De Isaeo

Isaeus, who was the teacher of Demosthenes and for this reason became most renowned, was, as some relate, an Athenian by birth, but, as others write, a Chalcidian. He flourished after the Peloponnesian War, as I judge from his speeches, and his life extended down to the dominion of Philip. The exact time of the orator's birth and death I am unable to state, nor indeed anything about the man's life, what manner of man he was, nor anything about the deliberate purpose of his public conduct—whether at the outset he chose any office or any policy—nor at all anything about any such matters, because I have come upon no such record. For not even Hermippus, who wrote up the pupils of Isocrates and was exact in other respects, has said anything about this orator beyond these two things—that he was a pupil of Isocrates and was the teacher of Demosthenes.

It remains, then, to speak about his deliberate purpose and his power, and what character he employs. Of one kind of speech only he became a practitioner, the forensic, and about this most of all he was earnest. The character of Lysias he emulated for the most part; and unless one were very experienced in the men and possessed a notable practice in both, one would not easily distinguish, of many of the speeches, to which of the orators they belong, but would be misled by the titles, which are not so exact as is shown to me by a single piece of writing. The likeness of the character is not, however, without variation, but possesses certain differences neither small nor few, both in the expression and in the matter, about which it would be the time to speak, as we have conceived them. And since in respect of diction he resembles Lysias more, I shall begin from this and tell the likenesses and the differences which he has toward that man's.

The diction of Isaeus is pure, exact, clear, proper, vivid, and concise, and besides these persuasive, proper to the subjects, round, and forensic, no less than that of Lysias; and in these respects one could not distinguish it from his. It would seem to differ from his in the following points. For the diction of Lysias is more plain and ethical, is composed more naturally and figured more simply, and is supplied with much pleasure and charm. But that of Isaeus would seem to be more artful and more exact than that of Lysias, somewhat more over-elaborate in its composition, and broken up by varied figures; and by as much as it falls short of that charm, by so much does it excel in the cleverness of its construction, and it is truly a kind of fountain of the power of Demosthenes. The diction, then, one would distinguish thus; but in the matter one will find differences of this kind. In Lysias one will see no great artifice, neither in the divisions of the matter, nor in the arrangement of the reflections, nor in their working-out; for the man is simple. But in Isaeus one will find these things done more exactly and more artfully. For he uses approaches, preliminary constructions, and more artful divisions, and he places each thing where he gives it use, and he carries the workings-out of his arguments to great length, and he varies his speeches with changes of figures contest-fitted and emotional. And against his opponent he works mischief, and over the jurors he plays the general, and to the matters on whose behalf the speech is made he tries by every means to bring help.

And in order that the difference of the men may become the more clear, I shall use an image from things visible. There are certain ancient paintings, worked simply in their colours and having no variety in their mixtures, but exact in their lines and possessing much grace in these. The paintings after these are less well-drawn, but more wrought out, varied with shadow and light, and having their strength in the multitude of their mixtures. To the more ancient of these Lysias is like in his simplicity and charm, and to the more laboured and more artful is Isaeus. There was, moreover, an opinion about him among the men of that time of sorcery and deceit, that the man was clever at artfully contriving speeches toward the worse ends; and on this account he was slandered. This is shown by one of the ancient orators, Pytheas, in the accusation of Demosthenes, as it seems to me. For, having said that all the wickedness and vice that comes from men dwelt in Demosthenes, he adds, in this part, as for slander, that he has fed upon the whole of Isaeus and the artifices of that man's speeches. And, by Zeus, each of them had this slander not wide of the mark. To me, at any rate, the speeches of Isaeus and Demosthenes—even if they be composed about true and just cases—seem to be suspect on account of their much artifice, whereas those of Isocrates and Lysias seem most of all just and true, even if the matters in them be not of that sort, because they show nothing roguish in their construction, but are free and plain.

These seemed to me to be the differences, from which one could not with difficulty distinguish the speeches of Lysias and of Isaeus. And whether I have rightly conceived them it will be open to one who wishes to consider, making his examination upon the examples themselves. I shall begin from the observations concerning diction. There is a certain speech of Isaeus on behalf of Eumathes, a resident alien among those who kept banks at Athens, whom, when he was being led off into slavery by the heir of the man who had freed him, one of the citizens rescues, and makes the defence on his behalf. The prooemium of the speech is of this kind: "Men of the jury, I both before was rightly of service to this Eumathes, and now, if anything lies in my power, I shall try to help save him along with you. But hear a little from me, that none of you may suppose that I came to Eumathes' affairs out of rashness or any other injustice. For when I was serving as trierarch in the archonship of Cephisodotus, and a report had been brought to my household that I had died in the sea-battle, and I had a deposit with this Eumathes, Eumathes, sending for my household and my friends, displayed the money which I had with him, and gave it all back rightly and justly. In return for which I, being saved, used him still more, and when he was setting up his bank I supplied him with money. And after these things, when Dionysius was leading him off, I rescued him into freedom, knowing that he had been released in the court by Epigenes. But about these matters I shall hold off."

There is also in Lysias a speech that makes the defence on behalf of a foreigner who is a defendant in a case about an inheritance. This speech Callimachus entitles On behalf of Pherenicus concerning the inheritance of Androclides, and it was argued many years before the other. In it he who makes the speech on behalf of the foreigner first sets forth the reason, just as the one who rescues the resident alien into freedom does. The prooemium of the speech is this: "It seems to me necessary, men of the jury, to speak to you first about the friendship between myself and Pherenicus, that none of you may wonder that, never having spoken before on behalf of any of you, I now speak on behalf of this man. For Cephisodotus, the father of this man, was my friend, men of the jury; and when we were in exile, I and any other Athenian who wished lodged with him in Thebes, and, having received many good things from him both in private and in public, we returned to our own land. So when these men met with the same fortunes and came to Athens as exiles, holding that I owed them the greatest gratitude, I received them so intimately that no one of those who entered—unless one knew it before—would have known which of us owned the house. Pherenicus knows, then, men of the jury, that there are many cleverer than I at speaking and more experienced in such matters; but nevertheless he holds my intimacy to be the most trustworthy. It seems to me, then, shameful, when this man bids and begs me to help him to his rights, to look on, so far as I am able, while he is deprived of what was given him by Androclides."

In what, then, do these prooemia differ from each other? In Lysias the opening is pleasant, and for no other reason more than that it is said somehow naturally and plainly: "It seems to me necessary, men of the jury, to speak to you first about the friendship between myself and Pherenicus." And what is added to this appears still more unconstructed, and spoken as a private man could speak it: "that none of you may wonder that, never having spoken before on behalf of any of you, I now speak on behalf of this man." But in Isaeus what seems to be plain has been constructed, and it has not escaped notice that it is rhetorical: "I both before was rightly of service to this Eumathes, and now, if anything lies in my power, I shall try to help save him." For it is loftier and less plain than that, and still more so what is added: "But hear a little from me, that none of you may suppose that I came to Eumathes' affairs out of rashness or any other injustice." For the "rashness" and the "injustice" and the "came to Eumathes' affairs" resemble things made rather than things naturally grown. And again, in Lysias the reason is stated without artifice: "For Cephisodotus, the father of this man, was my friend, men of the jury; and when we were in exile, I and any other Athenian who wished lodged with him in Thebes." And pleasantly and with clear demarcation he adds what comes after: "and, having received many good things from him both in private and in public, we returned to our own land." But in Isaeus it is phrased more over-elaborately and is not far removed from the construction of Demosthenes: "For when I was serving as trierarch in the archonship of Cephisodotus, and a report had been brought to my household that I had died in the sea-battle, and I had a deposit with this Eumathes." For the "a report having been brought," and the "that I had died," and the "there being a deposit of mine," I, for my part, would not say were spoken plainly. For spoken in that other way they would be more unwrought: "For when I was serving as trierarch and it was reported to those here that I had died, this Eumathes here having a deposit of mine."

