Chapter VI. Absolute Critical Criticism, or Critical Criticism in the Person of Herr Bruno

[[This chapter (subsection d in the third section of Chap- ter VI) is one of the most valuable in the book. Here there is absolutely no word by word criticism, but a completely positive exposition. It is a short sketch of the history of French materialism. Here one ought to copy out the whole chapter, but I shall limit myself to a short summary of of the contents.]]

The French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and French materialism are not only a struggle against the exist- ing political institutions, but equally an open struggle against the metaphysics of the seventeenth century, namely,

against the metaphysics of Descartes, Malebranch, Spin- oza and Leibnitz. “Philosophy was opposed to metaphys- ics as Feuerbach, in his first decisive attack on Hegel, opposed sober philosophy to drunken speculation.” (196)

The metaphysics of the seventeenth century, defeated by the materialism of the eighteenth century, underwent a vic- torious and weighty (gehaltvolle) restoration in German phi- losophy, especially in speculative German philosophy of the nineteenth century. Hegel linked it in a masterly fashion with the whole of metaphysics and with German idealism, and he founded ein metaphysisches Universalreich. This was fol- lowed again by an “attack on speculative metaphysics and metaphysics in general. It will be defeated for ever by mater- ialism, which has now been perfected by the work of specu- lation itself and coincides with humanism. Just as Feuerbach in the theoretical field, French and English socialism and co- mmunism in the practical field represented materialism coin- ciding with humanism.” (196-197)

There are two trends of French materialism: 1) from Des- cartes, 2) from Locke. The latter mündet direkt in den Soc- ialismus. (197)

The former, mechanical materialism, turns into French nat- ural science.

Descartes in his physics declares matter the only sub- stance. Mechanical French materialism takes over Descartes’ physics and rejects his metaphysics.

“This school begins with the physician Le Roy, reaches its zenith with the physician Cabanis, and the physician Lamet- trie is its centre.” (198)

Descartes was still living when Le Roy transferred the mechanical structure of animals to man and declared the soul to be a modus of the body, and ideas to be mechanical movements. (198) Le Roy even thought that Descartes had concealed his real opinion. Descartes protested.

At the end of the eighteenth century Cabanis perfected Cartesian materialism in his book Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme.

From the very outset the metaphysics of the seventeenth century had its adversary in materialism. Descartes—Gas- sendi, the restorer of Epicurean materialism, in England— Hobbes.

Voltaire (199) pointed out that the indifference of the Frenchmen of the eighteenth century to the disputes of the Jesuits and others was due less to philosophy that to Law’s financial speculations. The theoretical movement towards materialism is explained by the practical Gestaltung of French life at that time. Materialistic theories corresponded to materialistic practice.

The metaphysics of the seventeenth century (Descartes, Leibnitz) was still linked with a positive (positivem) content. It made discoveries in mathematics, physics, etc. In the eighteenth century the positive sciences became separated from it and metaphysics war fad geworden.

In the year of Malebranche’s death, Helvétius and Cond- illac were born. (199-200)

Pierre Bayle, through his weapon of scepticism, theore- tically undermined seventeenth-century metaphysics. He re- futed chiefly Spinoza and Leibnitz. He proclaimed atheistic society. He was, in the words of a French writer, “the last metaphysician in the seventeenth-century sense of the word and the first philosopher in the sense of the eighteenth cen- tury.” (200-201)

This negative refutation required a positive, anti-meta- physical system. It was provided by Locke.

Materialism is the son of Great Britain. Its scholastic Duns Scotus had already raised the question: “ob die Materie nicht denken könne?” He was a nominalist. Nominalism is in general the first expression of material- ism.

The real founder of English materialism was Bacon. (“The first and most important of the inherent qualities of matter is motion, not only as mechanical and mathematical movement, but still more as impulse, vital spirit, tension, or ... the throes (Qual) ... of matter.”—202)

“In Bacon, its first creator, materialism has still concealed within it a naïve way the germs of all-round development. Matter smiles at man as a whole with poetical sensuous brightness.”

In Hobbes, materialism becomes one-sided, menschen- feindlich, mechanisch. Hobbes systematised Bacon, but he did not develop (begründet) more deeply Bacon’s fund- amental principle: the origin of knowledge and ideas from the world of the senses (Sinnenwelt).—P. 203.

Just as Hobbes did away with the theistic prejudices of Bacon’s materialism, so Collins, Dodwell, Coward, Hartley, Priestley, etc., destroyed the last theological bounds of Locke’s sensualism.

Condillac directed Locke’s sensualism against seven- teenth-century metaphysics; he published a refutation of the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Malebranche.

The French “civilised” (205) the materialism of the English.

In Helvétius (who also derives from Locke), materialism was given a properly French character.

Lamettrie is a combination of Cartesian and English mat- erialism.

Robinet has the most connection with metaphysics.

“Just as Cartesian materialism passes into natural sci- ence proper, the other trend of French materialism flows directly into socialism and communism.” (206)

Nothing is easier than to derive socialism from the premis- es of materialism (reconstruction of the world of the senses— linking private and public interests—destroying the Geburts- stätten of crime, etc.).

