Book 5

Contents. The following is contained in the fortieth book of Dio's Roman History: 1. How Caesar crossed over a second time into Britain. 2. How Caesar, on his return from Britain, again made war upon the Galatae. 3. How Crassus began to make war on the Parthians. 4. Concerning the Parthians. 5. How Crassus, being defeated by them, perished. 6. How Caesar subdued the whole of Transalpine Gaul. 7. How Milo, after killing Clodius, was condemned. 8. How Caesar and Pompey began to fall into discord. The span of time is the remainder of the consulship of Domitius and Appius Claudius and four other years, in which the magistrates here numbered held office: Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus, son of Marcus, and Marcus Valerius Messalla, consuls; Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, son of Gnaeus, for the third time, and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Scipio, son of Nasica, consuls; Servius Sulpicius Rufus, son of Quintus, and Marcus Claudius Marcellus, son of Marcus, consuls; Lucius Aemilius Paulus, son of Marcus, and Gaius Claudius Marcellus, son of Gaius, consuls.

1.1. In Rome, then, these things happened, in the seven-hundredth year of its existence; but in Gaul Caesar, in the consulship of those same men, Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius, among other things made ready ships midway between his own swift vessels and the merchantmen of the country, so that they might be as light as possible and at the same time hold out against the wave, and might not be damaged when standing on dry

1.2. land. And when sailing weather came, he crossed over again into Britain, making as his pretext that they had not sent him all the hostages they had promised him, since they thought that, because he had then withdrawn empty-handed, he would no longer make any attempt upon them, but in deed eager for the island, so that, had this not been so, he would assuredly

1.3. have found some other excuse. He landed, then, where before, no one daring to oppose him by reason both of the multitude of his ships and of his bringing them to land in many places at once, and at once strengthened his

2.1. naval station. The barbarians, then, could not for these reasons hinder his approach, but, being more afraid than before, inasmuch as he had come with a larger army, gathered all their most precious things into the most overgrown and thickest of the

2.2. places near at hand, and having made them safe (for they cut down the trees around and heaped others upon them in rows, so as to be in a manner within a stockade), then harassed the foragers of the Romans. And indeed, being defeated in a certain battle on the open ground, they drew them on thither in the pursuit, and killed many in return.

2.3. And after this, when a storm again damaged their ships, they sent for allies in addition and set out against the very naval station, putting at their head Cassivellaunus, who held the first place among the

2.4. princes of the island. And the Romans, meeting them, were at first thrown into confusion by the charge of their chariots, but afterward, opening their ranks and letting them pass through and striking those who ran by on the flanks,

3.1. made the battle equal. And at that time both sides remained where they were; but afterward the barbarians, having got the better of the infantry, but being worsted by the cavalry, withdrew to the Thames, and barring its crossing with stakes, some visible and some under water, encamped there.

3.2. But when Caesar by a violent assault forced them to abandon both their position and the stockade, and after this drove them by siege out of their stronghold also, and others beat back those who attacked their naval station, they took alarm and came to terms, giving hostages and agreeing to an annual tribute.

4.1. And so Caesar departed altogether from the island, and left no army in it; for he thought that it would be in danger wintering somewhere in a foreign land, and that he himself would not do well to be away longer from Gaul, and so was content with what he had, lest, reaching for greater things, he stumble over those

4.2. as well. And this too he seemed to have done rightly, as indeed was proved by the event; for when he set out for Italy, as though to winter there, the Galatae, although each had many garrisons, nevertheless made a disturbance, and some of them even revolted openly. And had this happened while he was staying in Britain over the winter, all the affairs there would have been thrown into confusion.

5.1. The beginning of this war was made by the Eburones, with Ambiorix leading them. And they said that they had been stirred to action through displeasure at the presence of the Romans, over whom Sabinus and Lucius Cotta were in command as lieutenants; but the truth was that they both despised these men, as not likely to be sufficient to defend them, and did not expect that Caesar would quickly

5.2. march against them. So they fell upon them when they did not expect it, as though to take the camp at the first shout, and when they failed of it, turned to deceit. For Ambiorix, having laid ambushes beforehand in the most suitable places, came under a flag of truce to the Romans, as though he had warred against

5.3. them unwillingly, and said that he himself repented, and warned them to be on their guard against the others; for these, he said, did not obey him and intended to attack them by night. And from this he gave them counsel both to leave Eburonia, as being in danger if they remained, and to remove as quickly as possible to certain fellow-soldiers wintering somewhere

6.1. nearby. Hearing this, the Romans believed him, especially since he had been much benefited by Caesar and seemed to be giving him this return of gratitude. And having packed up in haste, they set out at once from evening, and falling into the ambushes were terribly

6.2. undone; for Cotta perished on the spot with many, and Ambiorix sent for Sabinus as though to save him (for he had not been present at what was done, and still seemed even then to be trustworthy to him), but seized him, and stripping him both of his arms and his clothing, shot him down, saying, among other things, "How is it that men such as you wish to rule over us who are

6.3. so great?" These men, then, suffered thus; and the rest broke through to the entrenchment whence they had set out, but when the barbarians attacked them there too, and they could neither defend themselves nor escape, they killed one another.

7.1. When this had happened, certain others of the neighbours revolted, and the Nervii, although Quintus Cicero was wintering among them; he was a brother of Marcus Cicero and a lieutenant of Caesar. And Ambiorix, taking them to himself,

7.2. came to grips with Cicero; and after fighting an indecisive battle, and taking some alive, he attempted somehow to deceive him too, but, being unable, both reduced him to a siege, and quickly, by reason of his abundance of hands and the experience which he had gained from the campaign he had made with the Romans, and learning something from each of the captives, both built a stockade and dug a

7.3. trench. For battles indeed occurred, as was likely in such a case, frequently, and far more of the barbarians perished, inasmuch as they were more numerous; yet they themselves, by reason of the abundance of their host, were not even aware of what of theirs was being destroyed, whereas the Romans, both being otherwise not many and ever becoming fewer, were easily surrounded.

8.1. So when they were in danger of being captured (for they could neither tend their wounds for lack of supplies, nor have food in abundance, inasmuch as the siege was unexpected; nor did anyone come to their aid, although many were wintering not far off; for the barbarians, guarding the roads strictly, seized all who were sent out by them and slew them before their very

8.2. eyes), a certain Nervian who was well disposed toward them out of gratitude for a benefit, and was then being besieged along with Cicero, furnished him with a slave of his own as a messenger; for both from his dress and from the native tongue he was able, unobserved, to consort with the enemy as though one of them, and afterward to withdraw.