And the remaining parts of the prooemia one would find spoken in the one man more plainly, in the other more rhetorically. In another contest, again, Isaeus, having composed a defence for a certain guardian who is being judged by his own nephew, has used such a beginning: "I could have wished, men of the jury, that Hagnotheus were not so excessively disposed shamefully toward money as to plot against others' goods and to bring such suits, but, being indeed my nephew and master of his paternal estate—not a small one, but sufficient even to perform liturgies, handed over to him by us—that he should take care of this and not covet what is mine; that he might both seem to all to be the better man, preserving and increasing it, and might furnish himself a more useful citizen to you. But since he has destroyed it and sold it and shamefully and basely brought it to ruin, as I would not have wished, and, trusting in clubs and contrivances of speeches, has come against my own, it is necessary, as it seems, both to count it a misfortune that he, being a kinsman, is such a man, and to defend myself, as eagerly as we can before you, concerning the charges he has brought and the slanders he has cast upon me outside the matter." And Lysias, having written a speech for a man charged by his own wife's brothers with misconduct in guardianship, has used such a prooemium: "It is not enough, men of the jury, for guardians that they have so many troubles on account of the guardianship, but even while preserving the estates of their friends many are made the objects of false accusation by the orphans. Which very thing has now happened to me. For I, men of the jury, having been left guardian of the property of Hippocrates, and having managed the estate rightly and justly, and having handed over to the sons, after their scrutiny, the money of which I was left guardian, am now falsely accused by them unjustly."

I think not many words are needed to show that this is said plainly and pleasantly, and displays a character not feigned but natural. For the "It is not enough, men of the jury, for guardians that they have so many troubles on account of the guardianship" no one would say belongs to an orator, but to any private man who has been brought into an unjust contest. But that the passage of Isaeus has been made rhetorically and adorned more dignifiedly, all would say—the "I could have wished, men of the jury, that Hagnotheus were not so excessively disposed shamefully toward money as to plot against others' goods." And still more, that in Lysias the words are spoken very gracefully and plainly: "For I, men of the jury, having been left guardian of the property of Hippocrates, and having managed the estate rightly and justly, and having handed over to the sons, after their scrutiny, the money." But the other passage is more sharply marked and not such as a private man would have composed: "but, being indeed my nephew and master of his paternal estate—not a small one, but sufficient even to perform liturgies, handed over to him by us—that he should take care of this." One more kind I shall mention, from which most of all the difference of the men will become clear.

Each of them sets before us a private, unmeddlesome, and young man compelled, against his own purpose and nature, to speak in a court—Lysias in the speech against Archebiades in this manner: "As soon as Archebiades brought this suit against me, men of the jury, I came to him saying that I was young and inexperienced in affairs and in no way needing to enter a court. 'I therefore think it right that you should not regard my youth as a windfall, but, taking my friends and your own, that you should relate concerning the debt, whence it has arisen. And if you shall seem to those men to speak the truth, you will have no need of trouble, but, having received your own, you will go away. And you are bound to leave out nothing, but to say everything, since I am younger than the contract, so that, having heard about things we do not know, we may deliberate about what you say; that it may somehow become plain whether you unjustly claim my goods or justly seek to recover your own.' Though I thus challenged him, he never once was willing to come together or to make any statement about his charges or to entrust the matter to arbitration, until you laid down the law about arbitrators." But Isaeus, in a dispute about a plot of land seized by the demesmen, to whom the land was mortgaged, brings in a speaker using this beginning: "I could most have wished, men of the jury, to be wronged by no one of the citizens; or, failing that, to meet with such opponents that I should give no thought to being at variance with them. But as it is, the most painful of all things has befallen me. For I am being wronged by my demesmen, whom it is not easy to overlook while they rob me, but unpleasant to be at enmity with—men with whom I must both sacrifice and hold common gatherings. Now, against many it is hard to litigate; for their multitude contributes a great part toward their seeming to speak the truth. Nevertheless, through trust in my case, though many vexatious things have befallen me, I did not think I ought to shrink from trying, through you, to obtain my rights. I beg you, then, to have pardon if, though I am rather young, I have dared to speak before a court; for on account of those who wrong me I am compelled, contrary to my own manner, to do some such thing. And I shall try to tell you, from the beginning, as best I can and as briefly as possible, about the matter."

