the Life of Richard Cobden, Maritime Law

“April 26, 1861. (To Mr. W. S. Lindsay.)—In your letter upon maritime law in time of war, you shirk the pinching point of the whole question, by omitting allusion to the fact that we gave up our old belligerent rights over neutrals, not from choice but from necessity. It was the attitude of the United States at the outbreak of the Russian war, which induced us to suspend those ‘rights’ of search and seizure, the enforcement of which led to our last war with America. And we yielded up permanently those rights at the Paris Congress from the same motives, namely, deference to the attitude of the United States, though no American plenipotentiary was present. In fact, as you know, all the modifications in our old arbitrary navigation code had their origin in the rising power of the Unites States as a maritime people.

“Looked at in this light, the question is much more simple than you assume it to be, for you put the alternative of going back to the state of things before the Paris Congress, as though the consent of England to that Congress were a voluntary choice and not an inevitable necessity. Viewed in this manner, there cannot be a doubt in any sane mind that it is our interest to go on even to the extent stipulated for by President Buchanan in his late letter on the subject. With the European law as it now stands, it merely offers the carrying trade to the United States in case of a war between England and any other maritime state sufficiently powerful to keep a few fast steamers at sea. Anybody who opposes your proposal to put England and America on the same footing in case of war, does not understand our present situation.

“P.S. The peace-at-any-price party (if there be one) are not so much interested as the war people in putting us on a par with the United States in case of hostilities with a maritime power; for in the present state of things a war with France, whatever might be the ultimate result, must involve tenfold sacrifices to England, as compared with what would be the case if your plan were acceded to. In fact, if France could keep a few swift steam corvettes at sea, to raise our sea insurance at Lloyd’s 10 per cent., our ships would have to transfer their registry to the United States or to rot in our ports. It is evident that the knowledge of these facts must weigh with our statesmen to prevent them from embarking in a war with France. In so Far it plays the game of the peace-at-any-price party, but at the risk of national humiliation.”

“July 27, 1861. (To Mr. W. S. Lindsay.)—I have read the debates on the iron-cased ships in the Times. It is important only so far as it elicited a most able and statesmanlike speech from Disraeli, which will bear fruits. .... You were wrong in throwing overboard your Paris authority, and giving in your adhesion to the Secretary of the Admiralty. There was no necessity to contradict him until you had the disproofs. But I would have waited for the answer from the other side. My maxim has been to distrust the Treasury bench at all times, and never admit myself wrong in a controversy with the Government, until I have better evidence than their assertions. Old Saddletree’s example in the Heart of Midlothian is worth remembering. When hard pressed by an opponent in an argument, who asked, ‘There, can ye deny that, Master Saddletree?” he replied, “No; but I’m not going to admit it, neither.’”