Book 6

arg. The following are contained in the forty-first book of Dio's Roman History: 1. How Caesar came into Italy, and how Pompey, abandoning it, sailed across to Macedonia. 2. How Caesar subdued Spain. 3. How Caesar sailed across to Macedonia against Pompey. 4. How Caesar and Pompey fought around Dyrrachium. 5. How Caesar conquered Pompey at Pharsalus. Span of time: two years, in which the magistrates here numbered were: Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, son of Publius; Gaius Claudius Marcellus, son of Marcus, consuls. Gaius Julius Caesar, son of Gaius, for the second time; Publius Servilius Isauricus, son of Publius, consuls.

1.1. At that time, then, he did these things; but afterward, having received a letter from Caesar to the senate, he came to Rome on the very first day on which Lentulus Cornelius and Claudius Gaius entered upon their office, and he did not hand it over to the consuls until they had assembled in the senate-house, lest they should take it somewhere outside and suppress it.

1.2. For even so they held out a long while, being unwilling to read it aloud; but at last, under pressure from Quintus Cassius Longinus and Marcus Antonius, who were tribunes, they were compelled to make it public.

1.3. Antonius, then, by thus serving Caesar at this juncture, was destined himself in return to receive much and to be lifted up to great heights. In the letter were set down all the other services Caesar had at any time rendered well to the commonwealth, and

1.4. a justification with respect to the charges brought against him. He promised to disband his legions and to lay down his command, provided Pompey should do the same; for so long as Pompey kept his arms, he said it was not just that he himself should be compelled to give up his own, lest he should be handed over to his enemies.

2.1. A vote was then taken on these matters, not man by man—lest from shame or some fear they should declare against their own opinions—but by a division of the house to this side and to that. No one voted that Pompey should give up his arms (for he held his forces in the suburbs), but all voted that Caesar should, except a certain Marcus Caelius and Curio, who

2.2. had brought his letter. Of the tribunes I say nothing, since they were not put under any compulsion to cross over, having authority to contribute an opinion if they wished or not. These things, then, were resolved, yet neither on that day nor on the next did Antonius and Longinus permit any of them to be ratified.

3.1. When the others were indignant at this and voted to change their dress, this too failed to gain validity from the same men; yet the motion was put in writing, and the act resulting from it took place. For all at once went out from the senate-house, changed their garb, came in again, and deliberated about punishing them.

3.2. Seeing this, those men at first resisted; then, taking fright—especially since Lentulus urged them to withdraw secretly before the votes should be cast—they said much and called the gods to witness, and thereupon, together with Curio and Caelius, they set off to Caesar, caring little that they had been struck off the senatorial roll.

3.3. At that time, then, this was decided, and the guarding of the city was entrusted to the consuls and the other magistrates, as was somehow customary; and later, going outside the pomerium to Pompey himself, they resolved that there was a state of disorder,

3.4. and they gave Pompey both money and soldiers, and voted that Caesar should hand over his command to his successors and disband his armies within a stated day, or else be regarded as an enemy, as one acting against his country.

4.1. Learning this, Caesar came to Ariminum, then for the first time advancing beyond the bounds of his own province, and, gathering his soldiers, he ordered Curio and the others who had come with him to relate to them what had been done. When this was done, he stirred them up still further,

4.2. adding whatever the occasion demanded. After this, setting out, he marched straight against Rome itself, adding to himself without a battle all the cities in his path, since the garrisons either abandoned them through weakness or chose his cause instead. Pompey, perceiving this, and at the same time learning his whole design from Labienus,

4.3. took fright. For this man had deserted Caesar and gone over to the other side, and reported to him all his secrets. One might well wonder that, having always been honoured by Caesar among the foremost—so that he commanded all the legions beyond the Alps whenever Caesar was in Italy—he did

4.4. this. The reason was that he himself, having clothed himself in wealth and reputation, had begun to bear himself more arrogantly than befitted his rank, and Caesar, seeing him set himself on an equal footing with himself, no longer regarded him with the same favour. So, unable to bear the change, and at the same time afraid that he might suffer some harm, he went over.

5.1. Pompey, then, from what had been told him about Caesar, and because he had not yet prepared a force fit to give battle, and because he saw that the people in the city—both the rest and especially his own partisans—shrank from war through memory of the deeds of Marius and Sulla and wished to be rid of it

5.2. safely, changed his mind, and of his own accord sent to Caesar as envoys Lucius Caesar, a kinsman of his, and Lucius Roscius, a praetor, to see whether he might somehow escape his onset and then come to terms on some moderate conditions.

5.3. When Caesar replied with the same things he had written, and added that he himself wished to confer with Pompey, this the many did not hear gladly,

5.4. fearing that the two might make some compact against them. Yet when the envoys praised Caesar in many ways, and finally promised besides that no one should suffer any harm from him and that the armies would at once be disbanded, they were pleased, and sent the same envoys again to him, demanding, with continual outcry everywhere, that both men together should lay down their arms.

6.1. Afraid on this account, then, was Pompey (for he well knew that he would fall far short of Caesar, if it came to depend on the people); and so he himself, into Campania,

6.2. before the envoys returned, intending to wage the war more easily there, set off in advance, and ordered the whole senate, together with those holding office, to follow him, granting them by decree immunity for the absence, and declaring beforehand that whoever remained behind he would hold in the same and equal account with those acting against

6.3. them. Besides this, he ordered them to vote that the public moneys and all the dedications in the city be taken up, expecting to gather from them a vast number of soldiers. For so great was the goodwill that almost all the cities in Italy, so to speak, bore him, that, when they heard he had a little before been dangerously ill, they had vowed to offer public

6.4. sacrifices for his recovery. And that they granted him something great and splendid in this, no one would deny; for to no other man whatever—save those who afterward gained absolute power—was such a thing ever voted; yet they did not thereby furnish sure pledge that they would not abandon him before the fear from the stronger man.

6.5. These measures, then, concerning the moneys and the dedications, were resolved, but neither was carried out; for in the meantime, learning that Caesar had given the envoys no peaceful answer and was further accusing them of having uttered falsehoods

6.6. against him, and that his soldiers were numerous and bold and would do any mischief whatever—such things being wont to be reported in a more fearful guise—they took fright, and made their departure in haste, before any one of them should be laid hold of.

7.1. And from this their removal became in all other respects likewise full of tumult and confusion. For those who went out (they were, so to say, all the foremost both of the senate and of the equestrian order,

7.2. and besides also of the common folk) set forth in name for war, but in deed suffered what captives suffer; for, compelled to abandon their country and their accustomed ways of life there, and to count alien walls more their own than their own, they were grievously

7.3. grieved. For those who rose up with their whole households left behind their shrines and their homes and their ancestral soil, as though these would straightway belong to their opponents, and they themselves were of such a mind that, if indeed they should be preserved, they would settle in Macedonia and Thrace; for Pompey's intention

7.4. they were not ignorant of. And those who left their children and wives and the rest of their most precious possessions in their place seemed to hold some hope of their country, but they fared far worse than the others, since, being torn from what was dearest, they were exposed to a twofold and most contrary fortune,

7.5. and so departed more painfully; for, having given up their nearest and dearest to their bitterest enemy, they were likely either, by playing the coward themselves, to incur danger, or, by showing zeal, to be deprived of them, and moreover to have neither for a friend but both for enemies—Caesar because they had not themselves remained, Pompey because they had not also brought those possessions with them.

7.6. So that, being plunged into uncertainty in their judgements and their prayers and their hopes alike, they were at once torn in body from their nearest and dearest and divided in soul in two.