Who, then, would not agree that the man of Lysias—young, a private person, and unmeddlesome—is a kind of archetype of truth, differing in nothing whatever from that truth, while the other is a kind of copy, and one that does not escape notice that it has been moulded by rhetorical art? For both the diction and the thoughts in the one display the natural, in the other the constructed. For the one uses for his beginning that he was young and inexperienced in affairs and in no way needing to enter a court. And he adds very characterfully: "I therefore think it right that you should not regard my youth as a windfall." And what comes after this he says as it had the nature to come to pass and to be said: that he thought it right to go before common friends as arbitrators, and "if you shall seem to those men to speak the truth, you will have no need of trouble, but, having received your own, you will go away." And, having gone through the rest in a good character, at the end he adds: "Though I thus challenged him, he never once was willing to come together." But Isaeus places this very part—that, being young, he has been compelled against his own judgement to speak in a court—at the end of the prooemium. And he begins from a thought not paltry, by Zeus, nor private—saying that it is more grievous to be at enmity with such men, with whom there is necessity to share in things most precious. Then he clears away one of the things that were going to vex him, namely that the demesmen who litigate against him are many. And he composes his words not in a paltry way, by Zeus, nor as a private man would: "For I am being wronged by my demesmen," he says, "whom it is not easy to overlook while they rob me, but unpleasant to be at enmity with—men with whom I must both sacrifice and hold common gatherings." For the "unpleasant enmity" and the "common gatherings" are composed more artfully than plainly; and still further the "though many vexatious things had befallen me, I did not think I ought to shrink from trying, through you, to obtain my rights." For least of all would a private man so speak: "I did not think I ought to shrink," nor indeed the "to try, through you, to obtain my rights," but rather somehow in that other way: "so many vexatious things having befallen me, I have been compelled to take refuge with you, that I may obtain my rights through you."

I think, then, that even from these things the difference of the men is not unclear. Nevertheless it will be more manifest from what is about to be said, and most of all from the demonstrative and emotional speeches, in which Lysias is somewhat simpler, both in the composition of words and in the commonness of his figures, while this man is more varied. For one would find many things in him . . . , as in this: "Whence ought the things said to be believed, in the gods' name? Is it not from the witnesses? I think so. And whence the witnesses? Is it not from the tortures? Likely enough. And whence ought the speeches of these men to be disbelieved? Is it not from their fleeing the proofs? There is great necessity. I, then, am plainly pursuing these things and bringing the matters to torture, while this man takes refuge in slanders and speeches, which is what one wishing to gain an advantage would do. But he ought, if he had any just thought and was not seeking to mislead your judgements, by Zeus not to do these things, but to come to the reckoning with witnesses and to examine each of the matters in the speech in this way, inquiring of me: 'You reckon how many contributions? So many. Paid at the rate of how much money? At so much and so much. Under what decrees? These. Who have received them? These men.' And, calling these to witness, to look at the decrees, the amount of the contributions, the sums paid, those who received them; and if . . . , to believe the account; but if not, then to produce witnesses, if anything I reckoned to them was false."

These things, then, are in the loose style and from question and answer. These Lysias least of all has used, but Demosthenes, who took his starting-points from this man, used them more unsparingly, as: "'Then are you not speaking of pay?' someone will say. And straightway, of the same arrangement of all, men of Athens, that, each taking his portion of the common funds, he might furnish whatever the city needed. It is possible to keep quiet: remaining at home you are the better, freed from the necessity of doing something shameful through want. Some such thing happens, as also now: being yourself a soldier from these very same receipts, as is just, on behalf of your fatherland. There is someone beyond our age: whatever this man now, taking disorderly, does not benefit, this, receiving in equal order, overseeing and managing all that must be done. And, in short, neither taking away nor adding, except that, having removed the disorder by some little, I led the city into order, making one and the same the order of receiving, of serving, of judging, of doing whatever each could according to his age and whatever the occasion required." But the following are in a compressed and venturesome manner, by being composed briefly, crookedly, and from the unexpected, and not recognizable by all nor off-hand: "And this man, the most reckless of all men, when they produce no witnesses, before whom they say they gave it back to us, pretends to trust those men, that they have given it back to us, rather than us, that we have not received it back. And yet it is plain to all, it seems, that those who robbed even this man's father, when he had full rights, would not willingly have given it back to us, and that, being so disposed, we could not have exacted it." For this too is the figure which Demosthenes often uses: "Then do you think that those who could have done him no harm, but would perhaps have guarded against suffering it themselves, chose rather to deceive these men than, with forewarning, to use force, but warred upon you with a previous declaration?" And further such things as these: "For the man for whom the goods that existed outside what was mortgaged had been spent on liturgies, and to whom, borrowing on them, no one would have given anything more, but who, having paid off the leases, ought to have held them indisputably—these men, having brought so great a suit and asserting that they were their own, prevented me from making the repair out of them." And what need is there to lengthen the discourse by setting down more? For one would find many passages of Isaeus, both in their composition and in their figures, departing from the diction of Lysias and resembling the cleverness of Demosthenes.

