Substance and accident

And since the accident is weaker than the body, and the body weaker than the soul, and death comes about through the ceasing of the accident [47] and not of the body, which is weaker than the soul, how can the intellect conceive (1) that the soul dies at the death of the body?

and the second is likewise impossible, since accidents attach only to bodies, and souls are not bodies.

we have already shown that the soul is neither a body nor an accident (5), and whatever has these characters is neither near to bodies nor far from them, neither inside them nor outside them.

how can the accident itself be the substance, and how can a meaning be a body, when the realities are divergent in their very selves?

that exists in the mind is substance and accident together, since the sense of the definition of the two holds true of it, while what exists in external reality is substance and not accident.

that the substances, in view of their existence in the mind, are accidents subsisting in it and needing it, whereas in external reality they subsist by themselves and have no need of anything else.

And when it is established that the soul is not a form for the body, nor an accident inhering in it, nor composed of an inhering thing and a locus, then passing-away is not allowable of it.

Its purport is that it has become clear that knowledge and intellection and their like, among the attributes and accidents that are independent of a locus, do not subsist through a locus — since it has been established that what does not inhere in what has position is among what has no position and needs no locus in which to subsist.

So all the sensibles — such as colours, sounds, scents, tastes and tangibles — and everything attached to the sensibles of their loci, their places and their magnitudes, and the things inhering in them, and whatever runs their course, whether substance or accident: