Orationes 53

1. I should have supposed anything sooner, men of Athens, than that this Demosthenes here would ever come to such a pitch of recklessness and impropriety as to be brought to advise us even on behalf of immunity from public service, and to declare that this is something of great value, and that it brings glory to those who grant it no less than to those who receive it. If anyone else thought fit to undertake such a thing, this very man ought to have been the first to try with all his might to prevent it — not only because this is, once and for all, among the things unprofitable to the city, as I shall show as my speech proceeds (whereas he both wishes and prays for the very opposite for her, and so governs himself at all times,
2. that he says of himself he is persuaded that not one single man of all would seem better in such matters, and not only says it but shows it by his deeds) — but also because the greatest possible harm would come to our affairs from this, if it should pass on in unbroken succession through all. As it is, by the things to which he gives his advocacy, and to which he gives more weight than to anything he has ever said or advised, he leaves us to reckon one of two conclusions: either that those former things were not well said, or that these present measures have not been rightly voted. Rather: if these present measures are right, then those former things were mere bombast and nothing sound; but if the proof of those rests upon his deeds, and not one man, Demosthenes, would say, judging from what you have done, that those things were not fittingly said — then it is altogether plain that you have here pursued matters that lie outside reason, and that, before being refuted by anyone whatever, you yourself cast this very vote against yourself.

But I, men of Athens, did not think this man so formidable as to ruin the city for the sake of wishing to lay up a favour with certain persons, nor to make the claims of those persons greater than what is just toward her, nor, while thinking he ought to help these men, to make war upon her in consequence; rather, I thought it his habit always to consider and to do whatever will be of common benefit. For where there are times when we overlook even things that are truly advantageous to us — indeed, once and for all we do so — for her very sake, how is it not plain unreason to do a favour to some other person against her? But he was so far from now choosing to act thus, that, just as before he was upright and democratic and a strict zealot for the constitution, so now he has departed from his thesis, and uses public affairs in the opposite way to before: not what benefits the city, but what benefits the son of Chabrias — or, if you like, what benefits himself, for he had married this boy's mother after Chabrias' death — these are the things he wishes to persuade us of, all but 3. shouting out in their midst that he makes no account of the city, but that all else is mere trifling to him compared with the family. To be sure, the law that ought from the beginning to have been laid down for the city — that none of the citizens either be or ever become immune from service — this law, now nobly laid down by Leptines, with all right-thinking men, as is fitting, praising him, and rejoicing greatly both in him and in his law, the one for the common benefit, the other because such forethought has been taken for her — this man alone, vexed it seems if we should fare well, instead of supporting him and admiring him and contriving that the law should be valid forever, does everything that it may be made void. Not, as one might say, that he is ignorant of the advantage — for who is more clever than he in such matters? — but that he may again establish Ctesippus in his ancestral immunity, not knowing that, while the city prospers, he too must of necessity prosper, but in wishing the one man to fare well and not the city, he too will all but immediately make trial of the same fate.

Furthermore, Demosthenes, if the law seemed to you not well drawn nor to attain what is fitting throughout, but to be nonsense and nothing sound, you yourself ought first to have come forward into the midst and prevented it, to have accused, to have indicted it as illegal — not to set on these men or those from concealment and try to refute the law through them, and to plead with them against it. For such matters concern you, if anyone. But in those very things over which you then thought you ought to keep silent, and now together with them to slander it, you confirm both points: that the law is most excellent, and that you yourself have been stirred against it to no purpose — you who, that you might not seem to be laying claim only to Ctesippus' interest while making 4. light of the city's, and then, besides having succeeded in none of the things you wish, become responsible to him for the very things you do not wish, having stirred the people to anger — fearing this, then, you devised the cleverest thing of all: how both easily to ward off this suspicion and to assist the son of Chabrias toward what he needs. First, by saying that immunity is most advantageous to the city and thereby stealing away the hearer's judgement, and then by making mention of him. And yet, when you proceed to these things not boldly and freely, but timidly and underhandedly and with much wishing to escape notice, you seem to be the first yourself to take hold of and to hate what you say, and on this account so to shape and lead forward your speech. But surely, if we all know this to be the difference between an accuser and a sycophant — that the one fabricates what is not, while the other pounces on existing or apparent evils; and that the one, even if unjustly, yet we sometimes think deserving of pardon, because he composes nothing from his own resources but uses what exists, whereas the other's malice has no face — to which division shall we assign you? To the moderate one that admits excuse, or to the basest and worst and worthy of all hatred, or to both together, as I, for my part, think and shall now show? For in that you wish to strike out, as though worth nothing, the very law which you ought most to have admired because it benefits the city — reviling it, running it down, sparing it not a single word — you take the reputation not only of an accuser but of a slanderer.

And that, in addition to what has been said, men of Athens, he is shown to be a sycophant in the very things he has used at the beginning of his speech, I should be ashamed of myself if I tried at great length to demonstrate it. For these very things are both a conspicuous sycophancy 5. and a clear demonstration that nothing of sycophancy is wanting. For things that Leptines neither thought of, nor, if he had them in mind, would, it seems to me, ever have said — as not being sufficient for what he wished to accomplish — these things this man, men of Athens, charges against him as though he had plainly said them, doing much the same as if someone, having a strong and unconquerable antagonist, thought fit to destroy him by drugs, because he was unable with his hands. And you too, then, being unable otherwise to refute the law, fabricate empty charges, partly working mischief and playing the rogue yourself, and partly composing and stitching things together out of your own head. So you give us to conjecture one of two things: either that you have not so much as glanced at the book, or — if you allow me to say it — that having glanced at it and admired it, you yourself suffered the malady of the envious, and were somehow driven out of yourself by grief, because Leptines, taking it up, had already accomplished a matter that long belonged to you, so that you could not from that point even remember the law cleanly. For if the one wrote the law in order that the public services should not altogether fail the city — seeing them grown scarce through the multitude of immunities, and the city's prosperity, as it were, slipping away from that cause — while the other deliberately keeps silent about this, and asserts that these immunities were instituted because certain unworthy men obtained them, how does he not establish what I say? How is he not refuted as both not telling the truth and trying, besides, to deceive us like so many children?

