Book 17

arg. The following is contained in the fifty-second book of Dio's Roman History. 1. How Caesar deliberated about laying down the monarchy. 2. How he began to be called Imperator. Length of time: the remainder of the fifth consulship of Caesar and of Sextus Apuleius.

1.1. These, then, were the deeds and the sufferings of the Romans under the kingship, under the republic, and under the dynasts, throughout seven hundred and twenty-five years. After this they began once more to be ruled, strictly speaking, by a single man, although Caesar had deliberated whether to lay down his arms and entrust affairs to the senate and the people.

1.2. He made his decision after consulting with Agrippa and Maecenas, to whom he confided all his secrets; and Agrippa was the first to speak to him as follows:

2.1. 'Do not be surprised, Caesar, if I intend to dissuade you from the monarchy, even though I should reap many advantages from it were you to hold it. For if it were likely to prove of advantage to you as well, I should be very eager for it;

2.2. but since the position of monarchs and that of their friends is by no means the same — since they reap, without envy and without danger, all that they desire, whereas to their friends fall both envy and danger — I thought it right to look not to my own interest, as in all else, but to yours and the common good.

2.3. Let us, then, consider at our leisure all that belongs to monarchy, and wherever the reasoning leads us, thither let us turn; for surely no one will say that we must by all means choose it,

2.4. even if it be not profitable. Otherwise we shall seem either to have been overcome by our prosperity and driven out of our senses by our successes, or to have long aimed at it and to have made our father and our piety toward him a pretext, and to have put forward the people and the senate, not in order to free them from those who plotted against them, but in order

2.5. to enslave them to ourselves. Either charge is blameworthy. For who would not be indignant to see that we have said one thing and now perceives that we have purposed another? How could a man fail to hate us more now than if we had at the very outset laid bare our desire and gone straight for the monarchy?

2.6. For to dare some act of violence is held in a manner to belong to human nature, even if it seem grasping; for everyone who is superior in any respect claims to have more than his inferior, and if he succeeds in anything he ascribes it to the strength of his soul, and if he fails of anything he attributes it to the working

2.7. of the divine power. But he who does such a thing by treachery and villainy is first held to be crafty and crooked and ill-natured and ill-disposed — qualities which, I am well assured, you would suffer no one to attribute to you or to think of you, not even if by this you should rule the whole world; and then, if he succeeds, he is thought to have made his greed unjust, and if he fails, to have received

3.1. a just retribution for his ill-doing. This being so, no less would a man blame us if, having from the first conceived no such design, we should now come to desire it. For to be overcome by present circumstances, and neither to restrain oneself nor to make good use of fortune's gifts, is far

3.2. worse than to wrong someone out of distress; for men are often compelled by their very misfortunes, even against their will, to do wrong in the service of their need, but the others become of their own accord masters no longer of themselves and act contrary to their interest. And those who have neither any simplicity in their soul nor the power to use the goods given them with moderation — how could anyone expect them either to govern others well or to bear

3.3. their misfortunes rightly? Therefore, as men who have suffered from neither of these faults, and who desire to do nothing unreasonably, but to choose whatever shall appear best to us upon deliberation, let us make our decision concerning it. And I shall speak with frankness; for neither could I otherwise say anything, nor am I aware that you take pleasure in hearing falsehoods accompanied by flattery.

4.1. Now equality before the law has a name of good omen and a practice most just. For when men who have been allotted the same nature and are of the same race with one another, who have been reared in the same customs and educated under like laws,

4.2. and who offer to their country the common use of their bodies and their souls — how is it not just that they should share in all else besides, and how is it not best that they should in nothing be preferred save by virtue?

4.3. For equality of birth reaches out for equality of portion, and rejoices when it attains it, but is grieved when it fails of it. And all humankind, since it has sprung from gods and will return to gods, looks upward, and neither wishes to be ruled forever by the same person,

4.4. nor endures to share in the toils and dangers and expenditures while being deprived of fellowship in the better things; but even if it be compelled to submit to anything of the kind, it hates that to which it is forced, and, if it gets the chance, takes vengeance on what it has hated.

4.5. For all claim the right to rule, and on this account submit to be ruled in their turn; and they do not wish to be taken advantage of, and on this account are not themselves obliged to take advantage of others. They rejoice in the honours bestowed by their peers, and

4.6. approve the punishments imposed by the laws. And when they conduct their public life in this way, regarding the goods as common and the ills also as common, they neither wish any harm to befall any of the citizens, and join in praying that all the better things may come to them all.

4.7. And if a man himself possesses any virtue, he displays it readily and practises it zealously and exhibits it most gladly; and if he sees it in another, he both brings it forward willingly and joins in advancing it earnestly

4.8. and honours it most splendidly. And moreover, if anyone shows himself base, all hate him, and if he is unfortunate, all pity him, holding both the loss and the disgrace arising from these things to be common to the city.

5.1. This is the constitution of democracies; but in tyrannies all the opposite befalls. And why need I lengthen out the account by relating the many particulars? The sum of the matter is this: no one wishes to seem either to know or to possess anything good (for to him the ruling power becomes, in this regard, generally hostile);

5.2. but each man, having made the ruler's disposition the rule of his life, pursues whatever he hopes, by playing upon it, to gain to his profit without danger. And on this account the greater number of them strive only for their own advantage and hate all others, making the successes of others their own losses and the misfortunes of others their own gains.

5.3. Such being these matters, I do not see what could reasonably move you to desire to be a monarch. For besides that the system is hard upon the peoples, it would prove far more troublesome to yourself. Or do you not see how the city and its affairs

5.4. are even now disturbed? And it is hard to dissolve our populace, which has lived so many years in freedom, and hard too to reduce again to slavery our allies and subjects — some of them anciently free, some freed by ourselves — with so many enemies pressing upon us round about.

6.1. And to begin from the smallest matter first: you will of necessity have to provide much money, and from every quarter; for it is impossible that the present revenues should suffice both for other purposes and for the maintenance of the soldiers. This, indeed, is the case in democracies too; for no

6.2. polity can be maintained without expense. But in democracies, above all, many willingly contribute much, making the matter a point of honour and receiving in return honours worthy of it; and if anywhere necessary levies be made upon all, they submit, persuading themselves

6.3. and paying on their own behalf. But in dynasties all think that the ruling power alone, as being exceedingly rich, ought to bear the expense, eagerly inquiring into its revenues but no longer reckoning its outlays in the same way; and they neither give anything gladly or willingly in private, nor make

6.4. the public contributions of their own accord. For the one course no one would consent to (for he would not readily even admit that he is rich), nor does it profit the ruler that it should be so; for he would at once, gaining a reputation with the many for being a lover of his city, be puffed up and turn to revolution. And the other course is very burdensome to the many, and most of all because they themselves bear the loss while others

6.5. receive the gain. For in democracies, for the most part, those who pay the money also serve in the army, so that in a manner they get it back again; but in monarchies others, for the most part, farm and ply trades and sail the sea and engage in public life — those from whom the receipts chiefly come — while others bear the arms and draw the pay.

7.1. This one matter, then, being such, will give you trouble; and there is this other. By all means must the man who ever does wrong pay some penalty; for the many are made temperate neither by admonition nor by examples, but it is wholly necessary to punish them with disgrace and exile and death, such as is wont to happen in so great a dominion and among so vast a multitude of men, and especially in a change of polity.

