IX. The Peasant War

In the beginning of the year 1525, perhaps as early as January, Münzer left Swabia to return to Thuringia. He had a motive for doing so, for he knew that the outbreak of the movement was imminent.

Like the uprising of the peasants in England in 1381, which broke out simultaneously at all points, the insurrection in Germany was arranged to take place in all parts on the same day, the 2nd of April but it occurred at an earlier date in some localities, owing either to the impatience of the participants, or to force of circumstances. Hence we cannot doubt that the revolt was organised and directed by a widely ramified conspiracy.

The age in which guild secrets could be kept for centuries was also peculiarly favourable to hidden leagues. Not only were sectarian doctrines propagated by means of secret associations, but political deeds were often effected in like manner both in town and country. Many of these associations acquired great importance, such as the Bundschuh (peasants of the shoe) and the Arme Konrad (poor comrade), which were the inaugurators of the Peasant War.

Hence in spite of portents in various places as early as the autumn of 1524, and the zealous preparations for an insurrection during the winter, the ruling classes were taken by surprise so that at the outset the insurgents almost everywhere gained the advantage.

On his way from Swabia, Münzer fell in with bodies of rebels, and on one occasion was within a hair’s-breadth of coming utterly to grief, being taken prisoner in the Fulda district with a mob of malcontents. On the 22nd of February the receiver of taxes in Allstätt, Hans Jeyss, who was always well informed of Münzer’s movements, wrote to Spalatin: “I add for your information that Thomas Münzer has been at Fulda, where he was thrown into prison. The Abbot said to the innkeeper at Schwartzburg, that had he known it was Thomas Münzer, he would not have let him go free.”

Shortly after this (March 12th) we again find Münzer in Mühlhausen, where Pfeiffer had previously made his appearance (December). On March 17th, a successful revolt made them masters of the town being nearly the same day and month in which, more than three hundred years afterwards, the populace in 1848 seized Berlin, and the proletariat gained possession of Paris. Hans Jeyss wrote about the affair to Spalatin, giving remarkable prominence to the part played by Pfeiffer, and ignoring Münzer, but showing an accurate appreciation of the elements by which the fight was won.

“I must tell you,” he says, “of the dreadful discord and tumult caused for a whole day in Mülhausen by a preacher named Pfeiffer. To sum up, Lord Omnes” (the populace) “wrested the government from the Council, which can neither rule, punish, write, nor act in any way against the popular will.”

“After Pfeiffer and Münzer had been banished, and the latter had visited and left Nurenberg, Pfeiffer returned to Mühlhausen, where he busied himself in the neighbouring villages by propagating his views. He complained to the peasants that he had been driven from the town only because he had preached the truth and had wished to deliver the people from the yoke of the Council and ruling authorities, and from all oppression. At his behest the peasants of these villages armed themselves and advanced in a body to the suburb of the town, where he delivered a revolutionary address. As soon as it came to the ears of the Council that Pfeiffer was trying to force his way into Mülhausen, they made ready for resistance, called their forces together, and marched out against him. ust as the fight was about to begin, the burgesses, who should have remained true to the Council, turned against it, and played a villainously treacherous part. Seeing that the populace had fallen away from the Council, the leader of the municipal forces endeavoured to put a stop to the uproar, and, after great labour and trouble, succeeded in doing so; not, however until the Council had been forced to allow Pfeiffer and Münzer to continue their preaching, and a promise had been exacted that nothing should be done without the consent and knowledge of the commune. Thus all power was taken from the Council, and very strange things went on in Mülhausen.”

Very strange things in truth: A communistic community was established in the town.

“This was the beginning of the new Christian government,” writes Melancthon. “They afterwards drove out the monks, and appropriated all the property of the Church. The Knights of St. John possessed a manor at that place, with a large rental; Thomas seized this manor ... He taught that all things should be in common, as is written in the. Acts of the Apostles, and by this means made the people so wanton that they would no longer work. When one of them wanted corn or cloth, he went to some rich man (to whomsoever it pleased him) and demanded it as a Christian right, on the ground that Christ had proclaimed that all things should be shared with the needy. If any wealthy person proved unwilling to give what was demanded of him, it was taken by force; and this happened in many cases. Moreover, those who lived with Thomas in the manor house of the Hospitallers acted in like manner.”