8.1. Such things, then, did those who set forth suffer; but those who were left behind were beset by other troubles, different yet no less severe. For those who were severed from their kin, being deprived of their protectors and least able to defend

8.2. themselves, given over to the war and destined to be in the power of whoever should master the city, were themselves wretched through fear of the violence and slaughter as though it were already happening; and concerning those gone, those who held anger against them for being left behind imprecated the same upon them, while those who made allowance for the necessity

8.3. feared the same. And all the remaining multitude, even if they had no kinship at all with those departing, nonetheless grieved both for them—some expecting that their neighbours, some that their companions, would go far from them, and would do and suffer many strange things—and far most of all

8.4. bewailed themselves; for, seeing the magistrates and the senate and all the rest who had any power (for they did not know whether any of them would be left) withdrawing from their country and from themselves, and reckoning that those men would never have wished to flee unless very many terrible things had been hanging over it,

8.5. they themselves, becoming bereft of rulers and bereft of allies, in all other respects resembled orphaned children and widowed women, and, dreading the angers and lusts of those who should come upon them and the foremost . . . from memory of former sufferings—some having themselves experienced them, others hearing from those men how many and what deeds Marius and Sulla had wrought—

8.6. they suspected nothing moderate even from Caesar, but expected to suffer far more and far more terrible things, since the greatest part of his army was barbarian.

9.1. Such, then, being the disposition of them all, and no one—save those who seemed in some way attached to Caesar—making light of the matter, and even those not confident with trustworthy faith in the changes of men's tempers, which the majority adopt according to their present circumstances, it is not easy even to conceive how great a tumult, how great a mourning, there was at the departure of the consuls and the others

9.2. who set forth with them. For all night long, packing up and going about, they made a din, and toward dawn there was much lamentation at the temples (for, going round to each, they made their prayers) which took hold of them all; for they called upon the gods, and kissed the pavements, and reckoned up how many and what perils they had survived, and bewailed that they were leaving their country—a thing they had never before dared. And much wailing there was, too, about the gates;

9.3. for some, beholding one another and the city as though for the last time, embraced; others bewailed themselves and prayed along with those departing, and the greater part cursed as though betrayed; for all, even those who were remaining, were present with all their children and all their wives.

9.4. And after this some set forth, others escorted them on their way; some lingered and were held back by their acquaintances, and certain ones, embracing one another, clung together a very long time. And those remaining, following those who set forth, cried out to them at the greatest length and pitied them, and besought heaven, asking either that they be taken along or that those others stay at home.

9.5. And in this there was loud wailing over each of them, even from the rest, and floods of tears; for the hope of the better course they least of all entertained, being in such straits, while the woes—first those left behind, then also those setting forth—

9.6. they looked for. One who saw them would have likened it to two peoples and two cities arising out of one, the one rising up and fleeing, the other being left behind and taken captive.

9.7. Pompey, then, thus abandoned the city, taking with him many of the senators (for some were left behind, some favouring Caesar's cause, others standing midway between the two), and he zealously made levies from the cities and collected money and sent garrisons everywhere;

10.1. and Caesar, when he learned this, did not hasten toward Rome (for he knew that it lay as a prize set before the victors, and he kept saying that he was marching not against it as though it were an enemy to him, but against his opponents, ostensibly on its behalf),

10.2. but, sending letters throughout all Italy, in which he summoned Pompey to a trial and exhorted the rest to take courage, he bade them remain in their place, and made them many promises. And against Corfinium, since it was held by Lucius Domitius and would not come over to him, he set out, and, overcoming in battle some who came against him, he shut up the rest in a siege.

10.3. Pompey, then, since these men were being besieged and many of the others were inclining toward Caesar, no longer had any hope of Italy, but resolved to cross over to Macedonia and Greece and Asia; for through the memory of what he had accomplished there, and through the friendship of the peoples and the kings,

10.4. he was greatly confident. For all Spain too was attached to him, but he could not be conveyed thither safely, since Caesar held the Gauls. Besides, he reckoned that, if he sailed off, no one would pursue him, both through the lack of ships and on account of the winter (for it was already past autumn), and that in the meantime he would at leisure gather from his subjects much, and from his allies much, both money and

11.1. armies. He himself, then, on these considerations set off for Brundisium, and ordered Domitius, abandoning Corfinium, to follow him. And he, even though he had a considerable force and set his hopes upon it (for he had courted his soldiers in various ways, and by the promise of land

11.2. had won them over; for he had been of Sulla's party and had acquired much from that domination), nonetheless obeyed. And while he was making his preparations to withdraw with some safety, his men, learning this, and shrinking from the retreat as being in fact a flight, attached themselves to

11.3. Caesar. And they took the field with him; but Domitius and the other senators were charged by him with their opposition, yet were released and went off to Pompey.

12.1. Caesar, then, was eager to come to grips with him before he should sail, and to fight the war out in Italy, and to catch him while he was still at Brundisium; for, since his ships were not sufficient for them, Pompey had sent ahead both others and the consuls, lest they should stir up some revolt by remaining in their place;

12.2. but Caesar, seeing the difficulty of taking the place, invited him to a compact, as though about to recover peace and friendship. And when he replied nothing else than that he would communicate what was said to the consuls, since it had been decided by them to admit none of the citizens under arms to a parley,

12.3. he assaulted the city. And Pompey defended himself against him for some days, until the ships returned; and meanwhile, having built across and blocked up the roads to the harbour, lest anyone should attack him as he sailed out, he then put out by night. And he crossed safely to Macedonia, but Brundisium was taken, and in it two ships full of men.

13.1. Pompey, then, thus abandoned his country and the rest of Italy, having both chosen and done everything most contrary to his former course, when he sailed into it from Asia—the course from which he had won both his fortune and his reputation as their

13.2. match. For whereas formerly he had at once disbanded his legions at Brundisium, that he might not in any way distress the citizens, now of his own act he led other armies out of Italy against them; and whereas he had brought the wealth of the barbarians into Rome, now everything,

13.3. so far as he was able, he conveyed elsewhere out of it; and he renounced all that was at home and purposed to use against his country the resources of foreigners, and indeed of allies once enslaved by himself, and in them he placed far more hope both of safety and of dominion than in those he had benefited;

13.4. and on this account, in place of the splendour with which, having gained it from those wars, he had arrived, he departed having received lowliness in the face of his fear of Caesar, and in place of the good fame which he had won by enlarging his country, he became most ill-famed for his then abandonment of it.

14.1. And straightway, putting in at Dyrrachium, he learned that he would not come off well; for thunderbolts destroyed soldiers at the very landing, and spiders covered the military standards, and, as he disembarked from the ship, serpents following in his track

14.2. blotted out his footprints. To him, then, these portents occurred, but to the whole city also others had befallen, both in this year and a little before. For truly in civil strife the commonwealth is harmed from both sides; and for this reason many wolves and owls were seen in the very city,

14.3. and continual earthquakes occurred with bellowings, and fire shot from west to east, and another fire burned, among other things, the temple of Quirinus. The sun was wholly eclipsed, and thunderbolts struck the sceptre of Zeus and a shield and the helmet of Ares, which were set up on the Capitol, and besides also the tablets containing the

14.4. laws. Many living creatures brought forth certain offspring outside their own nature, and certain oracles were chanted as being from the Sibyl, and some, becoming possessed, uttered many prophecies. And no prefect of the city was chosen for the festal recess, as was customary, but the praetors, as some hold, administered all that belonged to it; for others say it was in the following year they did

14.5. this. And that indeed happened again later; but at this time also Perperna, who had once been censor with Philippus, died, as I have said, the last of all who had been senators during his censorship,

14.6. and this too seemed to portend some change. They were troubled, then, at the portents, as was natural; but, each side thinking and hoping that all these things would fall upon their opponents, they made no expiatory offerings.