7.2. If you set other judges over these men, they will be acquitted through cabal, and especially those whom you are thought to regard as enemies; for the judges assume a certain pretence of independence when they do anything contrary to the will of the ruler;

7.3. and if any are convicted, they will be thought to have been condemned through you, by contrivance. But if you judge in person, you will be compelled to punish many even of your peers (and this is no happy thing), and you will certainly be thought to be calling some of them to account from anger

7.4. rather than from justice; for no one believes that those who have the power to use force act justly when they sit in judgment, but all suppose that they spread before the truth, for shame's sake, a shape and shadow-painting of a constitution, satisfying their own desire under the lawful name of a court. So in monarchies these things

7.5. fall out thus; but in democracies, if anyone is charged with a private wrong, he stands a private trial before equal judges, and if a public one, judges sit for that case also, chosen from his equals by lot, so that men more easily bear the outcomes, thinking they have suffered nothing through the power of a judge or through constrained favour.

8.1. Furthermore, apart from those who do any wrong, many men, exalted some by birth, some by wealth, and some by something else, men not otherwise bad, are by their very disposition born opposed to monarchy; and a ruler can neither let them grow great and live in safety himself, nor again attempt to abase them

8.2. and do this justly. What, then, will you do with them? How will you handle them? For if you pull down their families and lessen their wealth and humble their spirits, you would gain no goodwill from your subjects; for how could you, if it were permitted to no one to be well-born or justly rich or strong or brave or wise?

8.3. But if you allow these things severally to increase, you would not easily manage them. For if you yourself alone sufficed to do both civic and military business well and at the right time, and had need of no helper for any of these matters,

8.4. it would be another story. But as it is, it is wholly necessary for you, as ruler of so great a world, to have many fellow-workers, and it is fitting, I suppose, that all of them be both brave and prudent. Now, if you entrust the armies and the offices to such men, there will be danger both to you and to the

8.5. state of being overthrown; for it is not possible either for a man worthy of note to be born without spirit, or for great spirit to be got from servile pursuits, nor yet for a man of spirit not to desire freedom and hate all that domineers over him.

8.6. But if you entrust nothing to these men, and assign affairs to the base and to chance persons, you would very quickly incur the anger of the former as men distrusted, and very quickly

8.7. come to grief in the greatest matters. For what good could an ignorant or low-born man do? Who of the enemy would not despise him? Who of the allies would obey him? Who even of the soldiers themselves would not think it unworthy to be ruled by such a man? And indeed, as for all the evils that naturally arise from this, the rest

8.8. I need not relate to you, who know them well; but this one thing I must of necessity say, that if such a man does nothing of what is needful, he would harm you far more than the enemy; and if he does any of what is fitting, he would himself become formidable to you, having through want of training been driven out of his senses.

9.1. Yet democracies have no such thing belonging to them; but the more men there are who are wealthy and brave, the more do they themselves contend in honour and increase the city, and the city both makes use of them and rejoices in them, save if anyone desire a tyranny; for him they punish severely.

9.2. And that this is so, and that democracies are far better than monarchies, the case of the Greeks shows: for so long as they had monarchies, they accomplished nothing great, but when they began to live in democratic fashion,

9.3. they became most renowned. The case of other men too shows it, of whom some, living even now under tyrannies, are forever in slavery and forever plot against their rulers, while others, employing annual or somewhat longer-term presidencies, continue both free and

9.4. self-governing. But why need we use foreign examples when we have our own? For we Romans ourselves, governing at first in another way, then, when we suffered many and grievous things, desired freedom, and having gained it

9.5. advanced to such greatness, made strong by no other things than the goods that come from democracy — whereby the senate deliberated beforehand and the people ratified, the soldiery was zealous and the commanders ambitious. None of these things could be done under a tyranny. And indeed, on this account the Romans of old had so great a hatred of it that they even made the office accursed.

10.1. And apart from these things, if anything must be said also about your own private interests, how could you endure to administer so many affairs both by day and by night, and how, if you were not in health, could you suffice? What of the human goods could you enjoy, and how, deprived of them, could you be happy? In what could you take pure delight, and when would you not

10.2. be grievously pained? For it is wholly necessary that he who holds so great a dominion should both care about many things and fear many, and enjoy least of the most pleasant things, while of the most disagreeable he must ever and everywhere hear and see and do and suffer. Wherefore, I think, both Greeks and some barbarians have refused kingdoms even when offered them.

10.3. Foreseeing these things, then, deliberate before you are involved in them; for it is shameful, or rather impossible, for one who has once stooped to enter them to come up again. And let neither the greatness of the power deceive you, nor the abundance of possessions, nor the throng of bodyguards, nor the crowd

10.4. of attendants. For those who have great power have many troubles, and those who have acquired much are compelled to spend much; the multitudes of guards are gathered because of the multitudes of plotters; and the flatterers would ruin a man sooner than save him. So that, for these reasons, no one in his right mind would desire to be sole ruler.

11.1. But if, because such men can enrich and preserve some, and do many other good things — and, by Zeus, because they may also insult and ill-treat whomever they wish — anyone for these reasons thinks tyranny worth striving for,

11.2. he errs altogether. That to be licentious and to do evil is neither honourable nor anything but perilous and hateful both to gods and to men, I need not tell you; for you are not otherwise such a man, nor would you for these reasons choose to be a monarch. And I have now resolved to speak not of all the evils that a man might work by mishandling the matter, but of those which even they who use it most excellently are compelled both

11.3. to do and to suffer. As for the other thing, the power to benefit men ungrudgingly, it is indeed worth striving for; but in a private person it is honourable and dignified and glorious and safe, whereas in monarchies, first of all, it does not counterbalance the rest, which are more outrageous, so as to make anyone for its sake choose those also — especially when he is destined to give to others the enjoyment of it

12.1. while himself bearing the unpleasantness from them; and then it is not even simple, as someone supposes. For one could not relieve all who are in need of anything. For those who claim to receive something from him are, one may say, all mankind, even though no benefaction be at once owed them;

12.2. for everyone by nature is pleased with himself and wishes to gain some good from one who can give. But what can be given them — I mean honours and offices, and sometimes money too — would be found very easily counted in proportion to so great a multitude. This being so, hatred would arise toward him from those who fail of what they need rather than friendship from those who succeed.

12.3. For the latter, receiving what they regard as their due, think they need not feel any great gratitude toward the giver, since they get nothing beyond their expectation, and moreover they shrink from showing it, lest they thereby declare themselves unworthy of the favour;

12.4. while those who fail of what they hope are grieved on two counts — both as being deprived of something of their own (for all already think they possess whatever they desire), and as themselves condemning themselves of some injustice, if they bear easily their failure to obtain

12.5. what they had expected. For he who gives such things rightly clearly looks above all to each man's desert, and honours some and overlooks others, so that from his judgment too there comes to some pride and to others indignation by reason of their own consciousness of themselves. So that if anyone, guarding against this, should wish to distribute them unequally,

12.6. he will err altogether; for the base, honoured beyond their desert, would become worse, thinking themselves either praised as good or at least courted as formidable, while the worthy, finding nothing more than they, but ranked on a level with them, would be grieved at their equality with such men rather than rejoice that they too are deemed worthy of something,

12.7. and from this they would abandon the pursuit of the better and take up the emulation of the worse; and thus, even from the honours themselves, neither would those who bestow them reap any good, and those who receive them would become worse. So that this very thing, which most of all might please some in monarchies, would prove for you most difficult to handle.