And that, in saying these things, he says nothing true is clear both from what I have said and from the fact that he himself brings Leptines on stage not as having said these things, but as, it seems, about to say them hereafter. At any rate he says: "It is not unclear, men of Athens, that Leptines, and anyone else who speaks on behalf of the law, will say nothing just 6. about it, but will assert that certain unworthy men, having obtained immunity, slipped out of the public services, and will use this argument most of all." See, men of Athens, how he proclaims beforehand that the man will say these things and will use this argument most of all. Yet it was not without reason that he mentioned the unworthy, but with a thoroughly base intention: that, when the unworthy have been cast out of immunity, Ctesippus may seem worthy of it, both on his own account and through his father Chabrias. But in vain, men of Athens, is the man's scheming, and nothing more will come of his contriving these things, while you do what is just and what most befits the city, and besides hate those who try to distort the truth. Indeed, I myself am so far from being persuaded by these things and from giving heed to them, that I think them anything but right. For apart from the fact that, as I said, he has fabricated these things and that Ctesippus is the cause, I cannot at all recognize this matter of the "unworthy" as opportunely spoken or worthy of the case, however much he himself attempts it. For if an examination of birth were proposed, and only the well-born had to be honoured, it would be fitting to sift those who are to receive benefits; but if simply those who have done good must receive good, and this is the wage of virtue, and we know immunity to be nothing else than a return for things well done, I do not see what reason there is to make mention of the unworthy and the worthy, where all must by this very principle be honoured alike, even if one happen to be base and of the lowest clan, and even if another reach back to Codrus. For why is Achilles more entitled than Thersites to receive thanks from the Greeks, if both equally capture the Trojans? [Since the one is of the gods, the other not such.] And apart from these things, if immunity is to belong only to the worthy, there is nothing that will be more against ourselves. 7. For first, none, I am well assured, of all men will any longer think fit to perform public services and to pay the necessary contributions, as the law requires, but they will flee these duties in flight: the immune for this very reason, and those who have not obtained immunity because it is not even open to them to obtain it at all. And from this there will be on the one side a kind of envy toward those others, and grudging, and ever harbouring ill-will and hating in every way; while for the city — not to say anything harsh — there will be a standing still in the same place and not being led to increase, on account of these men's idleness and strife. Then, even if there shall be some who perform public services — and these would be those barred from nothing by immunity — that this contribution and zeal of theirs will be small and paltry and, so to speak, worth nothing, no one fails to know. Still, let it be, if you like, fine and fitting and sufficient for our affairs. Which, then, is finer and more advantageous for the city and more conducive to increase: to have all performing public services, or some? And to enjoy a common and abundant provision, or to obtain certain moderate zealots? And both better and worse men, or only the worse on this very count? And to possess all the rest as praisers, or as faultfinders? For I think the very barbarians might reasonably be indignant with us, that we have chosen single gain in place of double, and, when we ought to fare well in both respects, have thought we ought to do so only in part. That, then, men of Athens, some should be immune and others not — this, I think, you are all exactly persuaded will be most ruinous to the city, not only by none of the things Demosthenes runs through up and down, but by the things you have just heard me say, being quick-witted and equipped from your own nature for the judgement of the fine and the just and the advantageous. But that none of all men should be immune according to the law, neither now nor hereafter, this is so very valuable and full of hopes and pre-eminently fitting for every city and constitution, that whereas the other laws turn out to be, some for the things that concern each man 8. privately, and some public, this one alone affords us the most common and most advantageous and self-sufficient and secure benefit, reaching through all. At any rate, to go on campaign and to serve as trierarch, and to send and to receive embassies, and besides to make use of allies, to make treaties with enemies, to ward off enemies, to lay claim to our own and to preserve them, and, by Zeus, to be of one mind toward one another and for all to be one in purpose — and, to put it briefly, all the things a city must do that presides over so great a region and over so many nations and islands, to deliberate and to do all these readily and with much in reserve — all this, then, after the inclination of Athena's favour, will be most excellently provided to us from this law. And this I shall try, so far as I am able, to show and to make clear to all, that you may know exactly, men of Athens, and recognize how much excellence the law possesses, and that, if any man ever was, Leptines is democratic and useful to the city.

Now every constitution and dominion, and in general men one by one, consider not only what they shall do, but whether this will be advantageous to them, and through all things, so to speak, for their own sake. For they wish, men of Athens — they very much wish — both to attain what is just in these matters and to fall short in no part of it, as though this alone were the best course of action; but if it be not possible to do both — to act both justly and advantageously to themselves — they choose to do what is advantageous rather than what is just. Or rather, they think they ought not to act at all in the first place, when they perceive that what they are about to do is either not advantageous to themselves or against themselves. For the one is plain madness, to choose willingly to act against oneself; and the other is in truth a mark of frivolity and folly and of the company of Margites, so to speak — to toil at random and to act for nothing and to no purpose. Leptines, then, brought in a law that is not only just, but also advantageous and besides 9. a cause of glory to the city — in no way inferior to the laws laid down from the beginning and of old, if not indeed superior, in so far as those men passed it by and this man discovered and set it right — and one worthy to be well thought of not among us, the nurslings of Athena, only, but among well-nigh all men. Just, in return for the fact that it compels all in common to perform public services, which is the mark of those who are truly democratic and honour equality through all things, and do not by means of immunity beg off from this necessary and public contribution, as though fearing lest we should seem to be doing ourselves a good turn. And yet how is it not absurd and far from what is just, that we should be able to enjoy the good things from her on equal terms, but should not be on an equal footing in our relations toward her — but some perform public services and some not? And being like one another in our goodwill toward her, only here should we flee equality? And when war comes on, all should choose to face danger on her behalf and to hold to the same eagerness, but in lesser matters — where there is no danger whatever nor toil, but they procure the greatest possible benefit for the city and for us — there be seen, so to speak, citizens by halves? But advantageous, not only because the public services are simply constitutions of states and wonderful and very great resources for increase, but also because, when no one is immune, as I said, all will perform public services, but if some share in immunity, not a single one. If, therefore, that by which the city's affairs come to be worse, and which tends rather to her ruin than to glory for others, is worth nothing to use; while that which manifestly makes her greater and better and flourishing in all things, this must by every necessity be made of very great account, if indeed we have any account of ourselves — then neither ought any to be immune at all, as this is no small harm to our affairs, and the law, 10. being thus most advantageous to us through all things, as though come from Apollo, would justly, with the full assent of every mind, be valid and prevail in all things.