Becherer tells us that: “In the government Münzer was dictator, and managed everything as it pleased him ... In particular, he made the community of goods compulsory; from which it resulted that people left their craft-work and daily labour, believing that before they had consumed the possessions of the princes and barons, the churches and monasteries, God would further provide. This mode of life was carried on by Münzer for some months.”

We need not inquire into the bad effects said to have been produced by the communistic regimen on trade and production, as they have no basis in fact. This indeed is shown by the circumstance that the government of the revolutionary commune at Mühlhausen did not last more than two months; almost exactly the duration of the Paris Commune of 1871, which began March 18th and ended May 28th, while that of Mühlhausen continued from March 17th to May 25th. Indeed Münzer left Mühlhausen before May 12th. And in these few weeks communism is supposed to have exercised a sensible influence on production, in the midst of the most dreadful exigencies of a war which enlisted the services of every labourer capable of bearing arms!

Melancthon, it is true, tells us that communism lasted a year in Mülhausen! Let it be imagined that in the autumn of 1871, a modern author should have written a history of the Paris Commune, in which he stated that it lasted a year! It is difficult to say which is the more surprising, the cool audacity of the “ mild and timid “ Melancthon, or the credulity of his public.

And it is from such “contemporaneous sources” that most of the histories of communistic movements have been compiled!

Meanwhile the falsifications can easily be discovered with the exercise of a little caution. Much more confusion, however, has been created by the completely inaccurate accounts of the part played by Münzer in Mülhausen. Becherer and Melancthon represent him as a dictator whose will was law, and Luther occasionally expresses himself in a similar way. The latter writes in one of his letters: “Müntzer Mulhusi Ilex et Imperator est.”

As a matter of fact Münzer’s position was an extremely disagreeable one. He had conquered not by the strength of his adherents, but by a compromise with Pfeiffer’s party, who were not communistic, but outspokenly bourgeois in feeling. Moreover, he did not mount to the head of the government, but remained simply a preacher, and even as such acquired no decisive influence. The policy of the town was entirely out of harmony with his own, and in all important matters he met with opposition from Pfeiffer, who was backed up by the majority.

Mülhausen was no Tabor; the latter may. be designated as a communistic colony and a new institution, to which communists flocked for the purpose of building up an “exclusive people.” Circumstances were quite different in the ancient imperial town of Mülhausen, where the communists found their chief supporters in the proletariat together with some circles of the petty, independent, suburban craftsmen and the peasants of the neighbourhood. These strata of the population were at that time far too weak to force their will upon the middle class. Through a fortuitous combination of favourable circumstances, and a clever and energetic use of them for their own ends, the communists succeeded in playing a decisive part between the two contending parties, much resembling that of the needle on the balance; but toleration was all that they were able to obtain from those who, by their help, had been placed in power. We must not imagine that the whole town of Mülhausen was organised on the communistic basis. At all events, the only gain to the Brethren was the permission to transform their secret organisation into an open one, and to establish a “commune” within the town’s domain, of which the seat was probably the manor of the Hospitallers.

We may judge of the small number of Münzer’s adherents in Mühlhausen from the fact that when he marched away to help the peasants, he was accompanied by only three hundred men.

It is easy to believe Melancthon’s statement that the Münzer commune, “occupying the manor of the Hospitallers,” derived its revenues during the few weeks of its existence, not merely from the labour of its members, but also, and chiefly, from the spoils obtained from churches, monasteries, and castles for we know that the Taborites maintained themselves in a similar way. In those days the goods of the Church were res nullius – no one’s property – which he might seize “who had the power,” chief among such being the princes, while here and there, perhaps, a few poor devils might share in the plunder.

We have already pointed out that Münzer and Pfeiffer were opposed on fundamental principles. But from this contrary, antagonism others arose which were of a tactical nature.

