De Bello Hispaniensi

After Pharnaces had been overcome and Africa recovered, those who had escaped from those battles with the young Gnaeus Pompeius, when . . . he had gained possession of Further Spain as well, while Caesar was detained in Italy in giving the public games. . . . in order the more easily to assemble forces against him, Pompeius began to take refuge in the loyalty of each several state. So, partly by entreaties and partly by force, having got together a sizeable band, he set about laying the province waste. In these matters some states sent help of their own accord, and likewise some shut their gates against him. Of these, whenever he had taken any towns by force, if there were in that state any citizen who had served Gnaeus Pompeius the elder very well, on account of the size of his fortune some other charge would be brought against him, so that, once he was put out of the way, a largess to the brigands might be made from his money. Thus advantages, arising from the enemy, came to a few; and by this the larger forces of the others were augmented. As messages were sent more and more frequently to Italy on this account, the states opposed to Pompeius demanded help for themselves.

Gaius Caesar, dictator for the third time and dictator-designate for the fourth, having accomplished many things before his journey, when with swift haste he had come into Spain to finish the war, and the envoys of Corduba, who had revolted from Gnaeus Pompeius, had come to meet him, by whom it was reported that the town of Corduba could be taken by night, because he had gained possession of that province while his adversaries did not expect it, and at the same time because by the couriers, whom Gnaeus Pompeius had stationed in all places to inform him of Caesar's coming, he had himself betrayed his own fear of that coming—and they set forth besides many things that had the appearance of truth. Moved by these considerations, he informed of his coming the lieutenants whom he had previously set over the army, Quintus Pedius and Quintus Fabius Maximus, and asked that the cavalry which had been raised in the province should be a guard for him. He came up to them more quickly than they themselves had expected, and did not, as he himself wished, have the cavalry for his guard.

There was at the same time his brother Sextus Pompeius, who held Corduba with a garrison, because it was reckoned to be the capital of that province; but Gnaeus Pompeius the younger himself was besieging the town of Ulia, and had now been detained there for some months. From that town, when Caesar's coming was known, envoys, evading the garrisons of Gnaeus Pompeius, having come to Caesar, began to ask that he should send them aid at the earliest possible moment. Caesar—since that state had at all times served the Roman people very well—at once ordered six cohorts to set out in the second watch, with an equal number of cavalry. Over these he set a man known in that province and not a little experienced, Lucius Vibius Paciaecus. When he had come to the garrisons of Gnaeus Pompeius, it chanced at that same time that he was beset by foul weather and a violent wind; and the force of the storm so darkened the approaches that one could scarcely recognize the man nearest. This very difficulty afforded them the greatest advantage. So when they came to that place, he ordered two men to mount each horse, and they made straight through the adversaries' garrisons toward the town. When they were in the midst of those garrisons, as the question was asked who they were, one of our men answered that they should keep silent and say nothing: for at that very moment they were trying to come up to the wall, in order to take the town; and partly the sentries, hindered by the storm, could not show due vigilance, partly they were deterred by that answer. When they had approached the gate, the signal being given, they were received by the townsmen; and the infantry, posted there, partly remained, while the cavalry, raising a shout, made a sortie against the adversaries' camp. So in that exploit, since it had happened to men who did not expect it, almost a great part of the men who were in that camp thought they had been all but captured.

Having sent this relief to Ulia, Caesar, in order to draw Pompeius off from that siege, made for Corduba, and on the march sent ahead in front armoured men of valour with cavalry. As soon as these came into sight of the town, they were taken up upon the horses, so that this could in no way be noticed by the Cordubans. As they drew near, when a sizeable multitude had come out from the town to cut down the cavalry, the armoured men, as we have written above, dismounted from the horses and fought a great fight, in such a way that out of an enormous multitude of men only a few got back into the town. Moved by this fear, Sextus Pompeius sent a letter to his brother that he should come quickly to his aid, lest Caesar should take Corduba before he himself had come there. And so Gnaeus Pompeius, when Ulia was nearly taken, roused by his brother's letter, began to march with his forces toward Corduba.

Caesar, when he had come to the river Baetis and could not cross on account of the depth of the river, let down baskets filled with stones; above he laid beams; and so, a bridge being made, he led his forces across to the camp in three divisions. He encamped facing the town in the line of the bridge, as we have written above, in three divisions. When Pompeius had come hither with his forces, he too pitched camp opposite in like manner. Caesar, in order to shut him off from the town and from supplies for his men, began to lead a redoubt-line toward the bridge; Pompeius, on the same plan, did the same. Here arose a contest between the two leaders, which should first seize the bridge; out of this contest small daily skirmishes took place, so that now these, now those, withdrew the victors. When this matter came to a sharper contest, hand-to-hand fighting being begun by both, while they too eagerly strove to hold the ground, they were crowded together about the bridge, and, as they neared the banks of the river, being hemmed in, they were thrown headlong. Here, by turns, they not only heaped death upon death, but made mounds level with mounds. So, several days having been spent, Caesar desired, if he could on any terms, to draw the adversaries down to level ground and at the earliest moment to decide the war.

When he perceived that the adversaries were by no means willing, in order that, just as he had drawn them away from Ulia, he might lead them onto level ground, having taken his forces across the river, he ordered great fires to be made by night: thus he set out for Ategua, his strongest stronghold. When Pompeius had learned this from deserters, on the day he got the chance, abandoning the mountains and the defiles, he drew back several wagons and some that were loaded, and withdrew to Corduba. Caesar began to assail Ategua with siege-works and to carry redoubt-lines around it. When news was brought to him about Pompeius that he was setting out on that day, against whose coming Caesar, for the sake of a garrison, had occupied several forts, partly where the cavalry, partly where the infantry forces could be on guard and on watch as a protection to the camp, here, at Pompeius's coming, it happened that in the morning there was a very thick fog. So, in that darkness, with some cohorts and squadrons of cavalry they surrounded Caesar's cavalry and cut them down, in such a way that scarcely a few escaped in that slaughter.

On the following night Pompeius burned his own camp and, across the river Salsum, through the valleys, established his camp on a mountain between the two towns Ategua and Ucubi. Caesar meanwhile, the fortifications and the rest that were needed for the assault being completed, set about throwing up a ramp and bringing up mantlets. These places are mountainous and by nature difficult for military operations, being divided by the plain through which the river Salsum runs, though Ategua is nearest, so that the river is about two miles off. From that quarter of the town, in the mountains, Pompeius had pitched his camp, in sight of both towns, and did not dare to come to the aid of his own men. He had the eagles and standards of thirteen legions; but of those from which he thought he had some support, two were home-bred legions that had deserted from Trebonius; one was made up of the colonists who were in these regions; the fourth was Afranius's, from Africa, which he had brought with him; the rest were composed of runaways and auxiliaries: for in light-armed troops and cavalry our men were far superior both in valour and in number.

There was added to this, to make Pompeius draw the war out longer, that the places are lofty and not a little suited to the fortifying of camps. For the region of almost all Further Spain, on account of the fertility of the soil and no less abundant supply of water, makes assault scanty and difficult. Here also, on account of the frequent incursions of the barbarians, all places that are remote from the towns are held with towers and fortifications, and, as in Africa, are roofed with rubble, not with tiles: and at the same time they have watch-posts in them, and on account of their height look out far and wide. Likewise a great part of the towns of that province are fortified almost by mountains and set in places excelling by nature, so that at once they have approaches and ascents that are difficult. So they are kept from assaults by the nature of the ground, so that the states of Spain are not easily captured by an enemy: which is what befell in this war. For, between Ategua and Ucubi, which towns are written above, Pompeius had pitched his camp in sight of the two towns, and about four miles from his own camp there is a hillock excelling by nature, which is called the Postumian Camp: there Caesar had set up a fort by way of a garrison.

This Pompeius observed, since it was covered by the same ridge by the nature of the ground and was remote from Caesar's camp, and because it was cut off by the river Salsum, that Caesar would not so commit himself, in so great a difficulty of ground, as to risk sending aid. So, relying on this opinion, having set out in the third watch, he began to assail the fort. When they had approached, with a sudden shout and a multitude of missiles they began to make casts, so as to wound a great part of the men. When this was done, and they within the fort had begun to fight back, and news was brought to Caesar in the larger camp, he set out with three legions, to succour our hard-pressed men; and when he had drawn near them, many, panic-stricken in flight, were slain, several captured, among them two centurions: besides, others fled stripped of their arms, of whom eighty shields were brought back.

At the next dawn Arguetius came from Italy with the cavalry. He brought back five standards of the Saguntines, which he had taken from the townsmen. It was passed over in its place that the cavalry had come from Italy to Caesar with Asprenas. That night Pompeius burned his camp and began to march toward Corduba. A king named Indo, who had brought his forces with the cavalry, while too eagerly pursuing the adversaries' column, was cut off by the home-bred legionaries and killed.

On the next day our cavalry pursued, farther toward Corduba, those who were carrying provisions, bought, from the town to Pompeius's camp. Of these, fifty were captured with their pack-animals and brought to our camp. On that day Quintus Marcius, a tribune of soldiers who had been Pompeius's, deserted to us; and in the third watch of the night there was very fierce fighting in the town, and they sent out much fire. After this time Gaius Fundanius, a Roman knight, deserted to us from the adversaries' camp.

On the next day two soldiers from the home-bred legion were captured by our cavalry, who said they were slaves. When they came, they were recognized by soldiers who had previously been with Fabius and Pedius and had deserted from Trebonius. No chance of pardon was given them, and they were killed by our soldiers. At that same time couriers were captured who had been sent from Corduba to Pompeius and had come by mistake to our camp; they were sent off with their hands cut off. In their usual fashion, in the second watch, from the town, by throwing much fire and a multitude of missiles, they spent a good long while and wounded several men. As the night-time wore on, they made a sortie against the Sixth legion, when our men were busy at the works, and began to fight fiercely: their onset was checked by our men, although the townsmen were defended from higher ground. When these had begun to make a sortie, nevertheless by the valour of our soldiers, although they were pressed from the lower ground, the adversaries, repulsed and wounded with very many wounds, betook themselves into the town.

On the next day Pompeius began to lead a redoubt-line from his camp to the river Salsum; and when a few of our cavalry were on outpost duty, being found by a larger number, they were driven from the post and three were killed. On that day Aulus Valgius, a senator's son, whose brother was in Pompeius's camp, leaving all his belongings, mounted his horse and fled. A scout from the second Pompeian legion was captured by the soldiers and killed; and at the same time a sling-bullet was sent over inscribed thus: that on the day he should come up to take the town, he would lay down his shield. In this hope some, while they hoped that they could climb the wall without danger and gain possession of the town, on the next day began to work at the wall, and threw down a good large part of the outer wall. . . . When this had been done by the townsmen, as if they belonged to their party, they were spared . . . they begged that the armoured men, who had been set by Pompeius over the town for a garrison, be let go. To whom Caesar replied that he was accustomed to give terms, not to receive them. When these had returned into the town, the answer being reported, raising a shout and discharging every kind of missile, they began to fight all along the wall; on which account almost a great part of the men who were in our camp did not doubt that they would make a sortie on that day. So, a ring being drawn about, there was very fierce fighting for some time, and at the same time a ballista shot by our men threw down a tower, by which five of the adversaries who had been in that tower were thrown down, and a boy who used to watch the ballista.

When that day's time had passed, Pompeius set up a fort across the river Salsum, and, not prevented by our men, boasted in that false opinion that he had held a position almost in our part. Likewise on the following day, in the same fashion, while he pursued farther, in the place where our cavalry had had their post, several squadrons with light-armed troops, having made an attack, were driven from the position, and, on account of the small number of our cavalry, were trampled down together with the light-armed troops among the adversaries' squadrons. This was being done in sight of both camps, and the Pompeians exulted with the greater glory because, as our men gave way, they had begun to pursue them farther. When these were received by our men on level ground, as they were wont, with surpassing valour, raising a shout, the others turned away from giving battle.

It is generally the custom for cavalry in armies thus to come forward: when a horseman, having sent away his horse, engages on foot with a foot-soldier, it is by no means held an equal match; the opposite of which befell in this battle. When picked foot-soldiers of the light-armed had come to fight against our cavalry, who did not expect it, and this had been noticed in the battle, several dismounted from their horses. So in a short time the horseman began to make a battle on foot, even to the point that they fought close up to the rampart. In this battle one hundred and twenty-three of the adversaries fell, and several, stripped of their arms, many wounded, were driven back into the camp. Of our men three fell, twelve foot-soldiers were wounded and five cavalry. In the time following that day, in the former fashion, fighting was begun before the wall. When they had cast a good large multitude of missiles and fire upon our men as they defended themselves, they undertook an unspeakable and most cruel crime, and in our sight began to butcher the guests who were in the town and to throw them headlong from the wall, as is done among barbarians, a thing which within the memory of men was never done.

At the very end of that day a courier was sent by the Pompeians, unbeknownst to our men, that on that night they should burn the tower and the ramp and in the third watch make a sortie. So, after casting fire and a multitude of missiles, when they had spent a good large part of the night, they opened the gate which had been opposite and in sight of Pompeius's camp, and all the forces made a sortie, and carried out with them brushwood, hurdles for filling the ditches, and grappling-hooks for pulling down and burning the huts, which had been built of straw by our men for winter-quarters; and besides, silver and clothing, so that, while our men were detained in the plunder, they, the slaughter being done, might withdraw to Pompeius's garrisons: for, because he thought they could carry out the attempt, all that night he went up and down beyond the river Salsum in battle-line. Although this was done while our men did not expect it, nevertheless, relying on their valour, they drove them back, repulsed and wounded with many wounds, into the town, and gained possession of the plunder and their arms, and took some alive, who on the next day were killed. And at the same time a deserter reported from the town that Junius, who had been in the mine, when the slaughter of the townsmen was done, had cried out that he had committed an unspeakable crime and wickedness; for those men had deserved nothing for which they should be punished with such a penalty, men who had received them at their altars and hearths, and they had defiled their hospitality with crime; and he had said much besides: by which speech the others, deterred, had committed no more slaughter.

So on the next day the envoy Tullius came with Cato and Antonius and made a speech before Caesar: 'Would indeed that the immortal gods had brought it about that I had become your soldier rather than Gnaeus Pompeius's, and that I were showing this steadfastness of valour in your victory, not in his ruin. Since his deadly praises have come down to this fortune, that we Roman citizens lack a protector and, on account of the mournful destruction of our country, are reckoned in the number of the enemy—we who neither in his prosperous battle-line obtained the first fortune nor in his adverse one the second; we who, sustaining so many assaults of legions, enduring by night and day, at our works, the strokes of swords and the casts of missiles, left and deserted by Pompeius, overcome by your valour, beg our safety from your clemency, and ask that . . . such as I have shown myself to the nations, the like I will show myself in the surrender of citizens.'

The envoys being sent back, when they had come to the gate, Tiberius Tullius went in; and when Antonius had not followed Cato as he entered, he turned back to the gate and seized the man. When Tiberius noticed this being done, at the same moment he drew his dagger and cut his hand. So they fled back to Caesar. At the same time a standard-bearer of the first legion deserted, and it became known that, on the day on which the cavalry battle had been fought, thirty-five men had perished under his standard, and that it was not permitted to report it to the camp of Gnaeus Pompeius or to say that anyone had perished. A slave, whose master had been in Caesar's camp—he had left his wife and sons in the town—murdered his master, and so secretly went off from Caesar's outposts into Pompeius's camp . . . and sent information written on a sling-bullet, by which Caesar might be informed what was being prepared in the town for its defence. So, the letter received, when he who used to send the inscribed bullet had returned into the town. . . . In the time following, two Lusitanian brothers, deserters, reported what assembly Pompeius had held: that, since he could not come to the town's aid, they should by night withdraw out of the adversaries' sight toward the sea; that one had answered that they should rather go down to fight than show the signal of flight; and that the man who had so spoken had been murdered. At the same time his couriers were caught who were coming to the town: whose letters Caesar threw to the townsmen; and the man who begged his life of him he ordered to burn the townsmen's wooden tower: if he did this, he promised to grant him everything. This was difficult to do, that anyone should burn that tower without danger. So, his legs bound with a rope, when he had come nearer, he was killed by the townsmen. That same night a deserter reported that Pompeius and Labienus were indignant at the murder of the townsmen.

In the second watch, on account of the multitude of missiles, the wooden tower which had been ours gave way from the bottom up to the second and third storey. At the same time they fought before the wall very fiercely and burned our tower as the higher one, for this reason, that the townsmen had the wind in their favour. At the next dawn a matron threw herself down from the wall and leaped across to us, and said that she had arranged with her household that they should desert together to Caesar, but that she had been overpowered and butchered. At this time, too, tablets were dropped from the wall, on which this was found written: 'Lucius Munatius to Caesar. If you grant me my life, since I have been deserted by Gnaeus Pompeius, I will show myself to be toward you of such valour and steadfastness as I showed myself to him.' At the same time the envoys of the townsmen who had previously gone out approached Caesar: if he would grant them their lives, they would surrender the town at the next dawn. To whom he replied that he was Caesar and would keep his faith. So, on the eleventh day before the Kalends of March, having gained possession of the town, he was hailed imperator.

When Pompeius had learned from deserters that the surrender of the town had been made, he moved his camp toward Ucubi, and posted forts around those places, and began to keep within his fortifications: Caesar moved and brought his camp nearer to the camp. At the same time, in the morning, one armoured man from the home-bred legion deserted to us and reported that Pompeius had called together the townsmen of Ucubi and had so commanded them, that with all diligence they should search out who were of his party and likewise who were favourers of the adversaries' victory. After this time, in the town that had been captured, a slave was seized in the mine whom we showed above to have murdered his master: he was burned alive. At the same time eight armoured centurions deserted to Caesar from the home-bred legion, and our cavalry engaged with the adversaries' cavalry, and they killed some of the light-armed who were wounded. That night three slaves and one man from the home-bred legion were caught spying. The slaves were raised on the cross, the soldier had his neck cut off.

On the next day cavalry with light-armed troops deserted to us from the adversaries' camp. And at that time about forty horsemen ran out against our water-carriers, killed some, and likewise led off others alive: of whom eight horsemen were captured. On the following day Pompeius struck with the axe seventy-four men who were said to be favourers of Caesar's victory, and ordered the rest to be led back again into the town: of whom one hundred and twenty escaped and came to Caesar.

After this time, the envoys of the men of Ursao who had been captured in the town of Ategua set out with our men, that they might report to the men of Ursao what had been done, and what they should hope from Gnaeus Pompeius, when they saw that guests had been butchered, and besides, that many crimes were committed by those who were received by them by way of a garrison. When they had come to the town, our men, who had been Roman knights and senators, did not dare to enter the town, except those who were of that state. Their answers being received and given on both sides, when those who were outside the town betook themselves back to our men, those of the garrison, pursuing them, murdered the envoys from behind. Two of them, the remainder, fled and brought the matter to Caesar . . . and they sent scouts to the town of Ategua. When he had ascertained for certain that the envoys' answers had been delivered just as those men had reported, the townsmen, having made a rush, began to stone the man who had murdered the envoys and to stretch out their hands against him: that by his doing they had perished. So, scarcely freed from danger, he begged of the townsmen that he be allowed to set out as an envoy to Caesar: that he would give them satisfaction. The opportunity being given, when he had set out from there, a garrison being got together, when he had made a good large band and had been received into the town by night through a deception, he made a great slaughter, and, the leading men who had been against him being killed, recovered the town into his power. After this time deserting slaves reported that the townsmen's goods were being sold, and that no one was allowed to go outside the rampart except ungirt, for this reason, that from the day on which the town of Ategua had been captured, several, panic-stricken with fear, fled into Baeturia and held no hope of victory set before them; and that, if any of our men deserted, he was thrown into the light-armed troops and received no more than seventeen [pieces].

In the time following, Caesar brought his camp up to the camp and began to lead a redoubt-line to the river Salsum. Here, while our men were busy at the work, several of the adversaries ran down from the higher ground, and, while our men did not give over, casting many missiles, they wounded several. Here then, as Ennius says, 'our men gave way a little.' And so, contrary to custom, when it was noticed by our men that they were giving way, two centurions from the Fifth legion crossed the river and restored the line, and fiercely, with surpassing valour, while they drove back the larger number, one of them fell beneath the multitude of missiles from the higher ground. So, when his comrade had begun to make an unequal battle, when he noticed that he was being surrounded on all sides, retreating, he stumbled in his step. As several of the adversaries made a rush upon the insignia of this falling centurion and brave man, our cavalry, crossing on the lower ground, began to drive the adversaries to the rampart. So, while too eagerly they strove to make slaughter within those men's outposts, they were cut off by the squadrons and the light-armed troops. Had not their valour been of the highest, they would have been taken alive: for they were so hemmed in by the fortification of the outpost that a horseman, the space being cut off, could scarcely defend himself. Of both kinds of fighting several were wounded, among them Clodius Arquitius; among them there was such hand-to-hand fighting that of our men none was lost, save the two centurions who carried themselves to glory.

On the next day, at Soricaria, the forces of both sides closed. Our men began to lead redoubt-lines. When Pompeius perceived that he was being shut off by the fort of Aspavia, which is five miles from Ucubi, this matter of necessity called him forth to go down to fight; nor yet did he give an opportunity against himself on level ground, but from a hillock . . . they would seize a lofty mound, even to the point that he was of necessity compelled to undergo unfavourable ground. When, on this account, the forces of both sides had made for the high mound, the adversaries, prevented by our men, were thrown down into the plain. This matter made the battle favourable to our men. As the adversaries gave way on all sides, they were engaged in no small slaughter. To these the mountain, not their valour, was their salvation. Relying on this support, had not evening come on, they would have been deprived of all aid by our fewer men. For there fell of the light-armed three hundred and twenty-three, of the legionaries one hundred and thirty-eight, besides those whose arms and spoils were carried off. So the death the day before of the two centurions was atoned for by this punishment of the adversaries.

On the following day, in like fashion, when their garrison had come to the same place, they kept to that former practice of theirs: for, except the cavalry, they dared in no place to commit themselves on level ground. When our men were at the work, the cavalry forces began to make charges, and at the same time, as the legionaries shouted, demanding the place, as they were wont to follow up—you might suppose them most ready to fight—our men went out a good long way from the low valley and halted on the plain on more level ground. They, however, beyond doubt, did not dare to come down onto level ground to engage, except one Antistius Turpio, who, trusting in his strength, began to put it about that among the adversaries there was no one a match for him. Here, as is told of the meeting of Achilles and Memnon, Quintus Pompeius Niger, a Roman knight of Italica, advanced from our line to engage. Since the fierceness of Antistius had turned the minds of all from the work to watching, the lines were arrayed: for between the foremost warriors victory was set doubtful, so that it seemed almost that the duel of the two would decide the end of warring. So eager and desirous was each held, according to the goodwill of the men and favourers of his own side. By whose lively valour, when they had betaken themselves to the plain to fight, and the chased work, glittering, of the insignia of praise on their shields . . . by whose contest the battle would assuredly have been almost decided, had it not been on account of the engagement of the cavalry, as we showed above . . . he posted the light-armed not far from the work by way of a garrison. So, as our cavalry, in withdrawing, while they returned to camp, the adversaries pursued too eagerly, all together, raising a shout, made an attack. So, panic-stricken with fear, when they were in flight, with many lost, they betook themselves into camp.

Caesar, for their valour, gave to the squadron of Cassius thirteen thousand [sesterces], and to its prefect five gold collars, and to the light-armed twelve thousand. On this day Aulus Baebius and Gaius Flavius and Aulus Trebellius, Roman knights of Asta, with their horses almost covered in silver, deserted to Caesar; who reported that all the Roman knights who were in Pompeius's camp had conspired to make a crossing-over; that, on a slave's information, all had been thrown into custody, of whom, seizing the chance, they had deserted. Likewise on this day a letter was intercepted which Gnaeus Pompeius was sending to Ursao: 'If you are well, it is well; I too am well. Although, as our good fortune goes, we hold our adversaries thus far driven back to our satisfaction, if they would give an opportunity against themselves on level ground, I would have finished the war more quickly than your opinion supposes; but they do not dare to lead their raw army into the open plain, and, still fixed to our garrisons, they draw the war out. For they have beleaguered the several states: thence they get their supplies. Wherefore I will both preserve the states of our party and trust to finish the war at the earliest moment. I have it in mind to send you cohorts . . . Deprived of their supplies by our advance, they will of necessity go down to fight.'

In the time following, while our men were busy at the work, some cavalry, while they gathered wood in an olive-grove, were killed. Slaves deserted, who reported that, from the time of the battle which was fought at Soricaria on the third day before the Nones of March, there was great fear, and that Attius Varus was in command around the forts. On that day Pompeius moved his camp and pitched it over against Spalis in an olive-grove. Caesar, before he set out for the same place, the moon was seen about the sixth hour. So, his camp moved, Pompeius ordered the garrison he had left at Ucubi to be burned, so that, the town being consumed, they should withdraw into the larger camp. In the time following, when he had begun to assail the town of Ventipo, a surrender being made, he marched to Carruca, and pitched his camp over against Pompeius. Pompeius burned the town, which had closed its gates against his garrisons; and a soldier, who had murdered his own brother in the camp, was intercepted by our men and beaten to death with cudgels. From here, the march being made into the Mundan plain, when they had come there, he pitched his camp over against Pompeius.

On the next day, when Caesar wished to march with his forces, it was reported by scouts that Pompeius had stood in battle-line since the third watch. This message being brought, he displayed the banner. For this reason he had led out his forces, because to the state of the Ursaonenses, who had been his favourers, he had previously sent a letter that Caesar was unwilling to go down into the valley, because he had the greater part of his army raw. This letter strongly confirmed the minds of the townsmen. So, relying on this opinion, he thought he could do anything: for he was defended both by the nature of the place and by the fortification of the town itself, where he had pitched his camp. For, as we showed above, the lofty places are held together by hillocks divided by an interval of plain; which is what befell at that time.

A plain lay between the two camps for about five miles, so that the auxiliaries of Pompeius were defended by two things, the town and the nature of the lofty place. From here, running straight, the nearest plain was level. Before its descent ran a brook, which, at their approach, made the utmost unfavourableness of the ground: for, running on a marshy and miry soil, it was on the right. And so Caesar, when he had seen the line drawn up, had no doubt that the adversaries would advance to the middle of the plain, onto level ground, to fight. This was in the sight of all. There was added to this that the place, by that plain, called forth the cavalry, and the serenity of the day and the sun was such that that wonderful and desirable season seemed almost granted by the immortal gods for joining battle. Our men rejoiced, some even feared, because the affairs and fortunes of all were being brought down to such a point that, whatever chance should grant after an hour, it was set in doubt. And so our men advance to fight, which we thought the adversaries would do; who nevertheless did not dare to advance farther from the fortification of the town, but rather established themselves there near the wall. And so our men advance. Meanwhile the levelness of the ground demanded of the adversaries that on such a footing they should contend for victory; nor yet did they depart from their custom, to leave either the lofty place or the town. Our men, with measured step, when they had drawn near the brook, the adversaries do not leap down to champion the unfavourable ground.

The line was set with thirteen eagles, which on the flanks was covered by cavalry with six thousand light-armed troops, and besides there came up nearly as many auxiliaries; our forces were eighty cohorts, eight thousand cavalry. So, when our men had drawn near, at the edge of the plain, onto unfavourable ground, the enemy was ready and higher, so that the route to be crossed, being higher, was very dangerous. When this had been noticed by Caesar, lest anything be rashly done amiss through fault, he began to mark off that place. When this was set before the men's ears, they took it ill and bitterly that they were hindered from being able to finish the battle. This delay made the adversaries the more eager: that Caesar's forces were hindered by fear from joining battle. So, carrying themselves boldly, they gave an opportunity against themselves on the unfavourable ground, so that nevertheless their approach was held with great danger. Here the Tenth held its own place, the right wing, the Third and Fifth the left, and likewise the other auxiliaries and the cavalry. The battle is joined, a shout being raised.

Here, although our men excelled in valour, the adversaries from the higher ground defended themselves very fiercely, and a violent shout arose from both, and a clash from the casting of missiles, in such a way that our men almost despaired of victory. For the engagement and the shout, by which things especially the enemy is worn down, were in the encounter on an equal footing. So, of both kinds of fighting, when they had brought equal valour to the warring, the multitude of the adversaries, transfixed by the casting of javelins, is heaped up and falls. As we showed, the men of the Tenth held the right wing; who, although they were few, nevertheless, on account of their valour, by their work afflicted the adversaries with great fear, since the enemy began to press them violently from their position, so that, for support, lest our men should seize them on the flank, a legion of the adversaries began to be brought over from the right. As soon as this was moved, Caesar's cavalry began to press the left wing in such a way that, though they fought with surpassing valour, no room was given for coming in line to bring support. So, when the shout, mingled with groaning, and the clash of swords offered to the ears, hampered with fear the minds of the unskilled. Here, as Ennius says, 'foot is pressed by foot, and arms are borne against arms,' and our men began to drive the adversaries, fighting most violently, men to whom the town was a support. So, on the very Liberalia, routed and put to flight, they would not have survived, had they not fled to that place from which they had set out. In that battle there fell about thirty thousand men, and if anything more, besides Labienus and Attius Varus, both of whom, being slain, had a funeral made; and likewise Roman knights, partly from the city and partly from the province, to the number of three thousand. Of our men there were lost to the number of a thousand, partly cavalry, partly infantry; wounded, about five hundred. Of the adversaries thirteen eagles were carried off, and standards, and rods of office; besides, he had these . . .

. . . from the flight, those who had set up the town of Munda as a garrison for themselves; and our men were of necessity compelled to circumvallate them. From the enemy's arms, shields and javelins were set up for a rampart, corpses for turf; and above, men's heads, cut off, arranged on sword-points, all turned toward the town, so that they should both see, set before them, the marks of the enemy's terror and of valour, and the adversaries be shut in by the rampart. So the Gauls, having hedged the town round with the corpses of the enemy, began to assail it with darts and javelins. From this battle young Valerius fled to Corduba with a few horsemen; to Sextus Pompeius, who had been at Corduba, he reports what had been done. Learning of this business, the horsemen whom he had with him, and what money he had with him, he distributed to them; and he told the townsmen that he was setting out to Caesar concerning peace, and in the second watch departed from the town. Gnaeus Pompeius, with a few horsemen and some foot-soldiers, made for the naval station on the other side, toward Carteia, which town is one hundred and seventy miles from Corduba. When he had come there to the eighth milestone, Publius Caucilius, who had previously been set over Pompeius's camp, in his words sent a message that he was rather unwell: that they should send a litter in which he could be carried into the town. Litter-bearers being sent, Pompeius is carried to Carteia. Those who were favourers of that party assemble in the house to which he had been carried—who thought he had come in secret—to inquire of him what he wished concerning the war. When a crowd had gathered, Pompeius, from the litter, took refuge in their loyalty.

Caesar, after the battle of Munda, a fortification being thrown around it, came to Corduba. Those who had fled there from the slaughter seized the bridge. When he had come there, they began to revile him: that few of us survived the battle; where could we flee? So they began to fight for the bridge. Caesar crossed the river and pitched his camp. Scapula, the head of the whole rising, of the household and of the freedmen, when he had come to Corduba from the battle, called together his household and freedmen, built himself a pyre, ordered the best possible dinner to be brought, and likewise that he be covered with the best garments: he gave money and silver into the keeping of his household. He himself dined in good time, repeatedly pouring over himself resin and nard. So, at the very last, he ordered a slave, and a freedman who had been his concubine, the one to cut his throat, the other to kindle the pyre.

The townsmen, moreover, as soon as Caesar pitched his camp over against the town, began to fall into discord, even to the point that the shout of the brawl between the Caesarians and the Pompeians reached our camp. There were here two legions enrolled from deserters, partly slaves of the townsmen, who had been set free by Sextus Pompeius; who, at Caesar's coming, began to break away. The Thirteenth legion began to defend the town; but while they were now fighting it out, the others occupied part of the towers and the wall. Again they send envoys to Caesar, that he should send legions in to their aid. When the runaway slaves noticed this, they began to burn the town. They, overcome by our men, were killed to the number of twenty-two thousand, besides those who perished outside the wall. So Caesar gains possession of the town. While he is detained here, those whom we showed above to have been circumvallated from the battle made a sortie, and, a good many being killed, were driven back into the town.

When Caesar had made for Hispalis, envoys came to beg his pardon. So, when he had come to the town, he sent in Caninius as lieutenant with a garrison: he himself pitched camp at the town. There was a good large band within of the Pompeian party, which took it ill that a garrison had been received—secretly a certain Philo, that man who had been a most fierce defender of the Pompeian party (he was very well known throughout all Lusitania): this man secretly, past the garrisons, sets out for Lusitania, and meets Caecilius Niger, a barbarian man, at Lennium, who had a good large band of Lusitanians. Returning to Hispalis, he is received again into the town by night over the wall: they butcher the garrison and the sentries, close the gates, and begin to fight afresh.

While these things are being done, the envoys of Carteia reported that they had Pompeius in their power. Because before this they had closed their gates against Caesar, they reckoned by that service to make a profit of their misdeed. The Lusitanians at no time ceased fighting at Hispalis. When Caesar perceived this, if he strove to take the town, he feared lest the desperate men should burn it and destroy the walls; and so, a plan being taken, he by night allows the Lusitanians to make a sortie: which they did not think was done on purpose. So, in breaking out, they burn the ships which had been at the river Baetis. While our men are detained by the fire, those men flee, and are cut down by the cavalry. This done, the town being recovered, he began to march to Asta; from which state envoys came to surrender. The men of Munda, who had fled from the battle into the town, when they had long been besieged, a good many make their surrender; and, when they had been distributed among a legion, they conspire among themselves that by night, at a given signal, those who were in the town should make a sortie, while these should manage the slaughter in the camp. This matter being learned, on the following night, in the third watch, the watchword being given, they were all cut down outside the rampart.

The men of Carteia, while Caesar on his march was assailing the remaining towns, on account of Pompeius began to disagree. There was a party which had sent envoys to Caesar, and there was a party who were favourers of the Pompeian side. A rising being stirred up, they seize the gates, and a great slaughter takes place; wounded, Pompeius seizes twenty warships and flees. Didius, who had been in command of the fleet at Gades, as soon as the message was brought, at once began to follow; from Carteia infantry and cavalry quickly made their way to pursue, and likewise followed at once. On the fourth day of the voyage, because, having set out unprepared from Carteia, they were without water, they put to land. While they are getting water, Didius comes up with the fleet, burns the ships, and takes some.

