Oration 70
Imperial Dio Chrysostom Greek- (Dio.) Come now, if you should hear someone say that he wishes to be a farmer, but should see him doing nothing toward this—neither buying oxen nor keeping them, nor furnishing himself with ploughs nor the other implements for farming, nor himself dwelling on a farm, nor owning one, nor having hired one from another, but spending most of his time in the city about the marketplace and the gymnasium, and given to drinking-bouts and courtesans and such idleness—will you attend to what he says rather than to what he does? And will you call the man a farmer and a labourer, or one of the idle and indolent? — 2. Plainly one of the idle. — (D.) Very well; and if someone should say that he is a huntsman, and surpasses Hippolytus himself or Meleager in courage and love of toil, but should appear to do nothing of the kind—neither possessing dogs nor nets nor a horse, nor going out to the hunt at all, but neither having his body burned by the sun nor able to endure cold, but reared in the shade and soft and most like a woman—is there any way you would suppose this man to be speaking the truth and that hunting in any way belonged to him? — Not I. — 3. (D.) For it is absurd to know and judge each man's life from the words he speaks rather than from his deeds. And if someone should profess that he knows music best and spends his time about it, but no one ever heard him play the lyre, nor did anyone see him with a lyre or harp, nor expounding any discourse about music—beyond, that is, his profession and his claim to know better than Orpheus and Thamyras—but one saw him tending and raising cocks or quails, and for the most part spending his time with men of that sort, ought one to suppose this man to be one of the musicians, or one of those men with whom he associates and whose pursuits he shares? — Plainly one of these. — 4. (D.) And if someone undertakes to be an astronomer and to know most clearly the revolutions and courses and distances—how the sun and moon and the like stars stand toward one another, and the affections of the heavens—but has chosen nothing of the kind nor gives thought to these things, but rather consorts with dicers and on every occasion lives and is seen with them, will you call this man an astronomer or a dicer? — No, by Zeus; I should think that nothing of astronomy belonged to him, but much rather of dicing. — 5. And of two men, the one saying that he will sail with all speed and gain much money from trade, but having furnished himself with neither ship nor sailors, and having no cargo, and not even going near the harbour or the sea at all; the other busying himself about these things, and looking out for a vessel and a helmsman and putting goods aboard—which of them will you say has his mind on trade, the one who speaks, or the one who acts and makes ready the things of the voyage and of the trade? — For my part, this latter. — 6. (D.) In every case, then, you will hold the word, if it be spoken by itself with no deed attached, to be of no authority and not to be trusted; but the deed itself to be trustworthy and true, even if no word goes before it? — Just so. — (D.) Are there, then, certain works and equipment belonging to farming, and to navigation, and others belonging to the huntsman, and to the astronomer, and in the case of all the rest; but to philosophy belongs no proper work nor business nor equipment? — Surely there is. — 7. (D.) But are the things belonging to the philosopher and to philosophy obscure, while those of the merchants and farmers and musicians and astronomers and those I just named are manifest and plain? — It does not seem so to me. — (D.) But indeed there are also certain discourses which the philosopher must hear, and studies which he must learn, and a manner of living by which he must live, and, in a word, the life of the philosopher is one thing, that of the multitude another: the one tending toward truth and prudence and the care of the gods and the tendance of one's own soul; far from boastfulness and deception and luxury; toward frugality and self-control. — 8. For the dress of the philosopher is one thing, that of ordinary men another, and so is his way of reclining and his exercises and baths and the rest of his manner of living; and the man who follows and uses these things one must hold to have his mind on philosophy; but the man who differs in none of these and is in no way other than the multitude must not be counted one of them, even if ten thousand times he says and professes that he philosophizes, before the people of the Athenians or of the Megarians, or in the presence of the kings of the Lacedaemonians; rather this man must be thrust in among the boastful and the senseless and the luxurious. 9. And yet it is not impossible to be a musician without doing the things of the musician; for music does not compel a man always to keep his mind upon it and to count nothing else of greater worth. And being an astronomer, perhaps nothing prevents a man from raising cocks or playing dice; for astronomy is no hindrance to his not doing what he ought. And, by Zeus, if a man has become a horseman, or a good helmsman, or a geometer, or one who knows letters, it is nothing wonderful that he should be seen among courtesans or flute-girls; for to know these things makes the man's soul no better, nor turns him from his faults. 10. But a man who attends to philosophy and has partaken of this study would never withdraw from the best things, nor, neglecting these, would he choose to do anything shameful and base, nor to be idle and gluttonous and drunken. For not to admire these things, and to take the desire of them out of the soul, and, on the contrary, to lead a man toward hatred and condemnation of them—this is philosophy. But to say that one philosophizes, and to play the impostor, and to deceive both oneself and others—from this, perhaps, nothing prevents a man.