Vol. III, p. 5 — a shrewd statement about logic: it is a “prejudice” that it ”teach- es how to think” (just as physiology ”teaches ... to digest”??)

... “logical science, which is the true con- tent of genuine metaphysics or pure spec- ulative philosophy.... ” (6)

...“Philosophy cannot borrow its method froma subordinate science, such as mathe- matics....” (6-7)

...“But it can be only the nature of the content which stirs in scientific cognition, while at the same time it is this very reflection of the content which itself ini- tially posits and produces its determina- tion.” (7)

(The movement of scientific cognition — that is the essential thing.) “Understanding (Verstand) makes deter- minations” (bestimmt), Reason (Ver- nunft) is negative and dialectical because it dissolves into nothing (“in Nichts auflöst”) the determinations of Understanding. (7) The combination of these two—“Reason which understands or Understanding which reasons” (7) = the positive.

Negation of “the simple” ... “movement of Mind ...” (7)

(The “path of self-construction” = the path (this is the crux, in my opinion) of real cognition, of the process of cognising, of movement from ignorance to knowledge.

The movement of consciousness, “like the development of all natural and spiri- tual life,” rests on “the nature of the pure

essentialities which make up the content of Logic” (Natur der reinen Wessenheiten).

Turn it round: Logic and the theory of knowledge must be derived from “the development of all natural and spiritual life”.

Up to here: preface to the First Edition.

“To present the realm of thought in its philosophical aspect—that is, in its own

(NB) immanent activity, or (which comes

to the same thing) in its necessary (NB) development....” (10)

“The familiar forms of thought”—an im- portant beginning, “die leblosen Knochen eines Skeletts.” (11)

What is necessary is not leblose Knochen, but living life.

The connection between thought and language (the Chinese language, inciden- tally, and its lack of development: (11),

the formation of nouns and verbs. (11) In the German language words sometimes have “entgegengesetzte Bedeutung” (12) (not simply “different” but opposed mean- ings)—“a joy to thought....”

the history of thought = the history of language??

The concept of force in Physics—and of polarity (“the things distinguished insep- arably (Hegel’s italics) bound up to- gether”). (12) The transition from force to polarity—a transition to “higher Denk- verhältnisse.” (12)

[NB also p. 11.... “But if Nature in general is opposed, as physical, to what is mental, then it must be said that Logic is rather something supernatural....”]

Logical forms Allbekanntes sind, but ... “was bekannt ist, darum noch nicht erkannt. (13)

“Infinite progress”—“liberation” of “forms of thought” from the matter (von dem Stoffe), ideas, desires, etc., elaboration of the general (Plato, Aristotle): the beginning of Knowledge....

“It was only after nearly everything that was necessary ... was available, that people began to trouble themselves about philo- sophic knowledge,” says Aristotle (13-14); and the selfsame: the leisure of the Egyp- tian priests, the beginning of the mathe- matical sciences. (14) Preoccupation with “pure thought” presupposes “a long stretch of road already traversed by the mind

of man.” In this kind of thought “those interests are hushed which move the lives of peoples and individuals.” (14)

The categories of Logic are Abbrevi- aturen (“epitomiert” in another pas- age) for the “endless multitude” of “par- ticulars of external existence and of ac- tion....” (15) In turn, these categories die- nen people in practice (“in the intellectual exercise of living content, in production and interchange”). (15)

“We do not say of our feelings, impulses and interests that they serve us—rather, they are regarded as independent faculties and powers...all this is just what we are.” (15)

And concerning forms of thought (Denk- formen) it cannot be said that they serve us, for they permeate “all our ideas” (16), they are “the Universal as such.”

Objectivism: the categories of thought are not an auxiliary tool of man, but an expression of laws both of nature and of man—com- pare further the antithesis—

of “subjective thinking” and “the objec- tive concept of the very essence of things”. We cannot “get beyond the nature of things”.

“Also the remark against the "Critical Philosophy.” (17) It conceives the relation between “three terms” (We, Thought, Things) so that thoughts stand “in the mid- dle” between things and us, and so that this middle term “separates” (abschließt) “rather than... connects” (zusammenschli- eBen) us. This view may be met, says Hegel, by the “simple observation” that “these very things which are supposed to stand beyond (jenseits) our thoughts ... are themselves thought entities (Gedanken- dinge)” ... and “the so-called Thing-in-it- self is only ein Gedankendingder leeren Abstraktion.”

In my opinion, the essence of the argu- ment is: (1) In Kant, cognition demar- cates (divides) nature and man; actually it unites them; (2) In Kant, the “empty abstraction” of the Thing-in-it- self instead of living Gang, Bewegung, deeper and deeper, of our knowledge about things.

In Kant, Ding an sich is an empty abstraction, but Hegel demands abstrac- tions which correspond to der Sache: “der objective Begriff der Dinge die Sache selbst ausmacht,” which cor- respond—speaking materialistically—to the real deepening of our knowledge of the world.

It is incorrect to say that Denkformen are only a “Mittel”, “zum Gebrauch.” (17)

It is also incorrect to say that they are “äußere Formen,” “Formen die nur

an dem Gehalt, nicht der Gehalt selbst seien,” (forms which are merely forms at- tached to the content, and not the content itself). (17)...

What Hegel demands is a Logic, the forms of which would be ge- haltvolle Formen, forms of living, real content, inseparably connected with the content.

And Hegel draws attention to “thoughts of all natural and spiritual things”, to the “substantial content....” (18)

—“To bring into clear consciousness this logical character, which gives soul to mind and drives and operates in it, this is our problem.” (18)

Logic is the science not of ex- ternal forms of thought, but of the laws of development “of all material, natural and spiritual things”, i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the History of knowledge of the world.