15.1. Caesar, then, did not even attempt at that time to sail to Macedonia (for he both lacked ships and feared for Italy, lest Pompey's lieutenants, coming upon it from Spain, should seize it), but, setting a guard over Brundisium, that none of those who had departed should sail back,

15.2. he came to Rome, and, the senate having been assembled for him outside the pomerium by Antonius and Longinus (for, having been expelled from it then, they now gathered it), he delivered a long and conciliatory address, in order that they might both gain goodwill toward him for the present and a good hope for

15.3. the future. For, seeing that they were vexed at what was happening and suspicious of the soldiery, he wished to console and tame them in a way, in order that their affairs, at least, until he should finish the war,

15.4. might remain in quiet. And on this account he neither accused anyone nor threatened anyone in anything, but he even made an attack, not without curses, upon those willing to make war on fellow-citizens, and at the last he proposed that envoys concerning peace and concord be sent at once both to the consuls and to Pompey.

16.1. And having said these same things also to the people, who had likewise assembled outside the pomerium, he sent for grain from the islands and promised to give each man seventy-five drachmas. And he hoped to entice them by these means, but the people, reckoning that those who desire something and those who have obtained it neither think nor act alike,

16.2. but at the beginnings of their undertakings hold out all that is most pleasant to those able to oppose them, but, when they have accomplished all they wish, neither remember any of it and even use against those very men the powers they received from them; and remembering both

16.3. Marius and Sulla, how, after often saying many kind and humane things to them, they did such deeds in return for such; and moreover, perceiving Caesar's need, and seeing that his arms were many and everywhere throughout the city, they could neither believe what was said nor take courage,

16.4. but, holding the fear from the former time still ringing in their ears, they were suspicious even of him—especially because the envoys who were to be chosen, as it were, to bring about the reconciliation, were indeed chosen but did not set out, and because Piso, his father-in-law, merely because he once made mention of them, incurred blame.

17.1. And so far were they from receiving at that time the money he promised them, that they even gave him besides everything else that was in the treasury, toward the maintenance of the soldiers whom they feared. And upon all this, as though these were good things, they changed back to the garb of peace; for they had not yet

17.2. resumed it. Now against the proposal concerning the moneys a certain Lucius Metellus, a tribune, spoke in opposition, and, when he accomplished nothing, he went to the treasuries and kept the doors of them under watch; but the soldiers, caring little for his guarding, as little as for his outspokenness, broke through the bolt (for the consuls had the key, as though it were not possible for some to use axes instead of it)

17.3. and carried out all the moneys. And indeed all the rest also, in the same manner, as I have said in many places, was both voted and done in name of equality (for indeed the greater part of these things was brought forward through Antonius), but in deed of domination. For both sides, calling their opponents enemies of their country, and saying that they themselves were warring on behalf of the common cause, enlarged only their own private interests, and both alike ruined those of the public.

18.1. Caesar, then, did these things thus, and seized Sardinia and Sicily without a battle, the magistrates then in them withdrawing; and Aristobulus he sent home to Palestine,

18.2. that he might work some hindrance against Pompey; and to the sons of those proscribed by Sulla he gave leave to seek offices, and all else besides—both what was in the city and what was in the rest of Italy—he ordered in the manner most serviceable to himself, as best he could from present circumstances.

18.3. And those matters he entrusted to Antonius, while he himself set out for Spain, which was strongly espousing Pompey's cause and was bringing him into fear lest it should also make the Gauls revolt.

18.4. And meanwhile other senators, and Cicero, without even coming into Caesar's sight, withdrew to Pompey, on the ground that he was acting more justly and would prevail in the war.

18.5. For the consuls, before sailing out, and Cicero too, since he held command in place of a consul, had ordered them all to follow to Thessalonica, on the ground that the city was held by certain enemies, while they themselves, being the senate and the semblance of the state,

18.6. would have it wherever they might be. And on this account the greater part of the senators and the knights came over to them—some at once, some also later—and all the cities that were not held down by Caesar's arms.

19.1. The Massiliots alone, however, of those dwelling in Gaul, neither aided Caesar nor received him into their city, but even gave him

19.2. an answer worth remembering: for they said that they were allies of the Roman people and were on friendly terms with both parties alike, and that they would neither meddle nor were competent to judge which of the two was in the wrong; so that, if anyone wished to come to them as a friend, they said they would receive both even without their arms, but for war neither of them.

19.3. And, being brought to a siege, they beat off Caesar himself, and afterward held out a very long time against Trebonius and Decimus Brutus, who besieged them. For Caesar for a time persisted, thinking to take them easily (for it seemed to him a dreadful thing that, having mastered Rome itself without a battle, he should be refused admittance by

19.4. the Massiliots), but then, since they held out, he assigned them to others, and himself hastened to Spain.

20.1. For he had sent Gaius Fabius into it, but, fearing lest, fighting by himself, he should suffer a reverse, he himself also took the field. The affairs about the Ebro were then held by Afranius and Petreius, and they had made a guard also of the pass over the mountains, but on the whole they gathered their forces into Ilerda and there awaited

20.2. those who came against them. And when Fabius had forced the guard on the Pyrenees and was crossing the river Sicoris, they fell suddenly upon his men and killed many who were cut off; for the bridge, breaking down before they had got across,

20.3. greatly aided them. But against Caesar, who came up not long after and crossed the river by another bridge and challenged them to battle, they did not dare to engage for very many days, but, encamping opposite

20.4. him, they kept quiet. Taking courage from this, then, he attempted to seize the ground between their entrenchment and the city, which was strong, in order to cut them off from their walls. But Afranius's men, perceiving this,

20.5. occupied it beforehand, and beat back those who assaulted them, and, following the fugitives, they withstood those who sallied out against them from the rampart, and, yielding on purpose, drew them into ground suitable to themselves, and there slew far more. And, encouraged by this, they fell upon Caesar's foragers and harassed those who scattered abroad;

20.6. and once, when some had crossed to the far side of the river, and meanwhile a great storm arose and the bridge they had used was destroyed, they crossed over after them by the other bridge, the one near the city, and made away with them all, no one being able to defend them.

21.1. Caesar, then, since these things were happening, and neither did any of his allies come to his aid (for his opponents, lying in wait for them, as they perceived each party approaching . . . ), and he procured his supplies with difficulty, being in a foreign land and faring ill,

21.2. was in utter straits. And the Romans at home, learning these things, despaired of him as no longer likely to hold out for any longer time, and inclined toward Pompey; and certain ones at that time also set off to

21.3. him, both others and senators. And had not the Massiliots in the meantime been defeated in a sea-battle by Brutus—through the size of his ships and the strength of his marines—although they were using Domitius as an ally and were superior in experience of seafaring, and had they not thereby been completely cut off, nothing would have hindered all

21.4. Caesar's affairs from being ruined. But as it was, these tidings, exaggerated by design and announced to the Spaniards as greater than they were, so altered some of them that they took Caesar's side. And, receiving them, he both gained an abundance of provisions and built bridges, and harassed his opponents, and once, falling suddenly upon a number of them wandering in the country, he made away with them.

22.1. Afranius, then, dispirited at this, and seeing that his position at Ilerda was neither safe nor suitable for a prolonged stay, resolved to withdraw to the Ebro and to the cities there; and by night, so as to escape notice or to outstrip his

22.2. opponents, he set out and marched. And he did not escape notice in breaking camp, yet he was not at once pursued; for Caesar did not think it safe in the dark to follow with men unacquainted with the country those who were acquainted with it. But when the day shone forth, he hastened, and, catching them midway on the road, he suddenly hemmed them in on all sides from a distance; for he far surpassed them in numbers, and the ground, being hollow, served as an ally.