And apart from these things, from immunity there is no gain whatever to the city, except to render thanks from it; but those who have received it live in luxury, whereas the public services profit this same city most of all things, by which she is increased as they sustain her, and provide to those who perform them their own private glory of zeal on behalf of their fatherland. And indeed it is possible to requite benefactors in other ways too, but a city preserved without public services I have not known even in the tales. Nay, though it have a hero for its founder, though it have good fortune lending aid, nothing more will it gain unless this alliance be present. For if one need neither lead the people, nor serve on campaign, nor be trierarch, nor do any of all the things that are forms of public service — and are in truth the constitutions of states — we shall seem like nothing but a body lacking hands and feet and, besides, the senses. For what all these are to it, this is to the city the being served by the things I mentioned. Nevertheless, even if there were left absolutely no other manner of return, but it led everything to immunity, and this alone were the prize for those worthy of being well treated, in return for which they were zealous on our behalf, while the city seemed thereby to be harmed not a little — not even so, men of Athens, do I think we should endure such things, nor become responsible for loss to the city for the sake of a favour to this man or that; but, setting all account of the just on her behalf and of the common advantage, we should reasonably let go what concerns these very men, while they hold sufficient thanks in being shown to be benefactors of such a city. For even so it remains for them to be honoured the more, by seeming to have made their virtue not, as it were, a thing for sale, nor for the sake of anything else, but to have displayed these deeds for the sake of their own greatness of soul and of their goodwill toward 11. the city — just as in the Persian War it was so with Themistocles, son of Neocles, and with Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, and still before these with Cynegirus, son of Euphorion, and Callimachus the Polemarch. For all these neither, before joining battle, took courage for the contest with an eye to the magnitude of prizes of valour, nor, when they had saved Greece, which was no longer in danger, did they obtain what was fitting — but they thought it glory enough for themselves both to have wrought deeds greater than crowns, and that through them Greece had been saved.

Nevertheless, even if we should grant that there is something advantageous in immunity — as I, for my part, do not think — yet, first, it is not so much as comes from public service, nor so as to be even compared, nor near it. Then, the one reaches to the whole city, the other to some few persons. And the one, if overlooked, would do very little harm, but from men who do not perform public services cities would be most greatly harmed. And, by Zeus, the one came into being together with these very cities; for at once there was a city and at once also the performing of public services. Rather, if you examine closely, you will find that the very coming-into-being of cities from the beginning was outright a public service, and, as it were, a kind of common contribution of men for the constitution of the inhabited world; whereas immunity was devised by certain persons later, according to the opinion of their own judgement, as a kind of drug of ambition. By however much, then, this is the greatest and most necessary thing, and surpasses all, by so much must we too, beyond everything, cleave to it and exalt it. And indeed, if those affairs are worth more, and praises pre-eminently befit them, of which the gods are leaders, we should lose no time, be well assured, in setting public service above whatever one might name. For do not suppose, men of Athens, that this too, like the rest, was discovered by us and had its origin from no further source; but if anything among men is Heaven-sent, this too has come from there. 12. For the gods and divine powers, lords of the universe, not only on those things by which they constituted the whole from the beginning brought in and revealed this great and wonderful public service to life, but even now they do this not least, they who care so much for us on each occasion and are so tenderly disposed as to fall short in nothing that pertains to our constitution and preservation, in any manner whatever, but, out of a store far greater than one could even expect, to supply what is theirs — showing both things by means of each other: through this untiring and continuous providence, that they have become creators; and again, through their having become creators, that they are also under a necessity to take thought for us at all hours, that we may not, apart from their providence, come to nothing, like a vessel in want of helmsmen.

And yet, Demosthenes, when through immunity the matters of the public services drain away little by little, and you yourself are a zealot for these, how do you not simply make war on the gods, destroying by your deeds the very things they nobly ordained, and, so far as in you lies, overturning their gift? If, then, for those who debase the coinage, the penalty, by your own argument, is death, of what would you yourself justly be deemed worthy by us, for the things by which you cling to immunity, both dishonouring the things of the gods and corrupting the whole city? "Yes," he says, "for it is on your behalf and on behalf of what belongs to you that men rouse themselves to these efforts, and from which you live continually enjoying benefit; for not even one man, while the law prevails, would think fit to use greatness of soul toward the city in what affairs demand. To use it and to be ambitious in fitting measure — but when immunity is abolished, there will wholly be abolished along with it the willingness of anyone whatever to be zealous on her behalf; and this deprives us not only of gain but also of glory, for the sake of which you think you ought to do and say everything. If, then, we care 13. for these things, of necessity we shall also care for immunity." That, then, Demosthenes, none of all men seem to me to lay hold of ambition in order to be immune, as you say, but for the sake of their own glory and of their emulation and love toward the city, is clear both from those who, after having been very ambitious, were willing to take nothing whatever at all, but deemed this alone sufficient — that their relations with the city stood thus; and from those who have been thought worthy of something else, of the countless things with which the city rewards those who serve her, but not of immunity. And that, even if this were so, the advantage of the city ought to be preferred — of this too you yourself are witness, ever preferring the advantageous to anything whatever and giving it the precedence; since we even chose the Corcyraeans, who were outside our treaties, as allies for ourselves, judging it advantageous, seeing that they had power.