13.1. Considering these things, then, and all else that I said a little before, take thought while it is in your power, and restore to the people the arms, the provinces, the offices, and the money. For if you do it now and of your own will, you will at once be the most renowned of men and the most secure; but if you wait for some force to be brought against you, perhaps

13.2. you may suffer some dreadful thing along with ill repute. There is proof of this. Marius and Sulla and Metellus, and Pompey at first, when they had come into control of affairs, neither wished to hold sovereignty nor suffered any harm thereby; but Cinna and Strabo, the second Marius and Sertorius, and Pompey himself afterwards, when they desired the sovereignty,

13.3. perished miserably. For it is hard for this city, which has been a democracy for so many years and rules over so many men, to be willing to be a slave to anyone. You hear that they banished Camillus because he used white horses

13.4. for his triumph, you hear that they brought down Scipio when they condemned some grasping conduct of his, and you remember how they treated your father when they conceived some suspicion of monarchy against him. And yet no other men have been better than these.

13.5. Yet I do not advise you thus simply to lay down the office, but first to carry through all that is profitable to the state and to fix in decrees and laws what is fitting, just as Sulla did; for even if some of his enactments were afterwards overturned, yet the more numerous and greater remain.

13.6. And do not say that even so some will raise faction, lest I in turn say that far more would they refuse to be ruled by a monarch. For if we should consider all that can possibly befall men, most unreasonably should we fear the dissensions that arise from democracy rather than the tyrannies that grow

13.7. out of monarchy — of whose dreadfulness I have not even attempted to speak; for I did not wish merely to run down a thing so easy to accuse, but to show you this, that it is by nature such that not even good men . . .'

14.1. (' . . . nor are they able through their frankness easily to persuade men unlike themselves of anything,) and in their actions, since they are not of one mind, they fail to succeed. So that if you have any care for your country, on whose behalf you have waged so many wars, for which you would gladly give even your life, reform it and order it

14.2. toward greater temperance. For that it should be permitted to men simply to do and say all they wish, if you examine it in the case of the prudent, becomes for all a cause of happiness, but in the case of the foolish, of disaster. And on this account, he who gives such power to fools holds out a sword, as it were, to a child and a madman, while he who gives it to the wise preserves both all else and these very men, even against their will.

14.3. Wherefore I ask you also not to be deceived by looking to the fair sound of names, but, considering what comes of them, both to put a stop to the boldness of the populace and to commit the administration of the commonwealth to yourself and the other best men, in order that the most prudent may deliberate, the most skilled in war may command, and the strongest and the poorest may serve in arms and draw pay.

14.4. For so each man, doing his appointed task zealously and readily rendering benefits to one another, will neither perceive the inferiorities in which they fall short of others, and will gain the true democracy and the

14.5. secure freedom; for that freedom of the mob becomes most bitter slavery to the best men and brings common ruin to both, whereas this, everywhere preferring moderation and apportioning equality to all according to desert, makes alike happy all who use it.'

15.1. 'Do not, indeed, suppose that I am advising you to play the tyrant, having enslaved the people and the senate. For this neither would I ever venture to say nor you to do; but the following would be both honourable and useful both to you and to the city: that you yourself, with the best men, should make all the fitting laws, no one of the many either gainsaying or opposing them,

15.2. and that the wars should be conducted according to your will, all the rest at once doing what is commanded, and that the choice of magistrates should rest with you, and that you should fix the honours and the punishments, in order that whatever upon deliberation pleases you and your peers may forthwith be law,

15.3. and that the enemy may be warred upon secretly and at the right moment, and that those entrusted with anything may be appointed for their virtue and not by lot and intrigue, and that the good may be honoured without envy, and the

15.4. bad punished without faction. For thus most of all would affairs be rightly administered, neither referred to the public assembly nor deliberated in the open nor entrusted to packed crowds nor risked through ambition; and we should enjoy in peace the goods we have, making neither dangerous wars nor

15.5. unholy factions. For these things every democracy has; for the more powerful, reaching out for the first places and hiring the weaker, throw everything into confusion; and most of all have they done so among us, and there is no way

15.6. in which it will otherwise cease. There is proof of this: for very long now we have both waged war and raised faction. And the cause is the multitude of men and the greatness of our affairs; for those men, being of all sorts both in their races and their natures, have varied also their tempers and desires, and these matters have advanced so far as to be very hard to administer.'

16.1. 'And that what I say is true, the things that have happened bear witness. For so long as we were neither numerous nor differed much from our neighbours, we both governed well and subdued well-nigh all of Italy;

16.2. but from the time when we were led beyond it, and crossed over to many of the continents and islands, and filled all the sea and all the land with our name and our power, we have shared in nothing good, but first at home and within the wall we raised faction in cliques, and then we carried this disease into the camps as well.

16.3. And on this account our city, like a great merchantman full of a crew of every sort without a steersman, has now for many generations, borne along amid a great surge, tossed and darted hither and thither, as though without ballast. Do not, then,

16.4. look on while it is still storm-tossed — for you see how it is awash — nor let it be shattered upon a reef, for it is rotten and will no longer be able to hold out any time; but since the gods, taking pity on it, have set you over it as arbiter and master, do not betray your country, that, as now through you it has breathed again a little, so for all the time to come it may pass its life in safety.'

17.1. 'That I advise you rightly, then, in thinking the people should be ruled by a monarch, I believe you have long been persuaded; and this being so, undertake its leadership both readily and zealously, or rather do not let it go. For we are not deliberating about acquiring something, but about not losing it, and over and above this about

17.2. incurring danger. For who will spare you, whether you push affairs upon the people or entrust them to anyone else, seeing that there are very many who have been injured by you, and that all, one may say, will lay claim to the monarchy — none of whom will wish either not to take vengeance on you for what you have done, or to leave a rival

17.3. behind? There is proof of this: Pompey too, when he resigned his power, was both despised and plotted against, and, being thereafter unable to recover it, was destroyed; and Caesar your father, having done this same thing, perished besides. Marius and Sulla too would assuredly have suffered the like, had they not died first.

17.4. And yet some say that Sulla, fearing this very thing, made haste to make away with himself; at any rate many of his enactments began to be undone while he was still alive. So you too must expect that there will arise for you many a Lepidus, many a Sertorius, Brutus, and Cassius.'

18.1. 'Seeing these things, then, and reckoning up all else, do not betray both yourself and your country, lest you seem to some to have voluntarily let slip the rule. For first, even if anyone suspect this, the desire is not foreign to human nature, and its danger is honourable; and then, who does not know the necessity by which you were led into these

18.2. affairs? So that if there be any blame in it, one would most justly lay it upon your father's assassins; for if they had not so unjustly and pitiably slain him, you would neither have taken up arms, nor gathered armies, nor made compact with Antony and Lepidus, nor taken vengeance on those very men.