Pompeius flees with a few and seizes a certain place fortified by nature. The cavalry and cohorts who had been sent to pursue, scouts being sent ahead, are informed: they march day and night. Pompeius was severely wounded in the shoulder and the left leg. There was added to this that he had also twisted his ankle, which thing especially hindered him. So, having been carried in a litter to a tower, he was borne in it. A Lusitanian, sent out as a scout from his garrison, after the manner of soldiers, when he had been seen by Caesar's outpost, is quickly surrounded by the cavalry and cohorts. The approach to the place was difficult. For Pompeius had seized for himself that place fortified by nature for this reason, that, however great a multitude were brought up, a few men from the higher ground could defend it. Our men come up at their arrival, and are driven off by missiles. As they gave way, the adversaries pursued too eagerly, and at once slowed in their approach. As this was done rather often, it was noticed that this was happening at great danger to our men. They set about walling them round with a work: and, by their rapid haste, they direct equal circumvallations along the ridge, so that they could engage on equal footing with the adversaries. When this was noticed by them, they take flight for their protection.

Pompeius, as we showed above, wounded and with his ankle twisted, was for this reason slow in fleeing; and likewise, on account of the difficulty of the ground, he could prepare protection for his safety neither by horse nor by carriage. Slaughter was being dealt by our men on all sides. Shut out from the fortification and with his auxiliaries lost, Pompeius began to hide himself in a hollow and eaten-out place, in a cave, so that he should not easily be found by our men except by the information of captives. So there he is killed. When Caesar had been at Gades, his head was brought to Hispalis on the day before the Ides of April and given to the people to look upon.

Gnaeus Pompeius the younger being killed, Didius, whom we showed above, affected with that joy, withdrew to the nearest fort and hauled up some ships for repair, and . . . they had a redoubt-line on both sides. The Lusitanians who survived the battle withdrew to the standard, and, a good large band being got together, betake themselves back to Didius. Although diligence was not wanting to him for guarding the ships, nevertheless he was sometimes drawn out from the fort on account of their frequent excursions; and so, in almost daily fights, they set an ambush and divide their forces into three parts. There were those ready to burn the ships, and, when they were burned, to repel any relief: these were so posted that they could be seen by no one: the rest, in sight of all, press on to the fight. So, when Didius had advanced from the fort with his forces to drive them off, the signal is raised by the Lusitanians, the ships are set on fire, and at the same time those who had advanced from the fort to the fight, while at the same signal they pursue the fleeing brigands, are surrounded from behind by the ambush, a shout being raised. Didius, with great valour, is killed with several others; some in that fight seize the skiffs which had been at the shore, likewise several, swimming, betake themselves to the ships which were in the open water, and, the anchors being raised, began to make for the deep with oars; which thing was a protection to their lives. The Lusitanians gain possession of the booty. Caesar from Gades hurries back again to Hispalis.

Fabius Maximus, whom he had left to assail the garrison at Munda, besieged it with unremitting works by day and night: shut in, they began to settle matters among themselves by arms, and, a good large slaughter being made, make a sortie. Our men do not let slip the chance of recovering the town, and take the rest alive, fourteen thousand. They set out for Ursao, which town was held by a great fortification, in such a way that the place itself appeared given for assailing the enemy not only by the work but also by nature. There was added to this that water, except for the one within the town itself, was nowhere to be found round about nearer than eight miles; which thing was a great help to the townsmen. Then besides there was added that a ramp, . . . and timber, from which they are wont to make towers and mantlets, was not to be found nearer than six miles: and Pompeius, that he might make himself safer for the assault of the town, had cut down all the timber around the town and gathered it inside. So our men were of necessity drawn off, to carry the timber there from Munda, which they had lately taken.

While these things are being done at Munda and Ursao, Caesar, when he had withdrawn to Hispalis from Gades, on the next day, an assembly being summoned, recalls: that at the beginning of his quaestorship he had made that province, out of all the provinces, his own particular care, and had bestowed on it such benefits as he could at that time; that in the praetorship that followed, his office being enlarged, he had asked of the senate the taxes which Metellus had imposed, and had freed the province of that money; and at the same time, having taken up its patronage, having introduced many embassies of theirs into the senate, having undertaken the enmities of many in public and private causes, he had defended it; likewise in his consulship he had bestowed, though absent, such advantages on the province as he could: of all these benefits he had found them both forgetful and ungrateful toward himself and toward the Roman people in this war and in the past time. 'You, knowing the law of nations and the institutions of Roman citizens, after the manner of barbarians, have once and again laid hands upon the sacrosanct magistrates of the Roman people, and in broad daylight wickedly sought to kill Cassius in the middle of the forum. You have so always hated peace that at no time have the legions of the Roman people ceased to be kept in this province. Among you benefits are held for misdeeds, misdeeds for benefits. So you have been able at no time to keep concord in peace nor valour in war. A private man, in flight, young Gnaeus Pompeius, received by you, snatched for himself the rods and the command, killed many citizens, got together auxiliaries against the Roman people, and, at your instigation, laid waste the fields and the province. In which were you the victors? Or did you not notice that, even if I were destroyed, the Roman people had legions which could not only withstand you but even tear down the sky?' By whose praises and valour . . .