A Chronological Table of Remarkable Events.

The first emission of Continental money was dated May 10, 1775, but was not really issued into actual circulation till some months afterwards, but the quantity multiplied so fast that it became somewhat alarming at the time when this essay was written.

The citizen, at the time of writing this, had no conception that the continental money could continue to be a quick currency at 500 for 1, and finally run itself out to nothing, and die, not only without any tumult, but with the general satisfaction of the people.

No estimate of the current cash of the Thirteen States had been made on any sure data when this essay was published, but it was generally computed at about 30,000,000 of dollars, which is somewhat less than one third of the current cash of Great Britain; but on a more critical examination of the subject, this computation appeared much too high: perhaps, about 12,000,000 of dollars may be near the truth.

However plain the necessity of a tax at that time to prevent the excessive increase of the continental money, may appear to us now, it was then not so clear; for after many debates in Congress, that measure was not adopted for a long time. I am told, one member of Congress rose during those debates with this exclamation, “Do you think, Gentlemen, that I will consent to load my constituents with taxes, when we can send to our printer, and get a waggon-load of money, one quire of which will pay for the whole?”

The pressures of the war, together with the vast increase of Continental money had for a considerable time before this Essay was wrote, raised the nominal price of all goods, to a most alarming degree; to remedy which the most unhappy expedient had been adopted in most of the states, of regulating or limiting the prices at which goods should be sold, with high penalties on those who should sell at higher prices than those limited; and those ordinances were carried into such rigid execution, that many stores were forced open, and the goods sold at the limited prices, by committees, &c. when the owners refused to sell them at those prices; and much pains was taken to load the merchants with scandal and obloquy for combinations to raise the price of goods, depreciate the currency, &c. they were called Tories, Speculators, and many other hard names, &c. &c.

This was a proposal for a subscription and immediate advance of money, to be discounted on their future taxes of the subscribers.

No taxes had hitherto been collected, or other funds but Continental money and loans, provided for supporting the war, which had lasted four years, nor had any methods been adopted either to lessen the quantity of that money, or even to prevent the increase of it, except the institution of the Loan-Office, October 3, 1776, which proved a remedy altogether inadequate to the purpose, and of course the emissions of that paper were multiplied, which together with the emissio is of the particular states, swolled the quantity so much that the depreciation at that time (July 24, 1779) became very alarming; it was about 20 to 1, i. e. one dollar hard money would buy 20 dollars continental: the annual expense of supporting an army of 50,000 men and a small navy, amounted to at least ten millions of Mexican dollars.

That Congress should ever think of supporting that expense with such funds, or that it should be possible to do it, may seem strange to foreigners, and will appear so to our own posterity; but the universal rage and zeal of the people through all the states, for an emancipation from a power that claimed a right to bind them in all cases whatsoever, supplied all defects, and made apparent impossibilities, really practicable.

This idea of forming a scale of depreciation, I believe was the first ever proposed in America, and was much censured and even reprobated at first, but soon afterwards was adopted by Congress and all the States.

Congress, about this time, published a sort of sunding system, in which they proposed (and plighted the public faith with solemnity enough too, for) the payment of the public debt in eighteen years.

It is to be observed here that it was not the practice of Congress under the old confederation, to institute taxes by any direct acts of their own, but they calculated the sums wanted, and made requisitions of them from the several States, in such proportions or quotas as were made pro re nata, as no established quotas, or rules of forming them, were settled. There was much conversation about this time and many debates in Congress, concerning the rule or principle on which the estimates of the quotas of each State should be fixed; and sundry modes of this estimation were adopted by Congress, with various alterations and amendments, till at last the long debated matter was settled by the new Constitution (article I.) on the principle here proposed, with a small variation respecting Negroes and Indians.

N. B. This matter was taken up again, and the principle or rule of estimation here proposed, discussed and proved more fully in a future Dissertation.

Taxes in kind are taxes to be paid, not in cash, but in necessaries for the army, such as flour, beef, rum, clothing, &c. &c. A scheme of this sort was brisk a-foot, among other wild projects, about this time.

A small loan had been negotiated a little before this time in France, and further loans in France, Spain, and Holland were proposed, and urged in and out of Congress with great earnestness and zeal. This seems to have been a period of distress and madness.

I believe this was the first proposal made in America, for the appointment of such an officer; I was so much convinced of the importance of such an appointment, that I repeated the proposal in several subsequent publications, and about a year after this, at the particular desire of some members of Congress, published an essay on the nature, authority, and uses of this office.

The first recommendation of Congress to the States to raise money by a tax (which I recollect) was on Jan. 14, 1777; but this was done in so indefinite a manner, without any sums or quotas specified, that little or nothing came of it.

In Nov. 22, 1777, Congress recommended to the States to raise 5,000,000 of dollars in the course of the year 1778, in quarterly payments, with the quotas of each State annexed, &c. but this had little effect; small sums were raised and paid by some of the States, within the year 1778; others made some remittances long afterwards, when the money was 20 for 1, or more, &c. but great part was never paid at all.—In the address of Congress to the people of the United States, May 8, 1778, is this expression: “What are the reasons that your money is depreciated? Because no taxes have been imposed to carry on the war.”

Jan. 2, 1779, Congress resolved, that the States be called on for their quotas of 15,000,000 of dollars, to be raised by taxes for the year 1779, and of 6,000,000 of dollars to be raised annually for 18 years, commencing with the year 1780; as a fund for sinking loans and emissions, paying interest, &c.

May 21, 1779, Congress resolved, that the States should be called on for their quotas of the further sum of 45,000,000 of dollars, to be paid into the Continental Treasury before the 1st of Jan. 1780.

Oct. 6, 1779, they further resolved, that the States be called on to raise their respective quotas of 15,000,000 of dollars, monthly; to be paid into the Continental Treasury on the 1st day of Feb. 1780, and on the 1st day day of each following month up to Oct. 1st, inclusive; i. e. 15,000,000 of dollars per month for 9 months successively, beginning with Feb. 1780.

This provision for the year 1780, if continued thro’ the year, would have amounted to 180,000,000 of dollars; to which if we add the annual 6,000,000 for that year, it would raise the sum to 186,000,000 of dollars; which, had it been rigidly and effectually collected (as might be expected; for every body by this time, both in and out of Congress, seemed pretty much in earnest for effectual taxes) I say, had this sum been rigidly collected, it would doubtless have produced a very destructive and very useless appreciation of the currency, which it was my object in this Essay to prevent and avoid.

For, by fixing the money at 40 for 1 (which was the true exchange at that time) and directing the taxes to be paid either in hard money or Continental bills at that exchange, it would be manifestly impossible to raise or depress the Continental money above or below that exchange, let the demand for it be increased ever so much. A want of demand might have reduced the value of the Continental money (as was afterwards in fact the case) but an increase of demand never could raise the value of it above that exchange.

Nor could such a regulation be oppressive or burdensome to the States, as hard money was at that time extremely plenty; which was occasioned by large sums by various means coming from the English army at New-York, and spreading thro’ the States; also by large sums remitted by France to their army and navy then here; also by large importations of hard money from the Havannah and other places abroad; so that hard money was never more plenty or more easily collected than at that time.

It may be objected to this calculation, that 33,000,000 of the 140,000,000 of dollars emitted in 1779, were for exchanging the emissions of May 20, 1777 (8,000,000 of dollars) and of April 11, 1778 (25,000,000) which were called out of circulation; but this does not diminish but increases the loss by depreciation, which the States suffered in that year; for the whole 140,000,000 were really emitted (it matters not on what occasion) and all that the bills sunk in value by depreciation from the time of emission to the end of that year, was lost by the States.

And as to the 33,000,000 of the said two emissions called in, it is to be observed, that on the last day of the year 1778, they were worth at 6 for 1 (which was the exchange at that time) 5,500,000 of hard dollars; but on Aug. 1, 1779 (the day appointed by Congress for their redemption) the exchange was 20 for 1, and of course they were worth but about 1,700,000, which, subtracted from their value on the last of the year 1778 (5,500,000 hard dollars) leaves a loss of 3,800,000 of hard dollars, which the States suffered that year by the depreciation of the said two emissions only.

This proves the prodigious strength of the American States, and the very great buraens they can bear, as well as their firmness and patience in bearing them.

Indeed in the above calculations a very heavy, impoverishing part of their burdens was not brought into the account, viz. over and above what is there mentioned, they had to support a tex which the war itself imposed, more than four times as heavy as all the present duties of impost, with all the new additions, which the States now support, i. e. multiply the present impost laid on every article of imported goods by 4, and add the product to the old price-current of the same goods in 1774, and it will not raise them so high as the average price at which the same imported goods were sold thro’ the war.

Add to this the losses which were sustained by the extreme scarcity and want of some necessary articles, e. g. much meat was spoiled and lost for want of salt to preserve it; many trades and manufactures were either wholly stopped or greatly diminished for want of materials, &c.

To all this may be added the dire effects of the depreciation of the currency on all debts and money-contracts, all fees, salaries, taxes, fines, &c. &c. Also the distresses and losses arising from the limitations of the market, the ruinous effects of which were innumerable, and in many instances shocking and almost tragical.

Another hardship very sensibly felt, was the force which was used with all descriptions of men in seizing their goods, waggons, stock, grain, cattle, timber, and every thing else which was wanted for the public service; most of which, if ever paid for, were paid in certificates, or depreciated money, the real value or exchange of which at the time bore but small proportion to the value of the supplies for which they were given.