22.3. For he was unwilling to come to close quarters with them, partly fearing that, falling into desperation, they might work some dreadful deed, and partly hoping otherwise to bring them over without a struggle. Which also came to pass; for, when they had made many attempts and could nowhere break through, and from this and from their sleeplessness and their marching had grown weary, and moreover

22.4. had no food (for, expecting to complete the stage that very day, they had brought nothing) nor had any plenty of water (for those regions are terribly waterless), they surrendered themselves, on condition that they should neither suffer any harm nor

23.1. be compelled to take the field with him against Pompey. And Caesar guarded each of these conditions for them strictly; for he neither killed at all any of those captured in this war, although those men had once, during a truce, destroyed some of his men who were off their guard, nor did he force them to make war against Pompey, but the most notable he let go, and the rest he employed as volunteer allies, both because of the gains

23.2. and because of the honours. And from this he gained no small advantage both for his reputation and for his affairs; for he won over all the cities in Spain and all the soldiers there (and there were others in Baetica, and a considerable number with Marcus Terentius Varro the lieutenant).

24.1. Receiving them, then, and at the same time setting things in order, he ran through the country as far as Gades. And he distressed no one in anything except by the levying of money (for this he exacted in vast amounts), but he honoured many both privately and publicly; and to all the people of Gades he gave the citizenship, which the people of Rome afterward

24.2. confirmed for them. And this he did in requital to them for the vision of the dream, through which, when he was quaestor there, he seemed to have lain with his mother, and from this he took, as I have said, the hope of the monarchy. Having done these things, he assigned that province to Longinus Cassius, since he was familiar with them from the quaestorship which he had exercised under

24.3. Pompey; while he himself was conveyed by ships as far as Tarraco. Thence, advancing through the Pyrenees, he set up no trophy upon them, since he perceived that Pompey too had been ill spoken of on that account, but he founded a great altar built of hewn stones not far from Pompey's trophies.

25.1. While these things were going on, the Massiliots, ships having again been sent them by Pompey, ventured a fresh hazard. And they were defeated at that time too, but they held out, although they now learned

25.2. that Caesar held Spain, and they vigorously beat off the assaults, and, having made a kind of truce, on the ground that they would come over to Caesar when he should arrive, they secretly sent Domitius away, and the soldiers who attacked them in violation of the truce by night they so handled that

25.3. they dared nothing more. To Caesar himself, however, when he came, they made terms; and he then took from them their arms and their ships and their moneys, but afterward also all the rest, except the name of freedom. In requital for which, Phocaea, their mother-city, was set free by Pompey.

26.1. And when some soldiers at Placentia mutinied and were no longer willing to follow him—on the pretext that they were worn out, but in truth because he would not permit them to plunder the country or to do the other things they desired (for they hoped to obtain from him anything whatever, seeing that he was in such great need of

26.2. them)—he did not give way, but, calling together both them and the others, both for the sake of his own safety from them, and in order that, hearing what was said and seeing those who were punished, they might wish to do nothing beyond what was fitting, he spoke as follows.

27.1. "I, fellow-soldiers, do indeed wish to be loved by you, yet I would not on that account choose to share in your wrongdoing; for I both cherish you, and I would wish, as a father his children,

27.2. that you be preserved and prosper and be of good repute. For do not think it the part of one who loves to allow men to do what is not fitting, from which danger and disrepute must of all necessity befall them, but rather to teach them the better course and to keep them from the worse, both admonishing

27.3. and bringing them to their senses. And you will know that I speak the truth, if you judge the expedient not by the pleasure of the moment rather than by what is always profitable, nor count it more noble to glut one's desires than to master them. For it is base, after taking some momentary pleasure, to repent afterward, and it is dreadful, while mastering one's enemies, to be mastered by certain pleasures.

28.1. To what end, then, do I say these things? Because, having your supplies in abundance (for I will speak with frankness, hiding nothing: you receive your pay in full and in season, and you are always and everywhere filled with abundant food, and you endure neither any inglorious toil nor any unprofitable danger, and moreover you reap many and great rewards for valour, while for your faults you are reproved little or not at all),

28.2. you do not think fit to be content with these things. But I say this not to all of you (for you are not such men), but only to those who by their own greed bring the rest also into ill repute. For you, the many, obey my commands both very exactly and well and abide by your ancestral ways, and on this account you have gained so vast a territory and wealth and reputation; but a certain few fasten much shame

28.3. and disrepute upon us all. And yet I, knowing clearly beforehand that they were such men (for nothing of yours is neglected by me), did not pretend to know it, thinking that they would prove better men by being thought to have escaped notice in their errors, than by being punished for being many times excessive in

28.4. what had been pardoned them. But since they themselves, as though it were permitted them to do all they wish—because they were not straightway brought to justice at the first—grow overbold, and try to make the others who do no wrong join in rebellion, it is necessary for me to apply some treatment and

29.1. correction to them. For no other association of men can hold together and be preserved, unless the wrongdoer is brought to his senses; for that which is diseased, if it does not receive the proper cure, makes all the rest also waste away together with it, as in

29.2. bodies; and in armies least of all, because such men, having strength, become more reckless, and corrupt the good besides, making them more dispirited, as though they would gain no benefit from doing right. For among whom the bold gains the advantage, among them the moderate must needs be lessened; and where injustice is unpunished, there the temperate also goes unrewarded.

29.3. For what good would you say you do, if these men do no harm? And how could you reasonably wish to be honoured, if these men do not undergo their just punishment? Or are you ignorant of this, that if the one part be freed from the fears of justice, and the other be deprived of the hope of rewards, no good,

29.4. but a thousand evils, is wrought? So that, if indeed you truly practise virtue, hate these men as enemies (for surely the friendly is not by any nature distinguished from the hostile, but is marked off by men's characters and deeds, which, when good, make even the alien one's own, but when wicked, make even the kindred

30.1. alien), and make defence on your own behalf. For we too must of necessity be ill spoken of on account of them all, even though we do no wrong; for everyone, learning our number and our impetuosity, refers to us all even the offences committed by the few, and thus, though not sharing in their greedy gains, we bear an equal share of the

30.2. accusations. For who would not be indignant, hearing that we have the name of Romans but do the deeds of Celts? And who, seeing it, would not lament that Italy is ravaged like Britain? And how is it not dreadful that the lands of the Gauls, who have been conquered, no longer distress us, but those within the Alps, like some Epirotes or Carthaginians or

30.3. Cimbri, are plundered? And how is it not shameful that we should pride ourselves and say that we were the first of the Romans both to cross the Rhine and to sail the Ocean, but should plunder our own land, which is unharmed by the enemy, and receive in place of praise blame, in place of honour dishonour, in place of gains losses, in place of rewards punishments?

31.1. For do not think, either that, because you serve in war, you are on that account better than the citizens at home—for you are both Romans, and they likewise have served and will serve as you do—nor that, because you bear arms, it is permitted you to do wrong; for the laws are more sovereign than you, and you will assuredly

31.2. at some time lay these arms down too. Nor yet take courage in your numbers; for far more numerous than you are those who are wronged, if indeed they should band together. And they will band together, if you do such things. Nor, because you conquered the barbarians, despise these men too, from whom you differ in nothing either in birth or in education, neither in nurture nor in pursuits,

31.3. but, as is both fitting and expedient for you, neither do violence to any of them nor wrong them, but receive your supplies from them as willing givers and accept your rewards from men who give of their own accord.

32.1. For, besides what has been said, and the other things one might recount at length on such matters, you must take this also into account: that we have now come here in order to succour our country, which is being wronged, and to ward off those who do it harm; since, if it were in no danger,

32.2. we should neither have come into Italy with our arms (for it is not permitted) nor should we have left the affairs of the Celts and of the Britons unfinished, when we could have brought those also to completion.

32.3. Is it not, then, absurd that we, being present for the punishment of wrongdoers, should appear no less greedy than they? And is it not grievous that, having come for the succour of our country, we should compel it to need other allies against

32.4. us? And yet I, for my part, think that I so far surpass Pompey in justice that I have often summoned him to a trial, and, since he was unwilling to be peacefully judged through his guilty conscience, I hoped that on this account all the people and all the allies would attach themselves to me.

