The Doctrine of Being

1. Heaven—Nature—Spirit. Heaven away: materialism. 2) Everything is vermittelt = mediat- ed, bound into One, connected by transi- tions. Away with Heaven—law-governed connection of the whole (process) of the world.

1st line nonsense, 2nd line brilliant.

What should one begin with? “Pure Be- ing” (Sein) (63)—“no assumption to be made,” the beginning. “Not hold in itself any content ...” “to be mediated by noth- ing....”

Nonsense about the absolute (68-69). I am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism which has been stood on its head (accord- ing to Engels)—that is to say, I cast aside for the most part God, the Abso- lute, the Pure Idea, etc.

Sein—Nichts—Werden

“Pure Being and pure Nothing are ... the same.” (78)

(81: This seems to be a “paradox.”) Their union is Werden.

“Movement of immediate disappearance of the one into the other....”

Nichts is opposed to dem Et- was. But Etwas is already a determinate Being distinguish- ed from another Etwas, but it is a question here of simple Nichts. (79)

(The Eleatics and Parmenides, especially the former, arrived at this abstraction of Being.) According to Heraclitus “all things flow” (80)..., i.e., ”every- thing is Becoming.” Ex nihilo nihil fit? Out of Nichts comesSein (Werden)....

(81): “It would not be difficult to dem- onstrate this unity of Being and Noth- ing ... in every (Hegel’s italics) example, in every fact and thought” ... “neither in heaven nor on earth is there anything not containing both Being and Nothing.” Objections presume bestimmtes Sein (I have 100 taler or not) 82 i. f.,— but that is not the question....

“A determinate or finite Being is such as refers itself to another; it is a content which stands in a relation of necessity with other content or with the whole world. In view of the mutually determinate connec- tion of the whole, metaphysics couls make the assertion—which is really a tantology— that if the least grain of dust were destroyed the whole universe must collapse.” (83)

“Paramenides, equally with Spinoza, will not admit transition from Being, or the absolute Substance, to the neg- ative, finite.”

The absolute and the relative, the fin- nite and the infinite = parts, stages of one and the same world. So etwa?

“There exists nothing that is not a mean condition between Being and Nothing.”

“Unbegreiflichkeit des Anfangs”—if Nothing and Being exclude each other, but that is not dialectics, but Sophisterei. (108)

“For sophistry is an argument proceeding from a baseless supposition which is allowed without criticism or reflection; while we term dialectic that higher movement of Reason where terms appearing absolutely

distinct pass into one another through them- selves, through what they are, and the as- sumption of their separateness cancels it- self.” (108)

Werden. Its moments: Entstehen und Vergehen. (109)

concrete, determinate Being (?)

abstrakte und abstruse Hege- lei — Engels

This is very profound: the Thing-in- itself and its conversion into a Thing- for-others (cf. Engels). The Thing- in-itself is altogether an empty, lifeless abstraction. In life, in movement, each thing and everything is usually both “in itself” and “for others” in relation to an Other, being transformed from one state to the other.

Sehr gut!! If we ask what Things-in- themselves are, so ist in die Frage ge- dankenloser Weise die Unmüglich- keit der Beanwort- ung ge- legt.... (127)

Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they be- come) identical,—under what con- ditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,—why the human mind should grasp these oppos- ites not as dead, rigid, but as living, con- ditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another. En lisant Hegel....

(“Something, taken from the point of view of its imma- nent Limit—from the point of view of its self-contradiction, a contradiction which drives it [this Something] and leads it beyond its limits, is the Finite.)

Shrewd and clever! Hegel analyses concepts that usually appear to be dead and shows that there is movement in them. Finite? That means moving to an end! Something?—means not that which is Other. Being in general?— means such indeterminateness that Be- ing = not-Being. All-sided, univer- sal flexibility of concepts, a flexibil- ity reaching to the identity of oppo- sites,—that is the essence of the matter. This flexibility, applied subjectively = eclecticism and sophistry. Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e. reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world.

Evolution of the stone

...“The infinite progression, however, asserts more than this” (than the mere compar- ison of the finite with the infinite): “in it is also posited the connection (Hegel’s italics) of terms which also are distinct....” (160)

The idealism of Kant and Fichte... (181) “remains in the dualism” ((unclear)) “of existent Being and Being-for-Self...,”

i.e., that there is no transition of the Thing-in-itself (mentioned in the fol- lowing sentence) to the appearance? of the object to the subject?

Why Fürsichsein is Eins is not clear to me. Here Hegel is extremely obscure, in my opinion.

The One is the old principle of the άτο- μον (and the void). The void is considered Quell der Bewegung (185) not only in the sense that space is not filled, but also enthüllt; “this profounder thought, that the negative in general contains the ground of Becoming, the unrest of self-movement.“ (186)

Dark Waters...