The bad management of the finances, and of course their deficiency, made some of these methods indeed necessary to carry on the war; but at the same time they operated not only by way of great injury and oppression of individuals, but as a very heavy tax on the States.

Under all the forementioned pressures, a murmur at the expense of the war was scarcely heard, but the last mentioned incidental evils and hardships were matters of very great and universal complaint.

To all these direful sufferings may be added the captures, the ravages and depredations, the burnings and plunders of the enemy, which were very terrible and extensive; they had possession first or last, in the course of the war, of eleven of the capitals of the Thirteen States, pervaded the country in every part, and left dreadful tracks of their marches behind them; burned in cool blood a great number, not only of houses, barns, mills, &c. but also of most capital towns and villages.

The losses arising from all these, which were really sastained by the American States, must be immense.

Yet all this notwithstanding, such are the riches, strength, and resources of the States, that had any prudence in their finances and police been adopted and practised from even the close of the war, our country would by this time have recovered itself, and might have possessed and enjoyed all the blessings of general prosperity and full supplies.

But whilst we rejoice in the riches and strength of our country, we have reason to lament, with tears of the deepest regret, the most pernicious shift of property which the above mentioned irregularities of our finances introduced, and the many thousands of fortunes which were ruined by it; the generous, patriotic spirits suffered the injury; the avaricious and idle derived benefit from the said confusion.

The exchange of the currency at the end of the year 1780, without the presses, or additional emissions, was up to 75 to 1; but no man can tell what it would have been, had the presses kept going thro’ that year.

Indeed the final redemption of the Continental money began to be much doubted, or rather considered desperate, about that time, which increased the depreciation far beyond what the quantity only in circulation would have produced, for the value of the whole of it at the end of the year 1780 (when the exchange was 75 for 1) was less than 3,000,000 of hard dollars, which is not more than one fourth part of the current cash of the States.

To this Essay, when first published, the following preface was prefixed, viz. “The urging taxes, I know very well, is an unpopular task, and generally meets a sour reception and very little thanks; but the belly must be fed, or all the members must perish, and it is not possible it should convey nutriment which it does not receive. When we find a general decay and weakness spreading into every limb and nerve of the body, it is time to attend very seriously to the malady, and every other consideration must give place to the remedy. If there is a disorder or worm in the bowels which devours much of the food, it is a sad circumstance indeed, but still the belly must be fed, while we are taking every method in our power to extract or kill the worm. Truth, however disagreeable, will force itself into notice and attention, and to know it is always safer than to be deceived; our deception or ignorance will not retard the hasty steps of ruin. The man who points out the real distresses and dangers or errors of the State, does not make them; the knowledge of them tends to a remedy. I therefore hope my humble attempt may be received with candour, however disagreeable the subject, a present and diligent attention to which, I conceive absolutely necessary to the public safety. If any man can avoid my propositions, or substitute better, he may serve the public, and will not diseblige me.”

The substance of said act is as follows, viz.

1. The monthly tax of 15,000,000 of dollars, from Feb. to Aug. 1780 (recommended to the States, Oct. 7, 1779) is continued to the 1st of April, 1781, inclusive.

2. That hard money be receivable in payment of said tax, at the rate of 1 Mexican dollar in lieu of 40 Continental dollars.

3. That the Continental bills paid in for said tax, except for the months of Jan. and Feb. 1779, be not re-issued, but destroyed.

4. That as fast as those bills shall be brought in to be destroyed (and other funds shall be established for other bills) other bills be issued, not to exceed on any account one twentieth part of the nominal sum of the bills brought in to be destroyed.

5. That the new bills which shall be issued, be redeemable in specie within 6 years from Jan. 1, 1781, and bear an interest of 6 per cent. to be paid in specie at the redemption of the bills, or, at the election of the holders, in sterling bills of exchange, at 4s. 6d. sterling per dollar.

6. That the said new bills issue on the funds of individual States to be established for that purpose, and be signed by persons appointed by them.

7. That the United States be likewise pledged for the payment of such of said bills, as shall be signed by those States, who, by the events of the war, shall be rendered incapable to redeem them; which undertaking of Congress shall be endorsed on said bills, and be signed by a commissioner of Congress.

8. That the several States shall receive 6 tenths of the bills which they sign, for their own use, and that the remaining 4 tenths shall be subject to the orders of Congress, but shall be credited to the several States who signed them.

9. That the said new bills be received in taxes at the same rate as specie.

10. That the several States be called on to provide effectual funds to sink 1 sixth part of their respective quotas, annually, after Jan. 1, 1781.

11. That this act be despatched to the Executive of the several States, to be laid before their Assemblies, who are requested, as soon as possible to previde certain funds for the purposes of it, and take every other measure to carry it into full and vigorous effect.

In my Fourth Essay on Trade and Finance, published Feb. 10, 1780, I calculated the exchange of Continental money at that time to be 40 for 1, and strongly urged the fixture of it at that exchange, that the fatal mischiefs of a fluctuating currency, either by appreciation or depreciation, might be avoided.

From this I suppose that some people have surmised that the first idea and original plan of this act was formed by me and suggested to Congress, and my opinion here expressed, “that the States ought to adopt it without hesitation,” confirms their conjecture: this induces me to observe some things on this matter, viz.

1. This act was not the absurd, inefficient, and ridiculous thing, which some people have represented it to be; there was no error in its principle; it wanted nothing to complete its purposes but decided support and effectual execution. The taxes then instituted by Congress, with the arrearages of former requisitions, would have been (if punctually paid) sufficient to call in every bili of the old money, and a large sum of the new bills, in the course of one year, and would doubtless have raised such a demand for what remained, as would have kept up its value, and prevented any depreciation.

Yet, 2d, I did not approve of it, but in all conversations I had with Members of Congress, whilst it was under debate, I constantly opposed it; principally because I did not expect, as the state of things then was, that it would receive that support and vigorous execution which was necessary to give it a due effect.

The people of the States at that time had been worried and fretted, disappointed and put out of humor by so many tender-acts, limitations of prices, and other compulsory methods to sorce value into paper money, and compel the circulation of it, and by so many vain funding schemes, declarations, and promises, all which issued from Congress, but died under the most zealous efforts to put them into operation and effect, that their patience was all exhausted; I say, these irritations and disappointments had so destroyed the courage and confidence of the people, that they appeared heartless and almost stupid when their attention was called to any new propositions.

Besides all this, I had objections to several clauses of the act, viz. our people were pretty well accustomed to the old bills (bad as they were) but to call them all in, and substitute a new sort in their stead, I thought would be a novelty that might have danger in it; at least, it would require great expense, time, &c. and all to very little use or benefit; for the same energy of taxation absolutely necessary to support the credit of the new bills, would be quite sufficient to make such demand for the old ones as would prevent their further depreciation, and receiving hard money in their stead at 40 for 1, would prevent their appreciation.

I could not see any benefit in the signature of the States, and seared this might bring into doubt the full powers of Congress to issue bills, or do any other like acts under their own signature.

Nor could I see any advantage arising from the interest annexed to the bills; it being payable six years afterwards would create mighty little inducement to their present circulation; but if the bills succeeded, this would greatly increase the price of their final redemption.

But I had another material objection to the act; for when I calculated the exchange, Feb. 10, 1780, it was really 40 to 1; but when this act passed, viz. the 18th of March following, the exchange had increased to 60 for 1, and consequently, all the provisions of the act which related to the exchange, became essentially wrong, and of course rendered the act itself utterly impracticable, without new provisions conformable to the exchange which really existed at the time, or making all the requisitions of the act in hard money or Continental bills of the same value, i. e. at any exchange that should exist at the time of payment.

But notwithstanding all this, when the bill was actually past, and the revenues and supplies of the year depended on its success, I readily offered my little mite of aid to give it an effectual operation, as I suppose any Member of Congress would and ought to do, when it was past, tho’ he opposed it in every stage, whilst under debate.

Nov. 19, 1779, Congress earnestly recommended to the several States, “forthwith to enact laws for a general limitation of prices, to commence from the 1st day of Feb. (then) next,” on the principle of the exchange of the currency being at 20 for 1.

The real exchange when this resolution passed, was 38 for 1; and on Feb. (when their limitation was to commence) the real exchange was 47 for 1.

Various other methods equally idle and visionary were set on foot about this time to fix the currency, such as, modifying the loan-office with many proposals of supposed advantage, exclamations and threats against such as refused to sell their property for Continental money, setting on soot subscriptions for supplying the Treasury, &c. vide Journal of Congress.

The fatal error, that the credit and currency of the Continental money could be kept up and supported by acts of compulsion, entered so deep into the mind of Congress and of all departments of administration thro’ the States, that no considerations of justice, religion, or policy, or even experience of its utter inefficacy, could eradicate it; it seemed to be a kind of obstinate delirium, totally deaf to every argument drawn from justice and right, from its natural tendency and mischief, from common sense, and even common safety.

Congress began, as early as Jan. 11, 1776, to hold up and recommend this maxim of maniasm, when Continental money was but 5 months old (for its actual circulation commenced the beginning of August 1775, tho’ the bills were dated May 10, preceding, that being the first day of that session of Congress) Congress then resolved, that “whoever should refuse to receive in payment, Continental bills, &c. should be deemed and treated as an enemy of his country, and be precluded from all trade and intercourse with the inhabitants,” &c. i. e. should be outlawed; which is the severest penalty (except of life and limb) known in our laws.