As a petty townsman of pre-capitalistic times, Pfeiffer considered himself the representative of local interests only Münzer, like the communists of his time in general, was, on the contrary, cosmopolitan in feeling. Pfeiffer looked upon the insurrection in Mühlhausen as a purely local event, while for Münzer it was a link in the great chain of revolutionary uprisings, which, by co-operating, were to give the finishing stroke to tyranny and spoliation. That which Tabor had previously been for Bohemia, the fortified town of Mühlhausen was now to become for Thuringia, namely, the point d’appui of the whole rebellion, and in closest touch with the revolts in Franconia and Swabia.

Pfeiffer (and when we speak of Pfeiffer and Münzer we do not refer to the two individuals alone, but to the parties as well, of which they were the most prominent representatives) was, it is true, present in a few predatory expeditions into the neighbouring purely Catholic districts, but he did not contemplate anything beyond a petty town quarrel. Münzer, on the other hand, was well aware that victory in Mühlhausen did not signify the close of the revolutionary struggle, but was only a preliminary to the decisive battle. It behoved him, therefore, to prepare and organise the masses, train them in the use of arms, and combine the revolts in different districts into a common movement.

Perhaps nowhere in Germany were the peasants so unused to arms, so lacking in military capacity, and so wholly unprepared for war as iri Thuringia. Time therefore was needed to supply them with weapons and to train them in their use.

Münzer did all he could. He was specially solicitous with regard to heavy artillery, and had cannon cast in the monastery of the Barefooted Friars. The value he placed upon these guns – perhaps more as instruments of moral suasion than as weapons of war – is seen from the fact that he sent information concerning them as far as Swabia; and this fact alone shows how eager he was for an alliance with the South German insurgents.

He devoted himself with still greater energy to stirring up and combining the revolutionists in Thuringia displaying a feverish anxiety in speech and writing, and sending letters of exhortation and encouragement in all directions.

The mine-labourers seemed of more importance to him than the untrustworthy Mühlhauseners and badly armed peasants. These miners formed the most warlike and defiant part of Saxony’s population, and in consequence Münzer directed his attention to them. He formed an alliance with those of the Erzgebirge Mountains, after striving first of all to rouse an insurrection among his nearest mining neighbours, the Mansfelders; his friendliness with them ever since his Allstätt days giving him good cause to hope for their aid.

A letter written by him at that time to his confederates in Mansfeld, Balthasar, Barthel, &c., for the purpose of starting the agitation among the miners, is reproduced in Luther’s works as one of “three abominable, revolutionary writings by Thomas Münzer” (xix. p.289 sqq.). It reads: “Before all things, the pure fear of God. Dear brethren, how long will you sleep? How long will it be ere you confess why God of His good will has to all appearance abandoned you? It is high time. Hold back your brethren from mocking at godly testimony, else must you all perish. Germany, France, Italy, are all aroused. Our masters wish to make a game of it but the villains cannot escape their fate. During Easter week three churches were destroyed in Fulda. In Kletgau, Hegau, and Schwatzwald the peasants are up, three thousand strong, and their numbers are growing daily. I am anxious lest the foolish fellows should agree to a treacherous compact, for they do not yet perceive the mischief. Where there are only two of you who trust in God and seek His name and honour, they shall not be afraid of a hundred thousand. But forward, forward, forward! It is high time. Let this letter be given to the mine-associates. My printer will come in a few days. I have received the missive, but cannot do more at present. I had wished to instruct the brothers myself, that their hearts might grow much larger than the castles and armour of all the godless rascals on earth. Forward, forward, forward while the fire is hot! Let your swords be ever warm with blood; forge the hammer on the anvil of Nimrod raze his tower to the ground!”

Münzer’s letter was well received; a large number of miners assembled in the Mansfeld district, disturbances began to arise, and the impetus given to the Mansfelders extended to the mining population near Meissen. “Even before the foolish rioters rushed on to the bloody day at Frankenhausen,” says Hering, “many miners from the revolutionary domain of Count Mansfeld had taken flight to our mountains, either because they saw no promise of good in remaining at home, or because they hoped, by the aid of the ‘new wisdom,’ to play an important part in other places.”

The rioters succeeded in gaining influence, and in assisting an attempt at revolution in the neighbourhood of Zwickau, where the enthusiasts, under Storch and Münzer, had previously acquired power and paved the way for an uprising.