Perhaps, then, Demosthenes or someone else will say this also: that if it is advantageous and most befitting a constitution that not one of all should share in immunity, why was this not, along with the other things, laid down by the ancient laws, who looked to the common advantage? But as it is, in those many fine things they went through they did not think this worth a word, and so appear to have passed it over as unprofitable. If, then, what these men prescribe must be made of greatest account, and what, having mentioned, they did not decide on, it does not become us to remember either, lest, in honouring laws, we seem to dishonour laws. But, my good sir, first, not all things simply that ought to be are inserted in the laws, nor do they pass through all, so that nothing stands outside their decision, but there are things that escape even them; at any rate, that it is permitted to take from them and to add, if anything be not well, is said in these very laws — and that is the mark of men strongly 14. insisting that they have not reached through all. Then, men of Athens, one ought to consider not whether some one of the laws has said this, but whether it is most excellent and most just, and to cast one's votes accordingly. And it is always thus most excellent, both in itself and beyond the rest, both from what I myself have said and from what the long and manifold course of time has shown — so that I fear lest it appear more honourable even than the laws themselves, by this very thing and by being older, and by this being among men before laws came into being. Furthermore, not everything passed over by these is therefore straightway base, nor is one to be reckoned among forbidden things on that account; but whatever by its nature simply ruins our affairs and has all men besides accusing it — just as, on the contrary, whatever is very valuable, from which gain remains to us, whether the laws say so or not.

But if these things are so, and the advantageous must be sought everywhere, it would be superfluous, whenever there is an examination about anything whatever, to set aside how this matter stands and to inquire, and then to make mention of laws. For there are, men of Athens, some laws to be found that are in fact unprofitable, laws merely keeping up the form of laws; and there are certain matters that, being outside the laws, none the less work with us toward good fortune, and one must choose these as better than unprofitable enactments. Since even farming and tending plants and practising the arts — not because the laws did not in the first place discover them are we therefore to abstain from them, but because these alone constitute the life of men and hold the resources of our affairs, and without them it is altogether impossible to survive and live at all. For this reason we thought we ought to attend to these beyond everything and to stand off from them in no way, if indeed it concerns us to be preserved and we are not plainly courting death. What then if performing public service is not inscribed in laws, as those things are, and besides, the being 15. nourished and sleeping and all the most common things bound up in the law of nature? Yet, men of Athens, if one will examine closely, one will find in truth all the laws so disposed concerning public service that not only do they, in the things they each time recommend and in their account of how the constitution may best be, summon to this point with much that is in reserve, but they themselves also, by doing these very things, are to be reckoned, as one might say, among those who perform public service.

And what need to speak of laws, when even Demosthenes himself — who through caring for immunity makes war on public service — appears to confirm this very thing more than all men, now haranguing and proposing and advising, now serving on embassies and as choregus and through all these performing public service, and never himself having asked for immunity nor having made any argument whatever about it, except at present, on account of his own and Chabrias' son, Ctesippus here? And apart from these things, if you think you have this strong argument against the law — that it is not inscribed in the laws — you escape your own notice none the less in subjecting your own favourite too to these votes. And why do you accuse this rather than your own immunity from that source? For it is not that the one is according to the laws and the other not, but equally both stand apart from the laws; and not on this account, I think, are these things better and worse, both in themselves and toward one another; since otherwise public service is so far greater than immunity that they may not even be compared. For the one is both just and most advantageous to a city, and most responsible for the fairest fortune that comes to be, and besides has from the beginning and throughout all time prevailed; whereas immunity was not only discovered yesterday and the day before, but is besides nothing of the sort at all, so far as concerns a city, except this only, as I said — to the profit of those who use it, but to the city wholly the contrary; so that all may reasonably declare concerning them that the one, 16. so disposed, if indeed it were in the laws, ought to be struck out of the laws once for all, but the other, being such as it is, ought conversely to be inscribed in all the laws and to be thought worthy of ever so many decrees — or rather, to have become a law itself. And this, long fitting, now the excellent Leptines here, moved partly by the gods and partly yielding to these reasonings, being a lover of his city above all men, has paid off like a kind of common debt to the city, by writing that none of all should share in immunity, even if he should many times be a benefactor of the city — not only that the city might enjoy in addition the contribution from these, and that public service might come to her whole and entire, but because no small fear lurked from that quarter, lest, as time went on and immunity thus passed through all, public service might fail once for all. And what more would there be then for the city, harmed in the greater matters and in those without which it is impossible to be saved? For public service is the soul of a city; and as a body is not by nature able to survive and live when the soul is not present, so too, it seems to me, a city in want of public services — and reasonably so. For if no men are free from needs, except the gods, and these needs make the public services as necessary as anything I know — then, men of Athens, we shall have no need of public services at that time when we have no needs; but if it is impossible ever to be without needs, how it is possible to be without public services I cannot see — from which the city is in danger of falling, on account of the immunities of Demosthenes.

"But," he says, "one ought to have waited for the future and the failure of public service, and to have introduced the law then. As it is, in legislating before this comes to pass, he seems to put these things forward unseasonably." What, then, Demosthenes, prevents us too from using these same arguments against you conversely — and more justly than you? Namely, that you yourself ought to have waited for the future — if indeed this must be said at all of things most plainly evident from the start — 17. and to have tried to speak against the law then; whereas now, in prosecuting him before this came to pass, you seem to have made your indictment unseasonably. Then it occurs to me to wonder how — what do you think? — it occurs to you to say these things; not only because you are caught by your own feathers and arguments, which is the most dreadful of all and a calamity for those it befalls, and which you yourself besides especially condemn — I mean using deliberation after the events — persuading us now to cling to this as though it were something good; but also because, while asserting it to be dreadful, you fail to notice that you are asserting what is not permitted. For no one, I think, of all men in possession of his wits, when it is open to him to have deliberated well so as not to suffer ill, having first allowed himself to suffer ill, would then choose to have deliberated about deliverance, when perhaps not even this will be open to him. Nor shall we, having now the immunity that deserves the worst ruin set out of the way, then on account of your arguments wait for the future, as though ignorant of what it is and on that account needing the trial of it from there. For, apart from its being downright the extreme of madness — to let go the things we know best and pursue the things we do not know — I cannot even recognize the reasons by which one ought to choose these things. If, then, you put it off to time and to later votes, as men not yet knowing anything clear about immunity, you seem to be ignorant of why we have already set in motion the arguments against it; but if you put it off as men who do understand, then in truth you seem to me to advise nothing else than to take thought for ourselves after we have once for all been destroyed. But neither will you yourself, be well assured, if someone has killed you, then be able to summon him here before the Areopagus — no more than the dead are able to bring charges of injustice against the living; and immunity, as I said, having overturned the city, there will be nothing more toward having resolved to remove the one and to save ourselves, but along with us, of necessity, it too will have perished, like some 18. disease that dies along with the body. So that I do not see what reason there is in the argument about the future. Wherefore we shall both lose the present and not have that. For it is not possible, as you yourself say, if one spends his present resources on what he ought not, to be well supplied with the absent ones for what he ought; but so long as the vessel is safe, whether it be greater or smaller, then both sailor and helmsman and every man in turn must be eager, and must see to it that no one shall overturn it, whether willingly or unwillingly; but when the sea has overwhelmed it, the effort is vain — reasonably so. At any rate, of drugs and drinks and foods, before our body has fallen sick, we think we ought to partake so as never to fall into this state; but if the disease comes on first — how, do you think, do we then chafe at fortune and at ourselves? And yet, Demosthenes, when of bodies and ships and such things we make so much account that they may ever be in the finest condition, surely of a city so great and so mighty and so thoroughly supreme — that even the gods, to say nothing more, contended with one another over this very city — there is no telling how much we owe.