This ruinous principle was continued in practice for five successive years, and appeared in all shapes and forms, i. e. in tender-acts, in limitations of prices, in awful and threatening declarations, in penal laws with dreadful and ruinous punishments, and in every other way that could be devised, and all executed with a relentless severity, by the highest authorities then in being, viz. by Congress, by Assemblies and Conventions of the States, by committees of inspection (whose powers in those days were nearly sovereign) and even by military force; and tho’ men of all descriptions stood trembling before this monster of force, without daring to lift a hand against it, during all this period, yet its unrestrained energy ever proved ineffectual to its purposes, but in every instance increased the evils it was designed to remedy, and destroyed the benefits it was intended to promote; at best its utmost effect was like that of water sprinkled on a blacksmith’s forge, which indeed deadens the flame for a moment, but never fails to increase the beat and force of the internal fire. Many thousand families of full and easy fortune were ruined by these fatal measures, and lie in ruins to this day, without the least benefit to the country, or to the great and noble cause in which we were then engaged.

I do not mention these things from any pleasure I have in opening the wounds of my country, or exposing its errors, but with a hope that our fatal mistakes may be a caution and warning to future financiers, who may live and act in any country which may happen to be in circumstances similar to ours at that time.

N. B. The act of Nov. 29, 1780, herein referred to, was passed into a law, Dec. 19, 1780.

The Assembly of Pennsylvania, by their act of April 3, 1781, made a scale of depreciation, by which all debts, accounts, contracts, &c. were to be adjusted and settled.

The money here meant is resolve-money, shilling-money, and in short, all bills of this State, dated prior to 1778; the nominal amount was great indeed, but the value was so reduced by the depreciation (the exchange being at about 100 for 1) that a small tax of hard money would have sunk or redeemed it all.

The new State bills were such as were dated since 1778, of which the Island money (100,000l.) was the principal emission then extant; but an addition of 500,000l. more was made afterwards with tender, April 7, 1781.

Our circumstances were extremely dreary at this time; the enemy pressed us very hard; the burden of the war seemed insupportable; our visionary revenues all failed; and our public counsels (tho’ all firm and united in the great idea of establishing our independence at all events, and of sacrificing every other consideration to this most capital object) yet, I say, our counsels were much divided in opinion with respect to the means of obtaining it.

Schemes and projects various enough, and some of them wild enough, were proposed and urged; the great difficulty lay in the deficiency of the revenue; ways and means of procuring money engrossed every one’s attention.

Among other things the scheme of negotiating immense loans in Europe, had long been proposed and at this time began to gain ground in Congress; and the ruling powers of Pennsylvania, seemed disposed to adopt the same idea for the particular supplies of their own treasury.

This raised in every body the alarming idea of an immense foreign debt, which would drain the country for ages to pay the interest, with little hopes of getting clear of it, by ever paying the principal.

The horrors of this almost swallowed up the dreadful apprehensions of the domestic debt, for the burden of this still lay heavy on the public mind; for the idea of sinking it by depreciation had not yet gained establishment in the public opinion. The author of these Essays, from first to last, reprobated every idea of foreign loans beyond a sum sufficient to purchase such articles in Europe, as were essentially necessary for us, and which could not be procured among ourselves.

He thought the resources of the country were by no means exhausted, and that by proper wisdom and exertion, we could much better furnish all necessary supplies within ourselves, than by loans abroad.

This idea he not only adopted fully himself, but endeavoured to impress it on his countrymen to the utmost of his power, by every argument and means of conviction which he could possibly lay before them.

Tho’ the principle of the American revolution was perfectly just, and the necessity of adopting it unavoidable, yet the same great evil and inconvenience happened in the course of it, which, I conceive, always did take place, more or less, in all public commotions and revolutions which have existed in all States in the world; viz. that many very improper men worked themselves somehow or other into places of great trust and importance, both in the legislative and executive departments; by which the vices, the whims, the wild projections, and visionary plans of individuals became diffused and almost incorporated into the character, counsels, laws, and administration of the States.

Such men are ever dangerous, but most peculiarly so in times of general calamity and distress, when wisdom, fortitude, and prudence are most indispensably necessary in rulers and leading men. But however unfortunate our States have been in that respect, they were still happy in this, that the evil did not reach their most capital departments; the army, foreign affairs, and, in most instances, the presidency of Congress were under the direction of men of most unblemished integrity, adequate abilities, and most consummate prudence; and had not our confusions been in some degree under their check, it is hard to say to what lengths they might have extended.

Every reader will easily observe, that the grand principle of revenue every where recommended in these Essays is this, viz. an actual recourse to the solid wealth of the States for the public supplies, i. e. a tax of sure product, payable in hard money or paper at the exchange which should be current at the time of payment; and this tax must be so really productive as to be equal to the expenditures. These are the means here referred to, on which the States could safely rest, and all visionary projects (which multiplied in abundance at this time) would of course vanish before the true means of our deliverance, and become soon as manifestly useless as they were really vain and ridiculous.

The office of Superintendant of finance was first created by resolution of Congress, Feb. 7, 1781; and on the 20th of the same month, Robert Morris, esq. was appointed by vote of Congress to execute the office under the name of Superintendant of finance, tho’ he was commonly called the financier-general, or simply the financier.

He continued in the office till Nov. 1, 1784, when he resigned, and no successor has been since appointed under that name; (the business of the treasury was put into commission afterwards, and continued so till the dissolution of the old Congress) but I take it that the same office is revived and continued by the present Congress under a new name, viz. that of Secretary of the treasury; which office is at present held by Alexander Hamilton, esq. and the appointment of this officer lies (among others) in the President of the United States, with the approbation of the Senate.

We had many tumults during mr. Reed’s administration; the most memorable of which was, the riotous assault of mr. Wilson’s house, Oct. 4, 1779, in which the mob proceeded from insulting language and violent abuse, to actual firing with muskets, with which they were all armed.

A great number of most respectable citizens, who were in the house, returned the fire on the mob, and in fine, a number of lives were lost.

Many of these rioters were taken up, and held under legal prosecution for their offence; but the Assembly, by their act of March 13th following, indemnified and pardoned them all.

The facts referred to in these Essays were, at the time of their publication, fresh in every one’s memory, and matters of general notoriety; but that is not the case with strangers, or even our own people, at this distance of time; therefore a statement of these facts may be necessary to enable the reader to understand these remarks, and the reasonings on them.

The Assembly of Pennsylvania, 25th of March, 1780, issued 100,000l. paper bills, funded on the faith of the State, some city lots, and the Province Island, which at that time belonged to the State (hence this emission was called Island money;) they also issued the bills on interest at 5 per cent. per annum.

These bills, thus propped up, were ushered into the world with great confidence of the Assembly. They, however, passed in a depreciated state, much below their nominal value: to remedy which, a subsequent act was passed, Dec. 23, 1780, by which these bills were made “a legal tender; with penalties for refusing to take them for goods, &c. viz. forfeiture of double the value offered; and for the second offence, of half the offender’s lands, goods, and chattels, and imprisonment of his person during the war.”

This act had several uncommon clauses inserted in it, viz.

1. That agents for the public, collectors of taxes, &c. should account to the treasury for such of these bills as they had received, at the price or rate at which they received them, i. e. at their depreciated value.

2. That the exchange, till Feb. 1, then next, between Continental currency and these bills, should be 75 for 1; but the real exchange of Continental to hard money was 100 for 1, at that time.

3. The Executive Council were empowered and required to publish the rate of exchange between specie and Continental money, in the first week of every month after said Feb. 1: and

4. That exchange, so published, should be the exchange between Contimental money and these bills. On May 2, 1781, the current exchange of these bills to hard money was 3 for 1, and to Continental, was 75 for 1; but the exchange of hard money for Continental was about 220 or 225 for 1; and the practice was, to multiply the exchange of the State bills reduced to Continental, by their exchange with hard money, viz. 3; which gave 225 Continental for the value of one hard dollar.

At this time, the Council declared the rate of exchange of hard money for the month of May, to be 175 for 1, which was the same thing (according to the operation of the said act of the 23d of Dec. 1780) as declaring the exchange of the State bills to Continental to be 175 for 1; and the practice still continued of multiplying the State money reduced to Continental, which was now become 175 for 1, by its hard money exchange, viz. 3; which made the exchange of Continental money three times 175, viz. 525 for 1 of hard; a vast and sudden leap indeed, and which became the current exchange in less than a week from the declaration of the exchange by the Council.

So that every person who had one week before given a hard dollar for 225 Continental ones, found that he had lost above half the value of his money, as it would, at the end of the week, purchase but 3-7ths of a hard dollar.

This made a mighty noise, and deeply affected every body; as Contitinental money was then the general currency, and all prices in market were set or estimated in it, as much as they were in old Tenor at Boston, at the close of the last French war in 1763.

This roused the feelings of mr. Reed, who was President of the State at that time, and was supposed to be the prime mover, not only of the said declaration of Council, but of the act on which it was grounded, and induced him to publish his defence of said declaration, on which these remarks were made.

The error really lay in the absurdity of the law itself, which limited the State money to a certain exchange of Continental (viz. 75 to 1) with such variations of exchange of hard money, as should be published by Council the first week in every month; which exchange of hard money, by the operation of the act, became the legal exchange of the State bills, and of course raised their exchange 4-7ths higher than the real, true exchange of them was at that time, and made them bring indeed more than double the Continental money which they would have purchased before, but did not enable them to buy any more hard money than before.

Had the Council pursued the act, they might have been excused; but their error lay in declaring a false exchange of hard money, much below the true one, with design, by way of trimming and bending facts, to reduce a little the absurd effects of the act itself. The true exchange of Continental for hard money, the first week in Feb. 1781, was about 100 for 1, where it had stood several months; in March it was about 115 to 1, and in the beginning of April, 130; but rose fast thro’ the month, and got up to 220, the first week in May.

