Book 2

1.1. Since we have set before you the figures of political oratory and its virtues, you must now hear also about the form of the simple style; for there is nothing one ought to consider so much as the qualities of the simple and plain style and its differences from the political and contentious style. This is no easy matter, since all discourse is of one genus and one nature; nevertheless there are certain variations and forms that differ from one another.

1.2. Every discourse, clearly, consists of conceptions and of delivery, which lies in diction, in figure, in rhythm. We must say, then, what it is that makes the distinctions between the political discourses and the simple ones; for the conceptions of the simple are not the same as those of the political. For if the conception is the same, yet the diction is not the same; or if the diction too is the same, yet the rhythm is not the same; or if the rhythm too is the same, yet the figure is not the same.

1.3. One must know first, then — to put it in summary as best we may — that the differences of the political discourse from the simple are taken first from the conceptions. For the political thoughts are harsher, more distinguished and drawn from more distinguished sources, and keener, working their keenness from the fact that they are rarer and distinguished; while the simple thoughts are plain, ordinary, undistinguished, and these too drawn from undistinguished arguments. Concerning the thoughts, then — to say a few things out of many — these are they.

1.4. The next difference concerns the handling. For just as in the political discourse there is a certain handling, so too in the simple discourse. And the difference of the handlings is this: in the political discourse they must be manifest — for in this way the discourse is advanced in a political manner, if the hearers follow along with the points at issue; but in the simple this is not so; rather, the inquiries are sometimes hidden, and one does not even know what the speaker means to say, because the discourse resembles no set design.

1.5. The figures, in the political discourse, are harsh, vehement, refutative, forceful; in the simple they are relaxed, plain, showing no refutation nor any examination, but more ordinary and sprawling. For those make the discourse intense and political, while these make it simple, being, as it were, the speech of a private man and of conversation.

1.6. Nor, indeed, is the diction the same for them, but there is a certain difference in the diction too. For in the political discourse, sometimes the thought is completed, sometimes it must be joined to another thought; for the discourse must be advanced with all security and intensity. In the simple it is not so; rather the diction seems to be advanced as it chances, showing a slackness and no studied care of the diction. Further, in the political discourse, whatever one wishes to signify, this very thing and this alone must be made manifest by the diction; in the simple, the single word sometimes signifies one thing, and two, and three. And in diction the beauties are produced by the juxtaposition of words, for instance, "a keeper of horses, of horses," "a keeper of swine, of swine."

1.7. And concerning the rhythms we likewise say that there is a certain difference between the political discourse and the simple; and in general the difference of simplicity from the political discourse is that it belongs to simplicity for the discourse to proceed plainly, and for the hearing to be drawn along always upon what is uniform, and for there to be nowhere any checks in the discourse, nor any obstacle anywhere to the hearing. But where, as the discourse proceeds, a turning-back has occurred, and something has, as it were, met the hearing as an obstacle from the check produced by the turning-back, there the figure is contentious, and the discourse has by its rhythm already become more political; for such things always turn the hearer about and do not allow him simply to follow along — which last is the work of simplicity.

1.8. As Xenophon in the Symposium — for now I shall set out their examples too for you, that the observations of simplicity may become clearer to you: "Women, at any rate, especially if they happen to be brides, like the wife of this Niceratus here and of Critobulus, have no need of perfume." And the turning-back: "for they themselves smell of it." This, then, one must understand thus: that these women have no need of perfume from a man, for they have it from themselves, being brides. It is worth observing the matter of the turning-back; for it belonged to simplicity to go on as far as "they have no need of perfume," but the giving of the cause, set beside it by way of the turning-back, made the discourse exceedingly nimble — "for they themselves smell of it" — and the discourse comes near to having become political by its rhythm.

1.1. The conceptions, again, in regard to expression, belong to the simple writers — for instance, to use, should it so chance, even rather undistinguished conceptions. At any rate, when Xenophon wished to establish that Cyrus is a man of great worth, consider how he managed it. For the proposition is political, and the proofs most political — that Cyrus came to be of great worth; but of the conceptions some were political, some simple. Political are such as these: "Cyrus came to be of great worth, for he most easily accomplished the hardest thing." And what is the hardest thing? To rule over men. Thus far the establishing is political. If, then, you were handling it politically, you would have said thus: "Cyrus came to be of great worth, for he accomplished what was hardest — to rule over men. Why? Because men are not readily willing to be ruled, but many lordships and many tyrannies have been overthrown by those unwilling to be ruled." Thus far the conceptions are political.

1.2. But when you come to the establishing of the difference and say, "For it is easier to rule oxen and sheep and every herd than men," then I say that you are leading the discourse off into simpler conceptions; for they belong to character and manner, which preserved the simplicity of the discourse. The political man, then, having set down a proposition, sets beside it the establishing points, always choosing the more political of the conceptions; for instance, to speak, in the matter of revolts, of "shepherds as rulers" is not more political; or again, "we have never yet perceived herds banding together" — a political man would not say it; but this man, in keeping with what suited him, furnished the divergence to his arguments.

1.3. But where the conceptions are common, neither the diction nor the figure is the same. For when he says, "A thought once came to us," and "all those who, having attempted to play the tyrant, some of them were even very quickly overthrown, did they not pay the penalty?" and again, "but others, even if they continue ruling for however long a time" — for he did not say, "those who took the cities by force and established the strongest rule for themselves."

1.4. I have shown you, then, that of the conceptions some are taken from judgement, while some are conceptions of every sort; and some of them are taken from distinguished sources, others from small and obscure ones. This much, then, is so for you: that the simple writers use conceptions of every sort, and it is not enough for them to use only those taken from the subject matter, but sometimes also such conceptions as another might despise, and not even approach, because they are not taken from the subject matter and happen to be undistinguished; but the simple writers do not abstain from these.

1.5. Such, then, is the matter as to the handling of the conceptions; and there is still this — that the things said in establishing the point at issue should not be stated as though set forth as a proposition, but, while it is unclear toward what they are said, the discourse should so proceed; for instance, not setting down beforehand that he wishes to prove Cyrus of great worth, he brings in "A thought once came to us," and, having taken up beforehand all the preliminary establishings — from which it is hard to rule men, harder than this and that — thus he brought it in: "But indeed Cyrus ruled over very many men; Cyrus, therefore, came to be of great worth." And this is the handling of simple discourse, when what is said is not manifestly a proposition.

1.6. Often, too, the thoughts must not all be strong, as the thoughts of political discourses are, but some must be set down in a subdued way, and seeming to be the weaker; and some, if possible, such as would appear even ridiculous — as also in the Symposium, right at the beginning of the discourse, he says: "But to me it seems that of fair and good men not only the things done in earnest are worthy of record, but also the things done in their amusements." The thought belongs to character — that one must accept also the things done in amusement by fair and good men. And this is the observation of the simple discourse — that one must not in every way pursue the distinguished and the great, but also the things that seem paltry and contemptible.

1.7. As to delivery, then, neither of the two conceptions is harshly stated — neither the "A thought once came to us," nor the "But to me it seems." For since what was said in the Symposium seemed undistinguished — to recount the things done in amusements — and no political man would have done this, it being undistinguished, he advanced it with an apology, "But to me it seems." But if the discourse had begun for him with a declarative word, such as "It seems to me," the discourse would have become harsher and would have seemed more to belong to Critias or some such man.