18.3. And that you did all this rightly and justly, no one is ignorant; but if anything has been amiss, yet we cannot now safely change it. Wherefore, for our own sake and for the city's, let us yield to the fortune which gives you the monarchy.

18.4. And let us be very grateful to it, that it has not only freed us from the evils of civil strife, but has also placed the ordering of the commonwealth in your hands, that, caring for it as is fitting, you may show to all mankind that others both disturbed and wronged it, but that you are a good man.'

18.5. 'And do not, I pray, fear the greatness of the dominion. For the greater it is, the more does it have that preserves it, and it is far easier to guard a thing than to acquire it; for to win another's possessions there is need of toils and dangers, but to preserve what one has a little care

18.6. suffices. And do not even fear that you will not live most safely in it and enjoy all the goods that are among men, if you are willing to administer it as I shall advise you. And do not think that I am leading my discourse away from the present subject, if I converse with you about it at greater length;

18.7. for I shall not do this idly out of any garrulity, but in order that you may learn exactly that it is both possible and easy for a man of sense to rule both honourably and without danger.'

19.1. 'I say, then, that you should first of all sift and sort the whole senatorial body, since certain men not fit for it have become senators by reason of the factions, and retain those of them who have any virtue, but strike out the rest.

19.2. Do not, however, dismiss a man who is good merely because of poverty, but give him also the necessary money. And in place of the others bring in the noblest and best and wealthiest, choosing them not only from Italy but from among the allies and

19.3. subjects as well; for thus you will both have many fellow-workers and have the foremost men from all the nations in safe keeping, and those regions will raise no revolution, having no man of note for a leader, and their chief men will love you, as having become partners with you in the rule.

19.4. Do these same things in the case of the knights also. For enroll in the equestrian order those who in each place hold the second rank in birth and virtue and wealth, entering as many of each class as please you, troubling yourself not at all about their number; for the more men of repute there are with you, the more easily will you yourself

19.5. administer all things at need, and the more will you persuade your subjects that you treat them neither as slaves nor as in any way inferior to us, but that you share with them all the other goods that we have, and the leadership itself, that they may strive for it as their own.

19.6. And so far am I from retracting this as not rightly said, that I declare that a share in the citizenship too should be given to them all, that, having an equal portion in this also, they may be faithful allies to us, dwelling as it were in some one city of ours, and regarding this as truly a city and their own districts as fields and villages. But concerning this matter we shall consider more exactly hereafter what should be done, that we may not bestow all things

20.1. at once upon them. As for enrolment, men should be enrolled in the equestrian order at eighteen, for at this age the vigour of the body and the fitness of the soul best show themselves; but in the senate at twenty-five. For how is it not shameful and perilous that private affairs should be entrusted to no one before this age, but public affairs put into the hands of some who are younger?

20.2. Let them, after holding the quaestorship and the aedileship or the tribunate, become praetors when they are thirty years old. And these offices, and those of the consuls alone, I say you should appoint at home, both for the sake of the memory of ancestral usages and so as not to seem to be changing the constitution altogether.

20.3. Yet do you yourself choose them all, and entrust the choice of any of them no longer either to the populace or to the people, for they will raise faction, nor to the senate, for they will intrigue. But do not preserve their ancient powers, that the same things may not happen again, but keep their dignity while taking from their strength so much as will neither detract from their rank nor permit those who wish to make revolution

20.4. to do so. This will be the case if, among other things, you keep them at home, and entrust arms to none of them during their term of office, nor immediately, but only after an interval of time, such as you may think sufficient for each. For thus none of them will make revolution, becoming masters of armies in the pride of their titles, and, having for a time been private citizens, they will have grown mild.

20.5. And let these men celebrate the festivals — those at least to whom they belong — and let them all severally judge the suits, save those of murder, during their term of office at home; for though courts should be gathered also from the other senators and the knights, yet on the whole the matter should rest with these magistrates.

21.1. Let some Prefect of the City be appointed from the leading men and from those who have already passed through all the fitting offices, not that he may rule when the consuls are away somewhere,

21.2. but that he may both have continual charge of the city in all else, and may judge the suits — appeals and references — from all the magistrates I have named, and the capital cases both of those in the city, save such as I shall specify, and of those dwelling outside it up to a distance of seven hundred and fifty stades.

21.3. And let another be chosen from the like men, to examine and oversee the families and the property and the characters both of the senators and of the knights, of men and likewise of children and of the women belonging to

21.4. them, and to correct himself such matters as deserve no punishment but, if overlooked, become the cause of many great evils, but to refer the greater to you. For this charge should be laid upon some senator, and that the best after the prefect of the city, rather than upon one of the knights.

21.5. And the title he might fittingly take from your own censorship (for by all means it is proper that you should preside over the assessments), so as to be called sub-censor. Let these two hold office for life, unless one of them in some way prove base, or become sickly, or exceedingly

21.6. old. For from their long tenure no danger could arise, since the one is wholly unarmed, and the other has few soldiers and rules for the most part under your own

21.7. eyes; whereas from an annual office they would shrink from offending anyone and would fear to act vigorously, foreseeing both their own return to private life and the dominance of certain others. And let them draw some salary, both for their occupation and for their dignity.'

21.8. 'Concerning these matters, then, I give you this opinion. Let those who have been praetors hold some office among the subjects (for before they have been praetors I do not think this should be done; let them serve as lieutenants to those I shall name, once and a second time), then let them be consuls, if they have governed rightly, and after this let them receive the greater

22.1. commands. For thus I advise you to arrange matters. All Italy that is beyond seven hundred and fifty stades from the city, and all else, both the islands and the parts on the continents that are in accord with us, divide everywhere by races and nations, and let all the cities — as many as it is sufficient that one independent man should govern —

22.2. and establish soldiers there, and send out as governors over each district one man from those who have been consuls, set over all, and two from those who have been praetors: the one just coming out of the city, to whom let the private business and the provision of supplies be assigned, and the other from those who have already done this, who shall administer the common affairs of the cities and command the soldiers,

22.3. save such matters as involve disgrace or death. For these let be referred to the consular governor alone, except in the case of the centurions on the rolls and of the foremost private persons among each people; for the punishing of both these classes entrust to no one else, that they may not so fear any of them

22.4. as ever to do anything against you. And what I said, that the one of the ex-praetors should be set over the soldiers, is to be understood thus. If but a few are serving in foreign garrisons, or in a single citizen legion, it is well that this should be done; but if two citizen legions winter in the same province (and more than these I would not advise you to entrust to the same commander),

22.5. it will be necessary, I suppose, that the two ex-praetors should preside over those also, each over one, and over the rest, both the public and the private affairs alike. And let the consular man judge these matters . . . and besides the appeals and references coming to him from the praetors.

22.6. And do not be surprised that I advise you to divide Italy too into such parts; for being large and populous, it cannot be well administered by the magistrates in the capital. For the governor must always be present to the peoples, and to the magistrates only possible duties must be assigned.'

