Orationes 36

457. Reasonably, men of Athens, those who speak on behalf of the Spartans needed many words; for their case was not simple, like that of the Thebans, but needed, it seems to me, a more subtle orator. Now I, men of Athens, am among those who judged the Thebans our friends no later than you all did; but I see that the Spartans have, in favour of helping them, the principle that one must not bear malice, while the Thebans have both this very thing and the obligation to remember the good we have received. So that if we must cease to hate, we ceased to hate the Thebans long ago; and if it is a strong point for the Spartans that they are no longer able to harm you, it is a far stronger one for the Thebans that they have for a long time been seen wishing to do you good. These men, then, advise us to consider those no longer enemies; but these others I see to be already friends before we even summon them. And if the laying aside of enmity has so much force as to make you have them at once as allies, then where shall we place the fact that the others had us before — which is the very thing these men now strive for? And I do not reckon, men of Athens, that you owe gratitude to the Thebans and Argives — for I think the Thebans owe far more to you — but I say that these things are consistent with and befitting the past dealings you have had with one another. And I marvel if anyone fears to have the Thebans as friends and allies, thinking them strong, but judges it advantageous that they 458. become enemies and foes; and fears them while they make war on the Spartans, but contrives that they shall come against you; and bids us guard lest they ever afterward make war on us, yet urges us to come to this very thing now; and bids the Spartans take courage with us as partners against the Thebans, of whom he says they are the weaker, but does not allow the Thebans to take courage against these — as though the alliances of the weakest were the most helpful, and not those of men such as these say the Thebans are. And they ask who is the guarantor that the Thebans will keep to themselves — as though it were not open to us to ask in turn who is the guarantor that the Spartans will keep to themselves, if they should win this war.

And indeed the future is uncertain — which they use much against the Thebans; but if, letting go ready slander and contentiousness, we must look at the very truth, there is far more ground for trust in the Thebans than in the Spartans. And of this I will furnish you the very men who speak against me as witnesses. For if someone should ask them — tell me, did the Spartans act well in seizing the Cadmea, if they keep up the false posture they have just now assumed? — they will say, surely, that they did not act well. Why? — if someone should ask further — they will say, because they broke the treaty. For what else? Now the very things which they would not deny on their own behalf, that the Spartans did not do wrong, these they furnish as the testimony I speak of. For you know, surely, that it is most in peace and treaties that those who wish to do justice are tested; for in wars it is not character that is sovereign, but whatever fortune and the occasion grant, that each side takes its share of. When, therefore, both were masters of their own resolve, the Thebans were seen thinking they ought to attend to their own affairs, while the Spartans were attacking and grasping for more — how must we not in every way consider the Thebans the more trustworthy, and transfer this fear onto the Spartans, lest, when they have come by power, they do the same thing toward us too? For I for one would not be persuaded of this either — that, while passing through Boeotia, they then entered against the Thebans using the occasion, but that, if they had had this same opportunity against you, they would 459. willingly have refrained — you who, together with the Thebans, had made war against them. Just as, then, if this had really happened to you, you would justly think you must guard against them for the future, so, since it appears that it would have happened had the occasion offered, guard against them no less. For you have shared, surely, in the very things which they have held against the Thebans, and there is besides the original private quarrel. So that by however much they feel bitter toward the Thebans, by twice as much must you suppose to be what they now conceal because of their need. Furthermore, they know that the Thebans never yet attained the hegemony, nor by the consent of the Greeks, while you remained in it for many years, taking it at first by goodwill, and afterward holding the greater part by power; and they always say it is ancestral to them to lead the Greeks, and this on the one hand they did in the war against the Persian, on both fronts, and this on the other when they put down our empire. These things, then, are not full of all security, nor have they the ease that one might think. And the Thebans even seem to me likely to be my own counsellors that one ought not to wrest away any of our possessions, nor embark upon the sea, which belongs to all rather than to them. For what they are not conscious of ever having held, this they will not even think fit to seek; but in attacking the Spartans and pulling down what is theirs, they will not think fit that anyone should be indignant with them. If, then, it appears from these things that the Thebans are ill-disposed to the Spartans, not to you, and the Spartans to you far more than to the Thebans, how is not the Theban side preferable on both counts? For this very thing — that they are found hating your enemies — how is it not strongly in your favour, apart from their having no matter outstanding against you?

