Special Part, Illustrations. (3)

1. A. writes and sends a letter to B., in which he accuses B. of a criminal offence. B. opens and reads the letter. A. has not defamed B., though the letter may cause pain and annoyance to B..

2. A., having a dispute with B., makes an effigy of B., sets it up on a bamboo in a public place, calls it by B.’s name, and beats it with shoes. A. has defamed B., and the Court may award substantial damages to B. if he sues A..

3. X. has lost some goods; Z. says, “Of course A. did not steal the goods, for we all know A.’s honesty.” Such words, if in fact spoken in a manner calculated to suggest that A. did steal the goods, may be a defamation of A.

4. A. dictates to B. at Delhi a letter in Persian addressed to C. at Bombay. B., having written the letter, seals it and sends D. with it to the post office. The letter is delivered at C.’s house in Bombay. C. is away, but has authorized P. to open and read his letters. P. opens the letter, and, not knowing Persian, takes it to Q., a Persian scholar, to be translated. Q., having read the letter, explains the purport of it in English in the presence of X., an Englishman. P. forwards the letter to C. Here A. and B. have, and D. has not, made a statement of the purport of the letter to C., and P. has not, but Q. has, made the like statement to X. [But qu. whether a professional letter-writer ought to be held in India to publish the contents of documents written or read by him in the way of his business.]

5. A. is a Brahman attached to a temple at Gandharvanagar. X. says to Z., in a public place, that all Brahmans are imposters and corrupters of the Vedas. This is no wrong to A. Z. answers, “Not all Brahmans, but you say well as to those of the temple of Gandharvanagar.” This may be a wrong to A.

Note.—This clause is intended to contain the fundamental definitions. Sub-clause (1) does away with the fiction of “implied malice” or “malice in law,” a course which seems clearly authorized by Lord Blackburn’s language in Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty, 7 App. Ca. at pp. 771, 772, 782, and especially 787; and see Stephen, Dig. Cr. Law, Art. 271, and note XVI. in Appendix. Sub-clause (2), combined with the interpretation in sub-clause (5), gives the substance of existing law without the non-natural use of the words “publish” and “publication.” The phrase of the P. C., s. 499, is “makes or publishes,” but publication is not further defined. Sub-clause (3) states existing law. Sub-clause (4) abolishes (if now existing in British India) the distinction between slander and libel. As to sub-clause (5), illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely. But it is really a matter of common sense. The sub-clause might, perhaps, be safely omitted.

Construction of words complained of as defamatory.33. (1) In determining whether words are or are not defamatory, regard is to be had in the first place to their natural and ordinary meaning, and also, if necessary, to the special meaning, if any, which the words were fitted to convey.

(2) In ascertaining any such special meaning regard is to be had to the context of which the words are part, the persons to whom and the occasion on which they were communicated, the local usage and understanding of terms, and all other relevant circumstances.

(3) When words are capable of an innocent meaning and also of a defamatory meaning, it is a question of fact which meaning they conveyed.

(4) Provided that the burden of proof is in every case on the party attributing to words a meaning that exceeds or qualifies their natural and ordinary meaning; and such proof is admissible only if in the opinion of the Court the words are capable of the alleged meaning.

Responsibility for statements repeated on hearsay.34. A person is not the less answerable for a defamatory statement by reason only that he makes it by way of repetition or hearsay, or gives at the time or afterwards the authority on which he makes the statement, or (subject to section 38 of this Act) believes the statement to be true:

Provided that the Court may take these or like circumstances into account in awarding damages.