These exchanges and the interesting effects of every variation of them, will appear to a stranger as intricate and hard to understand as the price of stocks in Change-alley; but they were perfectly understood by people of all ranks at that time, in as much as every variation of the exchange altered the value of all their cash on hand.

One thing makes these manœuvres very important, viz. they not only raised the exchange of Continental money up to 500 or 600 to 1, but in a few days stopped the currency of the Continental bills intirely, after which they never passed at all as money; or any otherwise than as an article of speculation, at most desultory and capricious exchanges from 400 to 1000 for 1.

The same cause so disgusted the minds of all men with paper bills of all sorts, that our State money (tho’ undoubtedly well funded) depreciated in less than a month to 6 and 7 to 1; the final redemption of which, by a future appreciation, cost this State above 120,000l. tho’ we never received more than 20, or at most, 30,000l. real value for it.

Perhaps this whole transaction affords the most striking proof conceivable, of the absurdity of all attempts to fix the value of money by a law, or any other methods of compulsion.

In this instance we see the Continental money mortally wounded, and our State money debilitated and depreciated down to a seventh part of its nominal value, by the very ill-fated means which were designed to support both of them.

Thus fell, ended, and died, the Continental currency, aged 6 years; the most powerful state engine, and the greatest prodigy of revenue, and of the most mysterious, uncontrollable, and almost magical operation, ever known or heard of in the political or commercial world; bubbles of a like sort which have happened in other countries, such as the Mississippi scheme in France, the South-Sea in England, &c. lasted but a few months, and then burst into nothing; but this held out much longer, and seemed to retain a vigorous constitution to its last, for its circulation was never more brisk and quick than when its exchange was 500 to 1; yet it expired without one groan or struggle; and I believe, of all things which ever suffered dissolution since life was first given to the creation, this mighty monster died the least lamented.

Yet I hear that some folks are preparing to dig the skeleton of it out of the grave where it has quietly rested 9 years, that we may have the pleasure of wasting a million or two upon its obsequies.

If it saved the State; it has also polluted the equity of our laws; turned them into engines of oppression and wrong; corrupted the justice of our public administration; destroyed the fortunes of thousands who had most confidence in it; enervated the trade, husbandry, and manufactures of our country; and went far to destroy the morality of our people; after all this, I wish it might be suffered to lie where it is, in a state of quiet oblivion, yea, perfectly forgotten; for I think that every remembrance of it must be mixed with bitterness.

I hope the reader will excuse this small digression; for when I came to the spot where the poor old Continental died, I could not help stopping to mark the place with some little signal of notice.

Timoleon was an angry writer, who appeared in the Freeman’s Journal of May 16, 1781, in vindication of the resolve of Council on which the foregoing Remarks (of the Citizen) were made.

I ever supposed the author to be President Reed; but as he chose to shroud himself in darkness, and the printer would not give up his name, I did not think myself under any obligation to address him in a style or manner due to the first officer of the State; but, with the greatest freedom, treated the performance according to the merit of it.

But whoever was the author, the arguments (such as they were) are considered in these Strictures; but where the author was mean enough to leave the merits of the matter, and descend to low scurrility and personal abuse, I passed over it, as it was of no consequence to the public; and only remarked on one or two scandalous personal imputations, which I never before heard of from any body but himself.

In fine, the fatal importance of the facts, not any personal animosity, was at that time my sole motive for making my Remarks and Strictures, and is now the same for re-publishing them.

By resolve of Council, May 4, 1781, collectors of taxes, sines, &c. are directed to receive them in the following manner, viz. when paid in old Continental money, they are to receive the same sum at which each person stands charged in the duplicate (or tax-book;) but if paid in specie, or State money, or new Continental (i. e. 40 for 1 money) they should receive it at the former exchange of 75 for 1, not according to the new rate of 175 for 1, published by Council, May 2d, i. e. two days before.

This author is fond of finding fault with my manner of writing, complains of indecency, &c. the writings which excite his uneasiness are now before the reader, who will judge whether his censures are well or ill grounded.

I have only to observe for myself, that I ever meant, when writing on serious and grave subjects, to deal in definite ideas and sentiments, and to use such words to express them, as should convey my meaning with the greatest clearness and ease to the reader; polish of expression, or grace of period, is neither my talent nor object; and I suppose, the plainness of my style, especially when it happened to excite his feelings strongly, appeared to him like indecency; but if calling things by their right names, or, as the Datch say, calling a spade, a spade, is indecency, I must bear it as well as I can; and I hope, the clearness of the sense will malte amends for the want of polish in the expression with such readers as are more delighted with the sentiments and ideas of an author, than with the turn of his periods, or the dress of his language; and this is the sort of readers I most wish to please.

When the British troops under the command of general sir William Howe took possession of Philadelphia, Sep. 26, 1777, my whole family then in town was myself and two daughters, the one a little over, and the other under, twenty years of age, and were under such terrors, that I could searce leave them an hour in the day-time.

On the 6th of Feb. 1778, I was taken out of bed at 11 o’clock at night, by orders (as was said) of general Howe, and consined in the public gaol of the city.

I was under great apprehensions that my daughters would go out of their senses, with the fright and their unprotected condition.

I represented my distress in sundry letters to general Howe, to his superintendant of police in the city, and to sundry other officers, with most earnest request that I might be informed of the cause of my imprisonment, and have an opportunity of a hearing before the general, or any court he might appoint; but never could get any answer or knowledge of any crime or fault charged to me, but was held in close consinement till the day preceding the evacuation of the city, 17th June, 1778.

My property to a large amount was likewise seized and conveyed into the king’s stores; part of which I indeed recovered afterwards, but I sustained a final loss of about 500l. value, which I could never recover or obtain any compensation for.

And more than all this, my long and close consinement so injured my health, and impaired my constitution, that I am not yet, nor ever expect to be, restored to the state of sound health which I enjoyed before that grievous oppression.

From these circumstances (which were well known to President Reed, and the whole city) we may judge with what rancor and malignancy of heart it could be suggested by Timoleon, that my intercourse with the British troops was friendly and confidential, or my consinement collusive, and of my own seeking, that I might plead the merit of it with my countrymen after the British were gone.

Phocion appeared in the Freeman’s Journal of May 30, 1781, when, in answer to my challenge, he, with great triumph, produced Robert Morris, esq. who, he says, advised publishing the exchange at 75 for 1, in April last; which, if true, would have been nothing to the purpose.

But he appeared again in the Journal of June 6, with a recantation of what he had published about mr. Morris.—Impartial appeared in the same paper of May 30, and is, I suppose, the same person with Timoleon and Phocion, or, which comes to about the same thing, some heated partisan of the same cast.

He set out with blackening the Citizen and all the Republican party with rancor enough, and concludes with a labored panegyric of mr. Reed’s government. Any body who wishes to see any of these pieces, may find them in the Freeman’s Journal, as above quoted.

It may be worth notice here, that the tender-act which was to be supported by the precious plan of regulating the exchange month by month by the definitions and publications of the Council, and the vain and ridiculous attempts of the Council to put the same into execution (all which make the subject of these remarks and publications) I say, the said tender-act and subsequent resolutions produced such unexpected, wild, and pernicious effects, as not only gave a mortal wound to the Continental money, but proved also to be the last efforts, the dying struggles of the whole system of tenderacts, of limitations of prices of goods, of regulating the market, and defining the value of money by laws and acts of force.

For we find that the Assembly of Pennsylvania, with the recommendation of Congress, on June 2, 1781, repealed all the tender-acts then existing in that State, and discharged all penalties and forfeitures annexed to them, and the like was done about the same time in all the other States.

And so strongly is the injustice of that wild system impressed on the general mind, that it is an article in most of the constitutions since published, that all contracts shall be fulfilled according to the true and honest intention of them.

Forming a plan of confederation, or a system of general government of the United States, engrossed the attention of Congress from the declaration of independence, July 4, 1776, till the same was completed by Congress, July 9, 1778, and recommended to the several States for ratification, which finally took place, March 1, 1781; from which time the said confederation was considered as the grand constitution of the general government, and the whole administration was conformed to it.

And as it had stood the test of discussion in Congress for two years, before they completed and adopted it, and in all the States for three years more, before it was finally ratified, one would have thought that it must have been a very finished and perfect plan of government.

But on trial of it in practice, it was found to be extremely weak, defective, totally inefficient, and altogether inadequate to its great ends and purposes. For,

1. It blended the legislative and executive powers together in one body.

2. This body, viz. Congress, consisted of but one house, without any check upon their resolutions.

3. The powers of Congress in very few instances were definitive and final; in the most important articles of government they could do no more than recommend to the several States; the consent of every one of which was necessary to give legal sanction to any act so recommended.

4. They could essess and levy no taxes.

5. They could institute and execute no punishments, except in the military department.

6. They had no power of deciding or controlling the contentions and disputes of different States with each other.

7. They could not regulate the general trade: or,

8. Even make laws to secure either public treaties with foreign States, or the persons of public ambassadors, or to punish violations or injuries done to either of them.