9.1. So Caesar, learning what was happening (he had not yet gone off into Italy, but was still on the road), turned back, and taking the soldiers in the winter-quarters through which he passed, hastened on. And meanwhile, fearing lest Cicero should be beforehand and, in despair of aid, suffer some dreadful fate or even come to terms, he sent ahead a

9.2. horseman. For the slave of the Nervian, although he had had proof in deed of his goodwill, he did not trust, lest, taking pity on his countrymen, he should work them some great harm; but he sent from among the allies a horseman who knew their tongue and was equipped in their

9.3. dress. And that he himself might not, willingly or unwillingly, betray anything, he told him nothing, and wrote to Cicero all that he wished in Greek, in order that, even if the letter were captured, being unintelligible even then to the barbarians, it might teach them nothing. And he was wont also otherwise, whenever he sent any secret message to anyone, to write the fourth letter in place of the proper one, in order that

9.4. what was written might be unknown to the many. The horseman, then, came to the Roman camp, but being unable to approach close to it, fastened the letter to a javelin, and as though casting it at the enemy, fixed it on purpose to a tower. And Cicero, learning thus of Caesar's approach, took courage and held out the more

10.1. eagerly. The barbarians, for a long time, were ignorant of his coming to the rescue (for marching by night he then encamped by day in the most hidden places, that he might fall upon them as unexpectedly as possible); but at last, suspecting it from the great joy of the besieged, they sent out scouts, and learning from them that Caesar was now near, set out against him, as though to fall

10.2. upon him when he was off his guard. Caesar, then, learning this beforehand, remained where he was that night, and toward dawn, having seized a strong position, encamped there in as small a space as possible, in order to seem to be with few men and worn out from the march and afraid of their attack, and from this to draw them on to the very height.

10.3. And so it was; for despising him on this account, they assaulted the rising ground and met with a great disaster, so that they made war no longer.

11.1. Thus at that time both these and all the rest were subdued, yet were not well disposed toward the Romans. The Treveri, at any rate, in fear — since Caesar was summoning and punishing the foremost men among each people — lest they too pay the penalty,

11.2. were again driven into war with them, Indutiomarus persuading them, and having brought others too of those who feared the same to revolt with them, marched against Titus Labienus, who was among the Remi, and, the Romans coming out against them contrary to their expectation, were destroyed. These things happened in Gaul, and Caesar wintered in it, as though he would be able accurately

12.1. to settle them. But Crassus, desiring himself too to do something attended both with glory and with gain, and then, since he saw nothing of the kind in Syria (for they themselves were quiet, and those who had before warred against them made no movement through weakness), made an expedition against the Parthians, neither bringing any charge against them nor having the war voted to him; for he heard that they were very rich, and expected that Orodes would be easy to overcome, as being newly established.

12.2. So he crossed the Euphrates and advanced far into Mesopotamia, both plundering and ravaging it; for, his crossing being unexpected to the barbarians, no strict guard had been set over it, so that Silaces, who was then satrap of that country, was quickly defeated near Ichnae, a fortress so named, fighting with a few horsemen, and being wounded withdrew to be himself the announcer to the king of his

13.1. invasion; and quickly Crassus won over the fortresses and the cities, especially the Greek ones — among others that called Nicephorium; for the colonists of the Macedonians and of the other Greeks who had campaigned with them, many of them . . . being aggrieved by force and having many hopes in the Romans as lovers of the Greeks, went over

13.2. not unwillingly. Except that, when the inhabitants of Zenodotium sent for some of them as though about to come over, and when they had got within, took them and destroyed them, and on this account were uprooted, Crassus did and suffered nothing else dreadful at that

13.3. time. And he would certainly have subdued the rest of the country within the Tigris as well, had he used his own impetus and the dismay of the barbarians equally toward everything, and besides, by wintering there, established it in a strict

13.4. garrison. But as it was, having taken what he could seize by sudden onset, he took no thought either of the rest or of those very places, but, vexed at his stay in Mesopotamia and desiring the ease of Syria, gave the Parthians an opportunity to make ready and to harass the soldiers left in the country.

14.1. This, then, was the beginning for the Romans of the war against them. They dwell beyond the Tigris, for the most part in walls and fortresses, but also in cities, among them Ctesiphon, in which they have a royal residence. For their race existed

14.2. somewhere even among the ancient barbarians, and they had this name even under the Persian kingdom; but at that time they dwelt in a small portion of the country and held no dominion beyond their borders. But when the empire of the Persians was overthrown and that of the Macedonians flourished, and the successors of Alexander, falling into faction, cut off various portions and established kingdoms of their own,

14.3. then first they came into prominence under a certain Arsaces — whence the kings of them afterward were called Arsacidae — and, prospering, acquired all the neighbouring country and held Mesopotamia by satrapies, and at last advanced to such a height both of glory and of power that they both warred against the Romans then and are ever down to this day reckoned their match.

14.4. For they are otherwise strong in war, and yet have a greater name, although they have taken nothing from the Romans and have besides given up some of their own, because they have not yet been enslaved, but even now still maintain the wars against us,

15.1. as often as they engage in them. Concerning their race, then, and their country and the peculiarity of their pursuits much has been said by many, and I do not purpose to write of it; but their armament and their conduct of wars (the examination of which belongs to this history, since it comes also to a need of them) is of the following kind.

15.2. They make no use of a shield, but serve as mounted archers and lance-bearers, for the most part in full armour. Their foot-soldiers are few, and these the weaker; yet even they are all archers. For they are trained from boyhood, and both the climate and the

15.3. country help them toward both. For the country, being for the most part a plain, is best for rearing horses and most suited for riding over; whole herds of horses, at any rate, they bring with them even in their wars, so as to use different horses at different times, and to ride up suddenly from afar and to withdraw

15.4. suddenly to a distance; and the climate over them, being very dry and having not even the least moisture, makes their archery most powerful, except in the very depth of winter. And on this account in that season they make no expeditions anywhere. But for the rest of the year they are most hard to fight against both in their own land and

15.5. in one of like nature; for the sun, being very fiery, they endure by habit, and for the scarcity and difficulty of drink they have discovered many antidotes, so that from this too they ward off without difficulty those who invade their country. For outside that land, beyond the Euphrates, they have indeed sometimes been strong in certain battles and sudden

15.6. raids, but to make war on any continuously and steadily they are unable, both setting out into a condition of land and of climate most alien to them, and making no provision either of grain or of pay.

16.1. Such, then, are the affairs of the Parthians; and when Crassus had invaded Mesopotamia as has been said, Orodes sent envoys to him in Syria, both complaining of the invasion and inquiring the causes of the war, and sent against the captured places and those that had revolted

16.2. Surenas with an army; for he himself intended to march against the Armenia that had once been Tigranes', that Artabazes the son of Tigranes, who then was king of it, might send no

16.3. aid to the Romans, being in fear for his own country. Crassus, then, said that he would tell Orodes the causes of the war in Seleucia (this is a city in Mesopotamia which has even now a very large Greek population); and one of the Parthians, striking with the fingers of one hand into the palm of the other, said: "Sooner will hairs grow up from here than you will come to be in Seleucia."