There is, moreover, a certain testimony arising from the embassy itself. For now the Spartans were brought here by calamity and the occasion, which is no proof of any trustworthiness nor of being benevolently disposed toward you; but the Thebans have come as victors and invite you to share in what good fortune they have won; 460. than which what greater token could there be of their being faithful to you? Do they not, on all counts, appear less to be feared and less deceitful? And if, against shameless slander, we must use an excess of fair dealing, let us let the future go; for many things might happen in all time which it is impossible to foresee and not in our power to trust beforehand; but from the things that have already happened, and about which there is no dispute at all, by choosing the Thebans we are plainly going to do justice: on the one hand in return for the benefits they have rendered you, on the other in return for the fact that for these very reasons we received them as friends before, and on the other in return for the fact that the Spartans have treated both us immoderately and them unjustly. But if it is not possible to make a firm assertion about the future, and those who love the Spartans only so far as it was worth abating one's hatred of the Thebans shall enjoin us to be silent about the past, from which the just is judged — will anything else remain but that we must indicate our help by a nod? For surely it will not be permitted to say anything. And who could endure this unreasonableness? It is worth examining the cleverness of the Spartans and the manner in which they always use circumstances. These men, having made war on us in two wars — the former, the Decelean, and this later one, the Corinthian — how did they handle both? They called in the King as their ally, through whom they thought they would most readily put us down; and this latter war they ended through this very same man, sending Antalcidas, who gave up the Greeks to him, as the price of peace, and they set this conclusion upon both. Then shall nothing prevent the Spartans from using whatever method they think will give them the advantage, while we, if fortune has made any of our friends strong, shall abandon these? And indeed it is not so great a thing for Athenians to join the Thebans against the Spartans as it was for the Spartans, joining the Persian, to give up the Greeks. Or is it the same to abandon Ionians and Aeolians and Dorians, while accomplishing some end of their own — and betraying no men at all — to keep faith with our 461. neighbours and allies in matters of justice? Or do we fear lest we have some strong ally? And what could be more shameful than if someone should hear that the Athenians wish that none of their own allies should prosper? And indeed, if we shun those who have power, whom shall we pray to have as our own? We once received the Corcyraeans, who were outside the treaty, judging it advantageous, clearly, to secure them beforehand, since they were strong; and now I well know that, if the Thebans had nothing in common with the city, but were seen otherwise to have power, all would say they made the highest account of winning these men over and bringing them to us and making them ours. Now, then, they come of their own accord, and are persuaded of this — to be yoked to the city and not to fall away, if anyone receives them. And yet some men have ere now cast out a garrison once established and, having stooped, by force overran it, and everything, so to speak, that is brought about by gradual approach is easily dissolved at the opportune moment; but voluntary goodwill, so long as it obtains justice, is the most enduring thing of all.

I consider this too: if the Spartans had not made that fine peace of theirs, would we have done anything else than continue making war on them until now, both we and the Thebans, banded together as we were banded? This is plain. If, then, without their further wronging us they would have treated us as enemies, how shall they not now justly meet with the same treatment, when they have done us this very further wrong, of concluding such a peace? And if indeed they have not only concluded it but have also transgressed this very peace, how must we not all the more help against them? For the present weakness of the Thebans does not dissolve the accusation against them; for they did not attack them in order to make them strong, nor in order that they should suffer at their hands what they now suffer — for they would have been mad if they had striven for this — but, I think, these things came about by chance, while their plan was something else; and the rank of justice, whether the man plotted against be weak or strong, holds the same account. And you would learn this best if you should consider it thus. If they had come, not against the Thebans, but against you, and 462. had seized the Acropolis, how would you have thought fit these men should act — to sympathize with us, or to rejoice at it, or what to think? For the very things you would then justly have demanded of them, these you must now contribute to them, since they fell first into the others' greed. And I wish to learn from those who lament the Spartans, whether they are eager for their salvation or for their hegemony. For if it is for their hegemony, I for one did not think we ought to take thought for this — how the Spartans may rule; but if it is for their salvation, why do they press on? For it is possible both that the Spartans be defeated in war and that Sparta exist — which is the object of their reverence; unless they say this: that, unless they rule the Greeks and are able to do whatever they wish, they have no further need even of safety, but choose rather to perish. And if they are so disposed, they are not very humble; since I for my part think the Thebans too would very gladly submit to you before them, if, having finished the war, you should wish to preserve the city. For when they see this very thing brought about for them through you — having it in their power to use the Spartans as they wish — how will they not choose whatever you bid, or what gratitude will they say they shall render you for the alliance and the deeds, if they do not give back in return the help of your vote? But what if the Spartans should be destroyed first? And how could this come about? If all, by Zeus, should be arrayed in battle. But above all this would never happen; for they surely would not lead out their children and women along with themselves. And then I for one will ask in turn: what, then, if the Thebans should stumble with their whole people, while we are banded with the Spartans? Shall we not have overstepped the limit of our help? Shall we, then, destroy them? And how is that tolerable? But shall we be with them again? And what will be the end, if we again ward off the Spartans more severely? For surely we shall not bring a balance into the war and set affairs upon it, but, having chosen our position from the beginning, we must cling to that inclination, and not do as sailors do, who keep shifting to the side that is lower in the water.

