Oration 50
Imperial Dio Chrysostom Greek- I loved you before, men, even as it was fitting that the reasonable and not senseless man should cherish the most prudent and most secure part of his fatherland; whereas to prefer others to you is just as if a man who professed to love his city should delight in the houses and the workshops in the city, but should look more carelessly upon the market-place and the prytaneum and the council-house and the other holy places; or, by Zeus, as if one of the Lacedaemonians should love the multitude, but dishonour the kings and the ephors and the elders — those who surpassed the rest in prudence and through whom the whole city was preserved.
- For even among the Athenians, who were of all men the most democratic and assigned the most to the common and popular sort, no demagogue ever became so audacious — not even that Hyperbolus or Cleon — as to consider the Areopagus or the council of the six hundred less honourable than the people. And if I continually make mention of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, let those who are very keen pardon me, because I judge you worthy of such examples; and, discoursing as I am, I think, with Greeks, I hold it fitting to recall none others rather than the Greeks of the highest order.
- Of my goodwill toward you, then, and of my fidelity, let this be a proof for you: that, trusting in no faction, and having no familiars among you, I nonetheless come confidently before you, and think I should be at no disadvantage to anyone — plainly because I have put my trust in the common friendship and in goodwill toward all, and not because I seem, or wish, to be strong or formidable, that I should on this account be courted. And if I pitied the common people when they were pitiable, and tried, so far as was possible, to lighten their lot, this is no sign that I am more closely attached to them; since indeed of the body we always treat the suffering part, and take more forethought for the feet than for the eyes, whenever the former are in pain and have been hurt, while the latter are healthy.
- And if I called the common people pitiable, let no one suppose that I mean they were suffering unjust and unlawful things, since we pity even those who are cut or cauterized by physicians — suffering these things for their preservation — and over them both mothers and fathers weep, though they know they are being benefited. But what I said, that I loved you before too, before I had taken sufficient trial of your disposition — now at least I swear to you by all the gods that I, for my part, judge the council not only worthy of honour and friendship, but also marvel at your strength and your truthfulness and your freedom.
- And I have come into such a disposition that, while I seem to have discharged my debt to the people according to my ability, as a citizen, I yet owe a debt to you, and could never surpass your goodwill. And that saying uttered by one of the ancient orators, which seems to have a certain excess of flattery — "I might fittingly carry the people about in my eyes" — I might justly say to you. And this son of mine, if he has sense and is prudent, will, I think, dedicate his whole life to you and serve you no less than I.
- "On what ground," someone will say, "and having taken what trial of the men, do you so overstrain yourself?" Perhaps some inspiration has come upon me unbidden, and such an impulse of the soul toward you. But this, at any rate, know clearly: that I cannot cherish or court with my words either a people, or a council, or a satrap, or a dynast, or a tyrant, before I have first praised him in my own mind and approved the character of his soul. But you I see — well-nigh as often as trial has been made of your disposition — having never displayed anything unjust, or ambiguous, or base, or fickle, or insensible, whether in tumults or in affairs;
- so that I might say confidently: You have good presidents, but none worthy of yourselves — nor even of the men of former times, neither my father nor my grandfather, nor the fathers of the rest, all good men and worthy of honour. And let no one suppose that I am putting myself forward by presiding over the council; for I am departing, for many reasons (and believe that now at least I speak truly), and perhaps not for the sake of my own advantage or of some indulgence; but the opinion I held I could not conceal.
- And there is no fear that I should ever seem to flatter you, I who did not flatter the tyrant my enemy, nor utter any ignoble or unfree word, when to many it was a welcome thing merely to live, doing and saying whatever they were bidden. But it seems to me that what happens among you is great and divine. For privately, of what sort you are, I do not know very exactly; but I think you better than the many. But in common, whenever you assemble here, or again in the assembly, I have never known you to say or to be minded anything base or unfree, no exhortation prevailing among you, no promise, no threat — if indeed there is anyone such as to prevail by threats. But why should I not say what seems good to me — as though the philosopher ought to expose only the base, but conceal the better; or as though truth were profitable only in the case of evils, and not no less in the case of goods, because it is of good omen?
- "You, then," someone will say, "rose up wishing to deliver an encomium of the council?" And what is dreadful in that, if it be true? But this encomium, if you appear unlike what is said, is no praise of you, but an accusation of the speaker. Nonetheless I would have made no such speech, had I not been greatly pained — just as once before too, hearing that I was betraying your interest, I made my defence on that account, not disdaining to make a defence (how should I?) nor judging it beneath me. For to a drowsy juror, as they say, and, by Zeus, to a malicious and base tyrant, it is base to make defence; but to fellow citizens and kinsmen and friends, whom one holds to be fair, it is not base, but fair-minded and just. Then, therefore, I did rightly, and now far more, when I know you more clearly.
- For I learn that some have formed an opinion, and such a report has flowed abroad, that I was an obstacle to the council's being convened; since I have also heard this, that they suppose absolutely everything of the magistracy to be done according to my judgement. As for that, I do not deprive my son of the credit — that he would do nothing of what is in his power against my will, nor otherwise than aiming also at my judgement; but I swear that I never once gave any order — I mean in public matters — though for a father to counsel what seems the better course holds the rank of a command. And on account of this suspicion, for some time now I have not even attended the council-meetings. For that a man who has himself thought fit to rule the city, as being already competent to deliberate and to administer the public affairs, should in the meantime in fact make him a private man and void of the authority that is according to law, is neither otherwise reasonable, nor perhaps suited to men of such an age.