Addition by a Learned Friend.

In the court of Chancery, two cases have recently occurred, which may serve as an illustration of the extnet in which the taxes upon law proceedings may operate as a denial of justice, In one case—Roe v. Gudgeon—the Defendant, in his answer to the Plaintiff's bill, submitted that he ought not to be compelled to set out certain accounts which had been required by the bill, as the expense of taking what is called an office copy of them,—a necessary preliminary to any further proceeding onthe part of the Plaintiff in the cause,—would amount to the sum of 29,000l.; an expense almost wholly arising from the Stamps on the Paper, on which the office copy of the answer is compulsorily made. In this case the court determined, that it was not necessary these accounts should be set out: but in coming to this conclusion, how far the court was determined by the nature of the particular case, or by the magnitude of the expense that would thus be occasioned;—or whether if, without any such objection, the Defendant had actually set out these accounts, the Plaintiff could have been relieved from pursuing the regular mode of procuring a copy of them, and thus incurring the above expense;—or whether, if the expense had been instead of 29,000l. only 28 or 27 thousand pounds, such an objection would have been listened to;—it is extremely difficult to say.

The other case alluded to is one in which from peculiar circumstances, it is not thought proper to mention the names of t he parties. It is optional with a man to be a plaintiff in a cause, it is not altogether so optional with him to be a defendant. The preceding case shews that it is not always safe for a man to become a Plaintiff, without 28,000l. at least in his pocket, to begin with, over and above what is necessary for his maintenance.—The following case shews that a man may not be always able to resist a demand, however unjust it may be, without being able to support an outlay of at least 800l. In the case in question, the writer of this has been assured,—and from authority, which he has peculiar reasong for relying upon,—that the expense of merely putting in an answer by one of the Defendants to a bill in Equity, amounted to the above sum of 800l.: what part of this expense was occasioned by the tax on law proceedings cannot be accurately ascertained, but it assuredly constituted a very considerable proportion of that sum.

It confines itself of course to public men, or what comes to the same thing, private men speaking in the character of public. As for individuals aggrieved, they have performed their part when they have stated their own grievance.

Even in the instance of a defendant, or when the wrong is not pecuniary, the hardship of a double yoke does not cease: for the natural expense of litigation is a burthen which this artificial one finds pressing on him in any case.

I say there never can be: in those other instances the event insured against is always some very simple event, such as the death of a person, which in the ordinary course of things is not open to dispute. Here the incident which calls for contribution, is not only disputable, but by the supposition is actually in dispute. Nothing less than litigation can ascertain legally, whether litigation has been necessary. Have you engaged with a man for his paying you a sum of money whenever it shall become necessary for you to institute or defend yourself against a law-suit?—wait till the suit is at an end, and you will know whether he ought to pay you. A society indeed, and a very laudable one, has been established for purposes which come under this head: but the relief it affords is confined not only to criminal cases, but to a certain description of criminal cases; nor could it be rendered any thing like co-extensive with the grievance.

In England, the expense of carrying through a common action, cannot be less than about 24l. at the lowest rate, on the plaintiff's side alone. [See Schieffer on Costs, 1792.] The average expense of civil suits of all sorts, taking equity causes into the account, can surely not be rated at less than double that amount, on that one side. The average expenditure of an English subject, infants and adults, rich as well as poor, taken together, has been computed by Davenant (as quoted on this occasion somewhere by Adam Smith) at 8l. a year. Six years' income then is what a man must have in advance, before he can be admitted to take his chance for justice. Of many estimates which Dr. Anderson had met with, 20l. was the highest, and he takes but ten pounds. [Interest of Great Britain with regard to her colonies, London, 1792.] No man then we may say at any rate, can have the benefit of justice, in the ordinary way, either in making good a just claim, or saving himself from an unjust one, who cannot find, for this purpose alone, a sum equal to several years of a man's income. From this statement it needs not much study to perceive, that for the bulk of the community, as far as ordinary cases of the civil kind are concerned, justice is but an empty name.

This species of tax would stand absolutely alone in point of depravity, were it not for the tax on drugs, as far it extends to those used in medicine. This, as being also a tax upon distress, is so far in specie the same, but is nothing to it in degree. To recover a shilling in the way of justice, it will cost you at least 24l., of which a good part in taxes: but to be admitted to buy a shilling's worth of medicine for a shilling, it does not cost you threepence. Hospitals for the sick are not uncommon: there are none for harassed and impoverished suitors. There are Lady Bountifuls that relieve the sick from the tax on medicines, and the price of them into the bargain: but a Lady Bountiful must be bountiful indeed, to take the place of attorney and counsel, as well as of physician and apothecary, and supply a poor man with as many pounds worth of latitats and pleas, as he must have to recover a shilling. A man cannot, as we have seen, insure himself against law suits: but a man may insure himself and many thousands actually do insure themselves, against sickness. But these reliefs are neither certain nor general: and after all, a tax on him who has had a leg or an arm broken, a tax on him who has had a fit of the ague, gout, rheumatism, or stone, will be the worst possible species of tax, next to a tax on justice.

N.B. The tax on quack medicines, that is, on unknown and unapproved medicines, leaving all known and approved ones untouched, falls in a less degree, if at all, under this censure.

Dr. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations.

For instance the case of Mr. Atkinson.

It would be curious enough to know what profit the treasury may have drawn from that time to the present, from so extraordinary a fund: certainly, not enough to pay the salary of one of the Lords Commissioners: probably not enough to pay that of his valet de chambre.

These are busy statutes. By the prohibition and sale of justice, they run counter to Magna Charta:—by the prohibition of Mercy, they break the Coronation Oath.

The distinction between temerity and consciousness of blame, a distinction pervading human nature, and applicable to every species of misbehaviour, is scarce so much as known to the English law. There are scarce words for it in the language. Temerity is taken from the Roman law. Malice, the term by which English Lawyers seem in some instances to have had in view the expressing consciousness of blame, presents a wrong idea, since in common language it implies hatred, an affection which in many instances of conscious guilt, may be altogether wanting:—instance offences of mere rapacity, such as theft, robbery, and homicide for lucre.

The legislator?—he talk of vexation?—He does every thing to create the evil, he does nothing to remove it.

I happened once to fall into conversation with a man, who, from an Attorney had been made Judge of one of the provinces in America. Justice, I understood from him, was on a very bad footing there: it might be had almost for nothing: the people were very litigious: he found them very troublesome. A summons cost—I forget whether it was three and sixpence, or half a crown. Whom the half crown went to I do not know: one may be pretty certain not to the Judge.—Seeing no prospect of our agreeing, I did not push the conversation far. The half crown seemed to him too little: to me it seemed all too much. The pleasant thing would have been to have enjoyed the salary in peace and quietness, without being plagued with a parcel of low people. Justice would then have been upon the best footing possible. He had accordingly a project for checking litigation by raising the fees. I don't know whether it succeeded.

Let us not for the purpose of any argument, give rise or countenance to injurious imputations. Though justice is partly denied, and partly sold, the difference is certainly immense, betwixt selling it for the personal benefit of the king or of a judge, and selling it for the benefit of the public:—betwixt selling it by auction, and selling it at a fixed price:—betwixt denying it for the sake of forcing the sale of it, or denying it to a few obnoxious individuals, and denying it indiscriminately to the great majority of the people. In point of moral guilt, there is certainly no comparison: but in point of political effect, it may not be altogether easy in every part of the parallel, to say which mode of abuse is most extensively pernicious.

Law paper might be forged: but the difficulty would be to issue it.