“Instinctive action” (instinktartiges Tun) “is broken up ... into an infinitely di- verse matter.” On the other hand, “intelligent and conscious action” brings out “the con- tent of that which motivates” (den Inhalt des Treibenden) “out of its immediate unity with the subject” and makes it “an object for it” (for the subject).

“In this web strong knots are formed now and then, which are foci of the arrest and direction of its” [the spirit’s, or the subject’s] “life and consciousness ....” (18)

How is this to be understood? Man is confronted by a web of natural phenomena. Instinctive man, the savage, does not distin- guish himself from nature. Con- scious man does distinguish, cate- gories are stages of distinguishing, i.e. of cognising the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognising and mastering it.

“Truth is infinite” (19) —its finiteness is its denial, “its end”. The forms (Denk- formen), if one regards them as forms, “distinct from the substance and merely at- tached to it” are incapable of embrac- ing truth. The inaneness of these forms of [formal logic] makes them deserving of “contempt” (19) and “derision.” (20) The Law of identity, A = A, —vacuousness, “unerträglich.”. (19)

It is unfair to forget that these categories “have their place and validity in cognition.” (20) But as “indifferent forms” they can be “instruments of error and sophistry” (20), not of truth.

“Contemplative thought” should include “der Inhalt” as well as the “external form.” (20)

“With this introduction of Content into logical consideration,” the subject becomes not Dinge but die Sache, der Begriff der Dinge.

not things, but the laws of their movement, materialistically

...”the logos, the reason of that which is." (21)

And on page (22) at the beginning, the subject of logic is expressed in the words:

...“Entwicklung des Denkens in seiner Notwendigkeit.”

“develop- ment” of thinking in accordance with its necessity

The categories have to be derived (and not taken arbitrarily or mechanically) (not by “exposition”, not by “assurances,” but with proofs) proceeding from the simplest, most fundamental (Being, Noth- ing, Becoming (das Werden)) (without taking others)—here, in them, “in this germ, the whole development.” (23)

Logic is usually understood as being the “science of thinking,” the “bare form of cognition.” (27) Hegel refutes this view. He is against Ding an sich as “something beyond thought.” (29)

Forms of thinking apparently “have no applicability to Things-in-themselves.” (31) Ungereimt wahre Erkenntnis, which does not cognise the Thing-in-itself. But is not Verstand also a Thing-in-itself? (31)

“Transcendental idealism, carried more consistently to its logical conclusion, has perceived the nullity of the spectre of the Thing-in-itself left over from the critical philosophy—that abstract shadow detached from all content—and has had the aim of demolishing it altogether. Also, this phi- losophy (Ficthe?) made a beginning of mak- inf reason develop its own determinations out of itself. But the subjective attitude of this attempt did not admit of its being carried to completion.” (32)

Logical forms are tote Formen— for they are not regarded as an “organic unity,” (33) as “their living concrete unity” (ibidem).

In the Phenomenology of Mind I have examined “the movement of con- sciousness, from the first direct contradiction (Gegensatz) between itself and the object, up to absolute knowledge. (34) This path goes through all the forms of the relation of con- sciousness to the object....”

“The negative is to an equal extent pos- itive” (41)—negation is something defi- nite, has a definite content, the inner con- tradictions lead to the replacement of the old content by a new, higher one.

In the old logic there is no transition, de- velopment (of concept and thought), there

is not “eines inneren, notwen- digen Zusammenhangs” (43) of all the parts and “Übergang” of some parts into others.

And Hegel puts forward two basic require- ments: 1) “The necessity of connection” and 2) “the immanent emergence of distinctions”.

Very important!! This is what it means, in my opinion: 1. Necessary connection, the ob- jective connection of all the aspects, forces, tendencies, etc., of the given sphere of phenomena; 2. The “immanent emergence of dis- tinctions” - the inner objective logic of evolution and of the struggle of the differences, polarity.

Shortcomings of the Platonic dialectics in Parmenides.

“Dialectic is generally regarded as an external and negative procedure, that does not belong to the subject-matter itself, that is based on pure vanity, as a subjec- tive craving to shake and break down what is fixed and true,—or that at best leads to nothing but the inaneness of the dialec- tically treated matter.” (43)

NB: unclear, return to it!!

selbstbewegende Seele ... (“inher- ent negativity”) ... “the principle of all phys- ical and spiritual life” (44)

Is not the thought here that semblance also is objective, for it contains one of the aspects of the objective world? Not only Wesen, but Schein, too, is objective. There is a difference between the subjective and the objective, BUT IT, TOO, HAS ITS LIMITS.

45 Logic resembles grammar, being one thing for the beginner and another thing for one who knows the language (and lan- guages) and the spirit of language. “It is one thing for him who approaches Logic and the Sciences in general for the first time and another thing for him who comes back from the sciences to Logic.”

Then logic gives “the essential character of this wealth” (des Reichtums der Welt- vorstellung), “the inner nature of spir- it and of the world....” (46)

“Not merely an abstract universal, but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular” (47)

A beautiful formula: “Not mere- ly an abstract universal, but a uni- versal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular, the individual, the single” (all the (all the wealth of the particular and single!)!! Très bien!

“—Just as one and the same moral maxim in the mouth of a youth who understands it quite accurately does not have the significance and scope which it has in the mind of a man of years and experience, for whom it expresses the full force of its con- tent.

Thus, the value of logic only receives due appreciation when it is the result of ex- perience of the sciences; then it presents itself to the mind as universal truth, not as a particular department of knowledge alongside other departments and realities, but as the essence of all this other con- tent....” (47)

“The system of logic is the realm of shades" (47), free from "all sensuous con- creteness....”

Kant: to res- trict “reason” and strength- en faith

(53) Once again, that Ding an sich = an abstraction, the product of thinking that abstracts.