23.1. 'Let all these men who are entrusted with offices outside the city draw a salary — the higher officials more, the lower less, and the middling a middle amount; for it is neither possible for them to live abroad from their own resources, nor right to leave them to an indefinite and

23.2. unregulated expenditure, as now. And let them hold office neither less than three years, unless one commit some wrong, nor more than five — the one because annual and short-lived offices dismiss men just when they have learned what is needful, before anything of theirs has been shown forth; the other because longer and more lasting ones somehow exalt many and lead them out

23.3. into revolution. Wherefore I think the greater commands should not be given to the same men in immediate succession. For it makes no difference whether they rule in the same province or in several, in succession, longer than is needful; and men become better when they have left an interval of time and returned home and lived as private persons. The senators, then, I say should manage these matters and in this way;

24.1. but of the knights let the two best command the guard about you; for to entrust it to one man is perilous, and to

24.2. more is fraught with disorder. Let these prefects, then, be two, in order that, if one of them be ill in body, you may not be in want of a protector; and let them be appointed from men who have served often in the army and managed many other affairs as well.

24.3. Let them command the guardsmen and all the rest of the soldiers in Italy, so as even to put to death those of them who do wrong, save the centurions and the others assigned to the governors drawn from the senate.

24.4. For these let those very governors judge, that they may be able to use them without excuse, having the power both to punish and to honour them; but over the rest of the soldiers in Italy let those prefects preside, having deputies, and besides over the Caesarians who are in your service and over the others

24.5. of any account. For this will be both fitting and sufficient for them to manage, that they may not, being charged with more business than they can well bear, become too busy for necessary matters, or even unable to preside over all of them.

24.6. And let these men hold office for life, as also do the prefect of the city and the sub-censor. And let a night-watchman be appointed, and another over the corn-supply and the rest of the market, from the foremost of the knights after those others, and for a fixed term, like those advanced from the

25.1. senate. The administration of the moneys — both those of the people and those of the empire, I mean — both in Rome and the rest of Italy and all those

25.2. abroad, let the knights manage; and let these and all the others of the same order who administer anything draw a salary, some more, some less, according to their dignity and to the magnitude of their

25.3. task — partly because it is not possible for them, being poorer than the senators, to spend from their own means, even when doing business in Rome, and partly because it is neither possible nor profitable for you that the same men should be masters of both the forces and the moneys.

25.4. And besides, it is well that all the affairs of the empire should be managed through many hands, in order that many may at the same time be benefited and become experienced in business; for thus your subjects will be the more well-disposed toward you, enjoying a manifold share in the common goods, and you will most abundantly employ the best men for all necessary purposes.

25.5. And it is sufficient that in the city there be one man of the knights for each kind of business, and abroad one for each province, having under him as many subordinates as the need requires, drawn from the knights and from your freedmen; for one must yoke such men also with them, that your service may have some prize of virtue, and that you may not be at a loss for those from whom, even against their will, you can learn the truth, if anything be amiss.

25.6. And whoever of the knights, having passed through many offices, becomes of repute enough to be a senator, let his age be no hindrance to his being enrolled in the senate, but let men be enrolled even from their ranks, and even if some have been centurions in the citizen legions, save those who have served

25.7. in the ranks. For of these men, who have carried baskets and bundles of fuel, it is both shameful and a reproach that any should be reckoned among the senators; but from those who from the first held centurionships, nothing prevents the most reputable from having a share in it.'

26.1. 'Concerning the senators and the knights, then, this is the advice I can give you; and, by Zeus, this too, that while they are still children they should attend the schools together, and when they pass into youth they should turn to the horses and to arms, having for both salaried public

26.2. teachers. For thus, from boyhood, having learned and practised all that they will have to accomplish when they become men, they will be the more serviceable to you for every task. For the best ruler, and one who is of any use, must not only do himself all that is fitting, but also take forethought for the rest, that they may become as good

26.3. as possible. And this you can do, not by allowing them to do as they wish and then rebuking the offenders, but by teaching them beforehand, before any wrong is done, all that they may practise to be more useful both to themselves and to you, and by giving no one whatsoever any pretext —

26.4. whether through wealth or birth or anything else connected with virtue — to feign idleness or softness or some counterfeit pursuit. For many, fearing lest because of some such thing they be envied and endangered, do many things unworthy of themselves, thinking that they will thereby live more

26.5. safely; and from this they are pitied as being wronged in this very thing, that they seem not to be permitted to live rightly, while to their ruler comes both loss in being deprived of good men and ill repute from the charge. Do not, then, ever overlook this when done, nor again fear that one reared and educated as I

26.6. say will venture some revolution. On the contrary, you must suspect the ignorant and the licentious; for such men are easily led to do all things simply, even the basest and most dreadful, first against themselves and then against others, whereas those well reared and educated neither choose to wrong anyone, and least of all the man who has cared for their rearing

26.7. and education. But if anyone should prove base and ungrateful, entrust to him nothing of the kind whereby he could do any dreadful thing; and if even so he make some revolution, let him be both convicted and punished. For do not fear that anyone will blame you for this, if you do all that I have said.

26.8. For you will commit no wrong in punishing the man who has done wrong, any more than does the physician who cauterizes and cuts; but all will hold him justly served, in that, having shared the same rearing and education as the rest, he plotted against you. Concerning the senators and the knights,

27.1. then, let this be done. The soldiers should be a permanent force, maintained from among the citizens, the subjects, and the allies — in one place more, in another fewer, according to each nation, as the need of affairs

27.2. requires; and they should always be in arms and continually practise the arts of war, having winter quarters established in the most advantageous places and serving for a fixed term, so that something of their prime may remain to them before old

27.3. age. For we can no longer use makeshift aids at need, separated as we are by so great a distance from the borders of the empire and having enemies dwelling near on every side; and if we permit all who are of military age both to possess arms and to practise warlike exercises, factions and civil wars

27.4. will forever arise from them. And moreover, if, having forbidden them to do this, we should then need some military aid from them, we shall be in danger, ever using inexperienced and untrained soldiers. For these reasons, then, I am of the opinion that all the rest should live without arms and without walls, but that the strongest and those most in need of a living should be enrolled and trained.

27.5. For they themselves will fight the better, having leisure for this one task alone, and the rest will more easily farm and sail and do the other things that belong to peace, neither being compelled to take the field nor having others as guards before them; and that part which is most vigorous and strong and most compelled to live by brigandage will be maintained without distress, and all the rest will live without danger.'

28.1. 'Whence, then, will the money come both for these men and for the other things that must of necessity be spent? I will teach this too, having first briefly premised that even if we should be a democracy, we shall by all means need money; for it is not possible either for us to be preserved without soldiers or for any to serve without pay.

28.2. Let us not, then, be burdened as though the necessary collection of money belonged to monarchy alone, nor on account of it be turned away from monarchy, but, as though it were in any case necessary for us, however we be governed, that someone collect money,

28.3. let us deliberate thus. I say, then, that you should first of all sell all the properties that are in the public domain (and I see that these have become many because of the wars), save a few that are very useful and necessary to you, and lend out all this money at moderate interest.