In April there was, in fact, a revolt among the peasants and miners in the Erzgebirge Mountains, which, like similar movements elsewhere in Germany, was not wholly suppressed till after the fight at Frankenhausen.

Münzer was, as a rule, unsuccessful in his efforts to bring about a co-operation of the revolutionary movements in the various districts of Saxony.

He found the separatism of the petty townsmen and peasants too powerful for him. The equality of economic pressure in all places, the stirring up of the whole nation by the Reformation movement, and, last but not least, the indefatigable interlocal activity of the communistic “apostles” had been just sufficient at its commencement to make the insurrection of the peasants and their allies an affair which embraced the largest part of the nation; so that the revolt broke out almost simultaneously in all parts. In its progress, however, and when it became a question of securing the fruits of the early victories and taking advantage of them, the local separatism became more conspicuous than ever; for it was too deeply rooted in circumstances to be suppressed for more than a very short time, and then only to a very small extent.

With this separatism there was associated the fatal childishness of the peasants. That inexperienced folk believed that the word of a prince was, if not better, at least not worse than that of any other honourable man. They had no inkling of the new State craft, which promoted dishonesty and mendacity to the rank of highly estimable princely virtues.

Instead of co-operating, each district and each town which had made cause with the insurgents depended on its own strong arm; and a few empty promises on the part of their rulers (in which they held up the prospect of granting the demands of the insurgents) were sufficient as a rule to scatter the rebels, and induce them to lay down their arms. In this way the princes found time to collect troops, combine, and easily overcome one after another of the isolated peasant masses which, if united, could have made a good stand. Moreover, while on the side of the peasants the absence of any definite plans became more and more conspicuous, the growing danger increased the cohesion and systematic co-operation of the princes.

The rulers rose everywhere in their might to stifle the insurrection in the blood of the rebels. In the last week of April, Truchsess von Waldburg, then leader of the Swabian league’s army, had almost suppressed the revolt in Swabia, Landgrave Philip having done the same in Hesse, while large bodies of veteran troops had been despatched against the insurgents of Franconia and Thuringia.

In the beginning of May the good “evangelical” Landgrave Philip of Hesse united his forces with those of the arch Catholic George of Saxony and a few petty princes, who were afterwards joined by the new Elector of Saxony, John , for the purpose of putting an end to the Thuringian revolt. The headquarters of the rebellion were at the town of Frankenhausen, a few miles distant from the Mansfeld mines, and celebrated for its salt deposits, which employed a large number of workmen. Most of the military forces of the rebels had been concentrated at this place and not, as would have been more natural, at Mühlhausen, a well-fortified town provided with artillery, or at a more southern point, e.g., Erfurt or Eisenach, both of which were in the hands of the insurrectionists, and from which it would have been easier to keep in touch with the revolt in Franconia.

The encampment before Frankenhausen seemed of the greatest importance both to the princes and rebels, and, to reach it, Philip of Hesse executed a very singular movement He pushed on past Eisenach and Langensalza, leaving Mülhausen on his right and Erfurt on his left, and marched straight to Frankenhausen. While this evidences the importance of that town, the fact that Philip could perform this movement, without being in the least threatened or even molested by the Mülhauseners or Erfurters, proves the total lack of cohesion, co-operation, and plan among the insurgents.

The importance of Frankenhausen can be explained by its proximity to the Mansfeld mines, with their numerous warlike workmen for if the insurrection had spread thither the princes would have had a severe task before them.

Münzer too was fully alive to the value of Frankenhausen, and did his utmost to direct all his available forces to that place. He also wrote to the Erfurters, but they did not move. Nor could he induce even the Mühlhauseners to go to the help of the men before Frankenhausen. How did the affairs of the peasants of that place concern the petty townsmen of the imperial city? Even the usually energetic Pfeiffer remained inactive, thus obliging Münzer to march out in sole command of his three hundred men after the Mühlhauseners had grudgingly lent him eight mounted cannon.