Fourier proceeds immediately from the teaching of the French materialists. The Babouvists were crude, immature materialists. Bentham based his system on the morality of Helvétius, while Owen takes Bentham’s system as his starting- point for founding English communism. Cabet brought com- munist ideas from England into France (populärste wenn auch flachste representative of communism) 208. The “more scientific” are Dézamy, Gay, etc., who developed the teach- ing of materialism as real humanism.

On pp. 209-211 Marx gives in a note (two pages of small print) extracts from Helvétius, Holbach and Bentham, in or- der to prove the connection of the materialism of the eight- eenth century with English and French communism of the nineteenth century.

Of the subsequent sections the following passage is worth noting:

“The dispute between Strauss and Bauer over Substance and Self-Consciousness is a dispute within Hegelian speculation. In Hegel there are three elements: Spinoza’s Substance, Fichte’s Self-Consciousness, and Hegel’s ne- cessary and contradictory unity of the two, the Absolute Spirit. The first element is metaphysically disguised nature in separation from man; the second is metaphysically disguised spirit in separation from nature; the third is the metaphysical- ly disguised unity of both, real man and the real human race” (220), and the paragraph with its assessment of Feuer- bach:

“In the domain of theology, Strauss quite consistently expounded Hegel from Spinoza’s point of view, and Bauer did the same from Fichte’s point of view. Both criticised Hegel insofar as with him each of the two elements was falsified by the other, while they carried each of the elements to its one-sided and hence consistent development.—Both of them therefore go beyond Hegel in their Criticism, but both of them also remain within the framework of his specu- lation and each represents only one side of his system. Feuer-

bach was the first to bring to completion and criticise Hegel from Hegel’s point of view, by resolving the metaphysical Absolute Spirit into ‘real man on the basis of nature,’ and the first to bring to completion the Criticism of religion by sketching in a masterly manner the general basic features of the Criticism of Hegel’s speculation and hence of every kind of metaphysics.” (220-221)

Marx ridicules Bauer’s “theory of self-consciousness” on account of its idealism (the sophisms of absolute idealism— 222), points out that this is a periphrasing of Hegel, and quotes the latter’s Phenomenology and Feuerbach’s criti- cal remarks (from Philosophie der Zukunft, p. 35, that philosophy negates—negiert — the “materially sensuous,” just as theology negates “nature tainted by original sin”).

The following chapter (VII) again begins with a series of highly boring, caviling criticisms [1). Pp. 228-235]. In section 2a there is an interesting passage.

Marx quotes from the Literary Gazette the letter of a “re- presentative of the Mass,” who calls for the study of reality, of natural science and industry (236), and who on that account was reviled by “criticism”:

“Or”(!), exclaimed “the critics” against this representa- tive of the Mass,—“do you think that the knowledge of his- torical reality is already complete? Or (!) do you know

of any single period in history which is actually known?”

“Or does Critical Criticism”—Marx replies—“believe that it has reached even the beginning of a knowledge of histori- cal reality so long as it excludes from the historical move- ment the theoretical and practical relation of man to na- ture, natural science and industry? Or does it think that it actually knows any period without knowing, for example, the industry of that period, the immediate mode of pro- duction of life itself? True, spiritualistic, theological Crit- ical Criticism only knows (at least it imagines it knows) the major political, literary and theological acts of his- tory. Just as it separates thinking from the senses, the soul from the body and itself from the world, it separates history from natural science and industry and sees the origin of history not in vulgar material production on the earth but in vaporous clouds in the heavens.” (238)

Criticism dubbed this representative of the mass a mas- senhafter Materialist. (239)

“The criticism of the French and the English is not an abs- tract, preternatural personality outside mankind; it is the real human activity of individuals who are active members of society and who as human beings suffer, feel, think and act. That is why their criticism is a the same time practical, their communism a socialism in which they give practical, tangible measures, and in which they do not only think but even more act; it is the living real criticism of existing society, the discov- ery of the causes of ‘decay’.” (244)

[[The whole of Chapter VII (228-257), apart from the pas- sages quoted above, consists only of the most incredible capti- ous criticisms and mockery, noting contradictions of the most petty character, and ridiculing each and every stupidity in the Literary Gazette, etc.]]

In Chapter VIII (258-333) we have a section on the “Crit- ical Transformation of a Butcher into a Dog”—and further on E u g è n e S u e ’ s Fleur de Marie (evidently a novel with this title or the heroine of some novel or other) with certain “radical“ but uninteresting observations by Marx. Worth mentioning perhaps are only p. 2 8 5 Ⅹ — against Eugène Sue’s defence of the prison cell system (Cellularsystem).