28.4. For thus the land will be made productive, being given to owners who work it themselves, and those men, gaining a start, will become better off, and the treasury will have a sufficient and unfailing revenue. Then reckon up these and all the other resources that can come in securely from mining and from any other source,

28.5. and after this reckon over against them not only the military expenses but all the others by which a city is well governed, and besides all that must of necessity be spent on sudden campaigns and on the other things that are wont to befall at need;

28.6. and from this, for all that is lacking, impose a tax simply upon all who furnish any produce to their owners, and establish duties among all whom we rule (for it is both just and fitting that none of them be untaxed, neither private person nor people, since they will share in the benefit from these things equally with

28.7. the rest); and appoint collectors of them, men to act as procurators everywhere, so that they may exact from all the revenues all that is due during their term of procuratorship. For this will both make the collection easier for them and confer no small benefit on those who pay anything;

28.8. I mean, that they should pay in instalments what they owe, and not, having been idle for a short time, have the whole sum reckoned up and demanded at once.'

29.1. 'And I am not ignorant that some will be vexed at the imposition of taxes and duties; but this too I know, that if they be not further outraged, and are persuaded by the fact that all these contributions are made both for their own preservation and for the secure enjoyment of the rest,

29.2. and moreover that the greater part of them will be received not by others but by those very men, some as magistrates, some as procurators, some as soldiers, they will feel very great gratitude to you, giving a little out of the much that they enjoy without being molested — especially if they see you living temperately and

29.3. spending nothing in vain. For who, seeing you most sparing toward your own affairs and most unsparing toward the common ones, would not willingly contribute something, accounting your wealth to be his own security and prosperity?'

30.1. 'Of money, then, there would be a very great abundance from these sources; and the rest I advise you to manage in the following way. This capital adorn with every kind of magnificence and make splendid with every kind of festival; for it befits us, who rule over many, to surpass all men in all things, and such things bring, in a manner, both reverence from our allies and dismay to our enemies.'

30.2. 'The affairs of the others manage thus. First, let the peoples be masters of nothing, nor go to any assembly at all; for they would think nothing good and would forever be raising disturbances. Wherefore I say that our own populace too should not assemble, neither for a court nor for elections nor for any other such gathering in which any business

30.3. must be transacted. Then let them not use buildings beyond the necessary in number or in size, nor be drained of money by the expenses of many and various contests, that they may neither be worn out by vain rivalries nor warred upon by unreasonable

30.4. ambitions. Let them, indeed, have festivals and certain spectacles, apart from the horse-racing held among us, yet not so as to ruin the treasury or private houses, nor to compel any stranger among them to spend anything whatever, nor so that perpetual maintenance be given simply to all who have won any contest.

30.5. For it is unreasonable that the wealthy should be compelled to spend anything outside their own native cities, and for the competitors the prizes set up among each people suffice, save if one of them win the Olympic or the

30.6. Pythian games, or some contest here. For only such should receive maintenance, that neither may the cities be vainly worn out, nor any man train who is not worthy of victory, when he might pursue something more useful both to himself and to the commonwealth. Concerning these matters,

30.7. then, this is my opinion. But the horse-races, held apart from athletic contests, I think should not be permitted to any other city, that neither may vast sums be squandered in vain, nor men be wickedly maddened, and, most important, that the soldiers may have the best horses to use

30.8. in abundance. This, then, for these reasons I forbid altogether to take place anywhere save here; the rest I have kept moderate, that men, making their enjoyments both of spectacles and of recitals each of them inexpensive, may live both more temperately and with less faction.'

30.9. 'And let none of them have private coinage or weights or measures, but let them all use ours; and let them send no embassy to you, save if there be some matter requiring decision, but let them declare to their governor whatever they wish, and through him bring to you such requests as he shall approve.

30.10. For thus they will neither spend anything nor accomplish anything dishonourable, but will receive their answers entire, without expense or any trouble.'

31.1. 'And moreover the other matters too you would seem to me to order best thus: first, if you bring before the senate the embassies that come from the enemy and from those in alliance, both kings and peoples (for among other things it is both dignified and notable that the senate should seem to be master of all, and that many adversaries should appear to the unreasonable among them),

31.2. and then, if you make all the legislation pass through the senate, and bring nothing whatever otherwise upon all alike save the decrees of that body; for thus the dignity of the office would be the more secured, and the rights derived from the laws would become at once undisputed and clear to all.

31.3. Third, if the senators of the council, and their children and wives, whenever they incur some heavier charge, such that the convicted should be liable to disgrace or exile or even death, you bring before the senate without

31.4. any prejudgment, and entrust to that body the whole decision concerning them, entire, in order that those who do any wrong, being convicted before all their peers, may be punished without envy toward you, and that the others, seeing this, may become better through fear lest they too be made public examples.

31.5. And this I say concerning those wrongs for which laws are laid down and the trials according to them take place. For if anyone reviles you or says anything else unbecoming, neither listen ever to any accuser nor

31.6. prosecute it. For it is shameful to believe that anyone, while you neither wrong him and benefit all, has insulted you, and only bad rulers do this; for from their own conscience they infer that what is said of them is

31.7. true. And it is dreadful too to be angered at such things, which, if they be true, it is better not to do, and if false, not to take notice of; since many men have already, through this very course, caused far more and harsher things to be spoken against

31.8. themselves. Concerning those charged with reviling in word, then, this is my opinion; for you must be greater and higher than all insolence, and neither come yourself to the thought, nor lead others to it, that anyone can do you any outrage, in order that they may think of you as of the gods, that you are

31.9. venerable. But if anyone be charged with plotting against you (for some such thing might happen), do not yourself either judge or prejudge concerning him (for it is absurd that the same man should be both accuser and judge), but, having brought him before the senate, make him defend himself, and, if he be convicted, punish him, making the penalty as moderate as possible,

31.10. that the wrong may be believed. For most men are very hard to persuade that one who is unarmed plots against the armed; and only thus would you gain credence with them, if you carry out his punishment neither in anger nor irreparably, so far as is possible. And I say this apart from the case of one who, having an army, openly revolts; for such a man should not be tried, but punished as an enemy.'

32.1. 'These things, then, thus; and the rest, the greatest and most numerous of the matters that pertain to the state, entrust to the senate; for common affairs ought to be managed in common, and it is somehow innate in all men both to rejoice in whatever they are deemed worthy of by a superior as though equal to him, and to praise all that has been decided with their own participation as their own, and to cherish it as freely chosen.

32.2. Such matters, then, I say should be brought before the senate; and concerning the rest let all the members present alike give their opinion, but when one of them is accused, not all, save if one be either not yet a senator or be judged while still

32.3. among those who have held the quaestorship. For it is absurd that one who has not yet been a tribune or an aedile should cast a vote against such men, or, by Zeus, that one of these should vote against ex-praetors, or these against ex-consuls. But let the latter have the power of declaring an opinion against all, and the others against their equals and inferiors.'

33.1. 'Judge also yourself, in private, the appeals and references that come from the higher magistrates and from the procurators, from the prefect of the city, the sub-censor, the prefects, the overseer of the corn-supply, and the night-watch; for let no one be so entirely his own judge and so independent that no appeal can be made

33.2. from him. Judge these matters, then, and concerning the knights and the centurions on the rolls and the foremost private persons, whenever they stand trial for death or some loss of civic rights. For let such matters be assigned to you alone, and let no one else judge them by himself, for the reasons I have given.