32.5. But now, if we should do such things, neither shall I myself have any reasonable thing to put forward, nor shall I be able to charge them with any unfairness. And we must take all forethought for justice; for with it even the strength of arms is full of hope, but without it nothing is secure, even if one should for the moment succeed in something.

33.1. And that this is so by nature, the greater part of you know; for you do all that is fitting unbidden. Wherefore I too have called you together, that I might make you both witnesses and overseers of what is said and what is done.

33.2. But you are not such men, and on this account you are praised; while a certain few—you see how, in addition to having done much wrong and paid no penalty for it, they even threaten us besides. Yet I, for my part, think it neither otherwise honourable for a commander to be mastered by the commanded,

33.3. nor that anything salutary could ever come to pass, if that which is ordered to serve someone should attempt to master him. Consider what manner of order there would be in a household, if those in the prime of life should despise their elders; what in schools, if the pupils should neglect their teachers. What health for the sick, if the patients should not in all things obey their physicians; what safety for seafarers, if the sailors should disregard their helmsmen?

33.4. For by a kind of necessary nature, and for the sake of preservation, the ruling has been appointed among men for one part and the being ruled for the other, and it is impossible without these for anything whatever to subsist for any length of time. And it befits him who is set over anyone both to think out what is needful and to give orders, and the subordinate both to obey without excuse and to perform what is

33.5. commanded; from which, above all, the prudent has been honoured before the imprudent and the knowing before the ignorant in everything.

34.1. Such, then, being the case, I would never either grant anything to these men who have raised an uproar,

34.2. if I were compelled, nor would I yield though forced. Or to what end am I descended from Aeneas and from Iulus, to what end have I been praetor, to what end consul, to what end did I lead you—some of you from home, others I afterward enrolled besides—to what end have I now for so long held the

34.3. proconsular authority I received, if I am to be a slave to some one of you and be conquered by some one of you here in Italy, before Rome, through which you both subdued the Gauls and mastered the

34.4. Britons? Dreading what, fearing what? Lest some one of you kill me? But if you all thought thus, I would sooner willingly choose to die than both to destroy the dignity of command and to lose the spirit

34.5. befitting leadership; for far more is at hazard for a city than the unjust death of a single man, if soldiers become accustomed to dictate to their generals and to take the rights

35.1. of the laws into their own hands. But this, indeed, none of them has threatened (for I well know that he would straightway have been slain by you, the rest); rather they withdraw from the campaign as men worn out and lay down their arms as men who have toiled, and they will assuredly, if they do not obtain this from me of my own free will, both abandon their post and go over to Pompey; which some of them do even hint

35.2. at. And who would not wish to be rid of such men, and who would not pray that such soldiers were Pompey's—men who are neither content with what is given nor obedient to what is commanded, but, putting forward age in their prime and weakness in their strength, think fit both to lord it over their commanders and to play the tyrant over their

35.3. leaders? For I would ten thousand times choose both to be reconciled to Pompey in any way whatever and to suffer anything else, rather than do anything unworthy of my ancestral spirit and of my own

35.4. purpose. Or are you ignorant that I desire neither domination nor greedy gain, and that it is not my aim by all means and in every way to accomplish something, so as for that even to lie and fawn and flatter certain men? Cease, then, on this account from the campaign—O what shall I call you?—not, however, as you yourselves both wish and say, but as it is expedient for the commonwealth and for me."

35.5. Having said this, he balloted them for death, and the most reckless (for these by arrangement drew the lots) he condemned, but the rest, as having no need of them, he dismissed. And they, repenting of what they had done,

36.1. were about to resume their service; but, while he was still on the road, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus—this is the man who afterward was one of the triumvirate—being praetor, advised the people to appoint Caesar dictator, and straightway named him, contrary to

36.2. ancestral custom. And he undertook the office, when first he entered the city, yet he did nothing terrible in it, but he granted return to all the exiles except Milo, and he appointed the magistrates for the coming year (for at the moment they had then chosen no one in place of the absent;

36.3. and although no aedile was in residence, the tribunes administered all that fell to them), and he appointed priests in place of those who had perished, not observing all that was customary concerning them in such a case, and to the Gauls within the Alps dwelling beyond the Eridanus he restored the citizenship, since he had also governed them,

36.4. and, having done these things, he laid down the name of the dictatorship; for indeed its power and its function he kept ever in his own hands. For he used the strength of arms, and moreover he received besides a kind of lawful authority from the senate there; for it was permitted him to do with impunity whatever he wished.

37.1. Having obtained this, he straightway set right a great and pressing matter. For since those who had lent money to certain men made their exactions most bitterly, needing much money on account of the seditions and the wars, and since many of the debtors could not, even when willing, repay

37.2. anything to them (for it was not easy for them either to sell anything or to borrow afresh), and from this they did many faithless and many treacherous things toward one another, and there was fear lest they should advance to some incurable evil—the matter of the interest had indeed been moderated even before this by

37.3. certain tribunes, but, since even so the debts were not being repaid, but some withdrew from their pledges and others demanded the principal in coin, Caesar then aided both parties as best he could; for he ordered that the pledges be assessed at their worth, and he directed that judges of the value be allotted to those who disputed anything.

38.1. And since many were said to have much money and to be hiding it all, he forbade anyone to possess more than fifteen thousand drachmas in silver or gold, not as though he himself were enacting this law,

38.2. but as renewing one introduced at some former time—whether in order that the debtors might pay off the creditors and the rest might lend to the needy, or in order that the wealthy might become conspicuous and none of them have money in a mass, lest, in his absence, some

38.3. revolution be stirred up. And when the multitude was elated at this, and demanded that rewards of information be set forth for the household slaves against their masters concerning it, he neither added this to the law, and moreover he imprecated utter destruction upon himself, if ever he should trust a slave who spoke against his master.

39.1. Caesar, then, having done these things and taken up the dedications—both the others and all those from the Capitol—set out for Brundisium at the close of the year, and before entering upon the consulship to

39.2. which he had been elected, he set forth. And while he was making the arrangements for the expedition, a kite let fall a sprig of laurel upon one of those standing beside him in the Forum; and after this, while he was sacrificing to Fortune, the bull escaped before being struck, went out of the city, and, coming to a certain marsh,

39.3. swam across it. And, taking yet greater courage from these signs, he hastened on, and especially because the seers declared that if he remained at home there would be destruction for him, but if he crossed the sea there would be both safety and

39.4. victory. When he had set off, the boys in the city, of their own accord, divided themselves into two parties, and, calling themselves the one Pompeians, the other Caesarians, fought with one another after a fashion without arms, and those who used the name of Caesar prevailed.

40.1. While these things were taking place both at Rome and in Spain, Marcus Octavius and Lucius Scribonius Libo drove Publius Cornelius Dolabella, who was acting for Caesar and was in Dalmatia, out of it, using

40.2. Pompey's fleet. And after this they shut up Gaius Antonius, who wished to come to his aid, in a small island, and there, abandoned by the natives and pressed by famine, they captured him with his whole force save a few; for some of them got across to the mainland in flight, while others, crossing on rafts and being taken, made away with themselves.

41.1. Curio brought Sicily over without a battle (for Cato, its governor, since he was neither a match for him nor willing to cast the cities into danger to no purpose, withdrew beforehand to Pompey); but, crossing

41.2. over into Africa, he perished. For Lucius Caesar abandoned the city of Aspis, in which he chanced to be, at his approach, and Publius Attius Varus, who then held affairs there, was defeated by him and lost many soldiers and many ships;

41.3. but Juba, who was the son of Hiempsal and king of the Numidians, preferring the cause of Pompey, as being that of the people and the senate, and hating Curio both on this account and because, while tribune, he had attempted both to take away his kingdom and to make his country public domain,

41.4. made war upon him vigorously. For he did not wait for him to invade his own land of Numidia, but, while Curio was besieging Utica, he did not engage him with his whole army at once, fearing that, learning of it beforehand, he might put out to sea (for he desired not so much to repel him as to take vengeance on him),

41.5. but, sending forward a few men, and giving out beforehand that he himself had departed somewhere else and far away, he followed close upon them and did not fail of what he

42.1. hoped. For Curio at first, as though that king himself were approaching, removed to the camp by the sea, and was forming the design both of embarking on the ships, if forced, and of

42.2. abandoning Africa altogether; but when he learned that only a few were coming, and these without Juba, he took courage, and straightway by night, as though for an easy victory, lest they should escape him, he set out and marched, and, destroying some of the advance party who were sleeping on the road, he became far more eager.

