Conspectus of Feuerbach’s Book Exposition, Analysis and Critique of the Philosophy of Leibnitz

Conspectus of L. Feuerbach’s book “Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibnizschen Philosophie.” Sämtliche Werke. Bd. IV, Stuttgart, 1910 (Exposition, Analysis and Critique of the Philosophy of Leibnitz, Collected Works, Vol. IV, Stuttgart, 1910) is contained in a separate notebook on whose cover is written: “Feuerbach.” The conspectus was made in Bern at the end of 1914 or the beginning of 1915. Note that this document has undergone special formating to ensure that Lenin’s sidenotes fit on the page, marking as best as possible where they were located in the original manuscript.

In the brilliant exposition of Leibnitz some especially outstanding passages should be mentioned (this is not easy, for the whole—i.e., the first part (§ 1-13) is out- standing), and then the supplements of 1847.

P. 27—The feature that distinguishes Leib-

nitz from Spinoza: in Leibnitz there is, in addition to the concept of sub- stance, the concept of force “and indeed of active force...” the prin- ciple of “self-activity” (29)—

Ergo, Leibnitz through theology arrived at the principle of the in- separable (and universal, absolute) connection of matter and motion. So, it seems to me, Feuerbach is to be understood?

p. 32: “Spinoza’s essence is unity, that of

Leibnitz is difference, distinction.”

p. 34: The philosophy of Spinoza is a tele-

scope, that of Leibnitz a micro- scope.

“Spinoza’s world is an achromatic lens of divinity, a medium through which we see nothing but the colourless celestial light of the single substance; Leibnitz’s world is a many-faceted crystal, a dia- mond, which by its specific nature mul- tiplies the simple light of the substance into an infinitely varied wealth of colours and darkens it.” (Sic!)

p. 40: “Consequently, for Leibnitz, corpo-

real substance is no longer, as for Des- cartes, a merely extended dead mass brought into motion from outside, but as substance it has within it an active force, a never-resting, principle of activ- ity.”

For this, to be sure, Marx valued Leibnitz, despite his, Leibnitz’s, “Lassallean” features and his con- ciliatory tendencies in politics and religion.

The monad is the principle of Leibnitz’s philosophy. Individuality, movement, soul (of a special kind). Not dead atoms, but the living, mobile monads, reflecting the whole world in themselves, possessing (va- guely) the capacity of sensuous representa- tion (souls of a certain kind)—such are the “ultimate elements” (p. 45).

Each monad is different from the others.

...“It would be ... quite contradictory to the beauty, order and reason of nature if the principle of life or of its own internal actions were to be linked only with a small or special part of matter” (Leibnitz— p. 45).

“Hence the whole of nature is full of souls, as the ancient philosophers already correctly recognised, or at any rate of beings analogous to souls. For, by means of the microscope, one finds that there are a multitude of living beings not visible to the naked eye, and that there are more souls than grains of sand and atoms” (Leib- nitz—p. 45).

Qualities of monads: Vorstellung, Re- präsentation.

“Sensuous representation itself, however, is nothing more than the representation (reproduction in the mind and presenta- tion) of the complex or the external, i.e., of multiplicity in the simple”... or ... “the transitory state, which contains and reproduces multiplicity in unity or simple substance” (p. 49, Leibnitz)—verworrene (p. 50) (confuse, p. 52) Vorstellung in the monads (man also has many uncon- scious, verworrene, feelings, etc.).

Every monad is “a world for itself, each is a self-sufficient unity” (Leibnitz, p. 55).

“A mixture of vague conceptions, the senses are no more than that, matter is no more than that” (Leibnitz, p. 58).... “Hence matter is the bond of the monads” (ibi- dem)....

My free interpretation: Monads = souls of a certain kind. Leibnitz = idealist. And matter is something in the nature of an other- being of soul, or a jelly linking them by a worldly, fleshly connection.

“Absolute reality, lies only in the mo- nads and their conceptions” (Leibnitz, p. 60). Matter is only a phenomenon.

“Clarity is only spirit” (p. 62)... matter, however, is “unclearness and unfreedom.” (64)

Space “in itself is something ideal” (Leibnitz, pp. 70-71).

...“The material principle of the diver- sity of matter is motion....” (72)

“Similarly— Newton and his adherents to the contrary—there is no empty space in material nature. The air pump by no means proves the presence of a vacuum for the glass has pores through which all kinds of fine matter can penetrate” (Leibnitz, 76-77)....

“Matter is a phenomenon” (Leibnitz, 78). “The Being-for-itself of the monads is their soul, their Being-for-others is matter” (Feuerbach, 78). The human soul—the central, higher monad, en- telechy, etc., etc.