The thought of the ideal passing into the real is profound: very important for history. But also in the personal life of man it is clear that this contains much truth. Against vulgar materialism. NB. The difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional, not überschwenglich.

Obviously, Hegel takes his self-de- velopment of concepts, of categories, in connection with the entire history of philosophy. This gives still a new aspect to the whole Logic.

In general, all this Fürsichsein was, probably, in part required by Hegel to deduce “the transition of quality into quantity” (199)—quality is determi- nateness, determinateness for self, Ge- stzte, it is the One—this gives the impression of being very far fetched and empty.

Kant has four “antinomies.” In fact, every concept, every category is similarly antinomous. (217)

“The old scepticism did not shrink from the labour of demonstrating this contra- diction or antinomy in every concept which it found in the sciences.”

Analysing Kant very captiously (and shrewdly), Hegel comes to the conclusion that Kant simply repeats in his conclusions what which was said in the premises, namely he repeats that there is a category of Kon- tinuität and a category of Diskretion.

From this it follows merely “that, takes alone, neither determination has truth, but only their unity. This is the true dia- lectic consideration of them, and the true result.” (226)

Wahrhafte Dialek- tik

Among other things, an apt remark:

“The richer in determinateness, and hence in relation, thoughts become, the more con- fused, on the one hand, and the more arbit- rary and senseless, on the other hand, be- comes their representation in such forms as numbers.” (248-249) ((Valuation of thoughts: richness in determinations and

consequently in relations.))

In regard to Kant’s antinomies (world without beginning, etc.) Hegel again dem- onstrates des Längeren that the premises take as proved that which has to be proved. (267-278)

Further the transition of quantity into quality in the abstract-theoretical expo- sition is so obscure that nothing can be understood. Return to it!!

Hegel’s answer is complicated, abst- rus, etc., etc. It is a question of higher mathematics; c.f. Engels on the differential and integral calcu- lus.

Interesting is Hegel’s remark made in passing—“transcendentally, that is really subjective and psychological”... “tran- scendental, that is, in the subject” (288)

Pp. 282-327 u. ff.—379 A most detailed consideration of the differential and integral calculus, with quotations - Newton, Lagrange, Carnot, Euler, Leibnitz, etc., etc.,—showing how interesting Hegel found this “vanish- ing” of infinitely small magnitudes, this “intermediate between Being and not-Being.” Without studying higher mathematics all this is incomprehens- ible. Characteristic is the title: Carnot: “Réflexions sur la Métaphysique du calcul infinitésimal”!!!

“The development of the concept Verhält- nis (379-394) extremely obscure. Note only, p. 394, the remark on symbols, that there is nothing to be said against them in general. But “against all Symbolism” it must be said that it sometimes is “a con- venient means of escaping from compre- hending, stating and justifying the concep- tual determinations” (Begriffsbestimmun- gen). But precisely this is the concern of philosophy.

“The common determinations of force,

or substantiality, cause and effect, and others, are themselves too only symbols used to express, for example, vital and

spiritual relations; that is, they are untrue determinations of those relations.” (394)

“In Measure, to put it abstractly, Qual- ity and Quantity are united. Being as such is the immediate self-identity of de- terminateness. This immediacy of determi- nateness has transcended itself. Quantity is Being which has returned upon itself in such a manner that it is simple self-identity as indifference to determinateness.” (395) The third term is Measure.

Kant introduced the category of modal- ity (possibility, actuality, necessity) and remarks that in Kant: “This category means that it is the rela- tion of the object to thought. In the sense of this idealism, thought in general is essentially external to the Thing-in-itself..., objectivity, which is a quality of the other categories, is lacking in the categories of modality.” (396)

En passant: (397)

Indian philosophy, in which Brahma passes to Siva (change = disappearance, arising)....

The peoples deify Measure. (399)

? Measure passes into Essence (Wesen).

(Regarding the question of Measure it is not without interest to note the remark made in passing by Hegel that “in devel- oped civil society aggregates of indivi- duals belonging to different trades are in a certain relation to one another.”) (402)

On the question of the category of Grad- ualness (Allmähligkeit), Hegel remarks: “Recourse is so readily made to this cat- egory in order to render intelligible to the eye or to the mind the disappearance of a Quality or of Something; for thus the illu- sion is created that one can almost be eye-witness of disappearance; for, Quantum being posited as limit external and variable by its very nature, change (as a change of Quantum only) needs no explanation. But in fact nothing is thereby explained; the change is also essentially the transition of one Quality into another, or (a more ab- stract transition) of one existence into a non-existence; and this contains a determi- nation different from that of gradual, which is only a decrease or increase and a one- sided retention of magnitude.