42.3. And from this, falling in toward dawn with the rest who had advanced from the camp, he made no delay, but, although his soldiers were worn out both by the march and by their sleeplessness, he straightway came to grips with

42.4. them. And while they stood firm and were fighting on even terms, Juba, appearing to him suddenly, overcame him both by the unexpectedness and by his numbers, and killed him there together with most of the rest, and pursued the remainder as far as the entrenchment, and

42.5. after this shut them up in the ships, and in this confusion he both got possession of much money and destroyed many men. And a considerable number of those who escaped also perished, some, in the embarkation onto the boats, being tripped up by the pushing, others being sunk in the very vessels by their

42.6. weight. While these things were happening, certain men, fearing that they might suffer the same fate, went over to Varus, expecting to be saved, but found no fair treatment; for Juba, putting forward that he himself had conquered them, slew these too, save a few. Curio, then, who had aided Caesar in very much and had raised in him very great hopes, thus

42.7. perished; and Juba won honours from Pompey and the other senators in Macedonia and was proclaimed king, but by Caesar and those in the city he was held to blame and declared an enemy, while Bocchus and Bogudes were named kings, because they were his foes.

43.1. In the following year there came to be, contrary to established custom, two sets of magistrates for the Romans, and the greatest of battles was fought. For those in the city had chosen as consuls Caesar and Publius Servilius, and as praetors and the other officials those prescribed by the laws; while those at Thessalonica

43.2. had prepared nothing of the kind beforehand, although they had of the rest of the senate about two hundred, as some say, and the consuls, and although they had consecrated a certain plot of ground for the taking of auspices, in order that these might seem to be conducted as it were under some law—so that through them the people and the whole city might be reckoned to be

43.3. there (the cause being that the consuls had not introduced the curiate law)—yet they employed those very same men whom they had used before, changing only their titles, and calling some proconsuls, some propraetors, some proquaestors.

43.4. For of course they cared much for their ancestral usages, men who were taking up arms against it and had abandoned their country, so as not to do everything necessary toward the demand of present circumstances even contrary to the strict letter of what was

43.5. ordained. Nevertheless, in name these men ruled each party, but in deed Pompey and Caesar, who, for the sake of repute, held the lawful titles—the one that of consul, the other that of proconsul—but did not such things as those titles permitted, but such as they themselves wished.

44.1. Such, then, being the state of affairs, and the office being divided in two, Pompey was wintering at Thessalonica and was keeping no strict watch over the coasts (for he did not think that Caesar had yet come from Spain into Italy, and even if he were present, he did not suspect that in the winter, at least, he would dare to cross the

44.2. Ionian Sea); but Caesar was at Brundisium awaiting the spring, and, learning that Pompey was far off and that the mainland opposite was being carelessly guarded, he seized upon the novelty of the war and fell upon his negligence. In the middle of winter, at any rate, he set out with part of his army (for the ships were not sufficient for them all to cross at

44.3. once), and, eluding Marcus Bibulus, to whom the guarding of the sea had been assigned, he crossed over to the heights called Ceraunia; these are the extremity of Epirus, at the mouth of the Ionian gulf. And, arriving there before it became known that he would even sail, he sent the ships

44.4. back to Brundisium for the rest; and Bibulus damaged them as they were being brought back, and took some in tow, so that Caesar learned by the event that he had made the voyage more luckily than wisely.

45.1. In the course of this delay, then, he brought over Oricum and Apollonia and other places thereabout, which had been abandoned by Pompey's garrisons. This Apollonia, the Corinthian colony, lies well placed both as regards the land and as regards the

45.2. sea and the rivers. And what I marvelled at most of all: a great fire is sent up beside the river Aous, and it neither spreads farther over the surrounding earth, nor sets ablaze that very ground on which it dwells, nor makes it in any way drier, but has grasses and trees flourishing very close beside it; and at the inflowings

45.3. of the rains it increases and rises to a height. And on this account both it is named Nymphaeum and indeed it furnishes an oracle of the following kind. Taking frankincense, then, and praying for whatever you

45.4. wish, you throw it in, carrying your prayer. And thereupon the fire, if anything is to be brought to fulfilment, receives it most readily, and even if it fall outside somewhere, runs up to it, snatches it, and consumes it; but if it is to be unfulfilled, the fire neither otherwise comes to it, and even if it be carried into the very flame, draws back

45.5. and flees. And it does these things thus, in both respects alike, concerning all matters, save death and marriage; for concerning these it is not even permitted anyone to inquire of it at all.

46.1. This, then, is of such a nature; but Caesar, since Antonius, to whom the conveying over of those left behind at Brundisium had been entrusted, was tardy, and since no message about them was coming, both because of the winter and because of Bibulus, suspected them of taking a middle course and lying in wait upon events,

46.2. as is wont to happen in civil strifes. And on this account, wishing himself, and alone too, to sail to Italy, he embarked on a small boat as though he were someone else, saying that he had been sent by Caesar, and compelled the helmsman of it, although there was a wind,

46.3. to put out; but when they got away from land and the wind pressed hard and the surge tossed them terribly, so that the helmsman, even under compulsion, no longer dared to sail farther but attempted, against Caesar's will, to return, he revealed himself, as though by this he would even stay the storm, and said,

46.4. "Take courage; for you are carrying Caesar." Such, then, was the spirit and such the hope—whether otherwise founded, or from some oracle—that he held, so that even contrary to appearances he made for himself a sure pledge of his safety; yet he did not cross over, but, after toiling long in vain, sailed back.

47.1. And after this he encamped opposite Pompey near the Apsus. For Pompey, as soon as he perceived his arrival, did not delay, but, hoping easily to overcome him before he should also take up the others who were with Antonius, marched in haste to Apollonia with some

47.2. force. Caesar, then, went to meet him as far as the river, thinking that even so he would be a match for those then approaching; but when he learned that he was far inferior in numbers, he kept quiet. And in order that he might be thought neither to do this from fear nor to be the one beginning the war, he sent over to them certain conciliatory proposals and meanwhile passed the time

47.3. in this way. Pompey, perceiving this, wished to engage with him as quickly as possible, and on this account attempted to cross over the river; but when the bridge, taking the weight, broke up, and some of those who had crossed beforehand, being isolated, perished, he checked himself, dispirited that, in his first attempt at the deeds of war, he had stumbled. And meanwhile, Antonius having come up,

48.1. he took fright and withdrew to Dyrrachium. For so long as Bibulus lived, Antonius had not dared even to set out from Brundisium; so strict was the watch kept upon him; but when Bibulus, worn out by his hardships, died, and Libo succeeded to the command of the fleet, he despised him and put to sea, intending to force his way out.

48.2. And, being driven back to land, he vigorously defended himself against Libo, who assaulted him strongly, and after this, when Libo wished to disembark somewhere, he allowed him to put in nowhere on that

48.3. coast. So Libo, being at a loss both for anchorage and for water (for the islet by the harbour, the only place where he could put in, is both waterless and harbourless), sailed off somewhere far away, where he was likely to have plenty of

48.4. both. And thus Antonius, putting to sea later, suffered no harm from him, although Libo wished to attack them while they were on the open water; for a violent storm coming on prevented the attack; but from this very storm both sides fared ill.