1.8. As to figure, by a relaxed figure; for he would not have done it with strain, as one of the political writers would have said: "I do not hold the same opinion as the many about earnest men; for the many think nothing else of theirs worthy of record but the things done in earnest, whereas with me it is not so; but no less do the things done in amusements seem worthy of remembrance than what they might do in earnest." He did not advance it thus, but with a relaxed and altered figure, "But to me it seems"; then, in keeping with the idiom of the discourse, things belonging to character, and the words "fair and good men." And again he says, "And when the horse-race ended." The figure seems to be relaxed and sprawling; but a political man would not have done it thus, but more intensely: "Just when the horse-race ended," or in some such manner.

1.9. The ancient writers, both the simple and the political men, use the figures in varied ways; for the very things that, in political discourse, make the discourse keen, here produce simplicity. And the rhythm of delivery must be such as to advance and step forward rather than to press on as though bearing down upon itself, not as in the political writers, where they set beside the matter the qualities, when they say either "the most dreadful of all things," or "that at which you will all be indignant," or "for this is a monstrous thing." For before stating the matter the political writers show the quality, sometimes before the matters, sometimes bringing it on after the matters. And this too belongs to good rhythm: "Yet a man who at that time, in the foremost city, was judged by the best men worthy of the fairest prize — what further proofs does he need of his excellence even before he came to rule?" This too seems to me to have wrought good rhythm in the discourse; and what works the good rhythm is this — to have enfolded the thoughts and, having completed it, to set the thought at rest, so that what is said after it is no longer joined to it, but seems to be the beginning of another discourse. For what does he say? "But all that came about when he was already among men." Xenophon does not use this figure in many places; for it is harsher and more forensic, and we are accustomed to bring on such things with proven matters, either as men forcing the point or as those who seem to be saying something with great emphasis. Still, as for its other good rhythm, this too has come about marvellously — that the continuous distensions have been made in a single breath of discourse: "yet at that time," "in the foremost city," "judged by the best men," "deemed worthy of the fairest prize"; and the saying of many thoughts, one by one, toward a single phrase, belongs to power and rhythm.

1.10. The simple writers delight also in the words, transferring them from one thing to another, as Xenophon too in the Agesilaus says, "he made many lovers of his own friendship"; for "lover" seems to be the word of something else. And again, "but they themselves, catching sight of the attendants of the Greeks." Here again he used a word lesser than the matter; for the word "attendants" is more wont to be said of slaves, but he did not shrink from naming the followers and the rearmost of the camp "attendants." And in the Memorabilia: "I wonder, then," he says, "how on earth the Athenians were persuaded that Socrates was not sound concerning the gods." He transferred it here as something proper to the kind of discourse.

1.11. One must, however, observe this too: how, while setting down subdued words for the sake of simplicity, he nonetheless, in the proper manner, makes manifest the magnitude of the matter, as he says at the beginning of the discourse: "I have often wondered by what arguments those who indicted Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he deserved death at the city's hands; for the indictment against him was something like this: 'Socrates does wrong, in not acknowledging the gods the city acknowledges, and in bringing in other things, and in corrupting the young.'" For the "I wondered" and the "often" are no small emphasis, and the things brought against him made it plain as well. A political man, then, would have stated both forces not once but many times; but he, having stated the simple force, was content.

1.12. Thus the conceptions are sometimes the same, but the handling makes the difference of the discourse. And you see here too the simplicity of the words. For though the subject matter is worthy of anger and rebuke — for its quality is such, that so worthy a man as Socrates was condemned — nevertheless so simple a man often says, "I wondered." And he did not say, "at what one might be angry," or "at what it is worthy to rebuke." For in simple discourse there is neither force nor passion nor vehemence, nor is the disposition of the matters of such a kind, nor such as to mark the nature of what is brought on; and by this most of all the form of the simple discourse is characterized.

1.13. It is good, too, in matters one knows, to speak as though searching for something. "By what arguments?" — for he did not say, "not by accusations nor by slanders," which would have suited a political man, but "by what arguments they persuaded the Athenians." And to speak generically, not by species: not "Anytus and Meletus," but "those who indicted Socrates." And interchanges suit the simple discourse: "he does wrong, indeed, but he does wrong."

1.14. Then, of what follows, the proofs are most political; for he shows, it seems, a contradiction against the things attaching to him: "But this too seems marvellous to me — that some were persuaded that Socrates corrupted the young." But he, not setting down a proposition, thus brings on the establishing points, but simply goes through the matters, first. And one must observe the handling of the establishing points; for a political man would have stated the generic, choosing it: "how he was temperate, how self-controlled, how he held out against all toils"; but he states the species: "he was self-controlled, he says, in belly and in the pleasures of love; and how he bore himself toward winter and summer"; then he mixed the great with the small: "How, then, could he have made men impious or lawless or gluttonous?"

1.15. Often the simple writers use also conceptions brought in from without, beside the subject matter, such as: "We have never yet perceived the herds banding together against the shepherd," and all such things. It does not suit a political man; for even if the political men do use certain conceptions from without — such as if one should speak from examples or from histories or from some other such mode — yet at least one must use those attached to the matter, whence they are wont to tend such things either with justifications or with announcements; for instance, one out of many: "That you may know, then, that it is not even in keeping with the character of the city to make such a law valid" — then there follows talk of "money." But in the simple, the conceptions brought in are from nearly everything in life. And the things added from without produce magnitude in the discourse, when there is a distinguished name or place.

1.16. One must observe, then, in everything, that the rhythms and the figures and the words be suited to the simple discourse, and the rhythmically uniform among the thoughts, such as "things said, things done, things deliberated"; and one must know all the figures that suit these, and everywhere preserve the simplicity that is in them.

1.17. We say that in many places there are observations common to both the simple and the political — for instance, the marking of matters of which you are about to speak, and the considering of their nature and of what opposes what is being said by you, namely, that you are discoursing about small and paltry things. And such a thing too belongs to the simple: "Philip the jester came in," and "he wept," and that "those reclining at the banquet laughed," and that "the Syracusan presented marvels." For all these are common to both the political and the simple. But the handling of what is introduced is proper to the man; since even the announcement here is common: "I wish to make plain the things I came to know by being present." But what comes after the announcement is no longer common, but novel; for, having announced, he did not state the consequent of the announcement, but one of the things about him; for the things at which he was present were the things that took place at Callias's house; but he does not say these things at once, but the beginning from which these things began to come about, and such a thing seems to be a narrative rather.

1.1. The simple discourse too must be varied, especially in such a kind, and in one place to produce dignity, in another amplitude, in another standing, in another to display character and grace, and in another even laughter, if possible — as it is here too: "Philip the jester, knocking at the door." For the character is very graceful, which is the mark of simple discourse; for to strip away the designs and to use the very words and to follow the nature of the matters, and not to fear their smallness and lowliness, belongs to a plain and noble soul, whence too the arts of discourse were discovered, by which it was able to take on magnitude even for things that do not have magnitude by nature; and sometimes the things made manifest in them are such, while others even make manifest something false, as this too: "You are always mocking us, because you have given Protagoras much money for wisdom." For this makes manifest a slight grace, and at the same time has a certain malice in it.