Furthermore, men of Athens, if it were possible both to lay claim to immunity and yet for the city to suffer no harm in respect of public service, it would be plain madness to choose to prevent these things, which neither ruin the common good and in which there is gain to those who share. But when, on account of partial favours, it is necessary that we undergo a common loss, which is better and more advantageous: to take account of all together, or of some certain few? And apart from these things, when immunities are out of the way there will not be the slightest harm to the cities, but rather a gain not small — that the public services would thereby become more, out of which cities are constituted. But if the public services 19. suffer this very thing, the cities will perish, and the prizes of cities will perish too. For not only will nothing thereafter accrue to them from immunities, but the perishing most swiftly will in addition accrue to them — if indeed from public services comes the salvation of cities, and in their being in good case there will also be present the giving of these things. Then, with matters thus and so great a difference being between the two — that the one has the greatest benefit, the other wholly the contrary — shall we then, persuaded by Demosthenes, or by I know not whom and what to call it, choose not what is plainly for us but what is against us? And the law which from the beginning ought to have been laid down for our own safety and forethought, and which they now say is most worth using — bidding this farewell, shall we think the immunity that tends to the dissolution of the constitution very advantageous? Through which not even this very thing, as I said, will any longer be open to those who wish, but, in addition to themselves, they will destroy this too. And to whom should we not seem to be ill-starred, if, knowing the advantage to us above everything, we ourselves should deliberately do the things that, above everything, will wear us away?

And, in general, if someone should ask you, men of Athens, which has come to be of greater and more conspicuous glory to those who have it, while bringing no harm whatever to the city — immunity and the still being able not to perform public service, or the obtaining of statues and being honoured for all time alongside Harmodius and Aristogeiton — I well know you would say the latter; and reasonably. For what harm is it to the city if — not so-and-so or so-and-so, I say, but all Athenians together, or, if you like, all men, so to speak — should share in statues or crowns from her? Rather, two of the finest of all things accrue from this: not only praise and glory both for those thus honoured and for the city that honours, but there will also be a kind of wonderful summons toward the same deeds. When, then, it is possible for the city, both otherwise and by greatness of soul, to deal with those it ought, 20. and for her to be in no way at all harmed by anyone — what necessity is there of immunity and of thereby ruining our own affairs? So that even the things Demosthenes too brilliantly puts forward on behalf of immunity, asserting it to be among the most absurd and an evidence of unworthy meanness in all our greatness of soul, if we take back what we have given — these things have come round to nothing for him in this way. For we shall not deprive those who were well treated of this, as he thinks, nor will they fall, through the law, from the glory they enjoyed from us; but they will now recover this in fairer and more conspicuous form, obtaining, in place of immunity, certain wonderful inscriptions and statues, and standing thereafter publicly for all time — so that it is open even to those who come after to learn clearly how greatly the city dealt with these men for the sake of goodwill toward her. And than what immunity is this not greater? Seeing that the one is neither continuous nor reaches through all by being known, while the other is, so to speak, immortal and cannot escape any of all men, no more than the city can escape anyone. So then both Epicerdes and Leucon and whoever else, if, when the city honoured them, there had been a choice of two — to share in immunity or in statues — would not, it seems to me, have so much as deigned to hear about immunity, when it was possible to be honoured with something far greater, and which makes those who share in it seem like the gods. Those, then, who would then have been so disposed and have set their whole heart on these things, I well know would even now have made more account, not only than of the immunity attaching to them, but of the honour in statues — both for themselves and for their children, if they should not be living — nay, would have rejoiced so greatly as to confess, indeed, the fullest thanks to the city both for having had these things in mind and for having voted measures advantageous both to herself and to themselves. 21. "But," he says, "when we grant these things, the children of these men, because they will no longer be able even here to share with their fathers, as in immunity, will cry out as having been most greatly wronged." First, then, my good man, I do not think any of them will at all be displeased, because to the sons too there belongs, in full measure, the glory of those who begot them, but, as is likely, they will be content if only they be addressed as children of such fathers. For just as to be conscious of a father's or mother's evils, according to the poets, enslaves even the stout-hearted, so the good repute and brilliance of these men makes their offspring greatly envied. Then, if of all the things the city deems benefactors worthy of, their offspring too must share, and these descend, like a kind of inheritance, to the descendants, these men too would seem to speak reasonably when deprived of them. But if this held of immunity alone and of nothing else, and this is now once for all abolished, it has no reason to wish to seek such things and to make mention of immunity among the rest. And it will be much the same as if someone who is the son of an Olympic victor should then think fit, on account of his birth, to share in the olive-crown too; but such a one will assuredly hear that the prizes are not of birth but of contests, and he who desires them will first strip for those, and then so proceed toward these. If, therefore, even the small things and those of no such great account — for what is a spray of olive compared with a statue? since the one is lasting, but a spray has its gain only for the very time of acceptance — if, then, these things cannot be taken from mere birth, without toils leading the way, how is it possible to reap the greater without effort? And indeed, if the children think fit to share, on account of birth, in the prizes given to the fathers, why do they not, from this same cause, think fit to share in their misfortunes too? 22. For it is not that in the best things there are children, but in the worst no longer; rather, much more here ought these to display their nature, if they are not to have less than friends whom misfortunes bring to one's side. But if they would not choose to share misfortune with them even in dreams — not willingly, at least, as I think — how do they think they ought to use these men's prosperities? And how do they not fall foul of themselves when they make these claims, if in the basest things they deny their nature, but in the favourable things make argument of it up and down? In general, if they put it forward rightly and justly, they must surely cleave to it through all things and not now yes, now no; but if for the sake of gain alone they take refuge in it, and otherwise by no means, they escape their own notice in estranging themselves from it no less than in establishing it. Therefore one ought not to give heed to them when they make such claims.

Furthermore, from this too, men of Athens, you would best be able to perceive what I say, and that one must of necessity legislate the advantageous — that, except for immunity, everything else is to be done by us toward benefactors — if we consider what manner of men our ancestors were in these matters, at the time when the city's affairs most flourished, and the display and ambition toward her came forth somehow more ambitiously and with greater preparation. Those men, then, surpassing all men everywhere in quickness of wit and intelligence and the other good things, and bearing in their soul all the knowledge of political virtue — or rather, being this very thing, the soul of affairs, both in seeming and in being — not only that the city might prosper and pass her days worthily of herself, but that she might ever, through all things, try for benefits from fortune greater than her own deserts — having this in view, themselves thought they ought both to do and to say everything on her behalf, passing over in no way whatever anything that conduces to the happiness of the commonwealth; and those who had accomplished any 23. good toward her — citizens and strangers alike, I say — and had proved timely to affairs, at once requiting their zeal, and at once summoning both themselves and others toward the same deeds and greater for the future, they rewarded these men with the greatest and most ambitious honours: now setting up bronze statues in the market-place, now establishing them as assessors beside the gods on the Acropolis; deeming some worthy of great and wonderful titles, the very same as the gods'; and to some giving the most money possible — indeed plots of ground, some planted, some bare; while others chose maintenance or crowns and such things. These were then the city's requitals toward those who on each occasion were noble and good toward her. Thus Erechtheus, the son of Athena; thus Harmodius and Aristogeiton. And who of all does not know that Pericles, son of Xanthippus, was titled "Olympian," in the same way as Zeus? But of immunity, by the gods, there was then no account whatever nor examination, nor did they think fit to make their gifts from that source — not because they were ignorant of it, but because they clearly knew that, in giving the very things I mentioned, there will be no harm whatever to the city, whereas in bringing this man or that to immunity there is no small loss. For the scarcity of public services, little by little, and the failure to be able to give the very things I mentioned, as time goes on will abolish them, when all have become immune. Then they foresaw this too, and very much in the nature of absurdities: that, if for the good things certain men displayed toward the city they should, on account of immunities, become partly responsible for loss to her — when, if these things were thereafter going to come about, they ought not in the first place to have reckoned them among benefactors at all. How then is it not absurd that those of old, so disposed, abstained from no excess whatever in their requitals, but of immunity 24. nowhere at all in any way made mention, while we — who most of all both love and admire their works, and consider their precedent a law of what must be done — should then use this immunity and from it define our honours, as though condemning them, on the ground that they did not perceive this, or, perceiving it, refused it out of envy? And yet, when we admire these men as supreme through all things, we ought also to imitate them through all things, that what we adorn with words we may confirm with deeds; but when those things have reasonably been refused by them as not being well, and we embrace these as being well, we are held by one of two charges: either of having gone wrong in our judgements or of having played false in our imitations.

And in general, if immunity were the finest and most advantageous thing and most befitting a constitution, not we alone, men of Athens, but all others too ought to make an account of it, as of something of common benefit and reaching through all. But if none up to this point, except us, have been brought to these things — and may they not hereafter be brought to them, O Lady Athena — why do we alone of all suffer this sickness, unless we alone of all think fit to hate ourselves? "Surely," he says, "we ought not even to be charged with these things. For if, the same customs and laws holding for all, we then alone of all clung to immunity, we should reasonably be reckoned base, undertaking what was not permitted and governing ourselves against the common law. But if there is here a great difference, and we know that some use these usages and some those, and all simply use what they have long approved — what is dreadful if, immunity being customary among none of the rest, among us alone there is an account of it?" Nor, indeed, can we blame the Lacedaemonians or the Thebans or any others 25. for these things, but only him who has from the beginning had the conduct of affairs to grant it. That each people, then, Demosthenes, differs from another in this, I too agree, since they have not even acquired the same lawgivers, but these these and those those, as fortune and the time that befell each had prepared. But I would gladly learn from you whether, in the matters in which these differ, these things are among the advantageous, or among those that, privately and publicly, ruin affairs. For if you will say they are among the ruinous, then, first, it is tolerably absurd and dreadful to try, through these, to persuade us toward the like, and to heal evil with evil, as the saying is, instead of leading away from this as far as possible by means of the best things, and bringing us, as much as possible, toward those. Then, along with immunity, it was fitting to remove these too, like certain Death-spirits, from life, and reasonably to dispatch them to the poets' mountain and wave; for may there be nothing at all that holds public harm. But if these things were discovered for the sake of some common gain and of being able to accomplish what comes to pass, while immunity is no more hostile to the public services — and when I say these, I mean the city, by which she is preserved — why do you make superfluous deductions and become, where it is not permitted, a sophist, comparing immunity with things it ought not, and thereby persuading us to cling to it as to something good? But this is downright treacherous, and the act of one trying to surround the city with extreme evils. For just as no one, by the gods, would deny that to prosecute wrongdoers and choose to make war on them through all things is the mark of one who honours the laws — so, if anyone with much in reserve pleads for those who ruin the city, he furnishes a clear proof of an unsound mind, and one contriving the most dreadful things against us. And yet, when on account of the harm from them we turn aside such men, of what would he reasonably be deemed worthy who, by pleading for these, is himself such a man and urges others toward the like? Since even to play the sycophant and 26. take bribes and act wantonly and secretly deal with the enemy and compound drugs against anyone, and, by Zeus, robbers and burglars and anyone of base stamp are then the more hated and undergo the greater punishment, when, while they ought to veil themselves in what they do and tremble, they instead so pride themselves on these things as to wish to vaunt them before all — being then doubly sick, with vice and with effrontery, and understanding neither — but paying this penalty too, the publicly convicting of themselves.