49.1. When the soldiers, then, had been brought safely over, Pompey withdrew to Dyrrachium, as I have said, and Caesar followed him, taking courage because by the numbers of those then with him he was superior, owing

49.2. to the reinforcements that had come. Now Dyrrachium lies in the land formerly held by the Illyrian Parthini, but now and even then already reckoned as Macedonia, and it is most conveniently situated, whether it be the Epidamnus of the Corcyraeans or some other city. And those who have written of this refer its founding and its name to a hero

49.3. Dyrrachus; but others said that the place was renamed Dyrrachium by the Romans on account of the difficulty of the rocky shore, because the appellation of Epidamnus, having in the Latin tongue an ill-omened meaning, seemed to them ill-boding for crossing over to it.

50.1. Pompey, then, having taken refuge at this Dyrrachium, made a camp outside the city, and threw about it deep ditches and strong palisades. And Caesar, encamping against him, at first joined battle, expecting in a short time to take the rampart by the multitude of his soldiers; but when he was beaten back, he attempted to wall it off.

50.2. And while he was at this work, Pompey on his side both palisaded some parts and built counter-walls and dug counter-trenches in others, and set towers and guards upon the heights, in order to make the circuit of the wall of circumvallation endless and the approach impracticable for his opponents even if they should prevail. Many battles, then, occurred among them in this, though they were brief;

50.3. and in these, now these, now those, both conquered and were conquered, so that some on both sides died alike. And at Dyrrachium itself Caesar, in the space between the marshes and the sea, by night, as though it would be betrayed by its defenders, made an attempt, and got inside the narrows,

50.4. but, when many fell upon him there, both in front and from behind—men who, conveyed along in boats, suddenly attacked him—he both lost many and was himself nearly destroyed. When this had happened, Pompey, taking courage, plotted by night against the wall of circumvallation, and, falling upon it unexpectedly, took a part of it, and wrought much slaughter of those bivouacking by it.

51.1. Caesar, then, since these things had befallen and his grain had failed him (for both the sea and all the land near him were hostile to him, and on this account some had even deserted), fearing that, by remaining in the siege, he might be worn down, or even abandoned by the rest, overthrew all that had been built, and besides destroyed all that had been thrown up, and after this, suddenly setting out, made for

51.2. Thessaly. For in this same time, while Dyrrachium was being besieged, Lucius Cassius Longinus and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus, who had been sent by him into Macedonia and into Thessaly—Longinus there was severely

51.3. worsted by Scipio and by Sadalus the Thracian, but Calvinus, though thrust out of Macedonia by Faustus, when the Locrians and Aetolians came over to him, invaded Thessaly with them, and conquered Scipio in battles, in the one ambushed, in the other laying a counter-ambush, and from

51.4. this brought over some cities as well. Thither, then, Caesar hastened, as though with these men he would more easily have plenty of food and carry on the war. And since no one received him, on the ground that he had fared ill, he kept his hands off the others even against his will, but, falling upon Gomphi, a small Thessalian town, and mastering it, he killed many and

51.5. plundered everything, in order thereby to terrify the rest. At any rate, straightway Metropolis, another little town, did not even come to grips with him, but came to terms without a battle; and, having done them no harm, he the more easily won over certain others from either side.

52.1. And he was again becoming strong; but Pompey did not pursue him (for he had withdrawn suddenly by night and had crossed the river Genusus in haste), yet he was so minded as though he had finished the war. And from this he took the title of Imperator, yet he neither boasted of it nor wreathed any laurel about his fasces, being loath to do any such thing over

52.2. fellow-citizens. And from this same intention he neither sailed himself to Italy nor sent any others, although he might easily have seized all of it; for in his fleet he was far superior, having five hundred swift ships, so as to put in everywhere at once, and the affairs there were neither otherwise vexed at him, nor, even if it had been most alienated,

52.3. was it a match to make war against. For he both wished to be thought far removed from making war about it, and thought fit to cause no fear to those then at Rome. For these reasons, then, he made no attempt on Italy, nor yet did he send the commonwealth any report about what had been done; but, setting out after this against Caesar, he came into Thessaly.

53.1. While they sat encamped over against one another, the appearance of the armies bore a certain image of war, but the use of arms kept quiet as though in peace. For, considering the magnitude of the danger, and foreseeing the obscurity and instability of affairs, and feeling still some shame before kinship of race and blood,

53.2. they delayed, and meanwhile sent across to one another proposals of friendship, and were thought by some even to be about to be reconciled, all in vain. The cause was that both, aiming at the whole power, and employing both much ambition that was inborn and much

53.3. rivalry that was acquired (for men least of all endure to be bested by their equals and by their nearest of kin), wished neither to yield anything to one another, as though both were able to prevail, nor to trust one another, though they could come to some agreement, lest they should ever reach out after more and again fall to strife over the whole.

54.1. For in temper they differed from one another by just so much as that Pompey desired to be second to no man, while Caesar desired to be even first of all; and the one was eager to be honoured by willing men and to preside over those who consented and to be loved, while the other cared nothing if he should rule even the unwilling and give orders to men who hated him,

54.2. and bestow the honours upon himself. The deeds, however, through which they hoped to accomplish all they wished, both did alike and of necessity; for it was impossible for either of them to succeed without making war on his own people and leading foreigners against his kindred, and unjustly plundering much money, and lawlessly slaying many even of his dearest.

54.3. So that, even if in their desires they differed, yet in their deeds, by which they hoped to fulfil them, they were made like. And on this account they neither yielded anything to one another, although they put forward many claims of justice, and in the end came to blows.

55.1. The contest was great and such as no other. For they themselves were judged to be the best in all that pertains to war and the most renowned, conspicuously, not only of the Romans but of the other men of that time; for, as having been trained in these matters from boyhood and having been engaged in them throughout, and having performed deeds worth recounting, and having enjoyed both much valour and much fortune, they were most worthy to command

55.2. and most worthy to conquer. And as for forces, Caesar had the greatest and purest part of the citizen soldiery, and from the rest of Italy and from Spain and from all Gaul and from the islands he ruled he had the most warlike men; while Pompey had brought up many from the senate and the equestrian order and from the levies, and had gathered vast numbers from the rest of the subjects and from the peoples and kings in alliance

55.3. with him. For, save Pharnaces and Orodes (for this man too, although he was an enemy from the time he killed the Crassi, Pompey attempted to make his comrade), all the others, who had at any time been in even the slightest degree attached to him, both gave him money, and aid

55.4. some sent, some brought. The Parthian, indeed, promised him that, if he should receive Syria, he would be his ally, but, not obtaining it, gave no help. Since, then, Pompey far surpassed in numbers, Caesar's men were made equal to them by their strength; and thus, from an equal balance of advantage, they became both evenly matched and exposed to equal danger with one another.

56.1. From these things, then, and from the very cause and purpose of the war, a most notable contest was joined. For the city of the Romans and all its empire, already great and mighty, lay before them as a prize; for it was somehow clear to all that it would be enslaved to him who then prevailed.