Having said, concerning the matter too, that he is cleverer than Lysias at marshalling both whole speeches and the parts of them, and doing nothing outside the art which Demosthenes afterward used in great measure, I wish to furnish the proofs of these things as well. The discourse will be summary and as for those who have read the man; for it is not possible to set down examples of everything. For instance, the narratives he sometimes places, unconstructed beforehand, concise, and anticipating none of the demonstrative matter, in their proper place, as he does in the speech against Medon, and in the one against Hagnotheus, and in the dispute with the demesmen about the plot of land, and in many others. But sometimes, having divided them into headings and set the proofs beside each of them, he lengthens them more and departs from the figure of narrative, using what is to his advantage. Of this form are the defence to Hermon concerning the surety, the dispute with Euclides concerning the redemption of the plot, and the appeal on behalf of Euphiletus against the deme of the Erchians. For in these speeches, the narratives being longer, he does not place them whole all at once, but, dividing them by parts, at each heading he brings on his witnesses and furnishes the other proofs—fearing, so far at least as it seems to me, lest the speech become hard to follow on account of the multitude of headings and grow vast, and lest the proofs, all brought together into one place, being many and about many matters, confound the clarity. Therefore, after the narratives thus arranged, he no longer confirms the foregoing demonstrations with many words, nor is he like the young writers of manuals, but thinks he ought to do away with the proofs of his opponents.

Sometimes he constructs beforehand certain matters before the narratives and anticipates the things that are going to make them more credible or more useful in some other respect, as in the claim against Aristogeiton and Archippus he is found to have done; in which a man disputing an inheritance, being brother of the deceased, challenges the one holding the unseen property to bring it into the open, while the one holding the inheritance enters a counter-plea against the summons, saying that the property had been given to him by will. The dispute being twofold—the one about whether the will was made or not, the other, the will being now disputed, about who ought to hold the inheritance—first, having rendered the argument concerning the laws and having shown in this part that an inheritance under adjudication ought not to be held before trial, he so comes to the narrative, through which he shows that the will was not even made by the deceased. And he does not place even this narrative simply compressed and unconstructed, but, this too being longer, he divides it by certain breaks, and at each kind he brings up witnesses and reads challenges and produces agreements, and uses proofs and signs and all the refutations drawn from probabilities. And I could furnish many other narratives too, arranged toward the advantage by the orator through preliminary constructions, preparations, divisions, changes of place, transferences of matters, by the headings being turned about, by the things done not being told in their order of time, by not all of them, nor as they had the nature to be done, being placed together, nor stated as a private man would say them, and by countless other such methods. But I have neither sufficient time to speak about all of them, expounding straightway in each the art, as I would have wished, nor does the discourse to those who know the matters have its credit in the multitude of examples; rather for such men even the brief showing suffices.

I shall state also, in summary, what opinion I hold about this form, and in what I think Isaeus differs from Lysias. One reading the narratives of Lysias would suppose that nothing is said by art or knavery, but as nature and truth bear it—being ignorant of this very thing of the art, that to imitate nature was its greatest work. But upon the narratives of Isaeus one would experience the opposite—supposing that nothing is said naturally and without elaboration, nor, even if some things are stated as having happened by chance, but that all are from construction and devised toward deceit or some other roguery. And the one, even if he tells falsehoods, one would believe; but to the other, even if he speaks the truth, one will attend not without suspicion. And in the demonstrative parts Isaeus would seem to differ from Lysias in this—that he speaks not by a reflection but by an argument; and not briefly but in full exposition; and not simply but exactly; and that he both amplifies more, and makes the matters more formidable, and makes the emotions more noble. For in these things he is no less plainly seen to have given the starting-points to the art of Demosthenes, and not to be pursuing the plainness of Lysias, as one may judge from many speeches, or rather from all that were written by him. And if I must use examples too, lest anyone think we say things undemonstrated, I shall do this also, taking up the speech on behalf of Euphiletus, in which one of those rejected by vote summons the deme of the Erchians into the court as being unjustly driven from the citizenship. For a certain law was passed by the Athenians that a scrutiny of the citizens should be made by demes, and that the one rejected by vote of his demesmen should not share in the citizenship, but that for those unjustly rejected there should be an appeal to the court, after summoning the demesmen; and that, if a second time they were convicted, they should be sold and their goods become public. Under this law Euphiletus, having summoned the Erchians as having unjustly voted against him, conducts this contest. These matters, then, have been set forth exactly beforehand and confirmed through the witnesses; and the means by which he wishes to make the testimonies secure are these, all, as I hold the opinion, exactly wrought out. Let whoever wishes judge whether I have judged what is fitting about them.