17.1. And when the winter set in, in which Gnaeus Calvinus and Valerius Messalla were consuls, many portents occurred then in Rome itself; for owls and wolves were seen, and the dogs roamed about howling, and some statues

17.2. sweated, others were struck by thunderbolts, and the magistrates were appointed, partly through rivalry, but for the most part through the birds and the signs from heaven, only at last with difficulty in the seventh month; but those portents made plain nothing clear as to what they would end in. For both the affairs in the city were disturbed, and the Galatae were stirred up again, and they had clashed with the Parthians, not even knowing yet how;

17.3. but to Crassus, as he was crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma (so that place is called from Alexander's expedition, because he crossed there), there occurred manifest and easily interpreted

18.1. signs. For the so-called eagle (there is a small shrine, and in it a golden eagle is set up; and it is established in all the legions of the levy, and is moved nowhere from the winter-quarters, except

18.2. when the whole army goes forth somewhere; and one man carries it on a long pole, pointed at the spike-end so as to be fixed in the ground) — one of these eagles, then, would not at that time cross the Euphrates with him, but stuck in the ground as though rooted, until many

18.3. standing round forcibly pulled it out. And it followed even against its will; and one of the great standards, those resembling sails and bearing purple letters for the indication of the army and of its general the imperator, was overturned from the bridge and fell into the river. And this happened by reason of a violent

18.4. wind; but Crassus, by cutting down the others of equal length, in order that they might be shorter and thereby easier to carry, increased the portents. For a mist so great enveloped the soldiers at the very crossing of the river that they stumbled against one another and saw nothing of the

18.5. hostile land before they set foot upon it; and the fords and the landing-places were most difficult for them. And meanwhile a great wind fell upon them and thunderbolts struck down, and the bridge, before they had all crossed, broke apart. And since what was happening was such as to teach anyone, even the most senseless and stupid, that they would fare ill and not return, fear and dejection arose in the

19.1. camp, terrible. Crassus, then, encouraging them, said: "Be not dismayed, soldiers, if the bridge is destroyed, nor think that thereby anything grievous is signified;

19.2. for I myself, swearing to you, declare that I have resolved to make my return through Armenia." By this, then, he encouraged them; but now, adding something further, he said, crying out aloud: "Take heart; for not one of us

19.3. shall return from here." For the soldiers, hearing this, thought it an omen no less than the rest, and fell into greater despondency, so that they no longer heeded even the rest of his exhortations, by which he disparaged the barbarian and extolled the affairs of the Romans, and gave them money and

19.4. promised rewards. But even so they followed, and no one either spoke or acted against him, perhaps partly through the law, but already also struck with dismay and able neither to plan nor to do anything that might save them. At all events in everything else too, as though condemned by some divine power, they stumbled both in their minds and in their bodies.

20.1. But greatest of all Abgarus the Osrhoenian undid them; for, having become an ally of the Romans under Pompey, he chose instead the cause of the barbarian. And this Alchaudonius the Arabian did also; for he ever went over to the stronger side.

20.2. But the latter revolted openly, and in this respect was not hard to guard against; whereas Abgarus favoured the cause of the Parthian, but pretended to be friendly to Crassus, and spent money on him unsparingly, and learned all his plans and reported them to Orodes, and besides, if any of them was good, turned him

20.3. away from it, but if disadvantageous, urged him on. And finally he did something of this sort. For when Crassus intended to set out toward Seleucia, in order that he might be conveyed thither safely along the Euphrates, with his army and his supplies carried by it, and with them (for he hoped easily to win over the people, as being Greeks) might without difficulty cross over to

20.4. Ctesiphon, Abgarus made him neglect this, as though it would be a slow business, and persuaded him to come to grips with Surenas, as being near and with

21.1. few men. And after this, having prepared the one to perish and the other to prevail (for he was continually with Surenas on the pretext of reconnoitring), he led the Romans out unconcerned, as though to a victory ready at hand, and joined in the attack upon them in the very deed.

21.2. It came about thus. The Parthians, having hidden the greater part of their army (for the country was somewhat uneven and had trees), met the Romans. Crassus, then, seeing them — not the elder but the younger (for he had come to his father from

21.3. Gaul) — and despising them as though they were alone, led out against them with his cavalry, and pursuing them as they turned in flight on purpose, as though prevailing, was drawn far from the main body, and there,

22.1. being surrounded, was cut down. When this had happened, the Roman foot did not turn back, but eagerly came to grips with the Parthians, as though to avenge him; yet they did them nothing worthy of note, both by reason of their numbers and of their manner of fighting, and especially as they were

22.2. plotted against by Abgarus. For whether they resolved to lock their shields, as though to escape the arrows by the closeness of their array, the lance-bearers, falling upon them with a rush, struck some down and at all events scattered the rest; or whether they parted asunder to avoid this, they were shot down.

22.3. And meanwhile many died from the very charge of the lance-bearers, struck with dismay, and many were caught and destroyed by the horsemen; others were overturned by the lances

22.4. or carried off impaled. And the missiles, falling thick upon them and from every side at once, both struck down many with a mortal blow and made many useless for fighting, and bred trouble for all; for falling into their eyes and against their hands and the whole rest of the body, and passing through their armour, they took away their guard and compelled them to lay themselves bare to ever new

22.5. wounds, so that while a man guarded against an arrow, or drew out one fixed in him, he received more wounds, one upon another. And from this it was impossible for them to move, and impossible to keep still; for neither course held safety for them, but both brought destruction, the one because they could not, the other because they were more easily wounded.

23.1. And these things they suffered while they still fought against the visible enemy alone; for Abgarus did not at once set upon them. But when he too attacked, then the Osrhoenians both struck them in the rear, on the bare parts, as they were turned away, and made them easier for the others to slaughter. For wheeling their array, in order that they might be face to face with them, they put the Parthians at their

23.2. backs. So they turned about again toward these, and again toward those, and then toward the former. And being the more thrown into confusion by such a course, inasmuch as they were continually shifting hither and thither and were compelled to look toward whatever was wounding them, they fell foul of their own swords and

23.3. many perished by one another. And at last they were so penned into a narrow space, being compelled — the enemy ever falling upon them from every side at once — to cover their exposed parts with the shields of those who stood beside them, that they could no longer even move. Nor indeed did they have a firm footing, by reason of the multitude of the dead, but stumbled even over

23.4. them. And the heat and the thirst (for these things happened in the middle of summer and at midday) and the dust (for the barbarians, in order that as much of it as possible might rise, all rode round them) terribly wore down the rest, and many fell from these

24.1. causes unwounded. And they would have perished to a man, had not the lances of the barbarians been some turned aside and some broken, and their bowstrings snapped by the continuity of the shooting, and their arrows exhausted, and all their swords blunted, and, the chief thing, the

24.2. men themselves grown weary of the slaughter. So, then (for night was coming on and they had to ride off some distance), they withdrew; for they never encamp near even to the weakest, because they use no entrenchment and because, if anyone come upon them in the dark, they are unable to make strength either with the cavalry or with the

24.3. archery. They did not, however, take any of the Romans alive at that time; for seeing them standing in their arms, and perceiving neither anyone throwing them away nor himself fleeing, they thought that they still had strength and were afraid to lay hold of them.

25.1. So Crassus and all the others who were able set out toward Carrhae, kept safe for them by the Romans who had remained within; for many of the wounded, being able neither to walk nor to find means of conveyance or even to have guides (for the rest were glad to save

25.2. themselves), remained where they were. And of these some died of their wounds or even by their own hand, others were captured the next day; and of those who escaped, many, their bodies failing them on the road, and many also after this, perished, being unable to obtain prompt and

25.3. careful tending. For Crassus, in despair, thought that he could not even safely remain in the city, but at once planned flight. And since it was not possible for him to go out by day without becoming detected, he attempted to escape by night, but, betrayed by the moon, which was full, he did not escape notice.

25.4. So they waited until the moonless nights, and thus setting out — as in darkness and in a foreign and besides a hostile land, and in great fear — they were scattered, and of them some, captured when day came, perished, while others were saved into Syria with Cassius Longinus the quaestor;

25.5. others, taking to the mountains with Crassus himself, made ready to flee through them into Armenia.