9. They could institute no general judiciary powers.

10. They could regulate no public roads, canals, or inland navigation, &c. &c. &c.

And what caps all the rest was, that (whilst under such an inefficient political constitution, the only chance we had of any tolerable administration lay wholly in the prudence and wisdom of the men who happened to take the lead in our public councils) it was fatally provided by the absurd doctrine of rotation, that if any Member of Congress by three years’ experience and application, had qualified himself to manage our public affairs with consistency and fitness, that he should be constitutionally and absolutely rendered incapable of serving any longer, till by three years’ discontinuance, he had pretty well lost the cue or train of the public counsels, and forgot the ideas and plans which made his services useful and important; and, in the mean time, his place should be supplied by a fresh man, who had the whole matter to learn, and when he had learned it, was to give place to another fresh man; and so on to the end of the chapter.

The sensible mind of the United States, by long experience of the fatal mischiefs of anarchy, or (which is about the same thing) of this ridiculous, inefficient form of government, began to apprehend that there was something wrong in our policy, which ought to be redressed and mended; but nobody undertook to delineate the necessary amendments.

I was then pretty much at leisure, and was fully of opinion (tho’ the sentiment at that time would not very well bear) that it would be ten times easier to form a new constitution than to mend the old one. I therefore sat myself down to sketch out the leading principles of that political constitution, which I thought necessary to the preservation and happiness of the United States of America, which are comprised in this Dissertation.

I hope the reader will please to consider, that these are the original thoughts of a private individual, dictated by the nature of the subject only, long before the important theme became the great object of discussion, in the most dignified and important assembly, which ever sat or decided in America.

At the time when this Dissertation was written (Feb. 16, 1783) the defects and insufficiency of the Old Federal Constitution were universally felt and acknowledged; it was manifest, not only that the internal police, justice, security, and peace of the States could never be preserved under it, but the finances and public credit would necessarily become so embarrassed, precarious, and void of support, that no public movement, which depended on the revenue, could be managed with any effectual certainty: but tho’ the public mind was under full conviction of all these mischiefs, and was contemplating a remedy, yet the public ideas were not at all concentrated, much less arranged into any new system or form of government, which would obvrate these evils. Under these circumstances I offered this Dissertation to the public: how far the principles of it were adopted or rejected in the New Constitution, which was four years afterwards (Sep. 17, 1787) formed by the General Convention, and since ratified by all the States, is obvious to every one.

I wish here to remark the great particulars of my plan which were rejected by the Convention.

1. My plan was to keep the legistative and executive departments entirely distinct; the one to consist of the two houses of Congress, the other to rest entirely in the Grand Council of State.

2. I proposed to introduce a Chamber of Commerce, to consist of merchants, who should be consulted by the legislature in all matters of trade and revenue, and which should have the conducting the revenue committed to them.

The first of these the Convention qualified; the second they say nothing of, i. e. take no notice of it.

3. I proposed that the great officers of state should have the perusal of all bills, before they were enacted into laws, and should be required to give their opinion of them, as far as they affected the public interest in their several departments; which report of them Congress should cause to be read in their respective houses, and entered on their minutes. This is passed over without notice.

4. I proposed that all public officers appointed by the executive authority, should be amenable both to them and to the legislative power, and removable for just cause by either of them. This is qualified by the Convention.

And in as much as my sentiments in these respects were either qualified or totally neglected by the Convention, I suppose they were wrong; however, the whole matter is submitted to the politicians of the present age, and to our posterity in future.

In sundry other things, the Convention have gone into minutiæ, e. g. respecting elections of President, Senators, and Representatives in Congress, &c. which I proposed to leave at large to the wisdom and discretion of Congress, and of the several States.

Great reasons may doubtless be assigned for their decision, and perhaps some little ones for mine. Time, the great arbiter of all human plans, may, after a while, give his decision; but neither the Convention nor myself will probably live to feel either the exultation or mortification of his approbation or disapprobation of either of our plans.

But if any of these questions should in future time become objects of discussion, neither the vast dignity of the Convention, nor the low, unnoticed state of myself, will be at all considered in the debates; the merits of the matter, and the interests connected with or arising out of it, will alone dictate the decision.

It may be of use to the reader, to advert to some particulars of the state and condition of the country and its revenues, at the time when this Essay was first published.

1. The Continental money had been entirely out of circulation near two years, and all kinds of estimates, payments, and accounts were made in hard money.

2. That the Bank of North-America was instituted by Congress, and pretty well established at Philadelphia: the charter of it bears date Dec. 31, 1781.

3. Very strong exertions had been made to obtain money from the States, by a tax levied on polls and estates in the old and usual way, and such conviction of the necessity of public supplies generally took place thro’ the States, that considerable sums were obtained in this way, and remitted in bank bills to the Financier General, mr. Morris.

But these taxes were levied by the States neither in any due proportion of quotas, nor with any equality of either quantity or punctuality in the payments, and as no power of compulsion was vested in Congress at that time, the supplies fell vastly short of the public exigencies; large loans indeed were negotiated abroad, and many wild and vain schemes for raising money were proposed at home; but all was languor and deficiency.

4. A strong and laborious effort was made by Congress for an impost of only five per cent. on imported goods, which, with great difficulty and delay, was at last ratified by all the States except Rhode-Island, which, by its final negative, frustrated the plan, rendered it wholly void, and it died without any effect.

5. A very considerable foreign debt was contracted, and every department at home was deeply involved, and no payments could be made either at home or abroad; it was with the utmost difficulty that money could be procured for daily supplies, which were absolutely indispensable.

6. Very great arrears were due to the army, and had there not been more patriotic virtue in the army, and greater abilities in their General and other officers, than scarce ever existed before, it would have been impossible to have kept them together, or to have governed them with any proper discipline.

7. We were just upon the close of the war; the peace was expected soon; the preliminary articles of it were indeed settled and signed, Jan. 20, 1783, but the advice of them had not reached America at that time: but,

8. Peace, tho’ the most desirable of all things at that time, yet was clothed with terrors, and the near approach of it excited the most anxious apprehensions.

The murmurs of the army for their pay ran high; there was no money to pay them, yet they were to be dishanded; and whether they would suffer themselves to be dismissed, and sent to their several homes, without their pay, was a question of great importance.

These difficulties were afterwards obviated by the prudence of General Washington, but in a way that harrowed up all his feelings; he ordered small divisions of the army to be marched off to diverse distant places, and then directed them to be dismissed, without any pay indeed, but with a profusion of promises and assurances that speedy provision should be made for the settlement and payment of their accounts.

Commissioners were indeed appointed to settle all unliquidated public accounts, both of the army and other creditors, but no payments were made but in certificates of the debts due, with promise to pay them with interest to the creditor or bearer.

These were worth about 2s. 6d. in the pound, and the circulation of them soon became very great at that exchange: but to return to the time of writing this Essay—

9. Tho’ the public treasury was so very poor and distressed, yet the States were really overrun with an abundance of cash: the French and English armies, our foreign loans, Havanna trade, &c. had filled the country with money, and bills on Europe were currently sold at 20 to 40 per’cent. below par.

10. This induced the merchants to buy these bills, and remit them to Europe, and in return to import great quantities of European goods, which arrived under the great expense of a war freight and insurance; yet their scarcity, the great plenty of cash, and the luxury and pride of the people were such, that they sold rapidly and to great profit; all which made the tax of impost I proposed, very peculiarly necessary at that time for many reasons; not only,

11. To supply the treasury; but,

12. To restrain and check the luxurious consumptions which were growing fast into fashion.

13. To keep up the price of goods, and thereby save the merchants from ruin, or at least, from very great loss, by the reduction of the price of their goods on hand, which would be the natural consequence of the peace.

14. To prevent a deluge of imported goods flowing in upon us, which soon drained the country of its cash, and filled the States with luxury; but the tax would have either prevented the evil, or would have brought an immense sum into the public treasury, which would have eased our public embarrassments.

Perhaps both might have been produced by the tax to such a degree, as would have afforded very great and desirable advantages; but the measure was not adopted, tho’ I believe every one regrets at this day that it was not then pursued.

The principles of it have since been adopted by the new Congress, and tho’ on a much less scale than I proposed, yet we find the tax richly productive, and very little burdensome to our people.

The funding act of Pennsylvania was printed for public consideration some months before it was enacted into a law (March 16, 1785) during which time this Essay was published: the said act directed, among other things,

1. That one year’s interest should be paid by this State on all Continental certificates, which originally issued to any citizen or citizens of this State, &c. with a proviso, that that species of certificates, commonly called final settlements, which should be intitled to interest, should not have been alienated or transferred, but shall remain the property of the original holder, his heirs, &c. (which proviso, in my opinion, ought to have extended to all the other kinds of certificates, as well as to the final settlements:) by this proviso, every possessor of a final settlement, except he was the original holder of it, was excluded from receiving interest.

But I take it, that the true spirit, design, and reason of this proviso was, in a considerable degree, cluded in the subsequent practice; for the statute, among other proofs that the man who claimed interest, was really the original holder, prescribed this one, viz. that such claimant should make oath before a prothonatory, that he was truly the original holder of the certificate, and had not alienated it; and this certificate of the prothonatory of such oath being made, being annexed to the certificate on which interest was demanded, by construction of the statute, entitled the possessor of it to draw interest, tho’ he was not the original holder; by which means very many certificates were sold with such affidavits annexed, and the possessor, tho’ an alience, drew the interest on them as well as if he had been the original holder.

2. A tax was instituted for raising an annual sum of 76,945l. 17s. 6d. and,

3. An emission of 150,000l. in paper money, 50,000l. of which was reserved for a loan-office, and the other 100,000l. together with the aforesaid tax of 76,945l. 17s. 6d. were appropriated to the payment of said year’s interest, and other public purposes. The year’s interest at 6 per cent. paid under this act, amounted to 267,694 dollars, the capital of which, of course, was 4,461,570 dollars, nearly.