"That this Euphiletus, then, men of the jury, is our brother, you have heard testified not only by us but by all our kinsmen. Consider first our father—for what reason he would lie and adopt this man as his son when he was not his. For you will find all those who do such things either having no legitimate children of their own, or compelled by poverty to adopt foreign men, that they may get some benefit from them through their having become Athenians on their account. Now neither of these belongs to our father. For we, his legitimate sons, are two; so that he would not have adopted this man for lack of children. But neither indeed did he need maintenance and well-being from him. For he has a sufficient livelihood, and it has been testified to you that he reared this man from childhood, and trained him, and introduced him to the phratry; and these are no small expenses. So that it is not likely, men of the jury, that our father, gaining no benefit, undertook so unjust a thing. But neither again would any man suppose me so utterly senseless as to bear false witness for this man, that I might divide my patrimony among more. For it would not even be possible for me later to dispute that this man is not a brother. For none of you would endure to hear my voice, if now, making myself liable to suit, I testify that he is our brother, but later should appear contradicting these men. It is likely, then, men of the jury, that not only we have testified the truth, but the other kinsmen too. For consider first that those who have our sisters would never have testified falsely about this. For this man's mother was a stepmother to our sisters; and stepmothers and stepchildren are accustomed, as for the most part, to be at variance with one another. So that if this man were by some other husband to the stepmother and not by our father, never, men of the jury, would our sisters have allowed their own husbands to testify. And indeed neither would our uncle on the mother's side, who is no kin at all to this man's mother, have been willing, men of the jury, to give false testimony, through which a manifest harm comes to us, if we are adopting this man, who is a foreigner, as a brother to ourselves. Further, then, men of the jury, besides these things, how could any of you convict of false testimony this Demaratus and Hegemon and Nicostratus?—who, first, will appear never to have practised anything shameful, and then, being our kinsmen and knowing us all, have each testified to this Euphiletus his own kinship. So that I would gladly inquire even of the most dignified of our opponents whether he could show himself an Athenian from any other source than from these, from which we too show Euphiletus to be. For I think he could say nothing other than that his mother is a citizen-woman and lawfully wedded, and his father a citizen; and to show that he speaks the truth, he would produce his kinsmen as witnesses. Then, men of the jury, if these men were in danger, they would think it right that you should trust their own relatives testifying rather than the accusers. But now, when we furnish all these things, will they think it right that you should be persuaded by their words rather than by Euphiletus' father and by me and by my brother and by the phratry and by all our kindred? And indeed these men, being in no danger from anyone, do these things for the sake of private enmity, while we, making ourselves all liable to suit, testify. And besides the testimonies, men of the jury, first the mother of Euphiletus, whom these men admit to be a citizen-woman, was willing to swear an oath before the arbitrator at the Delphinion that this Euphiletus is indeed her son and our father's. And yet who more than that very woman should know this? Then, men of the jury, our father, who is likely, after this man's mother, best to know his own son, both then and now is willing to swear that this Euphiletus is indeed his son by a citizen and lawfully wedded woman. Besides these things, men of the jury, I happened to be thirteen years old, as I said before, when this man was born, and I am ready to swear that this Euphiletus is indeed my brother by the same father. So that, men of the jury, you would justly consider our oaths more trustworthy than these men's words. For we, knowing exactly, are willing to swear about him, but these men say what they have heard from this man's enemies, or themselves invent. Besides these things, men of the jury, we produce our kinsmen as witnesses, both before the arbitrators and before you, whom it is not right to disbelieve; but these men, when Euphiletus brought the former suit against the common body of the demesmen and against the man then serving as demarch, who has now died, though the arbitrator held the arbitration for two years, were unable to find any testimony that this man is of any other father than ours. And to the arbitrators these were the greatest signs that these men were lying, and both of them gave the arbitration against them. And take me the testimony of the former arbitration."—Testimony.—"That at that time too they lost the arbitration, you have heard. And I think it right, men of the jury, that, just as these men would have said it a great sign, that he is not the son of Hegesippus, if their arbitrators had decided against them, so now this should be for us such a testimony that we speak the truth, since they themselves were judged to be wronging this man, who is an Athenian, after they had first duly enrolled and then erased him. That this Euphiletus, then, is our brother and your fellow citizen, and was unjustly outraged by those banded together in the deme, I think you, men of the jury, have heard sufficiently."