26.1. But Surenas, learning this, and fearing lest, removing somewhere, they should again make war on them, was unwilling to assault the heights, which were impassable for horses (for, being men-at-arms and fighting from the higher ground, and having besides something of desperation through despair, they were not easy to come to grips with), but sent to them, inviting them, forsooth, to a truce, on condition that they leave all the land within the

26.2. Euphrates. And Crassus, without any hesitation, trusted him; for, being at the height of fear and confounded by dismay at once at his private and the public calamity, and besides seeing the soldiers shrinking from the road as long and rough and afraid of Orodes,

26.3. he was unable to foresee any of what was needful. So when he was ready for the truce, Surenas was unwilling to make it through others, but, in order that he might take him with few men and seize him,

26.4. said that he wished to come to a parley with Crassus himself. And from this, it having seemed good to them to meet one another in the space between, with equal numbers of men on each side, Crassus went down to the level ground, and Surenas sent him a horse as a gift, in order, forsooth, that he might come to him the

27.1. sooner. And so, as Crassus delayed and deliberated what he should do, the barbarians, seizing him, forcibly set him upon the horse. And meanwhile, as the Romans laid hold of him, they came to grips with them, and for a time were evenly matched, but afterward, when some came to their aid,

27.2. the barbarians prevailed; for being in the plain and prepared beforehand, they forestalled the upper Romans in defending themselves. And the rest fell, and Crassus too, whether by one of his own men, that he might not be taken alive, or by the enemy, since he was badly wounded, was slain.

27.3. This was his end, and the Parthians, as some say, poured molten gold into his mouth in mockery; for so eager had he been about money, although very rich, that he even pitied as poor those who were unable to maintain a legion of the levy from their own

27.4. means. Of the soldiers, the greater part escaped through the mountains into friendly territory, but some part was taken by the enemy.

28.1. The Parthians at that time did not advance beyond the Euphrates, but recovered all the country within it; and after this they invaded Syria too, yet not in any great force, as though it had neither general nor soldiers; whence Cassius easily beat them back, as they were

28.2. not many. For he, at Carrhae, when the soldiers, out of hatred of Crassus, offered him their supreme command, and besides Crassus himself, by reason of the greatness of the calamity, willingly entrusted it to him, did not accept it; but at that time, both by necessity, he took charge of Syria, both at the present and

28.3. afterward. For the barbarians did not refrain from it, but again with a larger force, nominally Pacorus the son of Orodes, but in deed (for he was still a child) Osaces leading them, made an expedition, and came as far as Antioch,

28.4. subduing all in their path. And they had hopes of subduing the rest as well, both because the Romans were present with no force worthy to fight, and because the peoples, aggrieved at their domination, inclined toward them, as being neighbours and familiar

29.1. to them. But failing of Antioch (for Cassius vigorously beat them off, and they were unable to besiege anything), they turned toward Antigonia. And since its suburb was thickly planted, and they had not the courage — nay, were not even

29.2. able — to ride into it, they intended to cut down the trees and lay the whole place bare, that they might approach the city both boldly and safely; but being unable (for the toil was great and the time was otherwise being wasted, and Cassius harassed such of them as scattered), they withdrew, as though to march against some other place.

29.3. And meanwhile Cassius laid an ambush on the road by which they intended to depart, and there, appearing to them with a few men, drew them on to pursuit, and surrounding them killed others and Osaces. And when he had died, Pacorus abandoned all Syria, and never again invaded it.

30.1. As soon as he had withdrawn, Bibulus too arrived to govern Syria, although it had been voted that no man, whether praetor or consul, should go out to the foreign commands either at once or before the fifth year, in order that on this account men should not, in canvassing, fall into faction.

30.2. And he himself kept the subject territory in quiet, but turned the Parthians against one another; for, having won over a certain satrap Ornodapates, who was vexed with Orodes, he persuaded him through messengers both to set up Pacorus as king and to march with him against Orodes.

30.3. This war, then — both that of the Romans and that of the Parthians — ceased in the fourth year from its beginning, in the consulship of Marcus Marcellus and

31.1. Sulpicius Rufus; and at that same time Caesar too again recovered by battles what had been disturbed in Gaul, doing very many things, some himself, some through his lieutenants,

31.2. of which I shall narrate the most noteworthy alone. For Ambiorix, taking to himself the Treveri, who even then were still grievously affected by the death of Indutiomarus, both gathered the local forces in greater numbers and sent for a mercenary band from the Celts.

31.3. Labienus, then, wishing to come to grips with them before those others arrived, invaded the country of the Treveri beforehand. And when they did not defend themselves but waited for the reinforcement, and, putting a certain river between, kept quiet, he gathered his soldiers and made a speech of the following kind, by which he was about to dismay both his own men and those others . . .

31.4. and he said that they ought, before the Celts came to their aid, to withdraw to Caesar and into safety, and at once signalled to pack up. And he set out not long after, expecting

31.5. that this would happen which did happen. For the barbarians, hearing this (for it was their concern, and for that very reason it was said openly), believed that he truly was afraid and was really making a flight, and crossing the river in haste, advanced against them in their fury, each as fast as he could.

31.6. And so Labienus awaited them scattered, and easily dismaying the foremost, routed the rest through those very men. And from this, as they fled in confusion and fell foul of one another and were thrust toward the river, he killed many.

32.1. Though even so many escaped, Caesar took no account of the rest, but had trouble both seeking and pursuing Ambiorix, who fled now in one direction, now in another, and did much mischief. And him he was unable by any means to take, but made an expedition against the Celts, as having wished to aid the Treveri.

32.2. And he accomplished nothing even then, but quickly withdrew through fear of the Suebi; yet he was thought to have crossed the Rhine again, and he broke up only those parts of the bridge near the barbarians, and built a fort upon it, as though ever intending to

32.3. cross over. And after this, bearing with anger the escape of Ambiorix, he permitted those who wished to plunder his country, although it had made no movement, proclaiming this very thing to them beforehand, that as many as possible might gather; whence many Galatae and many Sugambri

32.4. came to the plundering. Yet it did not suffice the Sugambri to ravage their land, but they set upon the Romans themselves; for watching them as they went off to gather grain, they attacked their camp, and meanwhile, when the Romans came to the rescue, since they perceived it, killed many.

32.5. And they, in fear of Caesar on this account, withdrew home in haste; while he, on account of the winter and because affairs in Rome were in faction, inflicted no punishment on any of these, but sending his soldiers to the winter-quarters, himself withdrew into Italy, on the pretext of the Gaul there, but in truth that he might from near at hand keep watch on what was being done in the city.

33.1. And meanwhile the Galatae again made a disturbance. For the Arverni, with Vercingetorix leading them, revolted, and killed all the Romans whom they found in their cities and country, and going against the allied territory of the Romans, cherished those who wished to revolt with them, but did mischief to the rest.

