Letter 38

38. To his brother Gregory, on the difference between essence and hypostasis.

Since many, in dealing with the mystical doctrines, do not distinguish what is common to the essence from the account of the hypostases, and so fall into the same confusion of thought, and suppose that it makes no difference whether one speaks of "essence" or "hypostasis" — whence it has seemed good to some of those who accept such things without examination to say that, as there is one essence, so there is also one hypostasis; and conversely, those who admit three hypostases suppose that they must, on the strength of this admission, lay down a division of essences in the same number — for this reason, that you too may not suffer the like, I have made for you a brief memorandum on the subject. The sense of what is being said is, to set it forth in few words, as follows.

Of all names, some, being applied to many things differing in number, have a more general signification, as for instance "man." For he who utters this word, indicating by the name the common nature, does not circumscribe by the utterance any particular man who is known individually by the name. For Peter is no more a man than is Andrew, or John, or James. The commonness, then, of what is signified, extending alike to all who are ranged under the same name, has need of a further distinction, by which we shall recognize not man in general, but Peter or John.

Other names have a more particular indication, by which it is not the commonness of the nature that is contemplated in what is signified, but the circumscription of some particular thing, having no fellowship, in respect of its individuality, with what is of the same kind — as for instance "Paul" or "Timothy." For such an utterance is no longer borne toward the common element of the nature, but, separating it off from the comprehensive signification, presents through the names the impression of certain circumscribed things. When, therefore, there are two or more men of the same kind together — say Paul and Silvanus and Timothy — and an account of the essence of the men is sought, no one will give one account of the essence in the case of Paul, another in the case of Silvanus, and another in the case of Timothy; but the very terms by which the essence of Paul is shown will fit the others also; and those who are described by the same account of essence are of one essence with one another. But when, having learned the common element, one turns his contemplation toward the particulars by which one is distinguished from the other, then the account that makes each one known will no longer agree in all respects with the account of the other, even though in some points it be found to hold the common element.

This, then, is what we say: that what is spoken of individually is indicated by the term "hypostasis." For he who says "man" has, by the indefiniteness of the signification, produced in the hearer a certain scattered notion, so that the nature is indicated by the name, but the subsisting thing, individually indicated by the name, is not signified. But he who says "Paul" has shown the nature subsisting in the thing indicated by the name.

This, then, is the hypostasis: not the indefinite notion of the essence, which finds no fixity from the commonness of what is signified, but that which presents and circumscribes, in a particular thing, the common and uncircumscribed element through the properties that appear in it; as the Scripture also is wont to do such a thing, in many other places, and in the history of Job. For when it was about to recount his affairs, having first mentioned the common element and said "a man," it at once marks him off by his individuality with the addition of "a certain." But the description of the essence, as bringing no gain toward the present aim of the discourse, it passed over in silence; and it characterizes the particular man by his own distinguishing marks, naming his place and the marks of his character, and whatever of external things, brought in along with these, served to separate and set him apart from the common signification — so that through all these the description of the man recorded should become vivid: from his name, from his place, from the properties of his soul, from the external things observed about him. For had it given the account of the essence, there would have been no mention of any of these things in the interpretation of the nature; for the account would have been the same as in the case of Bildad the Shuhite, and Zophar the Naamathite, and each of the men mentioned there.

The account of the difference, then, between essence and hypostasis which you have learned in matters concerning ourselves, transferring it also to the divine doctrines, you will not go astray. Whatever your notion supposes the being of the Father to be — for there is no defined concept upon which to fix the soul, because of our conviction that it is above all concept — this you will conceive also of the Son, and this likewise of the Holy Spirit. For the account of the uncreated and the incomprehensible is one and the same in the case of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. For the one is not more incomprehensible and uncreated, the other less. And since it is necessary, through the individual marks, to hold the distinction within the Trinity unconfused, what is contemplated in common — I mean, for instance, the uncreated, or what is above all comprehension, or anything of the kind — we shall not bring in to determine the individuality, but we shall seek only those things by which the notion of each is set apart clearly and unmixed from what is contemplated together with it.

