Cognition and the means of valid knowledge (Nyāya epistemology)

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buddhi / jñāna (Cognition) (buddhi), which is the cause of all usage, is cognition (jñāna). It is two-fold: memory and experience. The cognition produced solely by [mental] disposition is memory; the cognition distinct from that is experience.

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It [experience] is two-fold: veridical and non-veridical. The experience that qualifies a thing as having a property which it actually has is veridical; for example, the cognition 'this is silver' with regard to silver. This very [veridical experience] is called valid cognition (pramā). The experience that qualifies a thing as having a property which is in fact absent in it is non-veridical; for example, the cognition 'this is silver' with regard to a piece of nacre [mother-of-pearl].

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Veridical experience is four-fold, by the distinction of perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony. Its instrument is likewise four-fold, by the distinction of pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison), and śabda (verbal testimony).

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The distinctive [special] cause is the instrument (karaṇa).

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A cause (kāraṇa) is that which invariably precedes an effect.

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An effect (kārya) is the counter-correlate of [its own] prior absence.

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Cause is three-fold, by the distinction of inherent, non-inherent, and instrumental. That in which, being inhered, the effect arises is the inherent cause (samavāya (samavāyi)-kāraṇa); for example, the threads are the inherent cause of the cloth, and the cloth of the colour residing in it. That cause which, while inhering in the same locus along with the effect or with [its inherent] cause, [produces the effect] is the non-inherent cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa); for example, the conjunction of the threads is the non-inherent cause of the cloth, and the colour of the threads of the colour of the cloth. The cause distinct from both these is the instrumental cause (nimitta-kāraṇa); for example, the shuttle, the loom, and so forth, in the case of the cloth.

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Thus, among these three kinds of cause, that which is the distinctive cause is precisely the instrument (karaṇa).

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Among these, the instrument of perceptual cognition is pratyakṣa (perception). Perception is the cognition produced by the contact of a sense-organ with an object. It is two-fold: nirvikalpaka / savikalpaka (non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) and conceptual (savikalpaka)). Among these, non-conceptual cognition is the indeterminate cognition, as in 'this is something.' Cognition that involves a qualifier is conceptual, as in 'this is Ḍittha,' 'this is a brahmin,' 'this is dark.'

AnTs_43

The cause of perceptual cognition is sense-object contact (sannikarṣa), which is six-fold: conjunction (saṃyoga), inherence-in-the-conjoined (saṃyukta-samavāya), inherence-in-what-inheres-in-the-conjoined (saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya), inherence (samavāya), inherence-in-what-inheres (samaveta-samavāya), and the qualifier-qualificand relation (viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva). In producing the perception of a pot by the eye, the contact is conjunction. In producing the perception of the pot's colour, the contact is inherence-in-the-conjoined, since colour inheres in the pot that is conjoined with the eye. In the perception of the universal colour-ness, the contact is inherence-in-what-inheres-in-the-conjoined, for colour inheres in the pot conjoined with the eye, and colour-ness inheres in that colour. For [hearing] by the ear: since sound is a quality of ether, and [there is] inherence between a quality and its substrate [sound is grasped by inherence]. In the direct apprehension of sound-ness, the contact is inherence-in-what-inheres, since sound-ness inheres in the sound that inheres in the ear. In the perception of an absence, the contact is the qualifier-qualificand relation, as in 'the ground is qualified by the absence of a pot,' for here the absence of the pot is a qualifier of the ground that is conjoined with the eye. Thus, cognition produced by [one of] the six contacts is perception; its instrument is the sense-organ. Therefore it is established that the sense-organ is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge.

AnTs_44

The instrument of inferential cognition is anumāna (inference). Inferential cognition (anumiti) is the cognition produced by parāmarśa (ratiocinative subsumption). Ratiocinative subsumption (parāmarśa) is the cognition of the subject's possession of the probans as qualified by vyāpti (pervasion); for example, the cognition 'this mountain possesses smoke, which is pervaded by fire,' is the ratiocinative subsumption. The cognition produced by it, 'the mountain possesses fire,' is the inferential cognition. The rule of concomitance, 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire,' is pervasion (vyāpti). The probans's residing in the subject and the like is the subject-property-ness (pakṣadharmatā).

