question whether their commercial privileges ought to be renewed. We think decidedly not. The interests of the public are directly opposed to the monopoly. For years we have been paying double the prices for our teas we ought to pay; double the prices that are paid on the Continent and America; where there are no privileged associations. And for what purpose are the people of the United Kingdom subjected to this extortion? Why, in addition to our other burthens, should we be made to pay two millions per annum for the benefit of the Company? We are becoming a sober people—a tea-drinking nation, and why should this improvement in national character be obstructed by overgrown monopolists? The reason is this: The finances of the Company are embarrassed. They cannot pay their dividends out of fair mercantile profits, and they seek to pay them out of the produce of a poll-tax levied on the people of England!

Here is the gist of the matter at issue between the Company and the public. The question is not the policy of a free-trade with China; on this point no well-informed person can entertain a doubt: the interests of commerce, the interests of the people at large, and the public revenue of the country would all be promoted by free trade; but then how are the Company’s dividend, the interest of their bond debt, and other out-goings to be paid? They have no surplus territorial revenue; the profits of the tea-trade are the sole dependence of the proprietary. This is the rub! But what, it may be asked, have the community to do with the pecuniary difficulties of a junta of ambitious and improvident speculators? What is India to England? Some thousands of adventurers have amassed princely fortunes there by rapine and extortion, and have returned to spend them in this country, to add to the aristocracy of wealth already too predominant. Beyond this we have derived no advantage from our eastern acquisitions—neither true glory nor national happiness. Why should we then be called upon to make a sacrifice? If the Company cannot maintain their association without public support; if they cannot carry on trade to advantage, without privileges hurtful to the community; if they cannot enter into fair competition with individuals, let them retire from the contest—let them dissolve, and leave commerce to be pursued by others on more prudent and economical principles.

Only think of the situation of that most patient of all animals, the British public, in this business. The boroughmongers levy a hundred per cent. tax on tea for the support of extravagance and the payment of their dividends, and the Company a monopoly tax to the same amount, and for similar purposes. How finely is John Bull crucified between the exclusives of Leadenhall and the oppressors of Downing-street! If to these agreeables, we add the extra sugar-tax he is compelled to pay for the benefit of the West-India flaggellants, with what gusto he must needs swallow his morning and evening beverage; what fervent ejaculations he must utter over his cups for their prosperity and the permanence of oligarchical government!

There is, however, one resource to the Company, in lieu of the profits of the exclusive trade to China—they may retrench. Like their prototype, the Borough-System, they are embarrassed from a long course of war and prodigality, and they must economize. The people of England will never submit to be taxed for the maintenance of their territorial sovereignty and patronage. They must reduce still further than they have yet done their military, civil, judicial, and revenue establishments; they must curtail enormous salaries, and their “dead weight;” be less lavish in granting pensions, superannuations, and allowances to relatives and dependents. And if all this is not enough, they must reduce their dividend, and instead of bartering offices and appointments in India for the benefit of themselves, sell them openly and fairly to meet their expenditure. At all events, they may rely upon it, that they will not be allowed to tax the community, neither one, two, nor three millions per annum after the 10th of April, 1834.

In support of the allegations at the close of this article, we ought to have mentioned a few facts confirmatory of our opinions, which we were well enabled to do from the inquiries of parliamentary committees.

We have said that we are becoming a “tea-drinking nation;” here is the proof from the statement submitted to the Commons’ Committee, by Mr. Crawford, of the comparative consumption per head, of tea and coffee in Great Britain, France, and the United States.

Several statements were submitted to the Committee, with a view of showing the amount of the tax entailed on the community by the Company’s exclusive privilege; by one witness it was estimated at £1,500,000 per annum; by another at £1,727,934, and by a third at £2,588,499.

For a comparative statement of the prices at which teas are sold by the Company, and on the continent, and in America, we must refer to the statement of Dr. Kelly, No. 4709, of the Lords’ Committee. The prices at the Company’s sales in London, exclusive of government duty, are about double those in the countries mentioned.

From a statement of Mr. Melvill, auditor-general to the Company, it appears, the gross revenue of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay in the year 1828, was £22,551,617; of this revenue, £15,384,528 was the produce of the land-tax: the charge of collecting the revenue, pensions, &c. £5,524,728, and this enormous charge although three fifth parts of the revenue arise from the direct tax on land! The charge for collecting the revenue of the United Kingdom—which is justly considered extravagant enough—amounted, Jan. 5th, 1831, on the gross income of £59,308,872, to £3,713,944.

The following returns, by the auditor-general of the Company, exhibit a statement of the military charges, the general civil charges, and the judicial charges of the three Presidencies for the year 1828:—

Can any one believe the Company will not be able to find resources from such lavish outgoings, without a monopoly profit on the consumption of tea?

As every information which relates to the Company will speedily be of intense interest, we subjoin a few more statements; they were prepared by the Company for the Parliamentary Committee on East India affairs, and laid before that committee. It will be seen from the estimates of the auditor that the charges of the Company at the expiration of their charter will exceed their revenues by £827,300; so that there will be no surplus to pay the dividends without the monopoly profit on tea. But, we again beseech the sovereign Directors not to “lay that flattering unction to their souls,” but to look to their wasteful expenditure, especially the civil branches of it.

It appears from the returns of the revenue of the United Kingdom for Jan. 1832, that the expenditure exceeds the income by £21,000; and from the depression in all the great branches of national industry, there is little prospect of the country being able to support additional burthens. How then can it be expected, the people will suffer themselves to be heavily taxed to support the Indian empire—a foreign dependency, chiefly valuable for the patronage it vests in 24 merchants. Rather than such a sacrifice should be made, it would be better to abandon Hindustan to its native sovereigns—the Mogul, the Nabobs and Subahdars.

The rate of exchange observed in this account is 1s. 11d. the Sicca rupee.

(Errors excepted.)