This high tax proved a heavy burden upon such of our people as happened to have no certificates on which they could receive interest, and little benefit even to the most of those who had them; for the certificates were monopolized into few hands, and not many of our people drew more interest than would pay their taxes.

And as these heavy sums were mostly paid to such holders of certificates, as had never rendered any services to the State, or contributed any supplies, or had any kind of merit or earnings, on which they could, with any pretence, found their claim to so great a contribution from the public, much uneasiness was generated, and our people found that their labor was vain, in as much as the profits of it were drained from them, for purposes of no use or advantage to them.

For it is to be noted here, that altho’ interest was granted by this act for but one year, yet it was expected to be continued, and really was so, for several years afterwards, by a subsequent act (March 1, 1786) tho’ under a somewhat different form, yet with the same burden as before.

The paper bills emitted by this act never passed as a general currency, but were negotiated in market, like other commodities, at the exchange which they happened to gain, but always in a depreciated state, i. e. at a discount from 10 to 30 per cent.

In fine, this unhappy measure has cost this State already more than 500,000l. and still we are not clear of it.

And, I believe, no man can count up 500d. benefit which the State ever received from it.

I clearly foresaw the mischiess of this satal measure, and to obviate and prevent them was the design of this Essay, and tho’ I did not succeed, yet I have real satisfaction in reilecting that I exerted my utmost abilities, and faithfully porformed my duty in the attempt, tho’ it proved not successful, to avert the calamities of the State of which I am a citizen.

I am told, that in the public debates on this subject which have since taken place, my plan of paying the original creditors in preference to the speculators, was admitted to be just and desirable, but it was objected to and rejected because it was thought impracticable to make the discrimination; and this supposed impracticability was strongly urged and greatly insisted on: on which I beg leave to observe,

1. That the names of the original creditors are on the public books, with the balances due to them, and are easily found; to which a reference must be made equally on both plans; for if a certificate is offered for payment, which is not entered there, it will be rejected as counterfeit.

2. The proof will lie on the man who demands payment, that he is an original creditor: if he cannot make this appear, he will fail of payment, as all persons must, who bring suits which they cannot support with proof.

3. If there are some, or even many, original creditors who cannot prove their demand, and so must lose it, it does not fellow that such as can prove their claim, should be rejected: this would be a mad conclusion.

4. If the original, rightful creditor cannot be found, he cannot be paid; but it does not follow, that the money due to him must be paid to any body else, who has no claim of either original or derivative right; it is certainly very plain, that, in such case, the money ought not to be paid at all to any body, as must be the case with every private man who owes money, but cannot find his creditor; or with the public, to whom all estates or property escheat, if the owners cannot be found, as in case of treasure-trove, wreck of sea, lands, when the owner dies without will or beirs, &c.

5. The whole objection, tho’ true, when urged against paying the original creditors, and in favor of paying the speculators, is nugatory and trifling; for such original creditors as cannot be found, or cannot prove their demands, are left equally without remedy under both plans; for payment to the speculators makes no more provision for such cases, than payment to the original creditors.

6. If such cases exist (as probably many of them may) no one pretends that they bear any proportion to the vast number (that can be found) of creditors possessed of full proof; and it is very plain, that the defect of proof in the one cannot injure or diminish the right of the other, whose claim is capable of full proof.

Indeed I think that nothing can be plainer than this, viz. that we ought to pay all the real creditors, whose wealth or services we have had the benefit of, and who are possessed of full proof of the debts due to them therefor, but by no means to pay the whole money to speculators, who have certainly no right at all, because some may probably have right which they cannot make appear.

The State of Pennsylvania, in their funding act (1785) made the discrimination I propose, with respect to one species of certificates (final settlements) but I never heard any difficulty was found in the practice or execution of the statute, on that account.

Some people are wild enough to propose to pay the public money to the speculators, for fear the real, original creditors should perjure themselves in proving their accounts. This is too foolish to require an answer: for,

1. If we are to reject oaths in proof of accounts, for fear of perjuries, the rule ought doubtless to be made general and extend to all accounts of all descriptions of persons; for certainly one man has as good a right to take benefit of his own perjuries, as another. But,

2. If such perjuries should happen, it surely cannot follow from thence, that the speculators ought to have all the money paid to them, which is due to the real, original creditors.

In fine, I think it really disgraceful to human nature, to suppose such arguments and such objections require answers, and I have to beg my reader’s pardon for offering them.

When I wrote this I had no doubt but that, if such an assembly of fellow-laborers and fellow-sufferers had appcared, their general would have cheerfully put himself at their bead, and have supported their suit with all his power and influence.

It is also very manifest, that both they and their rights are all, at this time, in real existence and full life, tho’ not all met together in condition to assert and demand the justice which is due to them.

It is further certain, that the known rights of an absent man ought not to be neglected, because he is not present to assert them, or in condition to vindicate his demand; infants, and all other helpless persons, have rights which are ever recognised by the law of right, and ought ever to be supported by the government, to which the administration of that law of right is committed.

I apprehend that certificates should never be redeemed at a higher rate than their value or current exchange was at the time of issuing them; for the public never received a valuable consideration for any more than was paid; and to demand their redemption at a higher value would be charging the public with usurious interest, which would be as wrong between public, as between private, contractors.

It may be objected, perhaps, that the public do not literally receive 2s. 6d. and give their bond or certificate for 20s.: but I answer, they really do this; for it is very plain, that the certificate, when issued, was worth no more then its current exchange at that time, say 2s. 6d.: the public creditor received no more, and ought to be debited with no more; but the certificate is made payable to the bearer, who is a stranger, at 20s.

Now if I pay 2s. 6d. and, in consideration thereof, take a bond to a third person, who is a stranger, for 20s. it is plain that the bond is usurious and void, and if it passes by assignment thro’ a thousand hands, the usury will always stick to it, and, of course, it will ever carry with it its legal defect, or principle of avoidance.

For it is plain, that if a private man should receive 2s. 6d. and give his bond for 20s. the bond would be usurious, and of course void.

My proposition is plainly just, and acknowledged by Congress and every body else, and has the sanction of general practice with respect to loan-office certificates, Continental money, &c. and I challenge any man to give a shadow of reason, why all subsequent certificates, or paper of public credit, should not be estimated, and in every respect be governed, by the same rule.

But if the certificate depreciates below its original value, the aggregate public sustains the loss. This is manifestly the case with respect to all paper money, certificates, and other public securities of every kind, which gain a general currency, or become objects of common exchange and negotiation thro’ the community, and happen to depreciate during such currency.

The loss by depreciation becomes divided into innumerable parts, every single one of which consists of the loss each individual severally sustained by the depreciation of the paper, whilst it was in his hands, and the aggregate sum of all these parts or losses, makes up the whole sum of the depreciation, or the difference between the current value of the paper at the time, and the original value of it when it first issued.

By this it appears, that the aggregate public has sustained the whole loss, not in a way of perfect equality indeed (and perhaps no public assessment ever did or can do this) but by way of general tax, of which innumerable individuals (tho’ not strictly every one) has sustained or paid his share, and, of course, it would be very unjust to tax the same public over again for such sum, not to pay it to the persons who have suffered by the depreciation, but to other people, who have lost nothing, nor have any claim of merit to it.

When this Essay was written, I had not the least idea that any possible consideration could have induced general Washington to sign any act, which, in its operation, would cut his soldiers out of their pay, and leave those without compensation, who, by their advance of money and supplies, had fed and furnished his army; nor do I apprehend, that when he signed the funding bill, he conceived these effects would follow its operation: but I see two ways only, in which these effects can be avoided:

One is by paying both original creditors and speculators; which, I suppose, will be considered either extremely difficult or desperate, for want of cash.

The other is by a repeal of the funding act, or, which amounts to the same thing, by an explanatory declaration that by public creditors, in the act, is meant the real, original creditors; and not the speculators.

But be this as it will, I conceived it impossible for the general to sign such an act, and, of course, thought it would be great cruelty, and even insult, to offer such an one to him.

In the original publication of this Essay, the following short account of the South-Sea scheme in England was inserted by way of preface, viz.

“The South-Sea scheme in England affords us the only instance I ever heard of in that country, of any national stocks or funds, whose fluctuation or exchange ever varied, i. e. rose or fell, so much as from par to 8 for 1, or, vice versa, from 8 for 1 to par.

“National stocks or funds I call them, not because those stocks were properly public money, but because they were of such magnitude and extent as to affect the trade and credit of the nation, and were managed under the sanction and protection of national authority, and controlled by the inspection of Perliament.

“The South-Sea Company was incorporated by act of Parliament, in 1711, i. e. a great number of proprietors of navy bills, debentures, and other public securities, were incorporated into a Company, to which was given a great variety of duties on wines, tobacco, India goods, &c. to pay the annual interest due to them, amounting to above half a million sterling; and also, with this grant was joined a grant of a monopoly of the trade to Spanish South-America, grounded on the Assiento treaty, &c.

“This Company soon grew amazingly rich, had the King and most other capital personages for stock-holders, and, in 1718, his Mejisty himself was chosen their Governor; at which time, the Company was become the great favorite of the court and nation, and, in 1720, were in such good condition, that 100l. share of their stock was worth 130l. i. e. 30 per cent. above par.

“At this time, i. e. in 1720, the scheme of reducing all the public funds into one, for discharging the national debt (which, by the by, at that time was alarming enough) was set on foot.

“The South-Sea Company and Bank of England were competitors, and bid on one another for the privilege of taking in the national debts, and thereby increasing their capital stock and yearly fund. The offer of the Company to Parliament for this privilege, was above 7,000,000l. sterling, &c. which was more than the Bank would give, and, of course, was accepted and ratified by an act of Parliament.