AnTs_45

Inference is two-fold: for oneself (svārtha) and for another (parārtha). Of these, inference-for-oneself is the cause of one's own inferential cognition. To explain: having oneself, through repeated observation, grasped the pervasion 'where there is smoke, there is fire' in a kitchen and elsewhere, one goes near a mountain; and being in doubt about fire there, on seeing smoke on the mountain one recalls the pervasion, 'where there is smoke, there is fire.' Thereupon the cognition arises, 'this mountain possesses smoke, which is pervaded by fire.' This very [cognition] is called the ratiocinative subsumption of the probans (liṅga-parāmarśa). From it arises the inferential cognition, 'the mountain possesses fire.' This is inference-for-oneself. But that in which, having oneself inferred fire from smoke, one employs a five-membered statement for the sake of convincing another, is inference-for-another; for example: 'The mountain possesses fire' [thesis], 'because it possesses smoke' [reason], 'whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, as a kitchen' [example], 'and so is this' [application], 'therefore so it is' [conclusion]. By the probans thus set forth, another too apprehends the fire.

AnTs_46

The thesis, the reason, the example, the application, and the conclusion are the five members. 'The mountain possesses fire' is the thesis (pratijñā). 'Because it possesses smoke' is the reason (hetu). 'Whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, as a kitchen' is the example (udāharaṇa). 'And so is this' is the application (upanaya). 'Therefore so it is' is the conclusion (nigamana).

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For both inference-for-oneself and inference-for-another, the ratiocinative subsumption of the probans is precisely the instrument. Therefore the ratiocinative subsumption of the probans is [what is properly called] inference.

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The probans (liṅga) is three-fold: affirmative-and-negative (anvaya-vyatireki), purely-affirmative (kevala-anvayi), and purely-negative (kevala-vyatireki). That which has pervasion both by agreement and by difference is the affirmative-and-negative; for example, smoke-possession when fire is to be proved. 'Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen' is the affirmative pervasion; 'where there is no fire, there is no smoke either, as in a great lake' is the negative pervasion. That which has pervasion only by agreement is the purely-affirmative; for example, 'the pot is nameable, because it is knowable, like cloth.' Here there is no negative pervasion for knowable-ness and nameable-ness, since everything is both knowable and nameable [hence no negative instance exists]. That which has pervasion only by difference is the purely-negative; for example, 'earth differs from the others, because it possesses smell. What does not differ from the others does not possess smell, as water. But this [earth] is not so. Therefore it is not so [i.e., not non-differing].' Here, for [the proposition] 'what possesses smell is distinct from the others,' there is no affirmative example, since earth in its entirety is the subject [and nothing else can serve as an affirmative instance].

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The pakṣa / sapakṣa / vipakṣa (subject (pakṣa)) is that which possesses the probandum [only] doubtfully; for example, the mountain, when smoke-possession is the reason.

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The similar instance (sapakṣa) is that which possesses the probandum with certainty; for example, in that same case, the kitchen.

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The dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) is that which possesses the certain absence of the probandum; for example, in that same case, the great lake.

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The deviating, the contradictory, the counterbalanced, the unestablished, and the contradicted — these are the five hetvābhāsa (fallacies (pseudo-reasons)).

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The deviating (savyabhicāra) is the inconclusive (anaikāntika). It is three-fold, by the distinction of the common, the uncommon, and the non-conclusive. Among these, the common inconclusive is that which resides also where the probandum is absent; for example, 'the mountain possesses fire, because it is knowable,' since knowable-ness is present also in a lake which lacks fire. The uncommon is that which is excluded from all the similar and dissimilar instances; for example, 'sound is eternal, because it is sound,' for sound-ness is excluded from all eternal and non-eternal things and resides in sound alone. The non-conclusive (anupasaṃhārī) is that which lacks both affirmative and negative examples; for example, 'everything is non-eternal, because it is knowable,' for here, since everything is the subject, there is no example.

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The contradictory (viruddha) is the reason that is pervaded by the absence of the probandum; as in 'sound is eternal, because it is produced.' For produced-ness is pervaded by the absence of eternality, that is, by non-eternality.