“Hence every body is affected by every- thing that goes on in the universe” (Leib- nitz, 83).

“The monad represents the whole uni- verse” (Leibnitz, 83).

“The monad, despite its indivisibility, possesses a complex impulse, i.e., a mul- tiplicity of sensuous representations, which

individually strive for their special changes and which, by virtue of their essential connection with all other things, at the same time are found within it....” “Individ- uality contains the infinite within it, as it were, in the germ” (Leibnitz, 84).

Here is dialectics of a kind, and very profound, despite the idealism and clericalism.

“Everything in nature is analogical” (Leibnitz, 86).

“In general, there is nothing absolutely

discrete in nature; all opposites, all bound- aries of space and time, and kind, vanish in the face of the absolute continuity, the infinite interconnection of the universe“ (Feuerbach, 87).

“Owing to its peculiar nature, consisting solely of nerves and not of flesh and blood, the monad is influenced and affected by everything that takes place in the world....” Nevertheless “it is only a spectator of the world drama, not an actor. Therein lies the chief defect of the monads” (Feuer- bach, 90).

The conformity of soul and body is a harmonie préétablie by God.

“The weak side of Leibnitz” (Feuer- bach, 95).”

“The soul is a kind of spiritual automa- ton” (Leibnitz, 98). (And Leibnitz himself said once that the transition from Occa- sionalism to his philosophy is an easy one, Feuerbach, 100.) But in Leibnitz this is deduced from the “nature of the soul”.... (101)

In his Theodicée (§ 17) Leibnitz essentially repeats the ontological argu- ment for the existence of God.

In his Nouveaux essais sur l’entend- ement, Leibnitz criticised Locke’s emp- iricism,— saying nihil est in intellectu, etc., nisi intellectus ipse (!) (152).

(Feuerbach in the first edition also ideal- istically criticises Locke.)

The principle of “necessary truths” lies “within us” (Leibnitz, 148).

The ideas of substance, change, etc., lie within us (Leibnitz, 150).

“To be determined towards the best through reason is the highest degree of free- dom” (Leibnitz, 154).

“The philosophy of Leibnitz is idealism” (Feuerbach, 160), etc., etc.

...“The cheerful, lively polytheism of Leibnitz’s monadology passed into the se- vere, but for that reason more spiritual and intense monotheism of ‘transcendental idealism’” (Feuerbach, 188).

|Pp. 188-220: supplements of 1847|

P. 188: “Idealistic, a priori philosophy....”

“But, of course, what for man is a pos- teriori is for a philosopher a priori; for when man has gathered experiences and has embraced them in general concepts, then he is, of course, in a position to make

‘synthetic judgments a priori.’ Hence what for an earlier time is a matter of experience is for a later time a matter of reason.... Thus, earlier, electricity and magnetism were only empirical, i.e., here accidental, properties perceived only in particular bodies, whereas now, as the result of compre- hensive observations, they are recognised to be properties of all bodies, essential properties of a body.... Hence the history of mankind is the sole standpoint that yields a positive answer to the problem of the origin of ideas....” (191-192)

The soul is not wax, it is no tabula rasa.... “The creation of a sensuous re- presentation requires the addition of some- thing distinct from the object, hence it would be sheer folly for me to seek to derive this distinct element, which is the basis of the real essence of the sensuous representation, from the object. But what is this then? The form of universality; for even the individual idea or sensuous re- presentation is, as Leibnitz remarked, at least in comparison with the real individual object, originally universal, i.e., in this case undetermined, wiping out differences, destructive. Sensuousness is massive, uncrit- ical, luxurious; but the idea, the sensuous representation, is restricted solely to the universal and necessary.” (192)

“The basic thought, therefore, of the Nou- veaux essais sur l’entendement humain is

already, as in Der Kritik der reinen Ver- nunft, that universality, and the ne-

cessity which is inseparable from it, express the essence belonging to the under- standing or apperceiving being, and there- fore cannot come from the senses, or from experience, i.e., from outside....” (193)

This idea occurs already among the Car- tesians—Feuerbach quotes Clauberg, 1652.

