Chapter Twenty-Two: Showing That the Soul Knows After Its Separation from the Body, in Four Aspects

on the point of leaving his body; how then could his being in Paradise be conceived, given that his body was gone, unless our Lord's reference had been to his soul alone? And the word of Būlus: [51] « We know that this earthly dwelling is dissolved and passes away, but we have a dwelling from the Creator, exalted be He, which hands have not made » (1).

The Twenty-Second Chapter

On the demonstration that the soul is knowing after its parting from the body; it contains four aspects

The first: it has been settled in what went before that the soul is a non-corporeal substance (jawhar) that governs the body (2). Then it cannot but either apprehend the body through the mediation of the body or without mediation. The first is void, because if the body were able (3) to apprehend its own deficiencies, it would not stand in need of the soul and its governance. So the second division is determined, namely that the soul does not apprehend things through the mediation of the body; and if it has this character while it is bound to the body, it is all the more fitting that it continue in this condition after parting from it.

The second aspect: the soul apprehends the operations of the senses — the eye's seeing, the ear's hearing and the rest. So if it knew the eye's apprehending through the mediation of the eye, it would have to apprehend [52] this eye here mentioned through the mediation of another eye, and so on without end, which is impossible. So the truth is determined, namely that it does not (1) apprehend anything through the mediation of the body; and likewise, when the body is gone, it apprehends what is fit to be apprehended.

The third aspect: when we say « Zayd is a man » as we observe his body, the universal « man » is not the body of Zayd, but rather we observe it (2) by the intellect. And when the intellect apprehends the universal matter and knows it, it knows of necessity the particular that falls under it. And if it observed that particular through the mediation of the body, it would have to observe it through the mediation of another body, and so on without end, which is impossible. Therefore the soul's apprehension is not through the mediation of (3) the body.

The fourth aspect: the soul knows its own essence, its body and its instruments. This is either through a corporeal instrument or it is not. The first is impossible, for if it apprehended its instrument through the mediation of another instrument, it would follow (4) that it stands in need of an instrument by which to apprehend [53] the first instrument, and this would run on in a chain without end, which is impossible. Therefore the soul apprehends its instrument without an instrument it stands in need of, and this while it is in the body; and likewise it apprehends (5) the universal meanings and the particular cognitions after its parting from the body.

The testimonies of the Holy Scriptures to the soundness of this thesis: the word of the pure Gospel, « So he lifted up his eyes and beheld Ibrāhīm from afar, and Lāʻāzar beside him, and he raised his voice, saying » (6). We say: if cognition were not preserved in the soul, that would not hold true of one whose

— Notes —

[44] 1) The Second Epistle of Saint Būlus to the people of Kūrintus 5:1.

[44] 2) In the third and the sixteenth chapters.

[44] 3) In the original: amkana.

[45] 1) Fallen out in the original: lā.

[45] 2) In the original: nushāhiduhu.

[45] 3) Fallen out in the original: bi-wāsiṭat.

[45] 4) In the original: lazima.

[45] 5) In the original: yudriku.

[45] 6) The Gospel of Lūqā 16:23 and 24.