It seems to me good, then, to trace out the matter thus. Whatever good reaches us from the divine power, we say is the working of the grace that works all things in all; as the Apostle says, that "all these things works one and the same Spirit, dividing to each individually as he wills." But when we inquire whether the supply of good things, taking its origin from the Holy Spirit alone, thus comes to those who are worthy, we are again guided by the Scripture to believe that the Author and Cause of the supply of the good things wrought in us through the Spirit is the Only-begotten God. For we have been taught by holy Scripture that all things came into being through him, and have their consistence in him. When, therefore, we are lifted up also to that conception, again, led up by the divinely inspired guidance, we are taught that through that power all things are brought from non-being into being — yet not from that power without a beginning either; but there is a certain power subsisting unbegotten and without beginning, which is the cause of the cause of all things that are. For from the Father is the Son, through whom are all things, with whom the Holy Spirit is always inseparably conceived. For it is not possible to come into a thought of the Son without being first illumined by the Spirit. Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit, from whom all the supply of good things to the creation flows as from a fountain, is dependent upon the Son, with whom it is apprehended without interval, and has its being attached to the cause of the Father, from whom also it proceeds — this it has as the distinguishing mark of its individuality in respect of hypostasis: to be made known after the Son and together with him, and to subsist from the Father.

But the Son, who makes known through himself and with himself the Spirit that proceeds from the Father, alone shining forth as Only-begotten from the unbegotten Light, has, in the individuality of his distinguishing marks, no fellowship either with the Father or with the Holy Spirit, but is made known alone by the marks that have been named. And the God who is over all has, as the special distinguishing mark of his own hypostasis, this alone: to be Father, and to subsist from no cause; and through this mark again he too is recognized in his individuality. For this reason we say that the marks contemplated in the Trinity, by which the individuality of the persons handed down in the faith is presented, are, within the commonness of the essence, incompatible and uncommunicable — each one being apprehended distinctly by his own marks — so that through the said marks the separateness of the hypostases is discovered. But in respect of the infinite, the incomprehensible, the being uncreated, the being circumscribed by no place, and all things of this kind, there is no variation in the life-giving nature — I mean in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit — but there is contemplated in them a certain continuous and unbroken fellowship. And by whatever notions one may comprehend the majesty of any one of those believed in the Holy Trinity, by those same notions he will proceed, without variation, beholding the glory in Father and Son and Holy Spirit, the mind treading no void interval between Father and Son and Holy Spirit. For there is nothing inserted between them, neither any other subsisting thing besides the divine nature, such as to be able to divide it from itself by the intrusion of something foreign, nor the emptiness of any subsistenceless interval that should make the harmony of the divine essence with itself stand gaping, dividing the continuity by the insertion of the void. But he who has conceived the Father has conceived him by himself, and has at the same time admitted the Son into his thought; and he who has grasped the Son has not severed the Spirit from the Son, but has impressed within himself a faith of the three, mingled together — consequently, in respect of order, but conjointly, in respect of nature. And he who has spoken of the Spirit alone has comprehended, in this confession, also him whose the Spirit is. And since the Spirit is Christ's and from God, as Paul says, just as he who takes hold of one end of a chain draws with it the other end also, so he who has drawn the Spirit, as the prophet says, has through it drawn along the Son and the Father together. And if one truly grasps the Son, he will hold him on either side, on the one drawing along his own Father, on the other his own Spirit. For neither can he who is ever in the Father be cut off from the Father, nor will he who works all things in his own Spirit ever be separated from his own Spirit. Likewise too he who has received the Father has received with him, in power, the Son and the Spirit. For it is not possible to conceive a severance or division in any way at all, so that either the Son should be conceived apart from the Father, or the Spirit be disjoined from the Son; but there is apprehended among them a certain ineffable and inconceivable fellowship and at the same time distinction, neither the difference of the hypostases tearing apart the continuity of the nature, nor the commonness in respect of the essence dissolving the individuality of the distinguishing marks. And do not marvel if we say that the same thing is both conjoined and distinguished, and conceive — as it were in a riddle — a new and paradoxical conjoined distinction and distinguished conjunction. For if one would not hear the statement contentiously and with a view to cavil, even among sensible things it is possible to find such a thing.

And receive my account as an illustration and shadow of the truth, not as the very truth of the things themselves; for it is not possible that what is contemplated in illustrations should fit in every respect the things for which the use of the illustrations is taken up. Whence, then, do we say that the distinguished and at the same time conjoined is to be reasoned out from the things that appear before us to the senses? You have at some time, in the spring, beheld the brightness of the bow in the cloud — I mean that bow which common speech is wont to call the rainbow; which those skilled in such matters say is formed when a certain moisture is mingled with the air, the force of the winds pressing the moist and dense element in the vapours, when it has now become cloud-like, into rain. And they say it is formed thus: when the ray of the sun, running aslant beneath the dense and overshadowing mass of cloud, then fixes its own circle straight upon some cloud, there comes about, as it were, a bending and return of the light upon itself, the radiance being dissolved backward from the moist and glistening surface. For since it is the nature of fiery flashings, if they fall upon any smooth surface, to be bent back again upon themselves, and since the shape of the sun is circular, the circle made by the ray in the moist and smooth air must of necessity, in accordance with the shape of the sun's circle, be traced upon the air lying near the cloud by the glistening radiance. This radiance, then, is both continuous with itself and divided. For, being of many colours and many forms, it is imperceptibly blended with itself in the varied hues of its dye, secretly stealing from our eyes the meeting of the differing colours with one another; so that there is no recognizing the place in between that mingles through itself and separates the difference of the hues — the blue from the flame-coloured, or the flame-coloured from the purple, or that from the amber. For the radiances of all of them, seen at the same time, are far-shining, and, stealing away the signs of their conjunction with one another, escape detection, so that it is impossible to find out how far the fiery or the emerald part of the brightness extends, and from what point it begins to be no longer such as it is seen to be in the far-shining whole.

Just as, therefore, in the illustration we clearly distinguish the differences of the colours, and yet it is not possible for the sense to grasp the interval of one from the other, so reckon it possible to reason also concerning the divine doctrines: that the individualities of the hypostases, like some flower of those appearing in the rainbow, flash upon each of those believed in the Holy Trinity; but that, in respect of the individuality of the nature, no difference of one from the other is conceived, and that within the commonness of the essence the distinguishing individualities shine upon each. For there too, in the illustration, the essence that flashed forth that many-coloured radiance was one — that which was reflected through the sun's ray — while the flower of what appeared was of many forms; the discourse teaching us, even through the creation, not to be dismayed at the statements concerning the doctrine when, falling into what is hard to contemplate, we grow dizzy at the assent to what is said. For just as in the case of the things that appear to the eyes the experience proved stronger than the reasoning about the cause, so also, in the case of the doctrines that have risen above us, faith is stronger than the apprehension that comes through reasonings, teaching both what is separate in hypostasis and what is conjoined in the essence. Since, then, the discourse has contemplated something common in the Holy Trinity and something individual, the account of the commonness is referred to the essence, while the hypostasis is the sign of what is individual in each.

But perhaps someone may suppose that the account given of hypostasis does not agree with the sense of the Apostle's writing, where he says concerning the Lord that he is "the radiance of his glory and the express image of his hypostasis." For if we have given out that the hypostasis is the concurrence of the properties about each, and it is agreed that, as in the case of the Father, there is something individually contemplated, by which alone he is recognized, and in the same manner the like is believed concerning the Only-begotten — how is it that here the Scripture testifies the name of "hypostasis" of the Father alone, and calls the Son the form of the hypostasis, characterized not by his own marks but by those of the Father? For if the hypostasis is the sign of what is individual in the existence of each, and it is agreed that what is proper to the Father is to be unbegotten, while the Son has been formed by the properties of the Father, then it no longer remains for the Father to be called, in a special sense and of him alone, "unbegotten," if indeed the existence of the Only-begotten is characterized by what is individual to the Father.

But we say this: that the Apostle's discourse fulfils here another aim, with a view to which he used these expressions, calling him "radiance of the glory" and "express image of the hypostasis." He who has accurately understood this will find nothing at variance with what we have said, but the discourse carried through upon a certain individual notion. For the apostolic discourse is not concerned with how the hypostases may be distinguished from one another through the marks that appear, but with how the genuine, the undivided, and the conjoined character of the Son's relation to the Father may be conceived. For he did not say, "Who being the glory of the Father" — although the truth is indeed so — but, passing this over as agreed, and teaching us not to conceive one kind of glory in the case of the Father and another in the case of the Son, he defines the glory of the Only-begotten to be the radiance of the very glory of the Father, establishing the Son to be conceived together with the Father without interval, from the illustration drawn from light. For as the radiance is from the flame, and yet the radiance is not later than the flame, but at the very moment the flame blazes up the light flashes forth along with it, so he wishes the Son also to be conceived as from the Father, yet not the Only-begotten to be marked off from the existence of the Father by any extension of interval, but ever to apprehend, together with the cause, that which is from it.

In the same manner, then, as if interpreting the meaning already given, he says also "express image of the hypostasis," guiding us by bodily illustrations toward the understanding of things invisible. For as the body is altogether in a shape, yet the account of the shape is one thing and the account of the body another, and one giving the definition of each of these would not bring it into agreement with the account of the other — and yet, even though in discourse you distinguish the shape from the body, the nature does not admit the distinction, but the one is conceived conjointly with the other — so the Apostle thinks it necessary, even though the account of the faith teaches the difference of the hypostases to be unconfused and divided, yet also to present the closeness and, as it were, the connaturality of the Only-begotten to the Father through the words used; not as though the Only-begotten were not in hypostasis, but as not admitting any mean term in his union with the Father; so that he who has gazed with the eyes of the soul upon the express image of the Only-begotten should come also into a thought of the Father's hypostasis, the individuality contemplated in them not being exchanged or mingled together, so as to ascribe begetting to the Father or unbegottenness to the Son, but as though it were not possible, separating the one from the other, to apprehend by itself alone what remains. For it is not possible, when one has named "Son," not to come also into a thought of the Father, this appellation indicating the Father along with him by relation.

Since, therefore, "he who has seen the Son sees the Father," as the Lord says in the Gospels, for this reason he says that the Only-begotten is the express image of the Father's hypostasis. And that the meaning may be still better recognized, we shall take in also other expressions of the Apostle, in which he calls him "image of the invisible God," and again "image of his goodness" — not in that the image differs from the archetype in respect of invisibility and goodness, but that it may be shown to be the same as the prototype, even though it be other. For the account of an image could not be preserved unless it had the clearness and unchangeable likeness throughout. Therefore he who has understood the beauty of the image comes into a thought of the archetype. And he who has taken into his mind, as it were, the form of the Son has impressed upon himself the express image of the Father's hypostasis, beholding through this the Father — not beholding the unbegottenness of the Father in the image (for then it would have been throughout the same and not other), but discerning the unbegotten beauty in the begotten. For just as he who has understood, in a clean mirror, the impression of the form that has come to be in it has had a clear knowledge of the face that was imaged, so he who has recognized the Son has received in his heart, through the knowledge of the Son, the express image of the Father's hypostasis. For all things that are the Father's are seen in the Son, and all things that are the Son's are the Father's, since the whole Son also abides in the Father and again has the whole Father in himself. So that the hypostasis of the Son becomes, as it were, the form and face of the knowledge of the Father; and the hypostasis of the Father is recognized in the form of the Son, the individuality contemplated in them remaining for the clear distinction of the hypostases.