Book 1

18.1. . . . he spared. Eager for dominion, he attacked the Cretans also, who had come to terms with him, and he paid no heed to the truce they offered, but pressed on to crush them before Pompey should arrive. For Octavius, who was present without a force (since he had not been sent out for any war, but to take over the cities), kept quiet; and Cornelius Sisenna, the governor of Greece, did indeed come to Crete when he learned of these things, and urged Metellus to spare the peoples, but

18.2. did not, when his counsel failed, take any active steps against him. So Metellus did harm to many, and after taking the city of Eleutherae by treachery, he levied money from it; for the men who betrayed it had, night after night, soaked with vinegar a certain tower, built of brick and very great and most hard to assail, until it became brittle and broke apart. After this he took Lappa by assault, although Octavius was holding it, and did Octavius himself no harm, but destroyed the

19.1. Cilicians who were with him. Octavius, indignant at this, would no longer keep still, but first, using the army of Sisenna (for that man had fallen sick and died), he gave some aid to those who were being maltreated; and afterward, when these troops had been withdrawn, he went off to Aristion at Hierapydna and waged war along with him. For this Aristion, when he had at that time withdrawn from Cydonia, had defeated a certain Lucius Bassus who put out against him, and

19.2. had seized Hierapydna. For a time they held out, but when Metellus advanced against them they abandoned the wall, and putting to sea they met with a storm, and being cast ashore lost a great number. After this Metellus subdued the

19.3. whole island. The Cretans, then, who throughout all earlier time had been free and had never gained a foreign master, were thus enslaved; and Metellus took his title from them, but the Panares and the Lasthenes (for he had captured the latter too) he was unable to send in his triumph; for Pompey, having persuaded one of the tribunes, took them away from him beforehand, on the ground that they had attached themselves, by their agreement, to himself and not to Metellus.

20.1. But I shall now tell also how the affairs concerning this man came about. The pirates were always troubling those who sailed the sea, just as those who carry on robberies trouble those who dwell on land; for there is no time when these things have not happened, nor will they ever cease so long as the nature of

20.2. mankind remains the same. But formerly they used to plunder only in certain places and in the summer season alone, in small bands, both on land and on the sea; whereas at that time, from the moment when war was waged against them in many places at once and continuously, and many cities were laid waste, and punishments hung over all those of them who escaped, and there was no security for anyone anywhere, very many turned to piracy.

20.3. And the brigandage on the mainlands, since it was more before the eyes of the peoples, and both the sense of the harm done was close at hand and the seizure of the offenders not very difficult, was somehow more easily put down; but that upon the sea grew

20.4. to the greatest extent. For while the Romans were occupied with their adversaries, the pirates flourished for a long time, sailing about in many directions and attaching to themselves all who were like them, so that some of them even rendered aid, in the manner of allies, to many peoples.

21.1. Now it has been told how much they accomplished together with others. But when those wars too had been brought to an end, they did not cease; on the contrary, by themselves and on their own account they did many dreadful injuries both to the Romans and to their allies. For they no longer sailed in small bands but in great fleets, and they had commanders, so that they had even

21.2. acquired a great name. And first and most of all they harried and despoiled those who sailed the sea (for they did not even allow them safety in the winter season, but, through their own daring and habit and good fortune, they then too used the seaways without fear), and after these, also those who were in the harbours.

21.3. For if anyone dared to put out against them, in most cases he was defeated and destroyed; and even if he did conquer, yet he was unable to capture any of them, owing to the speed of their ships, and so, returning after a short time as though victorious, they would lay waste and burn, not only farmsteads and fields, but whole cities as well, and other places they appropriated, so as to make winter quarters and bases there as in a friendly land.

22.1. As these enterprises prospered for them, they began also to go up into the interior, and they did much harm even to those who made no use of the sea. And this they did not only to the allied territory abroad, but to

22.2. Italy herself; for thinking that they would thereby gain greater profits and would the more terrify all the rest if they did not keep their hands even off Italy, they sailed into the other cities along that coast and into Ostia itself, and they

22.3. burned the ships and plundered everything. And finally, since no notice whatever was taken of them, they made their abodes on land, and the men whom they did not put to death, and the booty which they took, they disposed of without fear,

22.4. as though indeed in their own country. And different bands plundered in different quarters (for they could not, of course, do their mischief over the whole sea at once); yet they maintained such friendship toward one another that they would send money and reinforcements even to men quite unknown to them,

22.5. as though to the closest of kin. And it was not least for this reason that they grew strong, that they all honoured those who served any of them, and all plundered those who came into conflict with any of them.

23.1. To such a height, then, did the power of the pirates rise that the war against them became great and continuous and ever-present and beyond defence. The Romans, indeed, heard something of all this, and saw some of it (for no other imported goods came to them, and the grain-supply was utterly cut off);

23.2. yet they took no great thought of the matter at the proper time, but sent out fleets and commanders, just as they happened to be stirred at each report, and accomplished nothing — nay, through these very men they brought far more suffering upon their allies, until at last they found themselves in extremity. Then they came together and deliberated for

23.3. many days as to what they ought to do. For, worn out by the unbroken succession of dangers, and seeing that the war against the pirates was great and many-sided, and believing it impossible to fight against them all at once or yet each separately (for they kept aiding one another, and it was hopeless to ward them off everywhere at the same time), they fell into great perplexity and despair of achieving anything,

23.4. until at length a certain Aulus Gabinius, a tribune, brought forward a motion — whether it was Pompey who put him up to it, or whether he simply wished to gratify him (for assuredly he did not do it out of goodwill toward the commonwealth, since he was a most worthless man) — that they should choose from among the ex-consuls one commander with full powers over all the pirates, to hold office for three years and to have at his disposal a very large force together with many lieutenants.

23.5. For though he did not name Pompey outright, it was perfectly clear that, once the multitude heard any such proposal, they would choose him.

24.1. And so it turned out; for they accepted his proposal, and at once all save the senate inclined toward Pompey. The senate, indeed, chose to suffer anything whatever at the hands of the pirates rather than to put so great a command into his hands; and they nearly killed Gabinius in the very

24.2. chamber. But when he somehow slipped away, the multitude, on learning the opinion of the senators, raised an uproar, so that they even rushed upon them as they sat in session; and had not the senators withdrawn, they would assuredly

24.3. have destroyed them. The rest, then, scattering, escaped notice; but Gaius Piso the consul (for it was in his consulship and that of Acilius that these things were taking place) was seized and was about to be slain in place of the others, when Gabinius begged him off. After this the men of power kept quiet, well content if anyone should let them live, and persuaded the nine tribunes to oppose

24.4. Gabinius. Of these the others, fearing the multitude, made no objection, but a certain Lucius Trebellius and Lucius Roscius did make the attempt; yet they were unable either to say or to do anything of what they had promised. For when the appointed day arrived, on which the measure had to be ratified, the following took place.

24.5. Pompey, though he greatly desired to hold the command, and by now, owing both to his own ambition and to the zeal of the people, considered the failure to obtain it not even a slight, but rather a disgrace, yet, seeing the opposition of the men of power, wished to seem

24.6. to be constrained. For he was at all times most given to pretending that he did not desire what he wished; but then all the more, both because of the odium he would incur if he willingly laid claim to the command, and because of the glory if even against his will he should be declared most worthy to command, he played the part.

25.1. And coming forward he said: "I rejoice, Quirites, to be honoured by you; for all men by nature take pride in benefits conferred upon them by their fellow-citizens, and I, who have so often enjoyed honour at your hands, know not how I may worthily delight in the present marks of your favour. Yet I do not think it fitting either for you to be so insatiable in your disposition toward me, or for me to be perpetually in some command. For I myself have toiled from boyhood, and you ought to show zeal also for

25.2. others. Or do you not remember how many hardships I endured in the war against Cinna, though I was then quite young; how much I suffered in Sicily and in Africa, before I had even fairly reached manhood; how many dangers I faced in Spain, while I was not yet even a senator? For all of which I will not say that you

25.3. have been ungrateful to me. Far from it — whence should that be? For besides the many other great honours of which you have judged me worthy, the very fact that the command against Sertorius was entrusted to me, when no one else either would or could undertake it, and that for that war you granted me a triumph contrary to custom, brought me the very greatest

25.4. honour. But because I have undergone many cares and many dangers, I am worn out in body and wearied in mind. Do not reckon that I am still young, nor count the years, so many and so many, that I

25.5. have lived. For if you should number the campaigns I have made and the dangers I have faced, you would find them far more numerous than my years, and you would thus the more readily believe that I am no longer able to endure either the toils or the cares.

26.1. But even if a man could hold out against these, yet you see that all such things are also a source of envy and of hatred — things which you, indeed, count as nothing (for it is not seemly that you should lay claim to any of them), yet which would weigh most heavily upon me;

26.2. and I confess that there is nothing among the terrors of war by which I am so disturbed or grieved as by such things. For what man of sound mind would gladly live among people who envy him, or would be eager to administer any public business when he is bound, if he fails, to undergo punishment, and if he

26.3. succeeds, to be looked upon with jealousy? Therefore, both for these reasons and for the rest, allow me to live in quiet and to attend to my own affairs, so that at long last I may give some care to my household and not perish utterly worn out; and against the pirates elect another. There are many, both willing and able to command at sea, both younger and older men, so that the choice may be easy for you out of

26.4. many. For surely I am not the only one who loves you, nor the only one experienced in matters of war, but so-and-so and so-and-so as well — that I may not seem to gratify certain persons by naming them."

27.1. When he had thus harangued, Gabinius took up the discourse and said: "Pompey, Quirites, in this very act does that which is worthy of his character, in neither coveting the command nor accepting it when offered him

27.2. on the spur of the moment. For it is not the part of a good man, in any case, to desire to rule and to wish to have public affairs in his hands; and even so it is fitting that he undertake all that is laid upon him only after due consideration, that he may carry it out the more securely. For rashness in promises, becoming in deeds too sharper than the occasion warrants, trips up many; whereas precision from the outset continues alike in action and is of profit to all.

27.3. But you must choose, not that which is pleasing to him, but that which is expedient for the city. For it is not the office-seekers, but the men fit for the task, who ought to be set over affairs; and of the former you will find very many, but of the latter no other such

27.4. man. Remember how much and what we suffered in the war against Sertorius for want of a general, and that we found no other man, neither among the younger nor among the older, suited to it, but sent forth this man, though he had then neither the age nor a seat in the senate, in place of

27.5. both the consuls. For my part, I could wish that you had many good men, and if it is even right to pray, I would pray for it; but since this matter is not one of prayer, nor does it come of itself to anyone, but a man must be born with a fitness for it, and must learn what is appropriate, and must train himself in what is fitting, and above all must enjoy good fortune — things which would most rarely befall the same

27.6. man — you must all, of one accord, whenever such a man is found, be zealous for him and make use of him, even against his will. For such compulsion is most honourable both to him who exercises it and to him who suffers it: to the one because he would be saved by it, to the other because he would save his fellow-citizens, for whom the good man and the lover of his country would most readily give both his body and his soul.

28.1. Or do you suppose that this Pompey, who when a stripling was able to serve, to command, to increase your possessions, to preserve those of your allies, and to win those of your adversaries, would not now, in his prime and at that age at which every man is at his best, and having gathered the greatest possible experience from his wars, prove most

28.2. useful to you? Will you reject as a man one whom you chose to command as a youth? And will you not entrust this campaign, now that he is a senator, to him to whom, while he was still a knight, you committed those wars?

28.3. And before you had thoroughly tested him, you needed him alone for the crisis that then pressed upon you; will you not now, having tested him most amply, commit to him the present needs, which are no less urgent than those? And will you not now send out against the pirates this man, who has already been consul, when you elected him against Sertorius at a time when he was not yet even able to hold office?

28.4. Nay, neither do you act otherwise, and do you, Pompey, hearken both to me and to your country. For by her you were begotten and by her you were reared; and you must be a servant to her interests, and on their behalf shrink from no toil or danger, but, even if it should be necessary for you to die, not await the appointed fate, but make use of whatever death

29.1. comes to hand. Yet surely I am ridiculous in urging this upon you, who in so many and so great wars have given proof both of your valour and of

29.2. your goodwill toward your country. Hearken, then, both to me and to these citizens, and do not fear because certain men envy you, but for that very reason be the more zealous, so that, in regard both to the friendship of the greater number and to what is for the common good of us all, you may show contempt for those who slander you.

29.3. And if you even wish to vex them somewhat, then for that reason too take the command, that you may grieve them against their will both by commanding and by winning fame, and that you yourself may bring to your former achievements an end worthy of yourself, by delivering us from many and great evils."

30.1. When Gabinius had spoken thus, Trebellius attempted to make reply; but as he could obtain no hearing,

30.2. he tried to prevent the taking of the vote. Gabinius, then, indignant, suspended the balloting concerning Pompey, and introduced instead another proposal concerning Trebellius himself; and the seventeen tribes which were the first to give their voice decided that he was acting wrongly and ought no longer to be tribune. So, when the eighteenth too was about to vote the same way,

30.3. Trebellius at last, with difficulty, fell silent. Seeing this, Roscius did not dare to utter a word, but, raising his hand, signified that they should choose two men, in order that at least in this he might curtail somewhat the power of Pompey. As he was thus making signs with his hand, the multitude raised so great and threatening a shout that a raven flying over them was struck senseless and fell

30.4. as if thunderstruck. After this had happened, Roscius kept quiet, no longer with his tongue only but with his hand as well; and Catulus, who had otherwise kept silence, when Gabinius urged him to say something — since he was foremost in the senate and it was thought that through him the rest too would

30.5. come to agree with them (for Gabinius hoped that he, from what he had seen the tribunes suffer, would join in approval) — obtained a hearing, since all reverenced and honoured him as one who always both said and did what was for their advantage, and he delivered a speech to the following effect:

31.1. "That I have been exceedingly zealous, Quirites, for the welfare of your multitude, you all, I think, clearly know; and this being so, it is necessary for me to speak with frankness, plainly, all that I judge expedient for the city, and fitting for you to listen to it in quiet

31.2. and thereafter to deliberate. For if you raise an uproar, you will perhaps fail to learn something that might have been useful to you, whereas if you attend to what is said you will assuredly find something accurately

31.3. expedient for yourselves. I say, then, first and most emphatically, that you ought not to entrust so many commands in succession to any one man. For this is forbidden by the laws, and it has been found by experience to be most perilous. For it was nothing else, so to speak, that made Marius what he was, than that he was entrusted with so many wars in the shortest time and

31.4. became consul six times within a very brief space; and nothing else made Sulla, than that he held the command of the armies for so many years in succession, and after that was appointed dictator and then consul. For it is not in the nature of man — not the young soul only, but the older as well — that one which has spent a long time amid such powers should be willing to abide by ancestral customs.

32.1. And this I say, not as one who has any charge to bring against Pompey, but because it is plain both that the thing has never otherwise been of advantage to you, and that it is not permitted by the laws. For if the office brings honour to those deemed worthy of it, all to whom it falls ought to obtain it (for this is democracy); and if it brings toil, of this too all ought to take their share in proportion (for this is equality of distribution).

32.2. Furthermore, under such an arrangement it comes about that many are exercised in the conduct of affairs, and that the choice of men who can be trusted for all that must be done is easy for you on the basis of experience; whereas in the other case there must of necessity be a great scarcity both of those who shall be trained in what is fitting and of those to whom anything shall be

32.3. entrusted. And it was not least for this reason that you were at a loss for a general in the war against Sertorius — because in the time before it you had employed the same men for a long while. So that, even if in all other respects Pompey is worthy to be elected against the pirates, yet, inasmuch as he would be chosen contrary to what is ordained in the laws and contrary to what has been refuted by experience in practice, it least of all befits either you or him that this be done.

33.1. This, then, is my first and chief point. My second is this: that, when consuls and praetors and those who govern in their stead duly receive their offices and commands from the laws, it is neither otherwise honourable for you, passing these men by, to bring in some new command, nor is it

33.2. expedient. For to what end do you elect your annual magistrates, if you are to make no use of them for such matters? Surely it is not that they may go about in their purple-bordered robes, nor that, clothed in the mere name of office, they may be deprived of

33.3. its work. How will you not make yourselves hateful both to these men and to all others who choose to take part in public affairs, if you abolish the ancestral offices and entrust nothing to those elected according to the laws, but assign to a private citizen some strange command such as never before has come into being?

34.1. For if indeed it should be necessary, beside the annual offices, to choose some other, there is an ancient precedent even for this — I mean the dictator. Yet our fathers appointed even such an officer neither for all matters

34.2. nor for a longer time than six months. So that, if you do need some such officer, it is in your power, without breaking the law and without deliberating carelessly concerning the common weal, to appoint a dictator — whether Pompey or anyone else — on condition that he rule neither for a longer time than is ordained nor outside Italy. For surely you are not unaware that even this our fathers guarded against most carefully, and no dictator could be found who was chosen for any other region save one, for Sicily,

34.3. and he too without accomplishing anything. But if Italy has no need of any such officer, and if you would no longer endure not the office of dictator only but not even the name (as is plain from the indignation you felt against Sulla), how could it be right to appoint a new command, and that for three years and over well-nigh all affairs, so to speak, both those in Italy and those abroad?

34.4. For how many evils befall states from such a course, and how many men, through their lawless love of power, have often thrown our people into confusion and wrought countless ills upon themselves as well — all this you alike know.

35.1. Concerning these matters, then, I cease to speak; for who does not know that it is neither otherwise honourable nor expedient that affairs be entrusted to any one man and that any one man become master of all the good things we possess, however excellent he may be? For great honours and excessive powers both exalt and corrupt such men.

35.2. But this I beg you to consider, that it is not even possible for one man to command the whole sea and rightly to administer all this war. For you must, if you are to do anything of what is needed, make war upon them everywhere at once, that they may not, by joining forces with one another, or again by finding refuge with those who are not being warred upon, become

35.3. hard to take. But this no one man, ruling alone, could in any way accomplish. For how could he make war on the same days in Italy and in Cilicia, in Egypt and in Syria, in Greece and in Spain, in the Ionian Sea and among the islands? Many soldiers, then, and many commanders must for this reason be set over affairs,

36.1. if any good is to come of them. But if anyone says that, even if you should entrust the whole war to some one man, he will assuredly have many admirals and lieutenants, how is it not far more just and more advantageous (this is what I should say) — and what prevents it? — that these very men who are to be his lieutenants should be appointed by you for this very purpose, and that they should receive their

36.2. command in its own right from you? For thus they will take more thought for the war, inasmuch as each of them has been entrusted with his own portion and can shift the responsibility for it upon no other, and they will vie with one another the more earnestly, inasmuch as they are independent and will themselves win the glory of whatever they accomplish; whereas in the other case, whom do you suppose would equally . . . being subject to some other man, and who would do anything without making excuses, when he is to win the victory not for himself but for another?

36.3. So that one man could not even wage so great a war all at once has been admitted by Gabinius himself; at all events, he claims that many helpers should be given to the man who is to be elected. The only question that remains is whether they ought to be sent as commanders or as lieutenants, as generals or as subordinate officers, and by the whole people for an independent command, or by that one man alone for service

36.4. under him. Well then, that what I propose is both more lawful and more advantageous, both for everything else and as regards the pirates themselves, every one of you would agree. And apart from this, see also what a thing it is, that all your other offices should be abolished on the pretext of the pirates, and that for this time not one of them should exist either in Italy or in the subject territory . . ."

37.1. . . . and of Italy in the place of a consul for three years; and they assigned him fifteen lieutenants, and all the ships, and voted him whatever money and forces he might wish to take. And these measures the senate too, even against its will, ratified, and whatever else from time to time was suitable for them it decreed — and this all the more since, when Piso would not permit the lieutenants to make levies in Narbonese Gaul, of which he was governor, the multitude was terribly indignant, and would straightway have driven him from his office, had not

37.2. Pompey interceded for him. Having made his preparations, then, as the business and his own spirit required, he sailed around the whole sea, so far as the pirates infested it, partly in person and partly through his lieutenants, and the greater part of it

37.3. he pacified within that same year. For he employed both a great armament, of fleet and of men-at-arms, so as to be irresistible both on sea and on land, and great kindness toward those who came to terms with him, so that by

37.4. this means too he won over very many; for men, both overcome by his forces and experiencing his clemency, came over to him most readily. For he took care of them in other ways, and that they might never again be driven by poverty to the necessity of evil deeds, he gave them whatever lands he saw to be deserted, and whatever cities

37.5. needed settlers, he gave. From this many other cities arose, and that

37.6. called Pompeiopolis; it is in maritime Cilicia, and had been sacked by Tigranes — it was formerly named Soli.

38.1. In the consulship of Acilius and Piso, then, these things came to pass thus; and against those convicted of bribery in connection with the offices a law was enacted by the consuls themselves, that no such man should hold office or sit in the senate, but should moreover incur a money fine.

38.2. For since the power of the tribunes had been restored to its ancient state, and many of those who had been struck from the lists by the censors were eager in some way to regain their senatorial standing, factions and canvassings without number were arising over all the

38.3. offices. The consuls did this, not because they were displeased at the practice (for they themselves had been elected by means of much canvassing, and Piso indeed, indicted for it, had bought himself off from prosecution both at the hands of one man and of another),

38.4. but because they were compelled by the senate. The cause was that a certain Gaius Cornelius, as tribune, attempted to impose the most bitter penalties against such men, and the multitude was for adopting them. For the senate, perceiving that the excessive severity of the penalties carried, in its threats, a certain terror, but did not easily find either accusers or men to vote for the conviction of the guilty, inasmuch as the punishments were

38.5. irremediable, whereas a moderate penalty both brings many to accusation and does not deter from convictions, ordered the consuls to recast his proposal in some fashion and to enact it themselves.

39.1. But since the elections had been already proclaimed, and on this account it was not permitted to pass any new law before them, and the office-seekers were doing many evil things in this interval, so that even murders occurred, they voted that the law be brought in even before the elections, and that a guard be given

39.2. to the consuls. Indignant at this, then, Cornelius framed a motion that the senators be not permitted either to grant office to anyone who sought it outside the laws or to decree anything else of what belonged to the people; for this had been enacted from very ancient times, but was not in

39.3. practice observed. Much uproar having arisen over it (for many of the senate, and Piso among them, opposed it), the crowd broke his fasces and attempted to tear him in pieces.

39.4. Seeing their onset, then, Cornelius at that time, before any vote was taken, dismissed the assembly; but later he added to the law a clause that the senate should in every case deliberate beforehand concerning such matters, and that the

40.1. people should of necessity ratify the preliminary decree. And thus he carried that measure into law, and another of the following kind. The praetors all used to draw up and publish the rules of law according to which they intended to give judgment; for not yet had all the principles concerning contracts been

40.2. ordained. Since, then, they neither did this once for all nor kept to what they had written, but often altered it, and many things in the process were done, as was likely, by way of favour or of enmity toward certain persons, he proposed that they should from the very outset of their term announce the rules of law they would use, and depart in nothing

40.3. from them. And in general the Romans at that period became so careful that nothing should be done by bribery that, besides punishing those convicted, they even honoured those who accused them. At all events, when Marcus Cotta dismissed his quaestor Publius Oppius on charges both of taking bribes and of suspicion of conspiracy, while he himself had made much money out of Bithynia, they exalted with consular honours Gaius Carbo, who had accused him, though he had been only a tribune. And this man, having afterward himself governed Bithynia and offended

40.4. no more moderately than Cotta, was in turn accused by Cotta's son and

40.5. convicted; for it is far easier for men to censure others than to admonish themselves, and they most readily do the very things for which they think their neighbours deserve punishment — so that no credit is to be gained from the accusations they bring against others, on the ground that they hate such conduct.

41.1. Lucius Lucullus completed his praetorship at home, but, when after it the lot assigned him the governorship of Sardinia, he would not take it, hating the business on account of the many who did nothing sound in the provinces. That he was a fair-minded man he showed most amply;

41.2. for when Acilius ordered the chair on which he gave judgment to be broken in pieces, because Lucullus, seeing him pass by on one occasion, had not risen, he showed no anger, and thereafter both he and his colleagues, on his account, gave judgment standing.

42.1. Roscius, then, brought in a law, and so did Gaius Manilius, when he was tribune. But the former — for he carefully marked off the seats of the knights in the theatres from those of the rest —

42.2. won praise for it, whereas Manilius nearly underwent a trial; for to the order of freedmen, on the last day of the year and toward evening, having got ready certain men out of the crowd, he gave the right to vote together with those who had

42.3. emancipated them. But when the senate, the very next day, on the first of the month on which Lucius Tullius and Aemilius Lepidus began their consulship, annulled his law, then, in fear — since the multitude was terribly indignant — he at first referred the proposal to Crassus and certain others;

42.4. but as no one believed him, he flattered Pompey, absent though he was, especially because he perceived that Gabinius had the greatest influence with him; and so he assigned to Pompey at once the war against Tigranes and that against Mithridates, and the command of Bithynia and Cilicia.

43.1. For indignation and opposition did then too arise on the part of the men of power, both for other reasons and because Marcius and Acilius were being superseded before the time of their command had expired;

43.2. but the multitude, although a little before it had sent the men who were to settle the conquered territory, on the ground that the war had been brought to an end, as appeared from what Lucullus had reported to them, nevertheless voted these measures, being urged on most strongly by Caesar and by Marcus Cicero.

43.3. For these men supported the proposals, not because they thought them advantageous to the city, nor because they wished to gratify Pompey; but since the thing was bound to come to pass in any case, Caesar at once both courted the crowd, seeing how much more powerful they were than the senate,

43.4. and prepared the way for some like measure to be voted to himself at some time, and in this way wished also to make Pompey both more an object of envy and more burdensome by reason of the gifts bestowed on him, so that men might the sooner have their fill of him; while Cicero claimed the right to direct public affairs, and was showing both to the multitude and to the men of power that, to whichever of the two parties he should attach himself, he would assuredly

43.5. increase their strength. For he played a double part and at one time supported the cause of these, at another that of those, in order that he might be courted by both. At any rate, having earlier declared that he preferred the better sort, and for this reason having wished to be aedile rather than tribune, he then went over to the

44.1. rabble. And after this, when a certain prosecution had been prepared against Manilius by the men of power, and Manilius was eager to introduce some delay into it, Cicero both took other measures against him, and with difficulty (for he was praetor and held the presidency of the court) put him off to the next day, making as his pretext that the year was at its close.

44.2. And when the multitude was vexed at this, he went into their assembly, constrained, forsooth, by the tribunes, and inveighed against the senate and promised to plead on Manilius' behalf. Whereupon he was both ill spoken of in other respects and called a turncoat; but a certain disturbance, arising immediately, prevented the court from being convened.

44.3. For Publius Paetus and Cornelius Sulla, the nephew of the famous Sulla, having been declared consuls and then convicted of bribery, plotted to kill the men who had accused them, Lucius Cotta and Lucius Torquatus, especially since these had been chosen consuls in their

44.4. stead. And there were prepared, among others, Gnaeus Piso and Lucius Catiline, a most reckless man (he too had sought the office, and on that account was enraged); yet they were unable to accomplish anything, because the plot was disclosed beforehand and a guard was given to Cotta and Torquatus by the senate;

44.5. . . . a decree would have been passed against them, had not one of the tribunes opposed it. But since even so Piso continued to be reckless, the senate, fearing that he might throw matters into confusion, sent him at once to Spain, on the pretext of some office. And there he was slain by the natives, having done

45.1. them some wrong. Pompey, meanwhile, was at first making ready to sail to Crete and Metellus; but on learning of the decrees, he pretended, as before, to be displeased, and reproached his opponents with always causing him trouble, in order that he might suffer some reverse,

45.2. while in fact most gladly accepting these commissions, he now reckoned Crete and the rest of the affairs at sea, if anything anywhere had been left unsettled, as nothing, and made ready for the war against the barbarians. And in this connection, wishing to test the mind of Mithridates, he sends Metrophanes

45.3. bearing friendly words to him. And Mithridates at the moment made light of him (for, Arsaces the king of the Parthians having died at this time, he expected to win over his successor Phraates as a friend); but when Pompey quickly made friendship with Phraates on the same terms, and persuaded him to invade beforehand the Armenia of Tigranes, then, learning this, Mithridates took alarm, and sending envoys at once

45.4. set about a settlement. But when Pompey bade him lay down his arms and surrender the deserters, he had no opportunity to deliberate; for when those in his camp heard this, the deserters (and they were many), fearing they would be surrendered, and the barbarians, fearing they would be compelled to wage war without them, raised an uproar.

45.5. And they would have done Mithridates some violence, had he not, by falsely declaring that he had sent the envoys not for a treaty but to spy out the preparations of the Romans, with difficulty restrained them.

46.1. Pompey, then, when he had resolved that he must make war, made his other preparations and enrolled in addition the Valerians. And while he was already in Galatia, Lucullus met him and said that the whole war had been brought to an end and that there was no further need of a campaign, and that for this reason the men sent by the senate to administer the conquered lands

46.2. were already present. But when Pompey was not persuaded to turn back, Lucullus betook himself to abuse, calling him, among other things, meddlesome and fond of war and grasping after power. Pompey, then, taking little thought of him, forbade anyone any longer to obey him, and hastened against Mithridates, eager to come to grips with him as quickly as possible.

47.1. And Mithridates for a while kept fleeing (for he was inferior in forces), and continually laid waste the country in front, and at the same time led Pompey astray and made him short of provisions; but when Pompey, both on this account and as intending to take it while undefended, invaded Armenia,

47.2. then, fearing he should be forestalled, Mithridates came into it too, and seizing in turn a strong hill, with his whole army he kept quiet, hoping to wear out the Romans by lack of food (for he himself, being in subject territory, had it in abundance from many quarters), while continually sending some of his horsemen down into the plain, which was open ground, he harassed those who came in their way, and on this account received many deserters.

47.3. Pompey, then, did not venture to engage them there, but having shifted his camp to another place, whence, the surrounding country being wooded, he was likely to suffer less from the enemy's cavalry and archery,

47.4. he laid ambushes where there was occasion, and engaging the barbarians' camp openly with a few men, he threw them into confusion, and drawing them on to the spot he wished, he killed many. Taking courage from this, he sent men in different directions throughout the country to gather provisions.

48.1. Mithridates, then, since these things were being procured for him in safety, and since he had subdued, through certain agents, the district of Anaitis, which belonged to Armenia and was dedicated to a goddess of like name,

48.2. and since after this many others inclined toward him, and the soldiers of Marcius too joined him, took alarm and no longer remained where he was, but at once arose by night and escaped notice, and thereafter, marching by night,

48.3. advanced toward the Armenia of Tigranes. And Pompey followed after him, eager to come to battle; yet he did not venture to do this beforehand, neither by day (for they would not come out of their camp) nor by night (for he feared his ignorance of the country), until they were near the frontier; for then, knowing that they were about to escape, he was compelled to fight by night.

48.4. Learning this, then, he set out beforehand, unobserved by the barbarians as they took their midday rest, by the way they were going to march; and coming upon a hollow place between certain hills, there he led his army up onto the heights

48.5. and awaited the enemy. And when they, in security and without an advance guard — inasmuch as they had suffered nothing dreadful before, and were now already advancing into safety, so that they did not even expect the Romans still to follow them — entered the hollow, he fell upon them in the darkness; for they had no other light, nor did any shine from the sky.

49.1. The battle was on this wise. First, all the trumpeters together, at a signal, sounded the war-note; then the soldiers and all the rest of the throng raised the war-cry, and some clashed their spears against their shields, and others struck stones against

49.2. their bronze vessels. And the hills, being hollow, both received and gave back the sound most fearfully, so that the barbarians, hearing it suddenly in the night and in the wilderness, were terribly dismayed, as though they had been stricken by some

49.3. supernatural visitation. And meanwhile the Romans, casting from the heights on every side stones and arrows and javelins, by reason of their multitude in any case wounded some of them and reduced them to utter wretchedness; for, being equipped not for a pitched battle but for the march, and with men and women alike moving about among the horses and the camels and gear of every kind,

49.4. and some riding on swift coursers, others borne pell-mell upon chariots and covered wagons and carriages, and some already wounded, others expecting to be wounded, they were thrown into confusion, and thereby, since they pressed against one another, were the more easily destroyed.

49.5. And these things they suffered while they were struck from afar; but when the Romans, having expended their power at long range, charged down upon them, the outermost were slain (and a single blow sufficed to kill them, since most were light-armed), while the centre was crushed together, all crowding toward it through fear of the encircling foe.

49.6. And so, thrust and trampled by one another, they perished, and they could neither help themselves nor take any bold action against the enemy; for being for the most part horsemen and archers, they were at a loss to see anything in the darkness, and at a loss to contrive anything in the narrow space. But when the moon rose, they rejoiced, as though they would in the light assuredly

49.7. ward off some of the foe. And they would have been helped somewhat, had not the Romans, keeping the moon behind them, caused them much wandering, falling now here, now there, and bred error both in their sight and in their action. For being very many and all together casting a very deep shadow, they deceived them, while as yet

49.8. they had not come to close quarters; for the barbarians struck in vain at the empty air, as though the foe were near them, and when they did come to grips, in the shadow, they were wounded unawares. And thus many of them died, and no fewer were taken captive. Many also escaped, and among them Mithridates.

50.1. And for the time he hastened toward Tigranes; but when, on sending ahead to him, he found nothing friendly — because, Tigranes' son having risen in revolt against him, the father suspected that he, being the boy's grandfather, had been the cause of the quarrel, and on this account not only did not receive him, but even seized and bound the men sent on ahead by him — Mithridates, balked of his hope,

50.2. turned aside into Colchis, and thence on foot, partly by persuasion and partly by force, made his way to the Maeotis and the Bosporus, and recovered the country, having so terrified Machares his son, who had taken the side of the Romans and was then holding it, that he would not even come into his sight; and Machares, through Mithridates' agents who promised him both impunity and money, he put to death.

50.3. While these things were happening, Pompey sent men to pursue him, but when Mithridates had got the start by escaping beyond the Phasis, Pompey founded a city in the place where he had conquered, giving it to the wounded and the older among his soldiers. And many of the neighbouring people of their own accord settled with them, and they exist even now, named Nicopolitans and reckoned in the Cappadocian district.

51.1. So Pompey was doing this; but Tigranes the son of Tigranes, taking with him certain of the foremost men, since the old king ruled not to their liking, fled for refuge to Phraates, and persuaded him, who was looking about, on account of the agreements made with Pompey, as to what he ought to do, to invade

51.2. Armenia. And they advanced as far as Artaxata, subduing all in their path, and assaulted Artaxata itself; for Tigranes the elder, in fear of them, had fled to the mountains. But when it appeared that time would be needed for the siege, and for this reason Phraates, leaving a part of his force to his son, withdrew to his own country, the father came out in turn against him,

51.3. now left alone, and conquered him. So the son fled, and at first set out toward Mithridates his grandfather, but when he learned that he had been defeated and was in more need of aid than able to succour anyone, he went over to the Romans; and Pompey, using him as a guide, marched into Armenia against his father.

52.1. And the father, learning this and taking alarm, at once sent a herald to Pompey and gave up the envoys of Mithridates. And since, his son opposing him, he obtained no moderate terms, but even so Pompey crossed the Araxes and drew near to

52.2. Artaxata, then at length he surrendered the city to him and came of his own accord into his camp, having arrayed himself as much as possible midway between his former dignity and his present lowliness, so that he might appear to Pompey worthy at once of

52.3. respect and of pity; for he had taken off the tunic with the white stripe and the all-purple mantle, but wore the tiara and the diadem. Pompey, however, caused him to dismount from his horse, sending a lictor (for Tigranes was riding up as though intending to ride into the very entrenchment after his own custom); and when he came in on foot and threw away his diadem and fell to the ground and did obeisance,

52.4. Pompey, seeing this, took pity on him, and springing up raised him to his feet, and binding the diadem about his head set him in the seat near at hand and comforted him, saying, among other things, that he had not lost the kingdom of Armenia but had gained in addition the friendship of the Romans. And so Pompey both restored him and

53.1. invited him to dinner; but the son (who was seated on the other side of Pompey) neither rose for his father nor gave him any greeting, but, though invited to the dinner, did not come. Whence he was especially hated by Pompey.

53.2. On the next day, at all events, having given audience to them, Pompey restored to the elder his whole ancestral realm; but the acquisitions made by him (and these were, among others, parts of Cappadocia and of Syria, and Phoenicia, and the country of Sophene, no small region bordering on the Armenians) he took away from him, and besides demanded money of him; while to the younger

53.3. he assigned Sophene alone. And since the treasures happened to be in it, the young man disputed about them, and failing of his claim (for Pompey had no other source from which to obtain what had been agreed upon), he was indignant and planned flight. Pompey, then, learning this beforehand, placed him under guard without fetters, and sending to those who guarded the treasures, ordered them to give all to his father.

53.4. And when they did not obey, saying that the young man, to whom the country was now reckoned to belong, ought to give them this command, Pompey sent him to the strongholds. And he, finding them shut, came up close and ordered them to be opened even against their will; but when they obeyed no more than before, alleging that he gave the command not willingly but under compulsion, Pompey grew angry and put Tigranes in bonds.

53.5. And thus the old king received the treasures, and Pompey himself, dividing his army into three parts, wintered in the country of Anaitis and by the river Cyrnus, having received from Tigranes many other things and much more money than

53.6. had been agreed upon. For which reason, not least, he not long afterward enrolled Tigranes too among his friends and allies, and brought his son to Rome under guard.

54.1. He did not, however, pass the winter in quiet. For Oroeses, king of the Albanians who dwell above the Cyrnus, partly wishing to do a favour to the younger Tigranes, who was a friend of his, but most of all fearing that the Romans would invade Albania, and thinking that, if in the winter he should fall upon them when they were off their guard and not encamped in one place, he would assuredly accomplish something, made an expedition against them at the very time of the Saturnalia,

54.2. and himself marched against Metellus Celer, with whom Tigranes was, while he sent others against Pompey and others against Lucius Flaccus, the commander of the third division, so that all, being thrown into confusion at once,

54.3. might not aid one another. He accomplished nothing, however, anywhere; for Celer vigorously repulsed him, and Flaccus, since by reason of its great extent he was unable to defend the long circuit of his trench, made another within, and giving the enemy the impression thereby that he had charged in fear, drew them

54.4. inside the outer trench, and there, charging out upon them when they did not expect it, slew many in hand-to-hand fight and many also as they fled. Meanwhile Pompey, learning beforehand of the attempt of the barbarians which they had made upon the others, went out to meet those advancing against himself, unexpectedly, and having overcome them hastened straightway, just as he was, against Oroeses. Him he did not overtake (for, repulsed by Celer and learning the disasters of the others as well,

54.5. he had fled); but of the Albanians he caught and destroyed a great number about the crossing of the Cyrnus. And after this, when they begged for terms, he made a truce with them; for though he greatly desired to invade their country in turn, yet on account of the winter he gladly deferred the war.