Münzer fared no better with the Mansfeld miners. There is, unfortunately, a total lack of minute information concerning his negotiations with these people. In Spangenberg’s Mansfeldischer Chronik (chapter 362) we find only the following notice, still more briefly reproduced by Bieringen in his Beschreibung des Mansfeldischen Bergwerks: “The peasants of Mansfeld were also in revolt. Count Albrecht exerted himself most diligently, and promised the miners all manner of things, in order to keep them at home and prevent their joining the rebellious peasants in the field.”

Albrecht seems to have succeeded. Münzer had good grounds for the fear expressed in the above-quoted letter to the miners that “the foolish fellows would agree to a treacherous compact;” for as soon as their demands had been granted most of them quieted down and troubled themselves no further about the rebellious peasants. They sent out a few reinforcing parties, only to be surprised, however, by Count Albrecht’s cavalry, which held all the roads.

One possibility still remained, namely, to carry the insurrection into Mansfeld itself, and in that way involve the miners in the struggle. But this chance also was not taken advantage of. The peasants before Frankenhausen were foolish enough to engage in negotiations with Albrecht, which he carefully managed to prolong from day to day until the armies of the princes arrived.

The Count had agreed with the peasants for a conference on the 12th of May; but he did not make his appearance, pleading important affairs as an excuse, and, instead, summoned the peasants to a meeting on the next Sunday, May 14th. “ In the meantime,” Luther tells us, “God so ordered that Thomas Münzer came from Mühlhausen to Frankenhausen.”

Münzer, who detected the Count’s artifice, caused the immediate breaking off of these negotiations, and made every effort to provoke a battle between Albrecht and the peasants before the arrival of the princes. The outrageously rude letters written by Münzer to Mansfeld at that time are incomprehensible except as deliberate provocations to that end. Zimmermann looks upon them as evidences of a state of self deception on the part of Münzer, arising from his frenzy and despair; but his arrangement of affairs indicates the possession of a clear intellect.

Meanwhile the Mansfelders did not grant Münzer the boon of allowing themselves to be provoked; and either the consciousness of the weakness of his forces, or perhaps their unwillingness, prevented him from making the attack.

It was soon too late. Münzer had reached Frankenhausen May 12th on the 14th Landgrave Philip of Hesse and Duke George Henry of Brunswick arrived, to be followed on the 15th by Duke George of Saxony with his army.

The fate of the men before Frankenhausen was now sealed, and with it that of the Thuringian insurrection. On one side stood 8,000 badly armed, undisciplined peasants, almost without artillery; on the other, about the same number of well-equipped, veteran soldiers with numerous cannon.

Descriptions of the fight at Frankenhausen have generally been based on Melancthon’s account. According to this, Münzer first of all delivered an eloquent speech to the peasants, which was followed by a still more eloquent one by Landgrave Philip to his troops; whereupon the latter advanced to the attack. “The poor folk, however, stood still and sang ‘Wur bitten wry den heiligen Geist’ (‘Now pray we to the Holy Ghost’) as if they were demented. They neither defended themselves nor fled, many of them trusting to the great promise made by Thomas, that God would show help from heaven; for Thomas had said that he would hold all the balls in his sleeves.” As the miracle did not take place, and as the soldiers continued cutting their way into the ranks of the peasants, these creatures at last took to flight and were butchered in heaps. A strange fight indeed!

Is it possible that Münzer and the peasants could have been such utter fools as they are here depicted?

Let us first of all consider the speeches. That of Münzer is in a style altogether different from his own, and has an empty bathos about it in no way characteristic of him. But on closer inspection the speech of the Landgrave seems a still stranger production. It is a categorical answer to Münzer’s – as if Philip of Hesse had stood by and refuted the former’s complaint point by point! Let us, for example, compare the following passages:–

MUNZER: “But what are our princes doing? They take no interest in the government, turn a deaf car to the poor people, do not administer justice, nor combat murder and robbery, and visit no criminal nor wanton with punishment.”

LANDGRAVE: “Whereas it is invented and fabricated that we do not care for the general peace of the land, and that we do not execute judgment nor combat murder and robbery we now declare ourselves to be, with all our abilities, assiduous in the maintenance of a peaceable government.”