And indeed, by the very things with which you try to deceive us in that other way too and think to escape notice, you are no less caught playing the rogue, and against yourself rather than against us. For not having it in your power to point to immunity as something lawful and bound to the necessity from above, nor to set in the midst the laws that prescribe concerning it, and thence, as you suppose, to refute Leptines — you instead so very differently embellish and lead about your argument, so as to be able to persuade on the spot by appearances and readily to master those who have not paid very close attention. For if, as you say, the laws bid expressly that the gifts be secure to the end for those who have received them, and that these be in no way whatever disturbed, while the man, by what he now legislates, makes void once for all the immunities the city has at any time bestowed on certain persons, both now and hereafter — how, thus transgressing the laws and being on this account justly liable himself to undergo the penalty of those who break the law, will he then be such as to be trusted by us in what he advises? Do you not say these things, turning them up and down and continually asking whether it is not just that those who have been well treated should be well treated to the end and share in the prize forever? Well, take note of this too. He who laid down the laws enjoined that the gifts ought not to be taken away; but of immunity he makes no 27. account at all, but simply of gifts in this fashion — unless you secretly heard him saying so. Why, then, do you wickedly snatch up the things he did not mention, and say that what does not seem so to the laws seems so to the laws — at once playing the sycophant against them, and at once convicting us of understanding nothing for the sake of laws?

But if you say this — that in saying "gifts" he had included this too, for this too is surely a gift — we shall by all means say that what privately exalts those who receive it, but publicly ruins the people that bestowed it, is not in truth a gift, but what is to the gain of both these and those; for that other is a gift to those who take it, but a loss to the city. This, then, all the laws too call a gift, and have taken care that no one shall fall from it, being common educators and guardians of what belongs to us. But immunity — if it is advantageous to the city, let it be called a gift and be inalienable from those who have it; but if it ruins and corrupts and does everything ill, why, using certain false reasonings, do you contend to foist it upon the laws like some smuggled and supposititious thing? Do you see how, by your own hand, you thrust the sword against the others, and, while seeming to strike others, yourself sustain the blows — out of the over-boldness of your mind and your being unable to refrain from contention, not understanding what answer will come to your arguments from others? Such, indeed, is this too — and that, they say, of the training-school. For Demosthenes, it seems, men of Athens, does not endure to seem bad to one man or two, but is convicted of it out of abundance. For besides the other things he resolved to use against Leptines — bringing every charge, but in truth being repulsed from them all — he thinks fit also that the man be indicted for illegality, in which he will now even more than before be found lying against the truth. For what does he say? "Leptines, then, ought 28. not to have laid down his own law before he had got this old one repealed by indictment; but now, leaving testimony against himself that he transgresses the law, he nevertheless legislated this law, and that too with another law commanding that he be liable to indictment on this very count, if it be contrary to the laws previously laid down." Now one ought, men of Athens — and most certainly one ought — to carry such matters through thus and to choose to legislate in this manner; and the man not so prepared, but going at it head-on, I myself would be the first to indict for illegality, because he did not perceive what is needed. But Leptines is not such a man. How should he be? Far from it; for if the law had bidden there be immunity, and he had paid no heed, but, before he had repealed the law and shown the man who spoke contrary to have spoken ill, had himself thought he ought to legislate the opposite, he would be leaving testimony against himself that he transgresses the law. But as it is, there was no law commanding it, nor does this man transgress the law in legislating such things — no more than Solon of old; but, if the truth must be told, the man who thinks the contrary of what is manifest, and, not, by Zeus, looking to what publicly preserves the city, but to what stood for her ruin, bringing all his zeal on its behalf, and, by being able to use his arguments as he wishes, now making mention of the laws toward his own opinion, now making the laws that are not into laws — such are you yourself. So that when you say these things, Demosthenes, you accuse yourself, not Leptines, if indeed he, not against any law laid down concerning immunity, but against a custom that, by Zeus, yesterday and the day before, came reveling into the city, brought in this law on behalf of the constitution — a law that all would call most excellent and most just; whereas you, trying to refute him, do this not by law, but leading us astray with certain empty arguments and tales, which stand wholly apart from laws and truth and are full of falsehood and lawlessness — even if you bolster them no less than oracles. 29. And not this only, but in this too you most of all lie against Leptines: as though he laid down the law in private ill-will toward certain persons, not in taking forethought for the city. For that this is so, and that he was not brought to these things for the reasons you allege, is clear from the following. First, because every man angry at anyone whatever uses arguments against him alone, and is zealous for this above all things — that he may show himself best through all, and the other most defiled and worst of men — refuting, accusing, slandering, running him down with all that is permitted, not, however, by Zeus, legislating. For these cannot come together — a law and the indictment of a man; for the one is a refutation and slander of baseness and of someone's being evil, the other a kind of common exhortation toward the best and a leading away from the worst, so that one flees the latter and chooses the former. How, then, was Leptines, surely, going to let go the things in which he could accuse and prosecute, and exhort these men how they may become best, and lay claim to those whom he would most gladly have seen ill-treated as though they were his most intimate and dearest friends? This is not so, it is not. But if he, by laying down a law that none of all should be immune, became chiefly responsible for grief to those who possessed immunity, while you from this most easily infer the hatred — then it is high time for you to vote these same things against nearly all lawgivers, so to speak, and to bring against them too a suit for enmity, because, in going through the matters of self-control and justice and the rest, they are surely not gracious to all simply, but to those whose characters are in good case; since to the basest and to those who think the contrary of what is established, there is no telling how unpleasing these men are.