“But already the ancients were aware of the connection by which a change appearing as merely quantitative turns into one which is qualitative, and they illustrated the confusions which arise from ignorance of this connection by popular examples...” (405-406) (“bald”—the removal of one hair from a head; a “heap”—the removal of one grain...) “what” (here) “is refuted is” das einseitige Festhalten an der abstrakten Quantumsbestimmtheit (“the one-sided clinging to abstract quantitative deter-

minateness,” i.e., “without taking account of the manifold changes and concrete quali- ties,” etc.). ...“Therefore those changes are no idle and pedantic joke; they are in them- selves correct and the product of a conscious- ness which takes an interest in the phenom- ena which occur in thought.

“Quantum when it is taken as indiffer- ent limit is that side from which an Exist- ent Being can unsuspectedly be attacked and destroyed. It is the cunning of the Notion to seize it from this side, where its Quality does not appear to come into play; and this so much so that the aggrandise- ment of a state or of a property, and so on, which leads in the end to disaster for the state or the owner of the property, may at first actually appear as their good for- tune.” (407)

“It is a great merit to become acquainted with the empirical numbers of nature (as the distances of the planets from one another), but an infinitely greater merit to cause the empirical Quanta to disappear

and to raise them into a universal form of quantitative determinations, so that they become moments of a law or Measure”; the merit of Galileo and Kepler... “They

demonstrated the laws which they discov- ered by showing that the totality of details

of perception corresponds to these laws.” (416) But höheres Beweisen of these laws must be demanded in order that their quantitative determinations be known from

Qualitäten oder bestimmten Begriffen, die bezogen sind (wie Raum und Zeit).

The development of the concept des Maßes, as a spezifische Quantität and as reales Maß (including Wahl- verwandtschaften—for example, chemical elements, musical tones), very ob- scure.

A lengthy note on chemistry, with a polemic against Berzelius and his theory of electro-chemistry. (433-445)

The “nodal line of measure relations” (Knotenline von Maßverhältnissen)—tran- sitions of quantity into quality... Gradual- ness and leaps.

And again p. 448, that gradualness explains nothing without leaps.

In Hegel’s note as always, factual mate- rial, examples, the concrete (hence Feuer- bach said jestingly on one occasion that Hegel banished nature to his notes, Feuer- bach, Works, II, p. ?).

Pp. 448-452, a note included in the table of contents (not in the text!! Pedant- ry!!): “Examples of such Nodal Lines; in this connection, that there are no leaps

in nature.”

Examples: chemistry; musical tones; wa- ter (steam, ice)—p. 449—birth and death.

Abbrechen der Allmähligkeit, p. (450)

“It is said that there are no leaps in nature; and ordinary imagination, when it has to conceive an arising or passing away, thinks it has conceived them (as was mentioned) when it imagines them as a gradual emer-

emergence or disappearance. But we saw that

the changes of Being were in general not only a transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from the quali- tative into the quantitative, and converse ly: a process of becoming other which breaks off graduality, and is qualitatively other as against the preceding Existent Being. Water on being cooled does not little by little become hard, gradually reaching the consistency of ice after having passed through the consistency of paste, but is suddenly hard; when it already has quite attained freezing-point it may (if it stands

still) be wholly liquid, and a slight shake brings it into the condition of hardness.

“The gradualness of arising is based upon the idea that that which arises is already, sensibly or otherwise, actually there, and is imperceptible only on account of its smallness; and the gradualness of vanishing is based on the idea that not-Being or the Other which is assuming its place equally is there, only is not yet noticeable;— there, not in the sense that the Other is contained in the Other which is there in itself, but that it is there as existence, only unnoticeable. This altogether can- cels arising and passing away; or the In- itself, that inner thing in which some- thing is before it attains its existence, is transmuted into a smallness of external existence, and the essential or conceptual distinction into a difference external and merely magnitudinal.—The procedure which makes arising and passing away conceiv- able from the gradualness of change is boring in the manner peculiar to tautol- ogy; that which arises. or passes away is prepared beforehand, and the change is turned into the mere changing of an exter- nal distinction; and now it is indeed a mere tautology. The difficulty for such Under- standing which attempts to conceive con- sists in the qualitative transition of Some- thing into its Other in general and its op- posite; Understanding, on the other hand, fancies identity and change to be of that indifferent and external kind which applies to the quantitative.

“In the moral sphere, insofar as it is con- sidered in the sphere of Being, the same transition from quantitative to qualitative takes place, and different qualities appear to base themselves on differences in magni- tude. A ‘more’ or ‘less’ suffices to trans- gress the limit of levity, where something quite different, namely, crime, appears; whereby right passes over into wrong, and virtue into vice.—Thus too do states— other things being equal—derive a differ- ent qualitative character from magnitu- dinal difference....” (450-452)

Further: Transition of Being into Essence (Wesen), expounded extremely obscurely. End of Volume I.