1.2. And some conceptions are such that nothing is to be understood in them besides; while some are such as to have character, and the character is not one nor simple, but varied — one a graceful character, one a good character, one making manifest sweetness, one kindness, one such a character as to make manifest, of itself, much dignity, as this too: "Autolycus, then, sat beside his father." It was a thing of great dignity, and in the conception, to make the lad sit beside his father. For such conceptions are dignified; and most of all his character was preserved for him by his not using elaboration of his own — as if he had said, "Autolycus, then, sat beside his father, as a son should sit with a father" — for such a thing is political. He let, then, the character and the dignity be made manifest.

1.3. For some conceptions, as I said, have a character lying underneath and to be inferred — such as the aforesaid, "You are always mocking us"; while others are simple and make manifest no malice, as this too: "Some, having anointed themselves, others having bathed as well"; for this makes manifest nothing more than what happened. But where the inferences are base and grieve the discourse, you must set right the absurdity in what you introduce, not simply, but by your own additions; for instance, "At once, then, one who considered what was happening would have thought that beauty is something kingly by nature" — and his own addition: "especially if one possesses it, as Autolycus did, with modesty and temperance." For, the discourse being about beauty, one would not refrain from receiving such things toward malice.

1.4. First, then, the character of the simple discourse must be such as to make manifest kindness; for kindness is a virtue of judgement, and a choice springing from the understanding and judgement, and a fairness of manners. But the character must not be signified of itself, but left in the hearers, that it may seem free of design; on this account one must not mark either the dreadful as dreadful or the fearful as fearful, but it suffices me only to say, "Tissaphernes slanders Cyrus to his brother." For it sufficed him to show, from the kindred relation, what kind of thing it is to slander brother to brother; but to consider the quality and the disposition this leaves to him. But if you advanced it contentiously, you would have said this, for instance: "A thing the most dreadful and most savage of all Tissaphernes cast into his soul"; and if you wish to raise it and to set down the very thoughts because of which the slander ought not to have come about, you will add: "revering neither the gods nor justice nor the matter as most dreadful." For the very things that one might think to belong to character among those who handle political discourses, these too can make manifest character in these cases — yet less; for the manner is one thing with them and shows something else, another with these; for there it is to hint at something or to point at something else, or even to make manifest the very opposite of what you say, but here not, since it is a mark of simplicity and a plainness of understanding. For the sake of an example, let it stand in both: Demosthenes, wishing to make manifest character, what does he say? "It would, then, be quite fitting that you should make most account of such a man, and justly name him a benefactor." But Xenophon's character — his very hand followed it; so that, clearly examining the arrangement in each of them, we should find the character.

1.5. Xenophon works the characters, first, by looking to the idioms of the persons about whom he happens to be making his discourse; then by looking at the occasions, and besides these the circumstances and the things that have befallen and the things present to them and the things attending; from which, reasoning, he finds how to work characters in the discourses, and, by Zeus, passions too. But that one may begin from the books themselves: in the Symposium there is every virtue, and the discourse and the plainness of understanding belong to the things said, which one might thus call character; and almost the whole discourse has been advanced thus. Whence, then, did this come to him? From seeing the occasion and what kind of thing the matter is and the things attending by nature — for instance, what kind of thing a banquet is, and what things happen to be said and done at a banquet. Looking forward to these, he worked the discourse, for instance, right at the beginning of the discourse: "But to me it seems that of fair and good men not only the things done in earnest are worthy of record, but also the things in their amusements." The thought belongs to character — that one must accept also the things done in amusement by great and good men — and it is the observation of the simple, that one must not in every way pursue the distinguished and the great, but also the things that seem paltry and contemptible. Again, in the Memorabilia, having learned the idiom of Socrates's purpose, he led the discourse with an eye to this; for, the subject matter being worthy of anger and rebuke — that so worthy a man as Socrates was condemned — nevertheless this man, as a simple man, showed character here too: "I have often," he says, "wondered," and did not say, "at what one might be angry," or "at what it is worthy to rebuke." One must, however, observe this too: how, while setting down subdued words for the sake of simplicity, he nonetheless, in the proper place, made manifest the magnitude of the matter; for the "I wondered" and the "often" are no small emphasis. Again, in the Education, see how he handled it, saying, "A thought once came to us." Now the thought is, in what manner Cyrus, while a boy, was reared, and what education he shared in, and what deeds he did, and how he became the most fortunate of men; but this means something else for the man. For he has not chosen to praise Cyrus, nor does he care in what manner Cyrus was educated or reared; but since he advances the discourse in character, he has used a sketch of what kind of man the good man must be, and what nurture and what education he must use, and what kind he must be while still among children, and what kind when one becomes a youth, and what deeds and pursuits befit the fair and good man; but Cyrus is, as it were, just a name for him. In the same manner, in the Memorabilia too, he has handled such discourses; for there it is told by him, concerning many, in what manner one must bear oneself toward one's own fatherland and toward friends and in all household matters; yet it is not told hypothetically — for instance, "one must bear oneself thus and so toward friends," nor "one must bear oneself thus toward brothers," nor "there must be a display of statesmanship before one becomes a man wise and skilled in affairs" — but, supposing other persons, he teaches you in what manner one must do such things; as he speaks of Chaerephon, who was at variance with his brother: "Tell me," he said, "are you alone ignorant that one must bear oneself toward brothers thus?" — but he set forward another person. When, then, you wish to advance a discourse in character, you do not introduce it hypothetically, "one must do this or that," but, supposing another person, you say whatever you wish someone to do, that "that man was such and did these things."

1.6. It is possible not only to seem to furnish the form of character in discourse by the plainness of understanding, but also by its opposite — for instance, to clothe a discourse with something harsher and more austere, when such a thing is supposed; and again, if one should clothe a lover with words proper to him, and likewise in all cases with an eye to the passions, in the manner in which, in the Education too, he worked passions from the surrounding circumstances — all that is said about Abradatas and his wife. But the whole virtue is to guard and preserve the idioms of each, just as they were. Thus he has made Cyaxares irascible throughout, and another man having some idiom in his soul; for these things work great characters in the discourse. And you would guard this, if you follow the previous understanding and the purpose of the discourse, considering what it means and looking to the idiom of him about whom you are speaking.

1.7. The characters, in simple discourses, take on intensity and dignity, when one, making manifest one's own judgement, leaves the character in the conception alone — for instance, if you said, marking it, "The gods gave and honoured Cheiron, as was right, having admired him for being just and for having done the deeds of beauty, because he was just and practised the rest of virtue"; for in these you make manifest your own judgement, how you stand toward such men; but for Xenophon it sufficed only to keep silent upon the conception: "and Cheiron, on account of his justice," and so on.

1.8. It belongs to the man's idiom, and to all the simple writers, to furnish, as much as possible, a kind character too, yet not to signify this very thing of itself. And consider from here the character of simplicity: whether it does not seem to you to belong to a kind man, that one about to die should wish both his children to be present with him: "And so kind and affectionate was Darius, that he wished both his children to be present with him. And when Darius fell sick and suspected the end of his life, he wished both his sons to be present with him." This belongs to kind character; for it has shown you a fatherly disposition, and it is the virtue of judgement, and the character of a simple man, such as would be kind. He made a kind character in the Symposium too, in the case of the woman displaying marvels, saying, "so that those watching were afraid." Here too, then, the character appeared kind — that the watchers were afraid at the strangeness of the spectacle.