33.2. Learning this, then, Caesar came back, and finding them invaded the country of the Bituriges, did not defend the latter (for not yet were all his soldiers present), but, invading the Arvernian country in turn, brought the enemy back home, and (for he did not yet seem a match for them in battle)

34.1. withdrew beforehand. So they again came back against the Bituriges, and taking their city Avaricum, held out in it for a very long time. But afterward, being besieged by the Romans — for the wall was hard to approach, surrounded on the one side by marshes hard to cross and on the other by a swift river, and they themselves, being very numerous, both easily beat back their assaults and, coming out,

34.2. greatly harassed them. And at last they burned all around, not only farms or villages, but even cities from which they expected to gain any advantage, and if anything was brought to them from their distant allies, they seized it, so that the Romans, who seemed to be besieging the city, suffered the lot of

34.3. the besieged, until at length a violent rain and a great wind, falling upon them somewhere as they were assaulting (for it was winter), first drove off the Romans and brought them back to their tents, and then shut the barbarians up in their houses. For when they had left the battlements, the Romans suddenly assaulted them again,

34.4. now empty of men; and seizing at once a certain tower, before the enemy even perceived their presence, they then without difficulty subdued the rest, and plundered the whole city, and slew all the people in anger at the siege and the hardship.

35.1. Having done this, Caesar made an expedition into their country. And since the rest of the Arverni, being at war, had seized beforehand the bridges by which he had to cross, being at a loss how to get over, he marched along the bank for a long way, in case he might lay hold of some suitable place to cross on foot through the

35.2. very water. And from this, being in a wooded and shady spot, he sent ahead the baggage and the greater part of the army, bidding them advance in a long extended array, so that all of them might seem to be

35.3. there; while he himself remained with the strongest men, and cut timber and made rafts and on them crossed the stream, the barbarians having their minds on those marching in front and reckoning that Caesar was with

35.4. them. And after this he recalled by night those who had gone ahead, and bringing them over likewise, got control of the country; and the people having fled together into Gergovia and conveyed thither all their most precious things, he had very great

36.1. toil in vain besieging them. For the fortress was on a strong hill and was powerfully secured with walls, and the barbarians, having seized all the heights around it, kept guard around, so that they could both remain in their places safely and, charging down, had for the most part the

36.2. advantage. For Caesar encamped in the plain (for he could not find a strong position), and himself neither foreknew . . . , while the barbarians, as commanding the higher ground, both looked down upon his camp and made their charges at

36.3. opportune moments. And if at any point, advancing beyond the right occasion, they were thrown back, in a short time they were again within their stronghold; for the Romans could by no means, so far as the stones and javelins reached, approach the

36.4. places. Caesar, then, since the time was being wasted otherwise, and he had often assaulted the very steep on which the town stood, and got control of a part of it, so as both to fortify something there and to make his approach to the rest easier from there, but was on the

36.5. whole beaten back, and lost many of his soldiers and saw them uncapturable, and the affairs of the Aedui were in this interval disturbed, and besides, when he had gone off against these, those left behind came off badly, broke up the siege.

37.1. For the Aedui at first abode by their agreements and sent him aid, but afterward made war on him even against their will, being deceived by others and by Litaviccus. For since he could not otherwise persuade them to do this, he contrived that he should be ordered to lead off certain men to Caesar, forsooth for his

37.2. alliance, and set out as though to do this, but having sent ahead horsemen and bidden some of them, returning, to say that those sent with them and the others of their nation who were with the Romans had been arrested by them and had perished, he further exasperated the soldiers by a speech in accordance with the messengers.

37.3. And so they themselves revolted and made the rest revolt with them. And at that time (for Caesar, as soon as he perceived this, sent them the Aedui whom he had and was thought to have killed, so that they were seen by all alive, and followed with the

38.1. cavalry) they repented and were reconciled; but afterward, when the Romans suffered a reverse at Gergovia in Caesar's absence, and after this withdrew altogether from it, those who had wrought the revolt and ever desired new things, fearing lest in idleness . . . , made a disturbance and revolted.

38.2. Learning this, those of them who were campaigning with Caesar asked to be permitted to go home, promising to set everything in order. And being thus dismissed, they came to Noviodunum, where the Romans had stored their money and grain and many hostages, and destroyed the garrison of it, the natives helping them, when off their guard, and got control of all of it.

38.3. And that city, being well situated, they burned, that the Romans might not make it a base for the war, and made the rest of the Aedui revolt besides. Caesar, then, attempted at once to march against them, but being unable on account of the river Liger, turned toward the

38.4. Lingones. And he accomplished nothing even there; but Labienus took the island in the river Sequana, having overcome those who fought in his front on the mainland and made his crossing in many places at once, both with the current and against it, that he might not be hindered by crossing at a single point.

39.1. Before this happened, Vercingetorix, despising Caesar from his reverses, made an expedition against the Allobroges. And meanwhile Caesar, setting out as though to aid them, he caught in the country of the Sequani

39.2. and surrounded; yet he did him no harm, but on the very contrary both compelled the Romans to be brave through despair of safety, and himself, by reason of his numbers and his boldness, met with a reverse, and was somewhat foiled also by the Celts who

39.3. were allied to the Romans; for these, being insatiable in their onsets and adding daring to their bodily strength, broke the encirclement. And Caesar, finding this opportunity, did not let it go, but shutting up those of them who escaped into Alesia, besieged it.

40.1. And meanwhile Vercingetorix at first sent out the cavalry, before he was completely walled in, both for the sake of the horses' food (for there was none) and that each of them, conveyed to his own country, might bring supplies and aid to

40.2. him. But when these delayed and the food began to fail them, he cast out the children and the women and the most useless of the rest, hoping in vain either that these too would be saved by the Romans for the sake of booty, or that the rest, by using their food longer,

40.3. would survive. For Caesar otherwise had not himself supplies enough to feed others; yet, thinking that he would make the lack of food among the enemy more severe if they returned, in hope of being assuredly received, he beat them all

40.4. back. And so they, in the space between the city and the camp, neither side receiving them, most piteously perished; while the reinforcement of the cavalry and of the others brought by them came to the barbarians not long after, in a cavalry battle . . . by the aid of the Romans.

40.5. And after this, having attempted by night to enter the city through the lines of fortification, they were grievously distressed; for the Romans had made hidden trenches in the ground passable for horses and fixed stakes in them, having made everything on the surface like the rest of the surrounding ground,

40.6. so that both the men and the horses, falling into them as recklessly as possible, came to grief. Yet they did not give way until, fighting again in formation hard by the fortifications themselves, both they and those who came out from the city met with a reverse.

41.1. Vercingetorix, then, was able to escape (for he was neither captured nor wounded); but hoping, since he had once been on friendly terms with Caesar, to obtain pardon from him, he came to him without a herald, and was suddenly seen by him as he sat upon the tribunal, so that some were even thrown into confusion; for he was both very tall and made a terrible appearance in his

41.2. armour. But when quiet had come, he said nothing, but falling on his knee and clasping his hands, made entreaty. This filled the rest with pity at the remembrance of his former fortune and at the moving sight of his present condition; but Caesar reproached him with this very thing through which he had especially expected to be

41.3. saved (for, setting his opposition against his friendship, he declared his wrongdoing the more grievous), and on this account neither pitied him at the moment but at once bound him in fetters, and afterward, having sent him to grace his triumph, put him to death.

42.1. This, however, happened later; but at that time he won over some of the rest by agreement, and others, prevailing in battle, he enslaved. For the neighbouring Belgae, putting at their head a certain Commius the Atrebatian, held out for a very long time, and fought two cavalry battles somewhat indecisively, and meeting in a third, an infantry battle, on even terms at first, were afterward routed when the cavalry fell unexpectedly upon their rear.

42.2. And from this the survivors abandoned their camp by night, and passing through a certain wood, set fire to it and left only their wagons behind, in order that, the enemy being delayed both by these and by the fire, they might forestall them and withdraw into safety.

42.3. Yet they did not attain their hope; for the Romans, as soon as they perceived their flight, pursued them, and coming upon the fire, quenched some of it and cut through the rest, and some even, running through the midst of the flame, caught them unexpectedly and killed very

43.1. many. After this some of the rest came to terms, but the Atrebatian, escaping, did not even so keep quiet, but once attempted to ambush

43.2. Labienus. And being defeated in the battle, he was persuaded to come to a parley with him, but before anything at all was agreed, being wounded by one of the Romans, in distrust that there could be any firm peace, he escaped, and again became troublesome to them, until, despairing of his affairs, he procured for the rest of those with him unimpaired impunity in all that was theirs, but for himself, as some say,

43.3. that he should never come into the sight of any Roman. These men, then, were thus subdued, and the rest after this, some willingly and some conquered in war, were brought to terms; and Caesar, by garrisons and exactions of justice and levies of money and impositions of tribute, humbled some and tamed others.

44.1. These things, then, were thus accomplished in the consulship of Lucius Paulus and Gaius Marcellus; but Caesar, on account both of the Galatae and of the time given for his command, ought to have departed from Gaul and returned to Rome; for he was at the close of his term and the war had ceased, and he had no longer any specious pretext for not both disbanding his armies and becoming a private man;

44.2. but since affairs in the city were in faction, and Crassus was dead, and Pompey had again come into power, inasmuch as he had been consul a third time and had managed to have the command in Iberia given him for five more years, and was no longer

44.3. on friendly terms with him, especially since the little child who alone had held them in friendship had died, Caesar feared lest, stripped of his soldiers, he should be at the mercy both of him and of his other enemies, and did not disband them.

45.1. For in these same years many other seditious things happened in the city, and especially at the elections, so that with difficulty in the seventh month Calvinus and Messalla were appointed consuls;

45.2. and not even then would they have been chosen, had not Quintus Pompeius Rufus been cast into prison by the senate, although he was a grandson of Sulla and was tribune, and this was voted against the others too who wished to do any mischief, and the protection against them entrusted to Pompey.

45.3. For sometimes the birds too held up the elections, unwilling that they take place under interreges; but most of all the tribunes, managing the affairs in the city, so as even to hold the festivals in place of the praetors, hindered the rest of the magistrates from being chosen. And on this account also

45.4. Rufus was cast into prison. And he afterward, on some small charge, threw into it Favonius, who was aedile, in order, forsooth, to have a partner in his disgrace; while all the tribunes brought in various pretexts as hindrances, and proposed that military tribunes be appointed in place of consuls, in order that more magistrates, as once formerly,

45.5. might be appointed. And when none of them was persuaded, they at any rate said that Pompey must be named dictator. And on this pretext they wasted very much time; for he was abroad, and of those present no one ventured either to vote it (for, in view of the cruelty of Sulla, all hated the office) or again not to choose him, through

46.1. fear of Pompey. But at last he himself, coming late, did not, forsooth, accept the dictatorship offered him, but brought it about that the consuls were appointed. They, however, did not establish successors for themselves, on account of the disturbance from the slaughters, although they had laid aside the senatorial dress and assembled the senate in equestrian garb, as though for some great mourning.

46.2. And they made a decree that no one who had been praetor or consul should take the foreign commands until five years had passed, in case by their not being at once in any command they might cease from canvassing. For they neither showed moderation

46.3. nor did anything sound, but were stirred up against one another, spending much and fighting still more, so that even the consul Calvinus once was wounded. Accordingly neither consul nor praetor nor city-prefect succeeded them, but in this respect the Romans were wholly without rulers at the beginning of the year.

47.1. And from this nothing else good came to pass, and the market held every nine days fell on the very first of January.

47.2. And this disturbed them, as having occurred not by chance but in the manner of a portent, as did the fact that an owl was both seen and caught in the city, and a statue sweated for three days, and a torch ran across from the south to the east, and many thunderbolts and many clods of earth and stones and potsherds and blood were borne through the air.

47.3. And it seems to me that that portent too, voted in the former year, at its close, concerning Sarapis and Isis, was no less than these; for it seemed good to the senate to pull down their temples, which certain men had

47.4. built privately. For they did not for a long time consider these gods, and even when it prevailed that they be publicly worshipped, they set them up outside the pomerium.

48.1. Such, then, being the state of affairs in the city, and no one being set over the government, slaughters occurred well-nigh every day, and the elections, although men were eager for the offices and used both bribery and murders on their account,

48.2. they did not bring to pass. At any rate Milo, seeking the consulship, when Clodius met him on the Appian Way, at first simply wounded him in a manner, then, fearing lest he proceed against him for what had happened, slew him, hoping — since he at once freed all the slaves who had done this — that, if Clodius died of the murder rather than survive the wound, he would more easily be

48.3. acquitted. Hearing this, then, those in the city toward evening were terribly disturbed; for it became to the factions an occasion of war and of evils, and the moderate men, even if they hated Clodius, were nevertheless indignant, both through human feeling and because they wished to be rid of Milo on this

49.1. pretext. Taking them in this state of mind, Rufus and Titus Munatius Plancus further provoked them; for, being tribunes, they brought the corpse toward dawn into the Forum and laid it upon the rostra and displayed it to all,

49.2. and said over it what was likely, lamenting, so that the crowd was thrown into confusion both by what they saw and by what they heard, and took no further thought either of what was holy or of what was divine, but confounded all the customs concerning burials, and within a little burned down the whole city. For taking up the body of Clodius they carried it into the senate-house and laid it out, and after this, having heaped up a pyre from the

49.3. benches, burned both it and the senate-house. And this they did, not by some impulse, such as suddenly seizes mobs, but of deliberate purpose, so that they even held the funeral feast on the ninth day in the very Forum, while the senate-house was still smouldering, and besides attempted to burn down

49.4. the house of Milo. That house, then, since many defended it, was not burned; but Milo, for a while, being in terror over the murder, hid himself, guarded not by private men only but by knights and certain senators; but when this had happened and he hoped that the anger of the senate would turn toward the pollution of his

49.5. opponents (for at once that afternoon they gathered on the Palatine for this very purpose and voted that an interrex be appointed, and that he and the tribunes and besides Pompey should take charge of the guarding of the city, so that no harm befall it), he came forth into public and laid claim to the office as before, or even more.

50.1. So from this many battles and slaughters again occurred, so that the senate both ratified what had been said before, and summoned Pompey, and entrusted to him the making of new levies,

50.2. and changed their dress. And when he had come, not long after, they gathered outside the pomerium by his theatre, with a guard, and resolved to take up the bones of Clodius, and ordered Faustus the son of Sulla to rebuild the senate-house.

50.3. For it was the Curia Hostilia, but had been remodelled by Sulla; for which reason this was decided concerning it, and that, being built up, it should recover his name. And the city being in suspense as to who should rule them, and men noising abroad, some that Pompey should be made dictator,

50.4. others that Caesar should be chosen consul (for so, of deliberate purpose, did they honour him for his achievements that they even voted to sacrifice sixty days over them), the other senators and Bibulus — who indeed, being asked first, was to give his opinion — fearing both, forestalled the impulse of the multitude by giving Pompey the consulship, in order that he might not be named dictator, and that to him alone, in order that Caesar

50.5. might not be his colleague. This, indeed, was a strange thing, which had happened in the case of no one else, that they did; yet they were thought to have done it rightly; for since he was less attached to the crowd than Caesar, they hoped both to break him off from him altogether and to make him their own. And so it was; for, exalted by the new and unexpected honour, he no longer deliberated anything for the favour of the many, but did strictly all that pleased the senate.

51.1. He was not, however, willing to rule alone; for, having the glory in its being so decreed, he avoided the envy attending it. And fearing lest, the place being vacant, Caesar should, through the zeal both of the armies and of the multitude, be given him as

51.2. colleague, he managed, on the one hand, that Caesar — that he might not think himself wholly neglected and from this conceive some just anger — should be permitted through the tribunes to seek the office even in his absence, whenever it was lawful, and himself, on the other, chose as colleague Quintus Scipio, who was his father-in-law and lay under a charge of

51.3. bribery. For this man, being by birth the son of Nasica, but adopted by testamentary succession into the family of Metellus Pius, and on this account bearing his surname too, had given his daughter to Pompey, and received from him in return both the consulship and exemption from prosecution.

52.1. For very many were brought to account on this charge, and especially because the courts were more strictly constituted by the laws of Pompey. For he himself chose all the men from whom those who should judge had to be allotted, and fixed the number of those who should plead for each side, in order that the jurors might not be confounded and disturbed by the multitude

52.2. of them. And he ordered that to the prosecutor two hours be given, and to the defendant three. And what most of all wronged most men, the giving of certain praisers by the accused (for very many, being praised by men of credit, were snatched from justice), he corrected, enacting that no one at all should any longer be a praiser

52.3. of such men. And these and certain other things were ordained alike for all the courts; but over those who bribed for the offices he set as accusers those previously convicted of some such thing, offering them no small prize;

52.4. for if anyone convicted either two of the like and lesser sort or even one of the greater, he obtained pardon for the charge against himself.

53.1. From this, then, many others were convicted, and Plautius Hypsaeus, who had sought the consulship in rivalry with Milo and Scipio. For of the three who had given bribes, he alone

53.2. was condemned. For Scipio was indicted by two, but was not tried on account of Pompey; and Milo was not brought to trial on this (for he had the greater charge of murder), but being brought up on that, was convicted, being unable to do anything violent. For Pompey both kept the rest of the city under guard, and

53.3. entered the court with men-at-arms, and when some made a disturbance at this, he ordered the soldiers to drive them out of the Forum, striking them with the flat and broad of their swords. And when they did not yield but, as in some game, being struck with the flat, mocked them, some of them were both wounded and killed.

54.1. So the courts thereafter were held in quiet, and many were brought to justice both on certain other charges and for the murder of Clodius — among others Milo, although he had Cicero as his advocate.

54.2. For that orator, seeing Pompey and the soldiers in the court contrary to custom, was struck with dismay and afraid, so that he said nothing of what he had prepared, but uttering with difficulty a little, and that scarce alive, was glad to withdraw. For this speech now extant, as having then been delivered on behalf of Milo, he wrote at some later time, when he had recovered courage at his leisure;

54.3. and indeed something of this sort is handed down concerning it. Milo, on receiving the speech sent him by Cicero (for he had been exiled), wrote back saying that it was a piece of good fortune for him that these things had not been so spoken in the court; for he would not be eating such mullets in Massilia (in which he was during his exile), if any such thing had

54.4. been pleaded in his defence. This he wrote, not because he was pleased with his present lot (for he had ventured many things for his recall), but mocking at Cicero, because, having said nothing useful at the time of the defence, he then both composed and sent him fruitless speeches, as though they could profit him at that time.

55.1. So Milo was thus convicted, and Rufus and Plancus, as soon as they had gone out of office, and many others with them, for the burning of the senate-house, although Pompey too exerted himself on behalf of Plancus, so that he sent to the court a written document containing both praise of

55.2. him and entreaty; for Marcus Cato (who was to judge) said that he would not admit the praiser, to the overthrow of his own laws. And Cato no longer gave his vote; for Plancus challenged him as one likely to bring the vote that would convict him (for it was permitted, by the laws of Pompey, that each of the contending parties reject five of those who were to judge

55.3. them); but the other jurors condemned him. For it seemed to them otherwise not right, having convicted Rufus, to acquit a man tried on the same charges; and since they saw Pompey aiding him, they exerted themselves against him, that they might not be thought to be outright slaves of his rather than

55.4. jurors. And yet Cicero then too accused Plancus no better than he had defended Milo; for the appearance of the court was the same, and Pompey in each both deliberated and acted contrary to him, whence not least he again gave offence to him.

56.1. These things, then, he managed at the same time, and he renewed the law concerning the elections, which bade those who announced their candidacy for any office attend the assembly in person, so that no one be chosen in his absence, a law somehow neglected; and he ratified the decree made a little before, that those who had held office in the city should not be allotted the foreign commands until five years had passed.

56.2. Nor was he ashamed, having then written such things, not long afterward both himself to take Iberia for five more years, and to give to Caesar, even in his absence (for his friends were terribly indignant), the right to seek the

56.3. consulship, as had been voted. For he added to the law that this might be done only by those to whom it was expressly and outright permitted; yet this differed nothing from there being no hindrance at all; for in any case those who had power were likely to manage to have that too voted to them.

57.1. Pompey, then, conducted his administration thus; but Scipio neither enacted anything, and annulled what had been written by Clodius concerning the censors. And he was thought to have done this for their favour, since he restored to them the power which

57.2. they had before; but it turned out the contrary. For, since there were many base men both in the equestrian order and in the senate, so long as it was not permitted them to strike out anyone neither accused nor convicted, they had no blame for those not erased;

57.3. but having recovered their ancient power, by which it was given them to do this in examining of themselves the life of each, they neither endured to give offence to many, nor again wished to come into any blame as not striking out the unworthy, and on this account not even one of the sensible men any longer sought the office.

58.1. Concerning the censors, then, these things were voted; but Cato otherwise had need of no office, but seeing both Caesar and Pompey growing beyond the constitution of the state, and suspecting either that both of them together would hold affairs, or that, falling into discord with one another, they would make a very great sedition and that

58.2. the one who prevailed over the other would become sole ruler, wished to break them down before they became rivals, and sought the consulship against them, since as a private man he was likely to have no strength; but being suspected by the partisans of those men of intending to do some such thing, he was not appointed, but Marcus

58.3. Marcellus and Sulpicius Rufus, the one for his experience in the laws, the other for his power of speech, were chosen, especially because these themselves, if not by money or by any violent deed, yet by much courting and entreaty, dealt with all, whereas Cato courted

58.4. none of them. And he no longer laid claim to the office, saying that it was the part of a good man neither to flee the leadership of public affairs, if any wished to use him, nor to seek it beyond what was

59.1. fitting. But Marcellus at once did everything toward the overthrow of Caesar (for he was of Pompey's party), and among many other measures against him, proposed that a successor be sent him even before the proper time. And against him both Sulpicius and certain of the tribunes acted — these out of favour to Caesar; while he communicated to them and to the many that it was not pleasing that a magistrate in mid-term, having done no

59.2. wrong, should be removed. So Pompey, learning this (for he had set out from the city as though to march into Iberia, yet not even then withdrew from Italy, but, having entrusted all affairs there to his lieutenants, himself kept watch on the

59.3. city), pretended that even to himself it was not pleasing that Caesar be deprived of his command, but worked that, when he had completed the time given him (this was to happen not long after, but at once in the following year), he should both lay down his arms and return home a private man.

59.4. And on this account he caused Gaius Marcellus, the cousin or even brother (for both are said) of Marcus, to be consul, since, although connected with Caesar by marriage, he was his enemy, and Gaius Curio, who was likewise his enemy of old, to be tribune.

60.1. Caesar, then, otherwise not enduring, after so great and so long a command, to become a private man, and fearing lest he be at the mercy of his enemies, made ready to remain in his command even against their will, and enrolled more soldiers and gathered money and made arms, and bore himself toward

60.2. all in a way to please them. And meanwhile, wishing to arrange beforehand affairs at home in a manner, that he might not seem to do everything by force but also by persuasion, he resolved to be reconciled with Curio; for he was of the family of the Curiones, and was keen in mind, terrible in speech, most persuasive with the multitude, and most lavish of money for everything from which he hoped either himself to gain some advantage or to manage something for another.

60.3. And by holding out many hopes to him, and by freeing him from all his debts, which were many through his great spending, he attached him. For with a view to his present zeal in what he was doing, he spared no money (since he was levying it from those very men), and besides promised some men vast sums of which he was not

60.4. going to give even the smallest part. And not only the free men but also the slaves who had any influence at all with their masters he courted; and many of the knights and senators too came over to him from this.

61.1. Curio, then, favoured the cause of Caesar, yet did not at once begin to act openly on his behalf; for he sought a specious pretext, that he might seem to have changed sides not willingly but by compulsion, and thought that, the longer he consorted with Caesar's enemies as though their friend, the more and greater of their secrets he would learn.

61.2. For these reasons, then, he concealed himself for a very long time, and in order that he might in no way be suspected of having changed and of not thinking and saying, then too still, all that was contrary to Caesar among the foremost, he both harangued against him from the time when he began to be tribune, and proposed

61.3. many and strange things. And he wrote certain measures against the senate and the most powerful among them, who indeed especially favoured Pompey's cause, not because he wished it or expected any of them to come to pass, but in order that, when they would not accept them, neither should anything be voted against Caesar (for many measures were proposed against him by many) and that he himself, on this pretext, might

62.1. change sides. So having for a long time, by various pretexts, wasted time, that none of them at all might be ratified, he pretended to be indignant, and claimed that another month be inserted for the legislation, forsooth, proposed by them. This was done as often as it was due, yet did not fall due at that time, as he himself, being a

62.2. pontifex, knew. Nevertheless he said it ought to be done, and tried to force his fellow-priests, so far as shouting went; and at last, being unable to persuade them to agree with him — as indeed he did not wish — he permitted nothing else to be voted on this account, but now openly pleading

62.3. Caesar's cause, since he was unable, forsooth, to do anything against him, put forward everything that could possibly not be accepted, and especially that all who held arms must lay them down and disband their armies, or else that Caesar too should not be stripped of his and given over to the forces of his opponents.

62.4. And he said this, not because he wished Caesar to do it, but because he knew well that Pompey would not obey him; and from this a reasonable pretext was given to Caesar too for not disbanding his soldiers.

63.1. Pompey, then, since by doing nothing else he accomplished anything, turned openly to harshness, and from the open both said and did everything against Caesar. Yet he accomplished nothing.

63.2. For many others fought for Caesar, and Lucius Paulus, the colleague of Marcellus, and Lucius Piso, his father-in-law, who was censor; for censors at this time were Appius Claudius and Piso, although against his will.

63.3. And the latter favoured Caesar on account of the kinship, while Claudius opposed him (for he chose Pompey's side), yet not least, even against his will, helped him; for he struck out very many both of the knights and of the senators, forcing his colleague, and from this made all of them

63.4. favour Caesar. For Piso, both being otherwise unwilling to have trouble and courting many for his son-in-law's friendship, himself did nothing of the kind, but did not oppose Claudius when he expelled from the senate all of freedman descent and many even of the very noble, among others Crispus Sallustius, who wrote

63.5. the history. Curio, however, who was himself about to be struck off, he begged off together with Paulus, of whom he was a

64.1. kinsman; and the other did not on this account release him, but published in the senate-house the opinion he held of him, so that Curio, in indignation, tore his garment. Marcellus, then, taking this up, and thinking that the senate would vote something dreadful both against Curio and, through him, against Caesar, put forward proposals

64.2. concerning him. Curio at first opposed any opinion being given concerning himself; but learning that the greater part of the senators then present some really favoured Caesar and others greatly feared him,

64.3. he permitted them to decide, only adding this much: "I am conscious to myself that I am doing the best and most advantageous things for my country; yet I deliver to you both my body and my soul, to use as you wish." Marcellus, then, having accused him as one who would assuredly be convicted, then, since

64.4. by the greater part he was acquitted, took it ill, and leaping out of the senate-house went to Pompey, who was in the suburb, and gave him, of his own accord, none having voted it, both the guarding of the city and two citizen-legions. And these soldiers had been gathered in this way and on this account,

65.1. and were then present. Pompey, earlier, while he still held Caesar in friendship, had given him one legion of those of the levy serving under him (for he himself was not conducting any war, and Caesar had need of

65.2. soldiers); but when they fell into discord, wishing both to take this back from him and besides to deprive him of yet another, he gave out that Bibulus needed soldiers against the Parthians, and that, in order that no new levies be made (for he said that the matter was urgent and that they had an abundance of legions), it was voted that each of them, himself and

65.3. Caesar, should send him one. And from this he sent none of those serving under him, but ordered that the army which he had given Caesar be demanded by those appointed for this purpose. And so in word both of them, but in truth Caesar alone, sent the

65.4. two; for he knew what was being done, but obeyed, not wishing to incur the charge of disobedience, especially as he intended on this pretext to enroll far more soldiers in their place.

66.1. These legions, then, were made ready as though to be sent against the Parthians, but when there was no need of them (for there was no use for them), Marcellus, earlier, fearing lest they be given back to Caesar, said that they ought to be in Italy, but then, as I said, handed them over to Pompey.

66.2. And since what was being done was at the close of the year, and was not likely to be in force long, inasmuch as it had seemed good neither to the senate nor to the people, he brought over to Pompey Cornelius Lentulus and Gaius Claudius, who were to be consuls the following year, and made them too give the same orders;

66.3. for since it was permitted even then to publish dispatches to those appointed to the offices and to do certain other things pertaining to their command even before it began, they thought themselves masters of this. And Pompey, although strict in everything else, nevertheless busied himself nothing, on account of his need of soldiers, either from whom or how he received them, but received them very gladly.

66.4. Yet nothing was done such as one would have expected to come from so great a daring, but, having only displayed their enmity toward Caesar, they themselves made ready nothing else strong, and gave him from this too a reasonable pretext for retaining the armies that were with him.

66.5. For Curio, on these grounds, made a long accusation before the multitude both against the consuls and against Pompey, and when he had completed his term of office, set out at once to Caesar.