56.2. Reckoning this, then, and moreover calling to mind their former deeds—Pompey those of Africa and of Sertorius and of Mithridates and of Tigranes and of the sea, Caesar those of Gaul and of Spain and of the

56.3. Rhine and of Britain—and holding that they were in peril concerning those glories too, and making it their zeal to acquire each the other's renown, they swelled with eagerness. For, besides the other things, the glory of the conquered accrues to the conquerors above all; for the greater and more powerful the adversary one overthrows, the higher is one himself

57.1. raised. And on this account they gave their soldiers many exhortations, much alike, however, to one another, saying all that on such an occasion is fitting to be said both for the immediate danger and for what comes after. For, setting out from the same commonwealth and making their speeches on behalf of the same things,

57.2. and naming one another tyrants and themselves liberators of the men, they could say nothing different, except that for the one death, for the other safety; and for the one, to take captives, for the other, to be in the lot of a master, and to have everything or to be deprived of everything, and to suffer or to do the most terrible things, would be the

57.3. outcome. Having made some such exhortations, then, to the citizens, and moreover having led on the forces of the subjects and the allies, both by the hopes of better things and by the fears of worse, they threw against one another men of the same race, tent-mates, mess-mates,

57.4. fellows of the same treaty. And why should one bewail the fate of others, when even those very men, who were all these things to one another, and who moreover had shared many secret counsels and many like deeds, and had once contracted a marriage-tie and cherished the same child—the one as a father, the other as a grandfather—nonetheless fought? For all that nature, mingling their blood, had bound together, they then loosed and tore apart and rent asunder through the insatiable desire of dominion. And on their account Rome too was compelled to be in peril both for herself and against herself at once, so that even in conquering she was conquered.

58.1. In such a contest, then, they were joined; yet they did not at once close, but, as men setting out from the same country and from the same hearth, and having arms much alike and ranks similar, they shrank from beginning the battle, and shrank too

58.2. from slaying any, each side. There was, then, silence on both sides and much dejection, and no one of them advanced forward or moved at all, but, stooping down, they kept still as though lifeless. Fearing, then, both Caesar and Pompey, lest by keeping quiet too long they should somehow grow more blunted, or even be reconciled, they hastily ordered the trumpeters to give the signal

58.3. and the men to raise the war-cry together. And each was done, yet so far were they from being heartened, that all the more, from the sound of the trumpets speaking with one voice and from their own cry speaking with one tongue, they revealed their kinship and convicted their common race, and from this they fell to tears and lamentation. At last, then, when the allied troops began, those men too closed, becoming beside themselves over them.

59.1. And for the rest, whose fighting was at a distance, the dreadfulness was less; for, not even knowing whom they struck, they shot arrows, hurled javelins,

59.2. slung stones; but the heavy-armed and the cavalry fared most grievously, for, being near one another and even able to speak somewhat to one another, they at once recognized those drawn up against them and wounded them, called out to them and slew them, called their countries to mind

59.3. and stripped the dead. These things the Romans and the others from Italy serving with them both did and suffered, wherever they chanced to meet one another; and many gave many charges to be carried home by the very men who slew

59.4. them. But the subject peoples fought both eagerly and unsparingly, putting forth much zeal—as once for their own freedom, so now against the slavery of the Romans—from the desire, since they were inferior in all things to them, to have them as fellow-slaves.

60.1. Greatest, then, and of most varied character, was the battle, both for these reasons and because of the multitude and the manifold sort of the equipment. For very many heavy-armed and very many cavalry, and others who were archers and others slingers, both occupied the whole plain, and, scattered in many places, fought in many places with one another as men similarly armed, and in many places with others

60.2. mixed together. The Pompeians were superior in cavalry and in archery, and on this account, encircling some from afar, they employed sudden onsets, and, throwing them into confusion, withdrew, then again and yet again attacked them, now

60.3. shifting hither, now thither. The Caesarians, then, both guarded against these things, and, deploying their ranks, became ever face to face with those who assaulted them, and, coming to close quarters with them, laid hold of both the men and the horses, fighting eagerly; for foot-soldiers, lightly armed for this very purpose, had been arrayed together with their

60.4. cavalry. And these things took place not in one spot, as I said, but in many places at once and scattered, so that, some fighting at a distance and others contending at close quarters, and some striking certain men and others being struck, others fleeing and others pursuing, many infantry-battles

60.5. and many cavalry-battles were to be seen. And in this many things happened contrary to expectation. For one who had routed another was himself routed, and another, having given way before someone, in turn attacked him; one who had struck another was himself wounded, and another, having fallen, slew the one standing over him. And many died even unwounded, and many half-dead

60.6. kept on slaying. And some rejoiced and sang the paean, others grieved and bewailed, so that all things were filled with shouting and groaning; and for the greater part there arose from this also confusion (for what was said, being unintelligible to them by reason of the difference of nation and of speech, terribly dismayed them), while for those who understood one another the evil was many times greater; for, besides their own sufferings, they both saw and heard at once the sufferings of those near them.

61.1. At last, when they had contended on even terms for a very long time, and many on both sides alike had both fallen and been wounded, Pompey, since the greater part of his army was Asiatic and untrained, was defeated, as had indeed been signified to him even before the action;

61.2. for thunderbolts had fallen into his camp, and a fire in the air, appearing above Caesar's entrenchment, had darted down upon his own, and bees had settled about his military standards, and many of the victims, when already being led to the very altars, ran away.

61.3. And that contest reached even to the rest of mankind so far that in many places, on the very day of the battle, there occurred both clashings of armies and noises of arms; and at Pergamum a certain sound of drums and cymbals, raised from the temple of Dionysus, went through the whole

61.4. city; and at Tralles a palm sprang up in the temple of Victory, and the goddess herself, lying somewhat aslant beside an image of Caesar, was turned toward it; and among the Syrians two young men, who announced the end of the battle, vanished; and at Patavium, in what is now Italy but was then still Gaul, certain birds did not only announce

61.5. it but even showed it in a fashion; for a certain Gaius Cornelius accurately inferred from them everything that had happened and explained it to those present. These things, in that very day, severally came to pass, and at the moment they were disbelieved, as was natural, but, when the deeds were reported, they were marvelled at.

62.1. Of the Pompeians who were not destroyed in the fighting, some fled wherever they could, and others after this . . . ; and of them Caesar enrolled into his own armies those who served in the ranks, bearing them

62.2. no grudge, but of the senators and the knights he put to death as many as he had captured and spared at some former time, except any whom his friends begged off (for to these he then granted that each save one man),

62.3. and the rest, who then for the first time made war against him, he let go, saying, "They have done me no wrong who took up the cause of Pompey, their friend, having received no benefit from

62.4. me." And this same thing he did also toward the rulers and the peoples who had aided Pompey; for he pardoned them all, considering that he himself knew either few or none of them, but that they had received many benefits from him beforehand.

62.5. And he praised these men far more than those who, having received some benefit from Pompey beforehand, had abandoned him in his dangers;

62.6. for the former he hoped would be devoted to himself as well, but the latter, even if they were thought to have done him some favour, yet, having become betrayers of him who was now his friend, would, he reckoned, never spare himself either.

63.1. And the proof is that he spared Sadalus the Thracian and Deiotarus the Galatian, although they had taken part in the battle, and Tarcondimotus, who held dominion over a certain part of Cilicia and had aided him very much toward his naval forces.

63.2. For why need one recount the others who sent their contingents, to whom likewise he granted pardon, taking from them only money? For he neither did them any other harm nor took anything away, although many had received many great things from Pompey, some long ago, some even then.

63.3. For a part of the Armenia that had been Deiotarus's he gave to Ariobarzanes the king of Cappadocia, yet he did not thereby harm Deiotarus in anything, but even benefited him besides; for he did not cut off his territory, but, having recovered all the Armenia that had been seized by Pharnaces, he bestowed part of it on Ariobarzanes and part on Deiotarus.

63.4. And so he dealt with these men; but to Pharnaces, who put forward that he had not aided Pompey, and on this account claimed to obtain pardon for what he had done, he assigned nothing fair, and moreover charged him with this very thing, that he had become both base and

63.5. unholy toward his benefactor. With so great clemency and virtue did he, on the whole, treat all who had made war against him; indeed, the letters laid away that were found in Pompey's caskets—all that convicted certain men both of goodwill toward him and of ill-will toward himself—he neither read nor copied out, but

63.6. straightway burned them, that he might not be compelled to do anything dreadful on their account, so that for this too some hated those who had plotted against him. And this I have said not idly, but because Caepio Brutus Marcus, the man who afterward killed him, was both captured by him and saved.