“Having thus carried their point, the next thing was to go to work, and make the most of their privilege, which was generally thought so great, that their stocks rose from 130 to 330l. for a share of 100l. by the time their contract with Parliament was completed.

“The first thing they had to do, was to purchase in the public securities, which they were able to do on pretty favorable terms; for the Revolution, and the wars of King William and Queen Anne, had raised the national debt to about 40,000,000l. sterling (if I remember right) which was in those days thought a very alarming sum (tho’ the nation have learned better since) of course, the credit of the public debts was somewhat doubtful; and as the stock of the South-Sea Bank or Company was in the first credit, the proprietors of the public securities thought themselves happy to carry in and sell their public securities, on such terms as they and the Company could agree on. Above 26,000,000l. sterling was subscribed into the South-Sea stock, in this manner.

“In short, the Company opened their books and sold out stock to an immense amount, and to a profit from 300 to 1000 per cent. Their first subscription was for 1,000,000 at 300l. April 12, 1720; and the stock rose so fast, that on the 24th of August following, the books were opened for a subscription of 1,000,000 capital stock, at 1000l. for every 100l. capital stock, which was filled in three hours; such was the rage for that sort of speculating, at that time. And, what is more amazing, after the books were closed, in the afternoon of the same day, this same subscription was sold in Change-Alley at 30 or 40 per cent. advance.

“The cash and credits of the Company were vastly accumulated by this time; and as they lent millions on interest, and sold most of their stocks for about 1-5th cash in hand, the rest on credit at several future payments, the debts due to them were immense.

“When the bubble burst, as it did in less than six months after, and the stock the subscribers had purchased at 1000 per cent. was reduced down to about 150, and, of course, the loss of every such subscriber was 850l. out of every 1000l. subscribed; I say, when this happened, legal suits (of which very many were commenced) for these debts due to the Company, would have reduced most of the monied men in the kingdom to a state of remediless bankruptcy, and the Company must have lost most of their money in the bargain. The public creditors had lost most of their public securities, which they had subscribed into that fund. And infinite other mischiefs of a like nature must have accrued, of a kind most ruinous and wrong, and of an amount so great as to affect national interest, honor, and credit, and of such an extreme and extraordinary nature, that no ordinary rules of law could be applied in any such manner as to afford the least remedy, but would rather increase the evil, and give the wrong a kind of sanction of law.

“In this extreme case, the Parliament found themselves under an absolute necessity of assuming the powers of sovereign equity, and, as supreme chancellors of the kingdom, to supersede the ordinary rules of the law, control its force, soften its rigor, and adopt such equitable principles, as would afford some remedy of an evil, an injury, a wrong, of such magnitude, as brought the justice, credit, and safety of the nation into danger.

“On this principle they suspended law-suits; annulled special bails; discharged numberless debtors who owed for stock, on paying 10 per cent. of their debts; compelled compensations in favor of the sufferers; forced dividends and appropriations of the stock of the Company; and even punished many for mismanagement, who seemed to have conformed themselves to the letter of the law, &c. &c.

“Vide Tindal’s Continuation of Rapin, in the pages referred to in the index, under the words, South-Sea Trade and Company.”

It is here very worthy of notice, that these salutary effects will naturally and savely flow from my plan of paying the public monies to the real, original creditors, who are scattered over all the States; and payment to them will, of course, not only afford such relief as will be highly convenient to them and their neighbours, but will also produce such a brisk circulation of the money so paid, as will be greatly beneficial to the whole nation.

Not so, but in a manner widely different, will be the operation of the scheme of paying these monies to the speculators; about one-third of whom, I am told, are foreigners, who will carry their share of the money out of the country, never to return again; and the other two-thirds, if paid to the speculators here, will not probably produce any general increase of circulation of money, or other benefit to the public.

For money obtained by sudden acquirement, without industry, merit, or earnings, seldom proves any benefit either to the possessors or to the public, but generally produces luxury, vanity, pride, and hurtful, example of prodigality and waste, till the whole is expended, and then the poor objects and their families are left much more forlorn and distressed than they would probably have been, had the money never have come into their hands.

I think any body may observe the very different effects and operations of these two plans, and it appears to me, that little penetration will be necessary to discern that the gain lies on the side of godliness; and, of course, if we reject the right, with so many benefits annexed, and adopt the wrong, with such a train of mischiefs at the heels of it, however our integrity may be unimpeached, our wisdom will be doubted, and will appear to many people altogether inadiquate to the management of the finances of a nation.

Congress, in their last session, after long debate, rejected the whole plan of disorimination between the original creditors or holders of certificates, and the speculators or the holders of alienated certificates, and, without any distinction, admitted alike the claims of all the present possessors, and, by their funding act of August 4, 1790, funded all the certificates at full value, or 20s. in the pound, with interest payable quarterly on two-thirds of their amount, from the first day of January, 1791; and the other third, with interest to commence the first of the year 1801, or ten years from said January 1.

The certificates for interest, called indents, are excepted out of this provision, and are funded at an interest of 3 per cent. only.

By this act, an enormous sum of the public money is appropriated for the payment of speculators, who never earned it, nor pretend to hold out any sort of right to it, which is founded on their merits, or earnings, or valuable consideration paid, but claim it entirely in right of others, to whose merits and earnings the money was righteously due, and which they make title to merely by force of the common rule of assignments, which, it appears to me, cannot admit any reasonable application to this case.

Whether it is the design of Congress, by this statute, to cut the real, original creditors off from their pay of that part of the balances which they have never yet received (and which, I suppose, is yet justly due to them) I know not; but I take it, that this is the light in which it is generally understood.

If this is really the case (which I cannot yet believe) I have only to lament that all the arguments I have published, which appear to me to be very strong, clear, and conclusive, and all the concern I have felt for this great subject, are vain and fruitless, and I suppose I ought to set myself down as an idiot, stupid as a post, because I cannot perceive an iota of reason or justice in a measure, which appeared to Congress so clear and just, as to induce them to adopt it in a solemn, public act. or may I rather be indulged in the thought that a Prince, a Diet a Parliament, a Congress, an Assembly, however high in dignity, and however important to mankind their decisions are, may err, and, what is more, may, on revision, be convinced of their error, and—correct it?

The seat of Congress was at New-York at that time.

Tho’ the United States of America contain about 640,000,000 acres of land, which have every advantage of soil and situation that any country can boast, and tho’ their territory is equal to Great-Britain, Germany, France, and Spain, taken together, yet their population and civil establishments are both young, and, as yet, in the tender state and small beginnings; and, of course, the greatest attention is necessary to that police and economy, which must strengthen, increase, and connect the whole. I therefore hope, that the humble attempts of the author to point out and patronize some leading principles of both these great objects, which are really of most essential consideration, will meet the candor and favorable attention of Congress and the Public.

North-Carolina and Rhode-Island had not, at the time this Essay was published, acceded to the Union under the New Constitution: the accession of some new States was expected, viz. Vermont, Kentucky, &c.

When the New Constitution was laid before the Assembly of Pennsylvania, in September, 1787, a resolution passed the House (forty-three against nineteen) to call a Convention to consider it, &c. Sixteen of the Dissentients published an Address to their Constituents, dated September 27, 1787, slating their conduct and assigning the reasons of it: but as there was very little in all this affair that reflected much honor on the dissenting Members or on the State to which they belonged, and nothing that could affect or concern any body out of that State, I have here omitted my remarks on all of it, but their objections to the New Constitution itself, which being of general consequence to the States, in as much as that Constitution (with a few amendments fince adopted) is the same which now exists in full establishment thro’ the Union, I therefore here insert, I say, their objections and my remarks on them, and leave out all the rest as matter of local concern at that time, but like to be little interesting to the public in general at this or any future time.

Vide this subject fully discussed in my Dissertation on that Constitution which is necessary for the United States, page 198.

Many advantages would arise from this method:

1. The bank is more responsible for any deficiency than any private man can be.

2. It has the best convenience and security for safe keeping the cash deposited in it.

3. No minister or other man can pay away public money otherwise than by a check on the bank, which is in some degree a matter of notoriety, and involves a responsibility.

4. The receipts and payments would be settled up to a shilling (according to the custom of the bank) at least once a month.

5. The commission or allowance to a treasurer for this service would be saved, as the bank would be very willing to undertake the business of receiving all or any part of the public revenue, and paying the same out, without any commission or salary, i. e. without any allowance or charge for the service; this would be a great saving, even if the commission allowed to a treasurer was not more than a real compensation for the service.

There is no doubt but such a combination and concurrence of events may happen, as will make a departure not only from the ordinary course of administering justice, but even from the common maxims of justice itself, necessary.

Such a necessity was found in France, when a remedy was to be provided for the flagrant mischiefs of the Mississippi scheme.

The South-Sea bubble produced a like necessity in England, in order to obviate the enormous and complex mischiefs of that fatal excess of speculation.

The National Assembly in France have found a like necessity in order to reduce the enormous accumulation of the wealth of the community into few bands (viz. of their nobility and clergy) and to liberate the nation from the distress, weakness, and ruin thence arising.

Perhaps every cession of territory from one nation or state to another involves in it some such necessity.

And we may probably meet the same necessity, if our nation should see fit to exonerate itself from the immense burden of proviaing about 30,000,000 dollars, to pay speculators who never carned a shilling of it, nor ever rendered any services or valuable consideration whatever to the nation or any body else, for any part of it.