1.9. Another character again, unseen and hidden, as befits the simple discourses: "Cyrus, then, goes up, having taken Tissaphernes as a friend." For why need one declare and say, "having taken Tissaphernes, the man most plotting against him, as a friend"? But to conceal it and let it pass by itself — this has the character. And attend to this most of all, that the simple writers do not mark the forces, but think it right that they should be shown of themselves, unless somewhere a fitting occasion appear, as in the Cynegeticus: "I, then, exhort the young not to despise hunting." He had here an occasion and a marvellous character, after results so great, to use it hypothetically too, from his own person: "I, then, exhort." And when you say the opposite of the significant and relax the emphasis, you work character; for you do not say, "to hold to hunting and to be in earnest about hunting," but the opposite, "not to despise hunting nor the rest of education." And this does not allow the discourse to become cheap, when you set a distinguished thing beside one not seeming very distinguished, "not to despise hunting nor the rest of education." To interweave, then, the greater with the smaller, and to mix in something generic with what is stated by species, belongs to a man of knowledge; for from these come men good for war and for other things: "This, then, one must do, for this reason." The justification, then, is common to both the political and the simple; but the figures differ — to say it without interweaving, "not only for war, but also for other things."

1.10. He made character again, with sweetness, saying in the Memorabilia, "and that he should not think he has the greatest gain in having acquired a good friend"; he made a sweet character by naming the matter from the lesser. For instead of saying that the substances of friends all become his, and the helps in life, he, by this one word, which makes manifest both sweetness and character, says, "having acquired a good friend."

1.11. And to make the rebukes by way of the denial of the opposite produces character; for instance, where the consequent would be to say "he took care," "he did not neglect," and "he blamed those who neglected," he says "he did not praise," for instance: "and indeed of the body he himself did not neglect it, nor did he praise those who neglected."

1.12. A good and Socratic character is not to lead from the necessary to the necessary, for instance, "but he himself discoursed about human affairs, considering what is pious, what impious"; then from the neutral to the nominal: "what temperance, what madness, what courage, what cowardice, what a city, what a statesman." And in the same he made beauty too by chopping it short matter by matter.

1.13. Ironies, too, work characters — for instance, all the cases in which he has made Socrates conversing and instructing the young, as though he himself did not know, but were searching out rather.

1.14. Some words, even apart from the matters, work character in discourses, for instance: "It is a fine thing that I have met with you." Here nothing else worked the character but the diction, "It is a fine thing that I have met with you."

1.15. And comparative figures very much belong to simplicity and belong rather to the historical kind of discourse, but they too furnish character, for instance, "rather to these, as to generals and cavalry-commanders and seekers of office." But if you, gathering the opposite, said, "as for all who are said to be such as men see surpassing others somewhat in offices and honours and such powers, they do not seem to me to act rightly," such a manner would seem to belong rather to Critias or one of the ancient sophists.

1.16. I say, then, that the simple man uses also an unemphatic diction and figure and rhythm, as it is here too: "And when Darius fell sick and suspected the end of his life, he wished both his children to be present with him"; for the rhythm is not such as would belong to a political man, drawn together and gathering up the thoughts. The thoughts set upright have keenness instead of being made oblique; for to make it oblique would have been, "and Darius being sick." And simplicity comes near to approaching cheapness, through using most words unemphatically, as here too the "fell sick" was a bare word. On this account an equivalent was set beside it, that it might escape cheapness: "And when Darius fell sick and suspected the end of his life."

1.1. Character has dignity also in making manifest either piety toward the gods or benefactions toward friends; and one must attend most of all to such things, for the greatest and most numerous of the observations are taken according to these conceptions. And the conceptions are taken from the things in the matter itself; but to have the conceptions stated as about piety and good obedience belongs very much to the purpose of the simple writers. For they do not, as I said, much delight in using the hypothetical, unless necessity somewhere arise — for instance, "one must be pious, one must obey ruling gods" — but, as it were, they sketch certain conceptions of how one must act, not saying didactically that one must not do this, but, in general, "to those who do these things, such things are wont to result."

1.2. Dignity arises in the simple discourse in many other ways too, but more dignified is when you transfer from a person to the matters; for it is not the same to say of the person, "the beautiful are kings by nature" — for this is boyish — as to bring it out upon the matter, "that beauty is something kingly by nature." And for the sake of the dignity in the conception, the addition after this: "especially if one possesses it, as Autolycus did, with modesty and temperance."

1.3. Such interweavings, too, produce dignity, for instance, "and a boy very comely and playing the lyre and dancing very finely"; for to interweave into the same thing the diverse among these takes away the difference of the kind.

1.4. And wherever you introduce the things about to happen, or the things happening, as already having happened, you make the discourse dignified, for instance: "And when the flute-girl had piped for them, and the boy had played the lyre."

1.5. And wherever you throw in dignified words, you will work, along with the dignity, a power of beauty too: "Zeus and Cheiron were brothers, of the same father, but of mother the one of Rhea, the other of a Naiad nymph." For to make it common, "of the same father," and to state the difference, "of mother the one of this, the other of that," has, along with the simplicity, dignity too.

1.6. And to say something generically is more dignified than by species, for instance, generically, "lest he suffer something"; for it is not the same to say by species, "lest he be pierced through, lest he be slaughtered." And to gather all these together generically in one word, "lest he suffer something."

1.7. Amplitude arises in the simple discourse too, when one, having made a thought oblique, throws in another, a second, the understanding not yet completed nor the conclusion brought on, so that it seems one conception; for instance, "And while the Lacedaemonians were deliberating about these things, Agesilaus undertook" — now the completing part, "to cross over," no longer made oblique; for it would have become long, for instance, "having crossed, to do this and that," but "to cross over."

1.8. Every amplitude works a power in the discourse, but we must consider in what respect the power that arises in the simple discourse differs from the political. Consider, then: "For prosperity beyond one's deserts becomes, for the foolish, a starting-point for thinking ill." I say, then, that the declarative form of the figure is not profitable in the simple; for it clothes it with standing and power, but it is no longer simple nor according to a man — that one should so state the matter — but lofty and puffed up; nor the subordinating particle, the "for"; for such particles compel the discourse, enclosing the thoughts, to become rounded and hard and squeezed tight; whence one must not add the particles, whenever we wish to bring out some sign of power, but to begin simply from verbal forms.

1.9. To amplitude belongs also that which both makes the discourse distinguished and gives it standing — when one does not introduce the matters by themselves and name them upon the subject, for instance, "Callias appeared worthy to behold through being possessed by love of Autolycus," but takes on from without certain definite things along with the indefinite: "All, then, who are possessed by some one of the gods seem worthy to behold." And if, then, you wished to pass quickly to the subject and not to raise the discourse very much, you would have said, "but most of all those possessed by love"; but as it is, it was raised much more through the differences being taken up beforehand in the middle, before the subject is led on: "but those possessed by other things seem to be seen as more terrible and to speak more fearfully and to be more vehement."

1.10. It is much more in the historical manner to set the figures upright and not to make them oblique; and to make them oblique belongs to the political men; for it has dignity and amplitude. If, then, you made it oblique, you would say thus: "the horse-race having ended"; but to set it upright is of this kind: "and when the horse-race ended"; but this seems relaxed and sprawling. And the political man would not have done it thus, but more intensely: "and when the horse-race ended." And as the political man is drawn together and gathers up the thoughts, so the simple man is supine and stretched out.