33.3. For along with you let there always sit in judgment the most honoured both of the senators and of the knights, and besides, at different times, certain others from among the ex-consuls and ex-praetors, in order that you may, by learning their characters more exactly in this way beforehand, know how to use them rightly, and that they, becoming acquainted with your ways and counsels, may thus go out to the

33.4. governorships of the provinces. Yet do not inquire openly into their opinions, at least such as require more exact consideration, lest, following their seniors, they shrink from speaking frankly, but have them written on tablets, which you alone reading — that they may not become known to anyone else — bid be at once erased; for thus most of all would you learn each man's true opinion, if they should believe it would remain unexposed among the rest.

33.5. And moreover, for the suits and the letters and the decrees of the cities and the requests of private persons, and whatever else belongs to the administration of the empire, have certain assistants and servants from among the knights; for thus each matter will more easily be dispatched, and you will neither err by judging on your own opinion alone nor be worn out by doing all yourself.

33.6. And grant frankness with impunity to everyone who wishes to advise you anything whatever; for if you are pleased with what he says, you will be much benefited, and if you are not persuaded, you will take no harm.

33.7. And those whose advice prevails both praise and honour (for by their inventions you yourself will gain repute), but those who err neither dishonour ever nor blame; for one must look to their intent, not blame their want of success.

33.8. Observe this same rule in military matters too, and neither be harsh with anyone for an involuntary misfortune nor envious at his success, that all may face danger on your behalf both zealously and gladly, trusting that they will neither be punished if they fail in anything

33.9. nor plotted against if they succeed. At any rate, many men, fearing the envy of those in power, have chosen rather to come to grief than to accomplish anything, and from this they have themselves gained safety, but have fastened the loss upon those rulers. So that you, who will yourself reap the greater profit alike from both the worse and the better, should never wish in word to envy others but in deed yourself.'

34.1. 'All that you wish your subjects both to think and to do, both say and do yourself. For thus you would educate them better than by terrifying them with the punishments of the laws; for the one inspires emulation, the other fear, and a man more easily imitates the better things, seeing them done in deed, than guards against the

34.2. worse, hearing them forbidden in word. And do you yourself do all things exactly, granting yourself no indulgence, knowing well that all men will straightway learn both whatever you say and whatever you do. For you will live as it were in some one theatre of the whole world, and it will not be possible for you to escape notice even if you err in the smallest matter;

34.3. for you will never do anything alone but always in the company of many, and all the rest most gladly busy themselves with what is done by their rulers, so that if once they learn that you proclaim one thing to them and yourself do another, they will not fear your threats but imitate your deeds.

34.4. But the life of others observe indeed, yet do not scrutinize harshly; rather, whatever is brought before you by others, judge, but whatever is charged by no one, do not even pretend to know, save the offences against the public.

34.5. For these ought to receive their due attention even if no one accuses; but the other, private matters, know indeed, that you may never come to harm by employing some unfit servant for any purpose,

34.6. yet do not bring them to conviction. For nature leads many men to err even against the law, and if anyone exactly prosecute these, he would leave few or none of them unpunished; but if he humanely mingle fairness with what is established, he might perhaps

34.7. even bring them to their senses. For the law, though it necessarily makes its penalties severe, cannot always master nature; and some men, thinking themselves to have escaped notice, or moderately admonished, become better — some ashamed to be convicted, others shrinking

34.8. from failing again — whereas, exposed and grown shameless, or punished beyond measure, they confound and trample upon all that is established, and become slaves to the mere impulses of nature alone. And from this it becomes neither easy to punish them all, nor seemly to overlook men openly behaving licentiously.

34.9. The errors of men, then, I advise you to handle in this way, save the wholly incurable ones, but their right deeds to honour even beyond the desert of the works; for thus most of all would you make them refrain from the worse, through your kindness, and aspire to the

34.10. better, through your generosity. And do not fear either that money or the other means by which you may reward those who do anything good will ever fail you (for I think rather that those worthy of being benefited will become fewer than these means, since you rule so great a land and sea), nor that some,

34.11. having been benefited, will act ungratefully; for nothing so enslaves and attaches a man, even though he chance to be a stranger or an enemy, as not to be wronged and, besides, to be well treated.'

35.1. 'Toward others, then, I advise you to behave thus; but for yourself overlook nothing extraordinary or arrogant given either by others or by the senate, whether in deed or in word.

35.2. For to others the honour from you brings adornment, but to you yourself nothing greater than what you have could be given, while much suspicion of counterfeit would attach to it; for of others no one is thought to vote any such thing to the ruler willingly, but one who takes all these things himself from himself not only gains no praise, but

35.3. incurs ridicule besides. The rest of your splendour, then, procure for yourself through good deeds, and never permit images of yourself in gold or even silver to be made (for they are not only costly but also easily plotted against and short-lived), but fashion others, in the very souls of men, both unalloyed and immortal,

35.4. out of benefactions. Neither, indeed, ever allow a temple to be made to yourself. For vast sums of money are vainly spent on such things, which it is better to spend on necessary purposes (for true wealth is gathered not so much from taking much as from not spending much), and nothing accrues from them toward true renown.

35.5. For virtue makes many men equal to the gods, but no one ever became a god by vote; so that to you, if you are good and rule well, all the earth will be a precinct, all cities temples, and all men statues (for in their thoughts

35.6. you will ever be enshrined with glory); but those who otherwise wield power such things not only do not exalt, even if they be set up in all the cities, but even bring them into discredit, becoming as it were trophies of their baseness and memorials of their injustice; for the longer they endure, the more does their ill repute also abide.'

36.1. 'So that if you truly desire to become immortal, do these things thus, and besides, both reverence the divine yourself in every way according to ancestral usage, and compel others to honour it, but those who introduce any strange worship concerning it

36.2. both hate and punish — not only for the gods' sake, since he who despises them would honour nothing else, but because such men, by bringing in new divinities, persuade many to adopt foreign practices, and from this arise conspiracies and factions and secret societies, things least of all profitable to a monarchy. Permit no one, then, to be

36.3. either an atheist or a sorcerer. Divination, indeed, is necessary, and by all means appoint certain men to be diviners by entrails and augurs, with whom those who wish to consult about anything may confer; but there ought to be no dealers in magic at all. For such men, by speaking some truths but more

36.4. falsehoods, often stir up many to revolution. This same thing not a few of those who pretend to be philosophers do; wherefore I advise you to be on your guard against them too. For do not, because you have had experience of Areius and Athenodorus, good and noble men, believe that all the others who call themselves philosophers are like them; for some, putting forward this pretence, work countless evils both upon peoples and upon private persons.'

37.1. 'In disposition, then, and in desiring nothing more than what you have, you should be most peaceful, but in your preparations most warlike, in order that, above all, none may either wish or attempt to wrong you, but if he do, may readily and at once

37.2. be punished. And since it is necessary, both for these reasons and others, that certain men should both listen and keep watch over all that belongs to your government, that you may be ignorant of nothing requiring guard and correction, remember that you must not simply trust all that is said by them, but

37.3. examine it exactly. For many men — some hating others, some coveting what they have, others to gratify someone, others having asked money of someone and not received it — slander them as making revolution or otherwise thinking or saying something unbecoming against the sovereign.

37.4. One must not, then, attend to them at once or readily, but test everything very thoroughly; for by being slow to believe anyone you will be no greatly wronged, but by hastening you might perhaps even commit some error which you could not retrieve.