Then, if someone should ask you, Demosthenes, who in the world these men are, vexed at whom Leptines wrote the law, you would not, it seems to me, be able to say. But that there are certain ones you have simply asserted; who they are 30. you no longer think fit to say — not because Leptines is unwilling to be refuted out of abundance, but because, having nothing clear to say about them, you then wish to be refuted yourself out of abundance. For you would not, if you could mention these men by name, have endured to keep silent, nor would you have spared them if present — you who fall upon the arguments about them as though the absent were present; not only because you are of all men readiest at such things, but because this too would have helped your case not a little. As it is, in bringing them forward anonymously, you not only have all incredulous, but you furnish the opinion that these very men do not exist at all, but have been fabricated by you. Thus, by mentioning them only, wishing to fasten an ill repute on Leptines, but again, by not speaking to a name, fleeing the refutation yourself — you have escaped your own notice, Demosthenes, both convicting yourself of not speaking the truth and Leptines of truly — that not as overcome by passion did he bring in the law. And they say of Diotima from Miletus that, since, though able to put off the plague from the city for ten years, she was not able to accomplish the whole, she did not even count this as having been done, nor as having proved timely to affairs, so that she was acclaimed from both sides — both from what she was able to do, so great a thing, and from her concern that she was not able to do the whole — being as displeased as though she had displayed nothing; whereas you, seeing your fatherland so long sick from immunity, neither thought yourself you ought to free her from this disease and to use, as was fitting, the incantations of arguments on her behalf, though it was easy above everything — but this noble and good Leptines here, who has done this most excellently of all men and by the providence of the gods, you would most gladly, if it were possible, have thrust into the Sicilian craters, trying from every side to drive him out and with all that is permitted 31. slandering him — that the one, O gods and laws, you may contrive to make pay the penalty, as hostile by his proposals to affairs; but immunity, like some exile and outcast, you may bring back again into the city, drinking thence to Ctesippus the toast of her advantage.

"But," he says, "the additional clause — that it not even be permitted in future to grant immunity, or that he who proposes the contrary be punished with death — not only is the having this customarily, at the moment when occasion calls for ambition, the act of a tyrant, but it has also done away with the city's freedom of action." If, then, Leptines, men of Athens, debars us once for all from greatness of soul, so that we are neither able to requite benefactors nor at all to reward with what is fitting those worthy of being well treated, he would reasonably bear the reproach of ill-judgement and of being unable to advise anything of what is needed, and this law of his must be subjected to a suit of ejectment from the laws. But if, except for immunity, he says we are masters of everything — maintenance in the prytaneum, and dwellings, and offices, and plots of land, and all such things as it is permitted to distribute — where is it just that he be charged with these? As if you thought fit to revile a physician, as enjoining total fasting upon the sick, because of his not allowing the use of harmful things; or as if a farmer too seemed to you base and altogether at war with the fields who clears away the growth of weeds that ruin it. And I say this too: if, Demosthenes, he proposes the law illegally, why are you vexed about the future? For this very thing — that he transgresses the law — means that this law does not exist at all. It is vain, then, to take thought about what does not now exist as though it would still be; but if you agree that this law is good, you have no less agreed besides that the no-longer-being-permitted has been settled. For surely you will not say that this law 32. is advantageous now, but afterward no longer; rather it ought to be the same throughout, if indeed it is truly to preserve its title.

But perhaps you will say this: if justice attaches to the law, and Leptines is conscious that it stands firm and secure, why does he think it needs this future security besides? For none of the lawgivers held this opinion about the laws they laid down — not even near it — but they thought it enough for themselves if they dealt with all in company with justice. But now, by your alone conceiving such things, you seem to have acquired no good opinion of the law. That the law, then, being most excellent and most just and most secure of all, is a good of common benefit, is clear not only, men of Athens, from what I have said, but also from what you yourselves displayed, in receiving such a measure straightway with a kind of god-inspired impulse and with whole and entire heart, so as to deem it worthy of the customary show of hands and the common vote. And that it is not unreasonable that to all the other laws nothing whatever is added, but to this one alone this should belong out of abundance — this you will not only know clearly, men of Athens, but you will also say, I am sure, that these things ought to have been no otherwise than thus, if you will reckon the reasons for both. For if Solon and Lycurgus and whoever else of the lawgivers, with no necessity laid upon them, but from the most democratic temper of mind, came to their laws and common proposals, while Leptines came by necessity and from being no longer able to bear to see the city in danger from immunity; and they grieved none of all men by what they legislated, for they did not even deprive of prizes, whereas he, on the contrary, has made enemies of himself many and various men who through the law have fallen out of immunity — then neither ought those men, because not even then did they have opponents, to have taken any forethought of the future; 33. and indeed they did not take it; nor ought this man, because he has these many adversaries, to have kept the future silent — and indeed he did not keep it silent. But just as some excellent physician, not only healing diseases but also administering certain drugs against the future, and besides bidding that it not be permitted at all, throughout life, to partake of the foods through which the disease came on, in order that one may not make trial of the same things again — so too Leptines, having written that none be immune, adds besides that it not be permitted in future either to grant it, securing once for all both the present and the future, and partly ever taking forethought for the city, partly also keeping in check those of after-time who would be like Demosthenes in such matters. For it is likely — likely, or rather wholly necessary — that there be in the city, for all time, both good men and base. And if even the establishing of a tyranny ever needed laws of any sort, what is new if Leptines too needed future security on behalf of the common advantage? But not, by the gods, as one fearing for his law — as someone might say; for he who has obtained from you, men of Athens, and from your vote, the assent above all to his being best, what profit is it against this if so-and-so or so-and-so talks nonsense?

Thus, Demosthenes, the things you seemed to be saying on your own behalf, these you were found saying most excellently on behalf of Leptines; and by the very things with which you hoped to convict him, by these you were yourself once for all convicted. And of immunity, on behalf of which you thought you ought both to do and to say everything, nothing more accursed has been seen; while of the law Leptines has introduced, nothing is more necessary to use. So that Leptines might reasonably be even grateful to you, in that you thereby exalt him more than if you had spoken with him from the beginning. For then you might perhaps have seemed even to be doing a favour, and someone might have shot a dart from concealment; but now the testimony is unsuspected — that the man is among the best and most advantageous, by the fact that even by his enemies these things have been voted to him.