1.11. Amplitude is this too, as in the Symposium Socrates also said: "in many other cases it is plain, and in those in which the girl . . ." He spoke in an enfolding way; and what made the amplitude? The taking up of the indefinite and the passing over to something definite: "in many other cases, but it is plain also in those in which the girl . . ." And the manner is Socratic and ancient — to introduce something useful out of everything, since indeed from the beginning, until discourses about virtue were discovered, there was even the greatest doctrine, that the virtue of men and of women is the same.

1.1. The sweetness of diction, we have said, is supplied from comedy and Plato and Xenophon; and the simple writers use also poetic diction, when they wish to clothe the discourse of the observations with bulk, and from comedy. It belongs to it to begin from partitions and as from an addition: "and yet," "and indeed," "but then," "but indeed"; for such things furnish simplicity to the discourse.

1.2. Wherever you wish to work sweetness, you will use such metaphors, transferring words lying upon other matters onto others; and when you do not remain upon the precisely significant, for instance, the significative of the subject "they gave," and the transferred from the trope, "and they honoured Cheiron on account of his justice," instead of "they gave."

1.3. And by stating the great in a small way, and the small in a great way, you will work sweetness. To name the small in a great way, we say, furnishes sweetness to the discourse; and most marvellous is such a trope — to call a thing "a war of a dog and a beast": "First, the hounds must be of each kind, not chance ones, that they may be ready to make war upon the beast."

1.4. He made a marvellous sweetness in the Agesilaus too, saying, "Whenever indeed he marched, he led the army drawn up in such a way that they could best help themselves"; then he brought on an example, as a simple man making manifest sweetness with dignity: "and quietly, as the most temperate maiden would advance." And the relaxation lies in the diminishing of the example and in its not being wholly alike; for what does a maiden resemble in an army? Nevertheless, the saying "the temperate maiden" had cheapness, but the turning round and the attending purpose belonging to the person worked dignity with sweetness, "as the most temperate maiden would."

1.5. And concerning sweetness we have spoken in what precedes too, both all that it accomplishes in the political discourse and again all in the simple. The virtue of sweetness is nearly more the property of the simple.

1.1. The simple discourse takes on beauties also from places, should it so chance, and from other attendant things, for instance, when one calls a city great and prosperous, when a river, or whence it flows, how great its breadth — such things always add beauty to the discourse. To go through by species all that attaches to a thing, whether to a river or a city or a plain, breaks up the simplicity; but the generic, if "great and prosperous," preserves both the beauty and the plainness.

1.2. Juxtapositions of like things, too, work a fine and keen discourse, as in the Anabasis, of Cyrus: "he offered prizes also to the cavalry squadrons, whichever should ride best."

1.3. And the over-elaborations and the figure-makings among the simple writers are unseen. For these things the ancients are of great worth; for see how he makes a figure: "and to the cavalry ones, whichever should ride best." For it would not have been the same to say "to the cavalry," for that would quickly have made the discourse contentious, but "to the cavalry squadrons, whichever should ride best." It has been figured, then, from the plural into one and set upright, and set beside the like, "to the cavalry, whichever should ride," and "to the hoplite squadrons, whichever should be in best bodily condition."

1.1. The greatest thing in simple discourse is that it should seem as true as possible, and that the things said should appear to be such as anyone might think easy to conceive. This comes about most of all when one takes a conception from the very matter introduced — for instance, as in the Agesilaus, he says, "that he wished to make war spending the King's resources rather than the resources of the Greeks." For taking from what was done by Agesilaus — and his crossing into Asia was about to take place — this conception, through which he showed him to be prudent, he seemed to have spoken most truly about him.

1.2. And it makes the discourse true to introduce something that seems to be against you, to admit it and let it stand without doing it away, for instance: "But if any of you, seeing the enemy to be fearful, has supposed . . . to me he seems to think rightly." For, in order that the other things which Cyrus went through to the soldiers should seem to be spoken truly, this he not only did not do away, but even assented to it, though it was against him.

1.3. And by introducing what is said in narratives, even if it be fictitious and small, it seems to be true; for he says it as having happened.

1.4. And to say something briefly and to set beside it many things belongs to true power, for instance, "having summoned" — then whom? "Araspes" — then whence? "a Mede" — then also the ground of acquaintance: "who had been his friend from boyhood" — then another: "to whom he had given his robe."

1.5. These things, then, seem to suffice also for advancing the discourse with power; but most of all, when you receive the truth said against you not as true, it belongs to a simple man, as Socrates too says, "You are always mocking us." He made character by the subduing of his judgement, and by not boasting at that man's praise, but attending to it as to a jest; for what that man said in earnest, this one received as though being mocked.

1.1. The economy of a discourse is, in everything, the fitting arrangement and the expectation of what is said, and the thoughts and the arguments depending on one another and holding to the subject; and besides these the other observations, all that belong to simple economy. I say, then, that if there is one heading, one must, without anticipation, state the distinguished points in its favour, and so set down the anticipation, having taken up beforehand something distinguished against the adversary; then thus, if they bring anything against ourselves too, consider. If the things from the adversary are more, one must consider the matter; for the method is the same; for the heading is that one must make the things of the enemies, being weak, to appear so, and the things in our own favour far surpassing; for it is plain to all how it would come about, and could be no otherwise.

1.1. Concerning interpretation I would say only this: to use neither noun nor verb otherwise than those from the books; and this you might say thus simply — not to put all things in all kinds, but each one separately according to the dignity proper to simplicity, to passion, to character, to spirit. And the parts of the Demosthenic discourses contribute much to the form of interpretation; but everywhere in expression Xenophon alone works simplicity. For spirit or passion or anger or sharpness and all the other things that are stirred belong to dignity or harshness, but to the changing and exhortation of the passions, such as the judgement of Demosthenes is; and the use of examples is Socratic, yet such a thing does not suit the political discourse very well.

1.2. Sometimes Xenophon, even before what he wishes to say, introduces it through the example itself; and the establishings of them are without examples, for the most part, as is plain in all the rest, but most of all in the Memorabilia; for there, in what manner he has made Socrates discoursing about each thing and demonstrating each, it is possible for one examining to learn that it has been advanced in this manner.

1.3. The examples and the things set beside them, through which you would demonstrate, must be like to what is set before you, and must share with the things spoken of, either in kind, or in strength, or in time, or in the results that follow from them, or in their idioms, or in some other likeness. And this is fine in such a kind of discourse, and most of all works the plainness, whence too an interwoven abundance arises, and the discourse, from the things circling about, appears simple, both through what is said becoming more dignified and through another making it more vivid — which last seems to be rather the work of conversation.

1.1. Of the arguments, Demosthenes always, and those who have compiled forensic discourses, make selections and distinctions, and mark, heading by heading, setting down their forces — doing this with reason, both because their discourse is contentious, so that the hearers may at once learn their strength and be able to examine each thing accurately.

1.2. Yet this does not seem to me to suit the simple discourse, if indeed the discourse must appear as free of design as possible, and simple and pure; and Xenophon sets down each of the thoughts bare and separately, as in the Agesilaus, by themselves, whence one might even think the thoughts to have been flung down. Yet they have not been flung down, but each has been advanced with elaborateness, while stripped of the fine examination and addition and transposition and interchanges and all such things; and they simply appear such; whence there are also many continuous distensions, and beginnings of thoughts no longer joined, but completed; and further, the things said appear most of all as separate, one and another, and the composition is not a web, but, as it were, gathered phrase by phrase in the form of conversation.