This is the character of the speeches of Isaeus, and these are the points of difference from the conduct of Lysias. And nothing prevents me from saying, having embraced summarily through the briefest showing the most manifest things, that it seems to me that Lysias pursues truth more, but Isaeus art, and that the one aims at the graceful, the other at the clever. And if anyone should regard these things as small and trifling, he would no longer be a competent judge of them. For the likenesses will confound his judgement, so that he cannot distinguish the peculiar character of each. And about these matters what opinion I hold has been shown by me.

I wish now to render the account about the other orators too, that no one may think I have passed them over—distinguished men and deemed worthy of no moderate name—out of ignorance, or that, fleeing toil and choosing the easiest of works, I have let go the inquiry about them. For I neither was ignorant of those whom all know, nor would I shrink from writing about them, if the writing were going to bring forth anything useful. But considering that in the poetic construction, and in this lofty and processional style, none became better than Isocrates, I willingly passed over those whom I knew to succeed less in these forms—seeing Gorgias of Leontini falling out of the measure and in many places becoming childish, Alcidamas his pupil being grosser in diction and emptier, Theodorus of Byzantium being somewhat antiquated and neither exact in the manuals nor having given a sufficient test in contest-fitted speeches, and Anaximenes of Lampsacus wishing to be a kind of all-rounder in all the forms of speech (for he has written histories, and left behind treatises about the poet, and brought forth manuals, and has touched also deliberative and forensic contests), yet being perfect in none of these forms, but weak and unpersuasive, as I observed, in all. I did not think, then, that, Isocrates surpassing all these in everything, I ought to make any account about those men, nor indeed about any of those who lived with Isocrates and imitated the character of his expression—I mean Theodectes and Theopompus and Naucrates and Ephorus and Philiscus and Cephisodorus and many others. For neither are those men fit to be compared with the power of Isocrates. Holding that man the most distinguished of those adorned according to this conduct, I no longer

thought it right to be long-winded about the others and to spend time on nothing necessary. But of those who choose exact speeches and practise the contest-fitted rhetoric—among whom were Antiphon of Rhamnus, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Polycrates the Athenian, Critias who ruled among the Thirty, Zoilus who left behind treatises against Homer, and certain others of the kind—holding that no one became either more exact or more graceful than Lysias (Antiphon, at any rate, has only the austere and antique, and is no contestant in deliberative or forensic speeches; Polycrates is empty in real cases, frigid and vulgar in display pieces, and without charm in those that need elegance; Thrasymachus is pure, fine, and clever at finding and saying roundly and distinctively what he wishes, but is wholly given to the manual-writing and display kinds, and has left no forensic speeches; and one could say the same about Critias and about Zoilus, except in so far as they differ from one another in the characters of their expression)—of these men, then, I say, and of those like them, holding that Lysias differs and, as an archetype to copies, excels, I made that man the standard of this purpose of speeches. And if anyone should ask me why I added Isaeus as third, who is an emulator of Lysias, I would give him this reason: that it seems to me that this man furnished the seeds and beginnings of the cleverness of Demosthenes, which there is no one who does not think to have become the most perfect of all. For these reasons, then, I took these men alone. But if I had thought fit to write about all, the discourse would have fallen into emptinesses, and, besides having no, or no great, usefulness, would have been drawn out into an endless and disproportionate writing. And about these matters enough. I shall make another beginning of the discourse, speaking about Demosthenes and Hyperides and, third, Aeschines. For the most perfect rhetoric and the power of contest-fitted speeches seem to be in these men.