“Undoubtedly this axiom” (that the whole is greater than the part) “owes its certainty not to induction, but to the understand- ing, for the latter has no other aim and vocation than to generalise the data of the senses, in order to save us the tedious trouble of repetition, to anticipate, replace, spare, sensuous experience and perception. But does the understanding do this by itself, without a basis for it being pres- ent in sense-perception? Is then the individ- ual case shown me by the senses an individ- ual case in abstracto? Is it not a qualita- tively determined case? But does not

this quality, however, contain so much as an identity of the individual cases that is perceptible by the senses?... Do the

senses show me only leaves and not also trees?... Is there no feeling of identity, likeness and difference? Is there no differ- ence for my senses between black and white, day and night, wood and iron?... Are not the senses the unconditional affir- mation of what is? Consequently, is not the highest law of thought, the law of identity, also a law of sensuousness; indeed, does not this law of thought rest on the truth of sense-perception?”... (193-194)

Leibnitz in Nouveaux essais: “Generality consists in the resemblance to each other of individual things, and this resemblance is a reality” (Book III, Chapter 3, § 12). “But is this resemblance then not sensuous truth? Do not the beings which the un- derstanding refers to a single class, a single genus, affect also my senses in an identical, equal manner?... Is there for my sexual sense—a sense which theoretically also is of the greatest importance, although in the theory of the senses it is usually left out of account—no difference between an animal and a human female? What then is the difference between the faculty of understanding and that of sensuous per-

ception or sensation? The senses present the thing, but the understanding adds the name to it. There is nothing in the under-

standing that is not in sensuous perception, but what is found in the sensuous perception in fact is in the understanding only in

name. The understanding is the highest being, the ruler of the world, but only in name, not in fact. What, however, is a name? It is a mark of difference, a striking

characteristic, which I make the character, the representative, of the object in order thereby to represent it to myself in its totality” (195).

...“The senses tell me just as well as the understanding that the whole is greater than the part; but they tell me so not by words, but by examples, for instance, that the finger is smaller than the hand.... (196-197)

...“Hence the certainty that the whole is greater than the part indubitably does not depend on the senses. But on what then? On the word: the whole. The state- ment that the whole is greater than the part says absolutely nothing more than the word ‘whole’ itself says.... (497)

...“Leibnitz, on the other hand, as an idealist or spiritualist, makes the means into an end, the denial of sensuousness into the essence of the mind.... (198)

...“That which is conscious of itself exists and is, and is called soul. We are, there- fore, certain of the existence of our soul before we are certain of the existence of our body. Of course, consciousness is pri- mary, but it is only primary for me, it is not primary in itself. In the sense of my con- sciousness, I am, because I am conscious; but in the sense of my life I am conscious, because I am. Which of these two is right? The body, i.e., nature, or consciousness, i.e., I? I, of course, for how could I admit myself wrong? But can I then in fact sepa- rate consciousness from my body and think by myself?... (201)

...“The world is the object of the senses and the object of thought. (204)

“In a sensuous object, man distinguishes the essence as it really is, as an object of sense-perception, from the essence of it in thought, abstracted from sensuous- ness. The former he calls the existence or also the individual, the latter the es- sence or the genus. The latter is defined by him as necessary and eternal—because, although a sensuous object may have van- ished from the sensible world, it still remains as an object of thought or sensuous representation—but existence as accidental and transitory.... (205)

...“Leibnitz is half-Christian, he is a theist, or Christian and a naturalist. He

limits the goodness and power of God by wisdom, by the understanding; but this understanding is nothing but a cabinet

of natural objects, it is only the idea of the interconnection of nature, of the uni- verse; hence he limits his theism by na- turalism; he affirms and defends theism by that which abolishes it....“ (215)

P. 274 (from the supplement of 1847): “How much has been said of the decep- tion of the senses, how little of the decep- tion of speech, from which, however, thought is inseparable! Yet how clumsy is the betrayal of the senses, how subtle that of language! How long have I been led by the nose by the universality of reason, the universality of Fichte’s and Hegel’s Ego, until finally, with the support of my five senses, I recognised for the salvation of my soul that all the difficulties and mysteries of the logos, in the sense of rea- son, find their solution in the meaning of the word! For that reason Haym’s state- ment ‘the critique of reason must become the criticism of language’ is for me in a theo- retical respect a soul-inspired statement.— As regards, however, the contradiction be- tween me as a perceiving, personal being and me as a thinking being, it reduces itself in the sense of this note and the dis- sertation quoted” (of Feuerbach himself) “to the sharp contradiction: in sensation I am individual, in thinking I am univer- sal. However, in sensation I am not less universal than I am individual in thinking. Concordance in thinking is based only on concordance in sensation.” (274)

...“All human communion rests on the assumption of the likeness of sensation in human beings.” (274)

Spinoza and Herbart (1836). P. 400 ff. A defence of Spinoza against the banal attacks of the “moralist” Herbart.

The objectivism of Spinoza, etc., is stressed. NB.

Verhältnis zu Hegel (1840 and später). S. 417 ff.

Not very clear, intermittently emphasised that he was a disciple of Hegel.

From the notes: “What is a dialectic that is in contradic- tion to natural origin and development? What is its necessity?...” (431)

Herr von Schelling (1843). Letter to Marx (434 ff.). According to the rough draft. Castigation of Schelling.