1.3. This, then, has produced the seeming that the things said are a narrative of the deeds of a good man; yet it does not, it seems to me, suit wholly and in everything among the simple discourses, and one must have learned this, if any other idiom of Xenophon. For this is most of all, as I think, what works the discourse simple.

1.1. Come, then, let us learn also about the beginning of the discourse, in what manner Xenophon is wont to make his beginnings. One must, in all discourses alike, arrange beforehand what is useful about the matters, and either resolve the things that oppose, or establish them for oneself. In this, then, it is alike with the political; but the idioms are left to the simple in the handling and the delivery.

1.2. The political men, then, take their beginnings both from the very matters and tending toward them; but Xenophon does not, in all cases, take them tending toward them, and is wont not to take them from the matters themselves, as in the Education, "A thought once came to us"; for he did not advance the discourse from the deeds of Cyrus, but argumentatively from without; on which account, going on, he made the increase little by little from without.

1.3. He has used the beginning from the very matters in the Memorabilia, so that the discourse seems outright to be forensic, at the beginning of the first laying-down of the matters, the thought not being completed: "I have often," he says, "wondered by what arguments they persuaded the Athenians."

1.4. This observation is in all the beginnings of his discourses — not to state it as though introducing a second thought, and so to separate the first, but to lay down at once the things depending on the thought and to go on at length. It is an idiom not to change the quality of the thought, and so to introduce it generically first, which a political man would have done, raising the discourse by standing — for instance, "A thought once came to us, what kind of thing the nature of the beautiful happens to be" — then so the species, "how many democracies and how many tyrannies." And another idiom is not to do it in a declarative figure, for instance, "Nothing is harder to persuade than human nature," but, as humanly as possible, with a question, he examined: "A thought once came to us." And another is not to use a diffuse but a contracted diction: "A thought once came to us" belongs to simplicity.

1.5. Let the end, both of the word and of the whole discourse, stand for you in the long form; the clauses are judged each by themselves, but let the discourse be simple, as being completed by clauses, but in the form or quality of the discourse making manifest a certain density and a novel and simple interweaving; and these are made from a single word, for instance, "A thought once came to us," instead of "we once considered." For the keen brevity makes simplicity, so that, the observation being changed, it comes about that from simplicity there is harshness or standing, and the source from which standing arises is its being something gentle.

1.6. In general, as the matters came about, so one must take the beginnings, for instance: "To Darius and Parysatis are born two sons"; for here, even if the theme is great, yet the beginning is from certain bare matters.

1.1. Most of all the difference of the matters makes a difference toward each kind of discourse; for instance, the political men do not raise doubts about distinguished and well-known matters or persons, but the historical writer, raising doubts and hesitating even over distinguished things, works simplicity.

1.2. But the greatest of all things in the simple discourse is for the matters to proceed bare and clean, and not to mark the forces in each case; for it belongs to a political man to mark them, when you add not only the matter but also the quality — if it be great, as great; if dreadful, as dreadful — of which simplicity must have no share. At once, then, the simple writer says, "Coming forward, he said this"; but Demosthenes, "Rising up, he spoke words deserving, O Zeus and gods, of many deaths."

1.3. In many places Xenophon uses many violent and Demosthenic strokes in the conceptions, and differs only in the handling, as in the Anabasis too, stating certain reasonings about Tissaphernes, that he does not plot against the Greeks — since the person is untrustworthy in respect of being willing to plot, and he cannot establish it from judgement, he, passing over to power, confirms it: "but if, being able to do you harm, we do not do it, it is plain that we do not even wish to." What, then, is it that has made conceptions so violent simple? The manner of the handling; for, setting them beside one another from presence and privation and chopping the thoughts, he says, "whether because you are in your own land, and we in a foreign land? and whether because you abound, and we are in want?" Nothing else, then, has relaxed the thoughts but the manner of the delivery. As he has done in the Agesilaus too; for since in the conception the discourse was harsh, in the delivery it was handled toward simplicity: "if, because he became surpassingly fair and good, on this account he should not meet even with moderate praises." But how do I say this? That if the conception be such, it makes the handling harsh; for he did not say it lamenting, as Demosthenes does, "For it would be a dreadful thing, if the letters sent by Philip." But some usages are proper to the simple writers, and you could in no way transfer them into political discourse, as here too the "surpassingly he became a good man."

1.4. In general, everywhere, in as many cases as he has stated many matters loosely in the briefest compass and has completed the thought, he has spoken with good rhythm, for instance: "and when she rose up, all the women about her rose up with her." Yet one must not enclose many matters in the simple discourse, as Demosthenes did, "for if, when we came, having helped the Euboeans," but in few, that the discourse may be most easy for you to follow.

1.5. To use words unemphatically works cheapness. Wherefore the simple discourse is in danger of coming round to cheapness, coming very near to it through using such words too. It is possible, then, to escape and to avoid cheapness by the juxtaposition of equivalents, for instance: "And when Darius fell sick and suspected the end of his life." And to use, by metaphor, words lying upon other matters belongs to the simple writers, for instance, "he made many lovers of his own friendship," and again, "the attendants of the Greeks"; for he did not shrink from naming the rearmost of the Greeks "attendants"; and the use of the same word, "they were persuading, we were persuaded"; and, chopping the thoughts, "we sent envoys"; for to advance the things loose from one another makes the discourse simple and makes manifest a certain character, as of one speaking the things that happened with speed. And all the names of places and regions that are fit in simple discourse, these one must choose, and further those having less force and less esteemed, for instance, "gymnasia, hippodromes," and when indeed you set them beside one another, choosing, "gymnasia of men exercising, hippodromes of horsemen riding" — all these belong to simplicity. And the words in the simple discourse must not be advanced upon one matter alone, but must signify two and three, for instance, since "going away" has several species, all these must be considered; for it comprises in itself both the near and the far, both on land and on sea, both having trouble and giving trouble, and, in general, there are countless things it signifies. And such words, in which it is possible to speak of barley and meal and oil, seem rather to make simplicity in the discourse; for the discourse is about less distinguished things. But a political man would shrink from approaching such words; and wherever he does approach them, one must know well that it will be either for the sake of vividness or so that character may arise in the discourse. The rhythm, being different, rescues the matters, and the unlikeness of the political discourse is no longer about the conceptions, but about the delivery; for the perfected and wholly complete political discourse must be such both in conception and in delivery. But sometimes the conception is simple, while the delivery is political, as in the speech Against Callicles too Demosthenes says, "that barley was wetted, and that, drying it, she saw not even three medimni of it, and of meal about half a medimnus; and that a jar of oil was tipped over, but that, nevertheless, no harm was done." And this too with dignity, where the proper term, if stated, would be in danger of making cheapness, as if you said, "yet that it was not poured out"; here he, instead of the proper and the specific, changing into the generic, said, "yet that no harm was done." And to interweave through the same words seems to belong to simple discourse, but it relaxes the intensity of the political discourse, as in the speech On the False Embassy too Demosthenes says, "For who does not know that by the Phocian war and by the Phocians being masters of Thermopylae . . ." — yet this security from the place and the matters he brought on aggressively, as in a completion.

1.6. And to anticipate the judgement belongs to simplicity, for instance, "knowing well," and "thinking," and "considering." And it is fine too to lay down the thoughts and to introduce them as from another's judgement. And Xenophon uses this most of all in the Education, saying every time, "But if any of you thinks this . . ."

1.7. And not to be astounded at the things at which one might be astounded, and not to wonder at things worthy of wonder, but simply to state what has happened without marking it of oneself — this too belongs to simplicity.

1.8. And to begin even from the nominative case makes the discourse simple, and to break the thoughts up phrase by phrase. Often the simple writers use also conceptions brought in from without, beside the subject matter, for instance, "We have never yet perceived the herds banding together against the shepherd." The political men too use conceptions from without, such as histories or examples, but they tend them with announcements or justifications.

1.9. Interchanges, too, suit the simple discourse, for instance, "he acknowledges, not acknowledging"; and to begin from the same words belongs to simplicity. To simplicity belongs also not to use harsh but subdued terms. For it belongs to harshness to say, "this privately, this publicly"; but the simple writer says, "at home" and "at the altars." And the use of such prepositions, for instance, "for it had been noised abroad," is simple.

1.10. And optatives seem to belong rather to simplicity, such as "that he might be worthy," and "if they were pious," and "as Socrates would say," and such things; and in the Anabasis, "that they might be competent to make war," and what follows in the same figure, "and might be well-disposed toward him." Optatives make the discourse pure.

1.11. And not to hasten the intensity of the delivery, but to slow it and to proceed at leisure, belongs to simplicity, for instance, "But indeed one could not blame them for these things either." And as for the results, the political men are wont rather to examine according to the results of absurd things, and this works harshness for them; but the simple writers rather according to the issues of good things, for instance, "for this, then, from no other source of rule . . ."

1.12. And not to strain overmuch, either in the matters or in the thoughts, belongs to simplicity, and such transitions, "but indeed," "as indeed." And not to use one's own verdict, when something is worthy of praise, but the common one, is very simple, for instance, "at once the many admired him." Here there is also another source: not to say by hyperbole, "all admired," but in a subdued way, "the many admired." And it is proper to the simple writers to omit the establishing points and to state the less establishing ones, for instance, "one must have hopes of safety in being conscious to oneself of nothing — neither impiety toward the gods nor wrong toward men."

1.13. And to set the words parallel and interwoven with one another, gaining no working, belongs to simplicity, for instance, "both to Ionians and to Aeolians and to Hellespontines." And not to abstain from things having less force and less esteemed, but to say "marketplace" and "in the marketplace," and by species "smiths, leather-workers," and such things, belongs to simplicity. Often, when the difference is greater, you interweave thus too: "yet there are some who even revolted"; and sometimes you said the thing alone and bare, sometimes you set beside it the cause, for instance, "reaching after freedom." And to take, instead of the demonstrative, the examining, belongs to simplicity, for instance, the demonstrative having vividness, "for that man, ruling very many cities on the mainland, and ruling islands too." Vividness arises sometimes in simplicity too, for instance, "Philammon, not because . . . Glaucus the Carystian."

1.14. It is simple too not to establish, as in a proposition, that a thing is fine, but, as in a comparison, finer than another fine thing. And to say, having stated something by way of denial, the hyperbole instead of the negation, for instance, "not even if I should." And to say, instead of the consequent, the opposite by way of denial, is simpler and more elaborate, for instance, here, "he took care," where the consequent would have been "he did not neglect."

1.15. And asyndeta belong to the simple; for they loosen the rhythm. This is opposite to the political, but suited to the simple, for instance, "Athenians, Thebans, Argives, Corinthians." It is simple too not to speak in a mass; for to speak in a mass is to say "the Persians," but partitively, "the things of the Persians."

1.16. [And to speak about the matters, leaning upon others' opinions, belongs to the simple, for instance, "since they fell into faction." But when you say, "and since they fell into faction," it makes the discourse harsh.] And often, changing the cases, to use the same word, turning it about, belongs to simplicity. This, then, is of the same manner — not to conceal either the matter or the name, and to state it unseen, for instance, "he said to Cyrus." But it belongs to the historical, if a perfect discourse is needed, to bring an indefinite upon the words stated by species, for instance, "to Gorgias and Prodicus and many others." And when the thought is completed from a single completing word and stands at the end upon one word — as here, "and when he was quite plainly vexed, unless they should follow, they followed along" — it is historical and belongs to a discourse having character. And things stated singly, for instance, "all bronze, all palm-wood," belong to simplicity; but the speaking in the plural belongs to amplitude and to standing.

1.17. Interweavings belong rather to the contentious writers, but could arise sometimes even in simple discourse, when the beginning is contracted, on account of the interweaving, but what follows is loose, for instance, "he was burning and ravaging." Keenness too is produced by the repetition of the interweaving, "at once he was burning, and at once he made it plain by proclamation, not proclaiming throughout nor bidding to proclaim."

1.18. It suffices, in the simple discourse too, not only to state the things that happened, but also to state them as they happened to come about, for instance, "Philip the jester, knocking at the door." The "knocking at the door" has been guarded, in that it is said not only "rapping" but "knocking"; some, however, do not think so; but that it is Greek, one need not dispute. But you, if you wished to amplify the discourse politically, would have set beside them the forces too: "Philip was a jester, who arrives suddenly, and since he found no one near him, he first resolved to leap in, but it seemed good to him to signal to another, and, coming up, he was rapping at the door."

1.19. To state some of the matters leaning upon the opinions of others belongs to the simple, for instance, "as is said." But it belongs to a political man to introduce most things from himself, for instance, Thucydides seems to have spoken simply, "having fallen into faction with one another for many years, as is said"; but if he should say, "and since they fell into faction," he makes the discourse harsh.

1.20. Some things are fine for the simple but lowly for the political, for instance, "living a hare's life"; for this is said in mockery, but it has its place; for the discourse is advanced in one way in simplicity, in another in cheapness. When, then, you wish to mock something, introduce it chopping it one by one, as Demosthenes does, "leader and chief and ivy-bearer." It is fitting, in elaborateness and in dialogue, that simplicity be mixed in the discourse with the beginnings of standing. And ending into the same, yet set apart, that it may not destroy the discourse, makes simplicity.