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That for which there exists another reason proving the absence of the probandum is the counterbalanced (satpratipakṣa); for example, 'sound is eternal, because it is audible, like sound-ness,' [counterbalanced by] 'sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect, like a pot.'

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The unestablished (asiddha) is three-fold: locus-unestablished (āśrayāsiddha), essence-unestablished (svarūpāsiddha), and pervasion-unestablished (vyāpyatvāsiddha). The locus-unestablished is, for example, 'the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, like a pond-lotus'; here the sky-lotus is the locus, and it simply does not exist. The essence-unestablished is, for example, 'sound is a quality, because it is visible'; here visibility does not belong to sound, since sound is audible. The pervasion-unestablished is one accompanied by an adventitious condition (upādhi). An adventitious condition is that which, while pervading the probandum, does not pervade the probans. Pervading the probandum means being a non-counter-correlate of an absolute absence co-located with the probandum; not pervading the probans means being the counter-correlate of an absolute absence acknowledged to be where the probans is. In 'the mountain possesses smoke, because it possesses fire,' contact with wet fuel is the adventitious condition. To explain: 'where there is smoke, there is contact with wet fuel' shows its pervasion of the probandum; 'where there is fire, there need not be contact with wet fuel' shows its non-pervasion of the probans. Thus, being one that pervades the probandum but not the probans, contact with wet fuel is the adventitious condition. Because it is accompanied by such a condition, fire-possession is pervasion-unestablished.

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That whose probandum's absence is established by another means of valid knowledge is the contradicted (bādhita); for example, 'fire is not hot, because it is a substance.' Here non-heat is the probandum, and its absence — heat — is grasped by tactile perception; hence its contradicted-ness.

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The instrument of comparative cognition is upamāna (comparison). Comparative cognition (upamiti) is the cognition of the relation between a name and the thing named. Its instrument is the cognition of similarity. The recollection of the meaning of the analogical statement is the intermediate operation. To explain: someone not knowing the meaning of the word 'gavaya' hears from some forest-dweller, 'a gavaya is like a cow,' and goes to the forest; recalling the meaning of that statement, he sees an animal resembling a cow. Immediately thereafter the comparative cognition arises, 'this is what is denoted by the word gavaya.'

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śabda (Verbal testimony) is the statement of a trustworthy person. A trustworthy person is one who speaks the truth. A statement (vākya) is a collection of words, as in 'bring the cow.' A word (pada) is that which has denotative power. Denotative power (śakti) is the convention of the Lord, 'from this word this meaning is to be understood.'

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Expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), fitness (yogyatā), and proximity (saṃnidhi) are the causes of the cognition of the sentence-meaning. Expectancy is a word's not conveying a connected meaning in the absence of another word. Fitness is the non-contradiction of the [combined] meaning. Proximity is the utterance of the words without [excessive] delay.

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A sentence devoid of expectancy and the rest is not a valid means of knowledge. For example, 'cow, horse, man, elephant' is not valid, from lack of expectancy. 'One should sprinkle with fire' is not valid, from lack of fitness. The words 'bring the cow' and the like, uttered [one at each] watch [prahare prehare — read prahare prahare; sic in source] and not together, are not valid, from the absence of proximity.

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A sentence is two-fold: Vedic and worldly. The Vedic, since it is spoken by the Lord, is entirely a valid means of knowledge. The worldly, however, is valid [only] when spoken by a trustworthy person; otherwise it is not valid.

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The cognition of the sentence-meaning is verbal cognition. Its instrument is the word (śabda).

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Non-veridical experience is three-fold, by the distinction of doubt (saṃśaya), error (viparyaya), and hypothetical reasoning (tarka). Doubt is the cognition that grasps a single substrate as qualified by various mutually opposed properties; for example, 'is it a post or a man?' Error is false cognition; for example, 'this is silver' with regard to nacre. Hypothetical reasoning (tarka) is the imputation of the pervader through the imputation of the pervaded; for example, 'if there were no fire, then there would be no smoke either.'

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Memory too is two-fold: veridical and non-veridical. That born of valid cognition is veridical; that born of invalid cognition is non-veridical.