37.5. To honour the good both among your freedmen and among the others who are with you is both right and necessary; for this will bring you both adornment and great security. Yet let them not have any excessive power, but let all of them be exactly temperate, so that you may be in no way discredited through them;

37.6. for all that they do, whether well or ill, will be attributed to you, and you yourself will be reckoned by all to be such as you permit them to be in their conduct. Permit, then, the powerful neither to take advantage of anyone nor again to be falsely accused; and let this very thing be no charge against any of them, that he is powerful, if he commit no

37.7. wrong. But defend the many strongly when they are wronged, yet do not readily attend to them when they accuse, but examine the very deeds in themselves, neither suspecting all in the superior nor trusting all in the

37.8. inferior. And honour those who work and contrive anything useful, but hate the idle and those who busy themselves with anything base, in order that, reaching out for the one because of the benefits and refraining from the other because of the penalties, they may become both better in their own affairs and more profitable to you in the common ones.

37.9. It is honourable, then, both to make the disputes of private persons as few as possible and to settle them as quickly as possible, but most honourable to curb the impulses of the peoples; and if, while invoking blessings on your rule and safety and fortune, they attempt to constrain anyone to do anything or to spend beyond his means,

37.10. not to permit it, and to cut off altogether their enmities and rivalries against one another, and to allow them to take to themselves neither empty titles nor anything else from which they will fall out with anyone. And all will readily obey you both in these and in other matters, both privately and publicly, if you never permit anyone to act contrary to them; for inconsistency

37.11. dissolves even what has been well fixed. And on this account you ought not even to permit them to ask for anything which you will not grant, but to compel them strongly to guard this very thing first, namely, to claim nothing of what is forbidden.'

38.1. 'These things I say concerning them; but for all cases I advise you neither ever to abuse your power, nor to think that there is any diminution of it if you do not do absolutely everything you can; rather, the more able you are to do all you wish, the more eager be to wish all

38.2. that is fitting. And always examine within yourself whether you are doing anything rightly or not, and what conduct will make some love you and what not, in order that you may do the one and avoid the other. For do not suppose that you will seem to be acting fittingly merely if you hear no one accusing you; nor wait until anyone becomes so beside himself

38.3. as openly to reproach you with anything. For this no one would do, not even if he were grievously wronged; on the contrary, many are compelled, at least in public, even to praise those who wrong them, striving not to seem angry. The ruler, then, must judge their intent not from what some men say, but from what it is likely they think.'

39.1. 'These and such things I wish you to do; for I pass over many, since it is not possible to embrace and state them all at once. But one thing I will declare in sum, both concerning what has been said and concerning the

39.2. rest. If whatever you would wish another, were he ruling over you, to do, this you yourself do of your own accord, you will err in nothing and will succeed in all, and from this you will live both most pleasantly and

39.3. most free from danger. For how will not all men look upon you as a father, how not as a saviour, and love you, when they see you orderly, of good life, good in war, peaceful, when you neither commit any outrage nor take advantage, when you deal with them on equal

39.4. terms, and do not yourself grow rich while exacting money from others, nor yourself live luxuriously while distressing others, nor yourself behave licentiously while admonishing others, but live in all things in every way most like to them? So that, having in yourself a great safeguard in never wronging anyone, take courage, and believe me when I say that you will neither ever be hated nor

39.5. plotted against. And this being so, it is wholly necessary that you live also pleasantly; for what is sweeter, what more blessed, than to enjoy with virtue all the goods that are among men, and to be able to give them to others as well?'

40.1. 'Considering these things, then, and all else that I have said, be persuaded by me, and do not let slip the fortune that has chosen you out of all and set you at their head. And if you choose the substance of monarchy, but fear the name of kingship as accursed, do not assume it, but rule under the

40.2. title of Caesar. And if you need some further appellations, they will give you that of Imperator, as they gave it to your father, and they will reverence you with some other style as well, so that you may reap the whole substance of kingship without the odium of the name itself.'

41.1. When Maecenas had said this, he ceased; and Caesar strongly praised both of them for their abundance of thought and of words and for their frankness, but he chose rather the counsel of Maecenas. Yet he did not at once do everything just as it had been proposed, fearing that he might come to grief if he should wish to transform men all

41.2. at once; but some things he reordered forthwith and others later, and some he left for those who should rule after him to do, as likely to come about better in time at the proper season. And Agrippa, although he had given the opposite counsel, most zealously assisted him in all of it, as though he had himself been the proposer.

41.3. These things, then, and all that I have related above in my account, Caesar did in the year in which he was consul for the fifth time, and he assumed the title of Imperator. I mean not that which was anciently given to certain men for their victories (for that he received often, both before and afterwards, from his very deeds,

41.4. so that he held the name of Imperator one-and-twenty times), but the other, the one that signifies supreme power, just as it had been voted to his father Caesar and to his children and descendants.

42.1. And after this, holding the censorship together with Agrippa, he set right various matters and examined the senate. For many knights and many foot-soldiers too had become senators undeservingly as a result of the civil wars, so that the full number of the senate had risen even to a thousand.

42.2. Wishing, then, to weed these out, he himself erased none of them, but, exhorting them, from their consciousness of their own birth and life, to become their own judges, first persuaded some fifty to withdraw voluntarily from the council, and then compelled another hundred and forty

42.3. to imitate them. And of these he disgraced none, but published the names of the latter; for to the former, because they had not delayed but had at once obeyed him, he remitted the reproach, so that they were not made public examples. These, then, became private citizens ostensibly of their own will; but Quintus Statilius, even very much against his will, he excluded from the

42.4. tribunate to which he had been appointed. And he made certain others senators, and among the ex-consuls he enrolled two men from those then in the senate, a certain Cluvius and Gaius Furnius, because, having been previously appointed, they had been unable to hold the consulship, others having seized their offices beforehand.

42.5. He also filled up the order of the patricians, the senate ostensibly having permitted him to do this, since the greater part of them had perished (for nothing is so consumed in civil wars as nobility) and since they are reckoned always necessary for the performance of the ancestral

42.6. rites. These things, then, he did, and he forbade besides all who were senators to go abroad outside Italy, unless he himself should order or permit anyone. And this is observed even to the present day; for save to Sicily and to Gaul about Narbo, a senator may not go abroad anywhere

42.7. else. To those places, on account of their nearness and the unarmed and peaceful character of the inhabitants, it has been granted to those at least who own property there to depart, without asking leave, as often as they wish.

42.8. And since he saw that many even of the senators and of the others who had favoured Antony's cause were suspiciously disposed toward him, and feared that they might make some revolution, he said that he had burned all the letters found in Antony's coffers. And in truth he had destroyed some; but the greater part he carefully preserved, so that he did not afterwards even shrink from using them.

43.1. This, then, he did thus, and he resettled Carthage, because Lepidus had laid waste a part of it and on this account was thought to have dissolved the rights of their colony. He also summoned Antiochus of Commagene, because he had treacherously slain an envoy sent to Rome by his brother, who was at variance with him, and into the senate

43.2. he brought him, and put him to death when he had been condemned. And Capreae he exchanged, by a grant of land in return, with the Neapolitans, to whom it had anciently belonged. It lies not far from the mainland over against Surrentum, of no value, yet bearing a name even now because of Tiberius's residence there.