But it is to be here noted with great care, that such necessity must exist, before it can operate, or be pleaded in excuse of the extraordinary measures which it will justify; but a pretence of such necessity, when it does not really exist, is not only ridiculous, but very dangerous. This is arguing on salse position, a sad example of which we have in the troubles of Charles I. of England.—The King, or rather his court, held out,

1. The vast powers and prerogatives of the crown in cases of extreme necessity, i. e. when the country was invaded, or otherwise in imminent danger; and,

2. That the King, holding the supreme executive power, was the legal and proper judge of that necessity.

On these positions they proceeded to justify the power at that time claimed and practised by the King, of raising money without act of Parliament, such as ship money, coal and conduit money, &c. &c. i. e. it was only saying that the King judged the existing necessity sufficient to warrant these measures, and the matter was all legal; that was the clincher that finished the business. I am told, this argument of necessity and imminent danger was often cailed up and urged in the Assembly of Pennsylvania, when the repeal of the charter of the bank was debated there.

By the act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, June 13, 1777, the following oath was required, viz.

“I do swear, or affirm, that I renounce and refuse all allegiance to George III. King of Great-Britain, his heirs, and successors; and that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as a free and independent State; and that I will not at any time do, or cause to be done, any matter or thing that will be prejudicial or injurious to the freedom and independence thereof, as declared by Congress; and also that I will discover and make known to some one justice of peace of the said State, all treasons, or traitorous conspiracies, which I now know or hereafter shall know to be formed against this or any of the United States of America.”

On which I beg leave to remark,

I. That a very great number of the principal inhabitants of Pennsylvania, and as respectable and well-behaved as any in the State, from scruples of conscience bad ever refused to take or subscribe any oath or affirmation of allegiance to any government, either British or American.

II. Very many very serious and good men, and fast friends to America and the American cause, thought at that time that the Declaration of Independence was premature; and it was a matter of great doubt with all men, whether that independence could be finally supported; and, should it fail, many thought.

III. That abjuring the British government would involve them in perjury, or, at least, in a shameful and ridiculous duplicity of conduct, under the most awful and solemn crisis of department.

IV. Many wise men had a great attachment to the British government, under which they were born and educated; and tho’ they abborred and condemned the demands and conduct of the British court as much as any man in Congress, yet did not think that a redress of American grievances was desperate, or that it was the real, true interest of America to be disjoined from the British Empire; at least, they thought the American independence ought to be settled, and the war should be over, and the disputes between the contending States should be adjusted, before an oath of allegiance to the one, or abjuration of the other, should be demanded.

V. Many good men thought they did not understand the nature and essential qualities of trecsons or trecsonable conspiracies, well enough to be sate in swearing to give information of all such as came within then knowledge; or they might know such, but not be able to make proof of them, and, of course, their information would expose them not only to the resentment, but to real actions of defamation.

I do not pretend to determine whether any or all of the above objections against taking said oath, were good and proper or not; but they had such weight with great numbers, that near half of our most serious people resused taking the oath.

Yet, I conceive, all men will allow that Pennsylvania was as true to the American cause, and supported it with as much effort, zeal, and unanimity as any State in the Union; and the few tories we had, who retained any attachment to the British government, were most effectually converted by the samples of British faith, honor, and savagenes, exhibited by General Howe, whilst he commanded the British army in Philadelphia and its neighbourhood.

But be all this as it may, the extraordinary penalties with which the oath was enforced, were, in my opinion, equally useless, absura, and severs; some of which were as follows, viz.

That every person above the age of eighteen years, refusing or neglecting to take and subscribe the said oath or affirmation, shall, during the time of such neglect or refusal, be incapable of holding any office or piace of trust in this State, serving on juries, sving for any debts, electing or being elected, buying, selling, or transferring any lands, tenements, or bered taments, and shall be disarmed, &c.

—Travelling out of the city or county where he usually resides, without a certificate of his having taken the oath or affirmation, may be committed to the common gaol to remain without bail or mainprise.

Shall be disabled to sue or use any action, bill, plaint, or information in course of law, or to prosecute any suit in equity or otherwise howsoever, or to be guardian of the person or estate of any child, or to to be executor or edministrator of any person; shall be incapable of any legacy or deed of gift or to make any will or testament; and shall be compelled to pay double taxes, &c.

All non-juring trustees, provosts, rectors, professors, masters and tutors of any college or academy, and all schoolmasters and ushers, merchants and traders, sergeants and counsellors at law, barristers, advocates, attornies, solicitors, proctors, clerks or notaries, apothecaries, druggists, and every person practising physic, are disabled in law to use any of those employments, and liable to be fined 500l. for practising in any of them.

Two justices may summon any non-juring person before them, and, on refusal to take the said oath or affirmation, commit him to the common gaol or house of correction for three months, unless he pay any sum, with costs, under 10l. which they may require, and also become bound with two sufficient sureties to appear at the next court of general quarter sessions of the peace; where, if he refuses to take the oath or affirmation, he shall, under the direction of the court, depart the State in thirty days, and forfeit his goods and shattels to the State, and his lands and tenements to the persons who would by law be entitled to inherit the same, in case such offender was dead intestate, &c. &c.

N. B. By act of Assembly of March 29, 1787 the above-mentioned oath, with all the shocking penalties of it, was repealed, after it had done infinite mischief in the State, and had kept the party that made it, in the saddle about ten years (which, by the way, I conceive, was the principal design and use of it) and there was substituted in the stead of it, a very simple oath of allegiance, without any of the exceptionable clauses of the former, by which the rights of our citizens are restored, and a happy peace and general satisfaction of our people have succeeded.

The Constitution of Pennsylvania then newly made (but since abrogated by the late Convention of the State) was greatly opposed by most men of gravity and wisdom, tho’ it was carried by a warm party which prevailed at that time, and was propped up by test-acts, &c.

Test-acts, at the time this Essay was written, were deemed so important, that any objection to them, or doubt of their use, was cried out upon and reprobated by the violent party which then prevailed in the State, as malignancy against the American independence, disaffection to the government, and a sort of treason. I was insulted and much threatened for writing this Essay. A very angry writer, under the signature of A Constitutionalist, in the Freeman’s Journal of Sept. 28, 1781, undertook to blacken it most effectually; then went on to defend test-acts, and answer my Essay. After applying pretty liberally all the hard words he could think of, he gives the character of it as follows—“Of all publications hitherto exhibited in print, since the establishment of our independence, this Essay is foremost in barefaced and undisguised principles, to toryism favorable; to our Revolution inimical; and of our Constitution subversive:” and then goes on to observe, that every independent State ought to be guarded by some criterion, by which good citizens may be distinguished from bad ones; and that all such States have good right and authority to adopt any such criterion or term of citizenship, which they think proper; and that test-acts are of this kind, &c.

In my reply, published in the same Journal, Oct. 5, 1781, I urge that test-acts have no more connexion with the independent government of the Union, or the Constitution of this State, than with all other governments; but they may be necessary to toryism, as they have been generally most adopted and pressed in the weakest and worst governments;—that I do not dispute the authority of any independent State to make test-acts; it is the expediency only of making them which I object to—that very many good men will refuse them, and many bad men will take them—that the merits and qualities of citizens ought to be taken and estimated by their conduct or overt acts, not by the secrets of their hearts, which are cognisable by God alone, not by the State, till by overt acts they are made known: the Constitutionalist says, that non-jurors are aliens, not citizens; this I denied; for were they aliens, they could not be bolden to any municipal obedience or duties, such as taxes, services, &c. or be capable of treasons, or crimes against the State, to which (if aliens) they could owe no allegiance—I further urged, that test-acts, where the most that could be, was made of them, amounted to no more than a man’s testimony in his own case, which was not admitted in matters of the smallest moment, and, of course, the most important of all interests ought not to be controlled or limited by it—that pressing test-acts was a sure way to keep alive the most galling frets and discontents in a State, and was very bad policy even in a ruling party, because the same measures might be retorted upon themselves, if they should happen to slip out of the saddle, and their opponents should get into it.—

On the whole I much prefer a government which secures to every man the secrets of his own mind, and makes him amenable for his conduct and overt acts only, rather than one which intrudes on such secrets, and makes the discovery of them on oath a term of the richest and noblest benefits and privileges of society.

If any body may wish to see more of this matter, I refer him to the pieces at large, which are preserved in the Freeman’s Journal, as quoted above.

The foregoing ideas and arguments were such as were suggested at the time when this Essay was first published, and were matters of much conversation and discussion both in and out of Congress, but have all been long since adjusted and settled.

The boundaries of the Union were defined in the treaty of peace with Great-Britain, in Feb. 1783, and extended much beyond the limits here proposed.

And the affair of the great western extent of the six States was accommodated to general satisfaction, by cessions of such parts of them to Congress as lay beyond their settlements, since which the lands so ceded have been considered as public property, and as such subject to the disposal of Congress, for the benefit of the whole Union.

It may be worth notice here (tho’ it does not immediately belong to the subject of the foregoing Essay)

1st. That the first Congress under the New Constitution met at New-York, March 4, 1788; and, after two long sessions, adjourned to Philadelphia. The first session which was held there was on Dec. 4, 1790; and the session concluded on March 3, 1791.

2d. That eleven States only had adopted the New Constitution at the time of the first session of Congress under it; but the two deliberating States, viz. North-Carolina and Rhode-Island, soon acceded, and their delegates were admitted in Congress.

3d. That two new States, viz. Kentucky and Vermont, were admitted into the Union in Feb. 1791: so that the American Union now consists of fifteen States.