And more to the same effect. The more closely these two speeches are examined, the clearer it becomes that they were not actually delivered, but were devised by the learned schoolmaster on the pattern of the speeches of statesmen and army leaders handed down to us by Thucydides and Livy. They are rhetorical exercises, written for definite purposes, The dissolute mercenaries, gathered from all countries, could not have been impressed in the smallest degree by the prelection of the Landgrave on morals and justice, and the necessity and utility of imposts, and so forth, with the affecting peroration that it was a question of fighting for the safety of wife and child. This hypothetical speech, however, must have raised the Landgrave in the estimation of the educated philistines for whom Melancthon wrote. It was to these that the speech was delivered, and not to the soldiers.

On the other hand, Münzer’s speech is composed with the sole purpose of making him ridiculous. Melancthon makes him say at the close of his address “Let not the weak flesh terrify you, but go boldly to the attack of the enemy. You need not fear the shot, for you shall see that I will hold in my sleeves all the cannon balls fired at you,” &c.

Nowhere in Münzer’s writings has he expressed himself so absurdly about practical things, his mysticism consisting solely in believing that God held direct intercourse with him and that his doctrines proceeded from the Holy Spirit. He never asserted that he could perform miracles. Hence we have no hesitation in pronouncing this speech an impudent invention.

It is, moreover, a clumsy invention so clumsy, indeed, that a hundred years ago Strobel became convinced that not Münzer but “Melancthon was certainly the author” of the speech (p.112). In spite of this, however, it is still used by writers in forming their judgment of Münzer, e.g., by Janssen.

There was little time for speech-making, if the battle is correctly described in the pamphlet entitled, Ain nützlicher Dialogus odder gesprechbuchlein zwischen einem Müntzerischenschwermer zu Frankenhausen geschlagen belangende, Wittenberg, 1525. The enthusiast says: “How now! Is it honourable for princes and barons to give us three hours for deliberation and yet not keep faith a quarter of an hour, but, as soon as they have won over Count von Stolberg with some of the nobility from our side, to begin firing at us with cannon and then immediately attack us?”

All of which means that the princes parleyed with the peasants, demanding their surrender, and gave them three hours’ grace. In the meantime they induced the nobles on the side of the populace to come over to them, and, long before the truce had expired, threw themselves upon the unsuspicious peasants and butchered them.

This certainly was not very honourable, and we can well understand Melancthon’s pains to devise another account of the affair. While, however, his version is wholly nonsensical, the description given in the Dialogus is in exact accordance with the mode of procedure universally adopted by the princes at that time in their dealing with the peasantry. In spite of their superior strength, they resorted to treachery and breach of faith to gain the mastery over their opponents. By this means, and not by any imbecile expectation among Münzer’s followers, that he would actually catch the cannonballs in his coat-sleeves, by far the greater number of the insurgents were slaughtered – from 5,000 to 6,000 out of 8,000! – while the princely forces suffered hardly any loss worth mentioning.

After the victory was won the troops pushed on into Frankenhausen, and, as Landgrave Philip himself wrote on the following day, “All males found there were slain and the town given over to pillage.”

Münzer, with a part of the vanquished forces, fled into the town, and as the enemy’s cavalry was at his heels, rushed headlong into one of the first houses near the gate, disguised himself by wrapping up his head, threw himself on a bed, and feigned illness. But his artifice failed. A soldier who entered the room recognised him by the contents of his satchel. He was immediately seized, and brought before the Landgrave of Hesse and Duke George. “When he came before the princes they asked him why he had thus led the poor folk astray. He answered defiantly that he had acted rightly and had purposed punishing the princes” – a truly bold reply! Melancthon, who tells us this, momentarily forgets that he always represents Münzer as being exceptionally pusillanimous.

The princes at once had him put to the rack and feasted on his agonies, after which he was sent as a “booty-farthing” to Count Ernest von Mansfeld. “If he had before ‘been cruelly tortured,’ he was now, after a few days, ‘barbarously dealt with’ in the tower of Heldrungen “ (Zimmermann).