1.21. It is very fine, in the simple discourses, to make the fictions, and it has marvellous vividness, for instance: you, if you wished to state it as a fiction, would have said, "he himself came up and said that he had met them in good time"; but Xenophon, "It is a fine thing that I have met with you." For both to chop and to make beginnings belongs to simplicity. And in such things, when you vary it and, completing it, lead the discourse on into many beginnings, it seems to belong to the novel and the more delicate form, for instance, here: "There was beside the road the spring called Midas's, of the king of the Phrygians"; then another beginning, "at this Midas hunted the satyr"; and another beginning, the manner of the hunting, "he mixed it with wine." Such beginnings, then, and the setting of the discourse continuously upright in this way, belong to the more delicate form. But it belongs to the more ancient manner to go through the whole in a single course of the discourse: "There was beside the road a spring called Midas's, of the king of the Phrygians, at which Midas is said to have hunted the satyr; and the manner how? having mixed it with wine"; for from a single beginning to a single end the discourse has been brought to a close. And this belongs to Xenophon's mould. Concerning obscure things I have often said that one must speak as though from hearsay. And this suits the simple discourse too, for instance, "it was said," and "it was said that he gave Cyrus much money." Concerning the mythical, not that it happened, but that it is said to have happened. We have said that novelties too belong to simplicity; it is not the worse, then, to use an example here as well, as in the Anabasis Xenophon says, of Cyrus, "he sacrificed the Lycaea." This is very novel and a special construction, "he sacrificed the Lycaea." For he has used the name of the festival as if of the very thing sacrificed, stating the thing done in terms of that in which it is done and on account of which it is done; for to say "to sacrifice at the Lycaea" is customary, but "to sacrifice the Lycaea" belongs to novelty — as if you should say, "he sacrificed the Panathenaea," or "he sacrificed the Olympia"; it is customary to say also "to sacrifice sacrifices." But it belongs to a worked discourse to set beside it the things from the places — where, and near what, and by whom — as it is in the Anabasis of Cyrus: "And there are also palaces of the Great King at Celaenae, strong, upon the springs of the river Marsyas, beneath the citadel." Then the same resumption, so as to be also another beginning: "and this flows both through the city and falls into the river Maeander." And another distinguished thing again from the place: "Here Apollo is said to have flayed Marsyas, who contended with him about wisdom." That, then, as we said before, one must know about the myths: that it is introduced not as having happened, but as being said to have happened. Then one must know this too, that the ancient manner, whenever it is indeed about very distinguished matters, does not have the same over-elaboration in itself, but it suffices to state the matters and the manner in which they were done, with nothing over-elaborated about them; for to over-elaborate and to linger upon distinguished things draws the discourse away from the ancient mould. "Here it is said" — he did not say, "here is Marsyas a flute-player, a Phrygian by race, to whom it came to think so highly of himself"; for there is lingering and over-elaboration. And see this too: he reversed the order. For the first thing would have been to say that he contended, then that he was defeated, then what he suffered; but in such things, when you reverse the order and set the last first, then so in sequence the things before it, you will make speed and beauty for the discourse; when, after stating what he suffered, the discourse seeks why he suffered: "having contended not about flute-playing or music, but about wisdom." And the skin — another would have said that it hangs, but again that is over-youthful; he says even "to have hung the skin in the cave, whence the springs." Then, as necessary and not over-elaborated, "and on this account the river is called Marsyas." And see in this too the restraint of the ancients; for he did not state the suffering on account of which he added the name of Marsyas to the river, or the misfortune of the flute-player; for Xenophon does none of these things, but it suffices him to say only this much, "and on this account the river is called Marsyas." Then another beginning from a distinguished thing: "Here Xerxes, when, defeated in the battle, he withdrew from Greece." See here too the restraint; for there is no Salamis here, nor fleet and multitude of infantry and triremes, nor how he was defeated, nor how he fled, nor anything else, of all the many things attaching to Xerxes, but bare, "when from Greece." You have learned, then, how the ancients proceed, and how great is the restraint in these things.

1.22. Observe this most of all in the thoughts, that one must husband the completing parts and set them last, so that the discourse may share in dignity too. And see this too, that in the simple discourses, even if some of the matters are greater and more esteemed and others lesser, they are always wont to set the lesser first, as here too, though it was a great and distinguished thing that Cyrus gave Clearchus so much money, he did not come at once to this, but first stated the matter of judgement: "he both admired him and gives him ten thousand darics." And the beginning, "Clearchus was a Lacedaemonian exile; Cyrus, having met with him . . ." — the word has a certain marvellous force of character, in not saying, "Cyrus, having made trial of him, or having perceived him to be of great worth and most skilled as a general," but simply, "having met with him." And what follows him, so that the character may most appear, stands thus: "he both admired him and gives him ten thousand darics."

1.23. I have often said that comparatives belong to simplicity, for instance, "he loved Cyrus more than the reigning Artaxerxes." As this too: "so as to be friends to him rather than to the King." And to use words less emphatic and to name the smaller in the case of great things belongs to the form of simplicity. In the Anabasis, of Cyrus, "he took care of the barbarians about him" — small namings for a great matter; for "to take care" is proper to none but middling things, and one might say "he takes care of a household," but in the case of an army it is less fitting to use such a word; and in the Agesilaus, "and he himself stayed there again, taking pleasure in the deed." For to use the less emphatic, and not to say "thinking great thoughts" or "lifted up by the victory," but "taking pleasure in the deed," belongs to simplicity.

1.24. And the variation of tense belongs to simplicity; for they define the past in the present, for instance, "He summons Cyrus from his command," instead of "he summoned"; for the tense, being changed, made the simplicity. For we must sometimes set down the things that have happened as happening, for instance, "he calls him to the house and converses with him," as though what happened long ago were happening now; and there is novelty in such a thing.

1.25. But if you take away from the magnitude by comparatives, it becomes rather elaborateness, as in the Agesilaus, "and the King of the Persians, thinking that Tissaphernes was the cause of all these things, of his affairs going badly, having sent down Tithraustes, cuts off his head"; and this, "cuts off his head," belongs to simplicity, but the "thinking" has a certain disposition of the subject matters; for he did not say, "since the affairs of the barbarians went badly, and so great was the tumult and disorder, and they had been defeated in so many battles, and at last, shut in, were besieged" — nothing of the kind; but he brought out only this, "thinking," and not "both being provoked at what had befallen and considering," but "thinking." And the comparison, "and after this the affairs of the barbarians became more dispirited"; and he did not say, "in dread dispiritedness," but "more dispirited." And to say partitively "the affairs of the barbarians," and not "the barbarians," this too belongs to simplicity, for instance, "who ruled very many cities on the mainland, and ruled islands too."

1.26. Further, of the words some are very significative, others less, for instance, the very significative, "he went through," "he drove out"; the less, "he marched," as in the Agesilaus too, "and on the next day, crossing the Achaean mountains of Phthia and all the rest, he marched through a friendly country to the borders of the Boeotians." Novelty too has simplicity; for he transferred the matter of the person onto the place; for instead of saying "through the country of friends" he says "through a friendly country," and instead of "through the country of allies," "through an allied country." The simple writers use also the "here" in varied ways; for it is significative both of place and of time, and the "here" lays hold of the place, while the distension is simple, for it set the thought apart from what preceded. And sometimes he uses a complete demonstrative, "here indeed," sometimes a defective one, "where indeed."

1.27. Concerning the trope among the historical writers, one must know only this much: that the tropes must not be taken from great or dignified things, but rather from baser or more ordinary ones, as it is in the Symposium too, "for these men, with their souls purified"; for the word "purified," having a trope from utensils or vessels, transferred from the more ordinary onto the more dignified — onto the men and the soul of the men — has not made the trope clean, but guarded and historical. And such tropes are more habitual to simplicity, for instance, "the land, inhabited and sown, furnishes ever-flowing sustenance." Such a figure belongs very much to the encomiastic kind.

1.28. The matters of arrangement must stand so as to seem fitting to each; for in histories the very matters work out also the arrangement of what is said, but in counsels and teachings and memorabilia, as one wishes.

1.29. If, then, you have observed these things accurately and trained yourself in them, you will produce, even where there is standing, elaborateness, and from elaborateness standing; and simplicity will be such, in all things possessing the strength of the observations. These things, then, have been sufficiently demonstrated to you concerning what we set before us — all the observations, in each kind of diction, concerning character and the beginnings of discourse and the handling of thoughts and the sweetness of diction, and again the simplicity of diction and narratives and the conduct of myths, and concerning beauty in discourse; and these things have been stated one by one.