Since, then, the impossibility of husbanding 463. the war is common to both cases, and we must, having chosen one party, not abandon nor betray them, let us consider for which it is the more fitting to take forethought. Come now, by Zeus the god of freedom at Plataea and by the Thirty Tyrants: if, when they first came into war with one another and sent envoys, we, having heard both, had inclined toward the Spartans and chosen them, would not this have been the strongest point for those who now speak on the others' behalf — that you had already condemned the Thebans and ought not to overlook those whom you then made your allies? If, then, you went out not against the Thebans but on behalf of the Thebans, and continued ever afterward holding the same position with them, will not this same thing now have force for us again, which it would then have had for these? But where, even before the Spartans came to the Cadmea, you chose these men, how will you now change, when, even if you were with the Spartans, it would befit you to exchange them for the wronged? And indeed, if the Thebans were driving us off and not receiving us, all would say they were committing outrage and doing terrible things, and would counsel you to change sides. If, then, they cling to us, long for us, summon us, and need us fighting alongside them no less than the victory itself, shall we set this at naught? It is not worth it. How, then, shall we be their allies, and on what terms? For this was asked just now. And I, indeed, without ceasing to marvel at the man who said it, hold this question terrible and ridiculous; for it was not, once we had become allies on one footing or another, that we should then have sought whether we ought to help, but, having deliberated about the alliance, we should then consider on what terms it shall be, by common resolve. And then I for one have this ready to answer those who already wish to know — on the same terms as before. And they surely summon you just as they did then, so how will they not consent? But if we must snatch the occasion beforehand, let us consider this same thing in the case of the Spartans. For we shall find theirs far more difficult. For if they shall wish to use us as allies on the former terms, they will wish to lead both by land and by sea. But suppliants and 464. champions, the same men — by the gods, I for one cannot conceive of it. But even if the alliance must be made on equal terms, I would confidently say I choose the Thebans rather, whom these very men say are superior to the Spartans. To come to an equal footing with the conquered and the unfortunate, I think, leaves no excess of shame. For when, men of Athens, shall we have the advantage over the Spartans, if now, when they have come into need of us, by coming to equal terms we are content? And if they look to the dignity of a title, or judge such things by the glory of a name, the Thebans are the founders of those whom they admire. Let them not, then, refuse them as inferior, since that these are fine phrases, and there is nothing such as one might suppose, I will easily show, caught in the act. For if the Spartans are unfortunate and have fallen and nothing whatever is left them, let them hand themselves over and bring you into the city, just as they themselves once entered ours, and thus find their safety; and, by Zeus, not many will anticipate me, but I, rising first, will bid you take up arms against the Thebans, if they will not be persuaded by reason nor keep their hands off the men. But the Spartans, I think, will never do this; how should they? Since I call in the envoys, and you shall behold. A little later, then, it will be in your power to make trial of this; but now grant me to add a little more. For it came over me in the midst of speaking — the matter of the ancient help, which they obtained from us at the extremest crises, themselves asking for it in the very manner in which they have now come, sending it down to us, the war being then concentrated and at its height for them, while they were in need of allies, and using all their other present resources, and would not, even if they were asked, have consented to let any of those men depart. If, then, men of Athens, they now do the same thing and say they no longer need you — whether, by Zeus, from suspicion or from however it may seem good to them, the men being insolent and secretive — we shall surely depart having fared charmingly, both outraged by those and overlooked by these, having both for enemies thereafter.

465. And this too appears to me astonishing: if anyone fears to have the Thebans left as our sole rivals, but judges the prospect of being at odds with both of no account worth fearing. "By Zeus, but with the trophies standing, it is not right to defeat the Spartans in war." But we did not, for this reason, spare our very own citizens, those who proposed the measures through which we raised those trophies, when we afterward found them to have done wrong; rather, on the one hand we did not judge that Miltiades, who died in prison, had perished undeservedly, and on the other we made Themistocles, who had been the counsellor and general of the noblest deeds, an exile, being unable to take and kill him when he was present. How, then, is it not terrible that those who have so treated you should have you on their side, through whom anyone whatever would say those deeds of old were brought to success rather than through the Spartans — but that we should let the Spartans go free, when we have got the occasion to destroy them on account of those very deeds? And indeed you will easily know that the character of the war against them is better than that of the war on their behalf. For in the latter there is the appearing to be with the weaker, which these men say is noble; but in the former, instead of this, there is being with the wronged, which is greater for dignity; and the perilous element that attends the latter, this we have escaped by having better partners. And what conquers in safety while being equal in glory — how would anyone in his right mind not judge it the finer? These things, then, I demonstrate; but to say, and not only to say but also to help carry out eagerly, what seems good to you, is for me too both finer and more just, and a necessity.