It was here that he was tortured into making the confession, from the protocol of which we have so repeatedly quoted. He revoked nothing, and, concerning his secret league, revealed only such things as could not injure anybody. Not one of the confederates named by him is mentioned among those who were executed hence he probably inculpated only such as had already perished. As the fight of Frankenhausen had broken the force of the movement in Thuringia, nothing further remained to the princes but to take bloody revenge – a task which they carefully accomplished.

It being a sufficient cause of congratulation that the Mansfeld miners remained peaceable, they were left for a time unmolested. Spangenberg tells us that it was not until the next year that “the miners began to be somewhat harshly dealt with, by the imposition of additional labour, from which, in spite of energetic remonstrances, they could obtain. no relief.” On the contrary, troops were sent to “quiet” them, and they were deprived of all freedom of speech and of meeting.

Worse still was Mülhausen’s expiation for its desertion of the insurgents’ cause at the critical moment. From Frankenhausen the allied princes at once pushed on to the imperial city. In vain did the town appeal for assistance to the Franconian insurrectionists. These now treated the Mülhauseners as they themselves had treated the defenders of Frankenhausen. As soon as the siege began (May 19th) despondency spread rapidly among the rebellious citizens. Seeing that all was lost, Pfeiffer escaped on the 24th, with four hundred men, to gain the uplands of Franconia; but the cavalry of the princes overtook him, and made him prisoner, together with ninety-two of his men.

On a written promise of mercy from the princes, Mülhausen capitulated May 25th. In practice this mercy consisted in the execution of several citizens and the pillage of the town. The city, moreover, lost its independence, and fell into the power of the Saxon princes, who thus gained what they had hoped for from the insurrection; while the rebels, who had helped them to gain their ends, were executed, including Pfeiffer and Münzer, who had been brought to Mühlhausen.

Pfeiffer died defiant and unrepentant. With regard to Münzer, Melancthon naturally asserts that he was “very faint-hearted in the last extremity.” As evidence of this he relates, that, from downright terror, Münzer was unable to utter a single word, and consequently could not repeat the Creed. Duke Henry of Brunswick had therefore to recite it for him. Immediately afterwards, however, our authority makes the man who was speechless from terror deliver one of those eloquent addresses so much beloved by the classical and rhetorically-educated schoolmaster.

The other chroniclers of the time make no mention of Münzer’s “faint-heartedness” (compare Zimmermann, ii. p.444). In addition to the utterly worthless testimony of Melanethon, there is only one piece of evidence from which it is possible to draw conclusions as to the agitator’s despair in his last days, viz., his letter to the Council and commune of Mülhausen, written in his prison at Heldrungen, and dated May Uth. In this he exhorts his friends not to exasperate the higher authorities, as his death was deserved, and was well calculated to open the eyes of the “foolish.” He implores them to look after his poor wife. Once more he beseeches them not to provoke the authorities for purposes of self-interest, as they had already done, but to abandon the rebellion and beg the pardon of the princes.

Without doubt this letter betrays faint-heartedness. We cannot agree with Zimmermann, who puts a more favourable construction upon it.

But is the letter genuine? It did not proceed from Münzer’s own hand. He himself says that he dictated it to a certain Christoph Lau. Why did he dictate it? Why did he not write it himself? For whose interest was it that such a letter from Münzer should come to Mülhausen? We answer, for the interest of the princes alone. It was composed on May 17th, and on May 19th the siege began. It was calculated to make this siege easier, and to produce despondency among the besieged. Is not the assumption probable that Münzer’s name was made use of by the princes for carrying out one of those tricks of war so common at the period?

The least that can be said, is that the document is highly suspicious and is not sufficient to corroborate Melancthon’s statement.

Hence we can truly say that nothing certain is known regarding Münzer’s last moments, and that the accusations of pusillanimity on his part are unsubstantiated.

It does not in the least affect our judgment of the man whether his nerves were or were not completely under his control to the very last. We have dealt with this question only because the great stress laid on Münzer’s alleged cowardice, without any tangible basis, is of significance, not for him, but for his opponents.

But the furious attacks on Münzer made by the advocates of reaction have themselves proved the most powerful means of keeping his memory green among the populace of Germany, and of preserving their undiminished sympathy for him.

In the eyes of the German working-classes Münzer was and is the most brilliant embodiment of heretical communism.

Chapter 5 |