“The mystery of this” (305) (there was a quotation from Anekdota above) “courage of Bauer’s is Hegel’s Phenom- enology. Since Hegel here puts self-consciousness in the place of man, the most varied human reality appears only as a definite form, as a determination of self-consciousness. But a mere determination of self-consciousness is a ‘pure category,’ a mere ‘thought’ which I can consequently also transcend in ‘pure’ thought and overcome through pure

thought. In Hegel’s Phenomenology the material, sensuous, objective bases of the various alienated forms of human self-consciousness are left as they are. The whole destructive work results in the most conservative philosophy [sic!] because it thinks it has overcome the objective world, the sensuously real world, by merely transforming it into

a ‘thing of thought,’ a mere determination of self-con- sciousness, and can therefore dissolve its opponent, which has become ethereal, in the ‘ether of pure thought.’ The Phenomenology is therefore quite consistent in ending by re- placing all human reality by ‘Absolute Knowledge’ — Knowledge, because this is the only mode of existence of self-consciousness, and because self-consciousness is con- sidered as the only mode of existence of man;—Absolute Knowledge for the very reason that self-consciousness knows only itself and is no more disturbed by any objective world. Hegel makes man the man of self-consciousness instead of making self-consciousness the self-consciousness of man, of the real man, and therefore of man living also in a real objec- tive world and determined by that world. He stands the world on its head and can therefore in his head dissolve all limita- tions, which nevertheless, of course, remain in existence for e- vil sensuousness, for real man. Moreover, everything which betrays the limitations of general self-consciousness— all sensuousness, reality, individuality of men and of their world— is neccessarily held by him to be a limit. The whole of the Phe- nomenology is intended to prove that self-consciousness is the only reality and all reality....” (306)

...“Finally, it goes without saying that if Hegel’s Phe- nomenology, in spite of its speculative original sin, gives in many instances the elements of a true description of hu- man relations, Herr Bruno and Co., on the other hand, provide only an empty caricature....” (307)

“Thereby Rudolph unconsciously revealed the mystery, long ago exposed, that human misery itself, the infinite ab- jectness which is obliged to receive alms, has to serve as a plaything to the aristocracy of money and education to satisfy their self-love, tickle their arrogance and amuse them.

“The numerous charitable associations in Germany, the numerous charitable societies in France and the great num- ber of charitable quixotic societies in England, the concerts, balls, plays, meals for the poor and even public subscriptions for victims of accidents have no other meaning.” (309-310)

And Marx quotes from Eugène Sue:

“Ah, Madame, it is not enough to have danced for the be- nefit of these poor Poles.... Let us be philanthropic to the end.... Let us have supper now for the benefit of the poor!” (310)

On pp. 312-313 quotations f r o m F o u r i e r (adultery is good tone, infanticide by the victims of seduction — a vicious circle.... “The degree of emancipation of woman is the natural measure of general emancipation....” (312) Civ- ilisation converts every vice from a simple into a complex, am- biguous, hypocritical form), and Marx adds:

“It is superfluous to contrast to Rudolph’s thoughts Fourier’s masterly characterisation of marriage or the

works of the materialist section of French communism.” (313)

P. 313 u. ff., against the political-economic projects of Eugène Sue and Rudolph (presumably the hero of Sue’s novel?), projects for the association of rich and poor, and the organisation of labour (which the state ought to do), etc.—e.g., also the Armenbank [7)—b) “The bank for the Poor” pp. 314-318] = interest-free loans to the unem- ployed. Marx takes the f i g u r e s of the project and exposes their meagreness in relation to need. And the idea of an Armenbank, says Marx, is no better than Sparkas- sen..., i.e., die Einrichtung of the bank “rests on the delusion that only a different distribution of wages is needed for the workers to be able to live through the whole year.” (316-317)

Section c) “Model Farm at Bouqueval” 318-320, Ru- dolph’s project for a model farm, which was praised by “Criticism,” is subjected to devastating criticism: Marx de- clares it to be a utopian project, for on the average one Frenchman gets only a quarter of a pound of meat per day, only 93 francs in annual income, etc.; in the project they work twice as much as before, etc., etc. ((Not interesting.))

320: “The miraculous means by which Rudolph accomp- lishes all his redemptions and marvellous cures is not his fine words but his ready money. That is what the moralists are like, says Fourier. One must be a millionaire to be able to imitate their heroes.

“Morality is ‘Impuissance mise en action.’ Every time it fights a vice it is defeated. And Rudolph does not even rise to the standpoint of independent morality based at least on the consciousness of human dignity. On the contrary, his morality is based on the consciousness of human weakness. He represents theological morality.” (320-321)

...“As in reality all differences boil down more and more to the difference between poor and rich, so in the idea do all aristocratic differences become resolved into the opposi- tion between good and evil. This distinction is the last form that the aristocrat gives to his prejudices....” (323-324)

...“Every movement of his soul is of infinite importance to Rudolph. That is why he constantly observes and appraises them....” (Examples.) “This great lord is like the members of ‘Young England,’ who also wish to reform the world, to perform noble deeds, and are subject to similar hysterical fits....” (326)

Has not Marx in mind here the English Tory philanthropists who passed the Ten Hours’ Bill?