Section: On Dismissal

Section

(On Dismissal)

As for dismissal (al-ʻazl), it is of two kinds:

The first of them: that which is done for no cause, and this falls outside governance (siyāsah). For deeds and words have causes, and when they are stripped of them the deed is idle and the speech is empty babble, which no sound judgment (raʼy) requires and no intelligent man's governance makes necessary. It has been said: dismissal is one of the two divorces. Just as divorce for no cause is unseemly, so dismissal for no cause is unseemly. And when the officeholder (nāẓir) has no confidence that his charge will continue while he keeps to uprightness, he turns aside from uprightness to looking to himself, and the enfeeblement of his office follows; and such a dismissal proceeds from nothing but failure or weariness. It has been said: it is no requital of one who has pleased you that you should do him ill. And one of the sages said: he whose affection is fair, to set about corrupting him is foul.

The second kind: that the dismissal is for a cause that called for it. Its causes are of eight aspects. The first of them is that its cause is a breach of trust that has appeared in him; dismissal is then among the claims of governance, together with the recovery of what was misappropriated and requital for it with corrective deterrents; and in this a man is not called to account upon surmises and suspicions. For it has been said: whoever betrays is abased. The second aspect is that its cause is his incapacity and the shortfall of his competence (kifāyah), for office committed to incapacity is squandered. And it has been said: incapacity sleeps and prudence (ḥazm) keeps watch. It is a defect in the incapable man, and even if it is no sin it is not permissible in governance to confirm him in an office he has proved unequal to. Then his incapacity is to be weighed after his dismissal: if it was on account of the weight of what he had taken upon himself, he may be appointed to what is easier; but if it was for the shortfall of his vigour and the weakness of his prudence, he is fit for neither appointment nor office. It is related of ʻUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, may God the Exalted be pleased with him, that he said: do not bind yourselves to the right of one who does not bind himself to your right. The third aspect is that the cause is the disorder of the office arising from his oppression (ʻasf) or his rashness (khurq); this office exceeds competence and falls outside governance, and the vizier appointed over it stands between two choices: either to dismiss him and put another in his place, or to restrain him from his oppression and his rashness, if he will be restrained. And he may be held in reserve for appointment to that in which governance calls for harsh measures against whoever is contentious and refractory. For it has been said: every building has its foundation, and every soil its planting. The fourth aspect is that its cause is the dissipation of the office under him, from his softness and the little awe he inspires; this cause weakens governance, and in it the vizier stands between two choices: either to dismiss him and put in his place one who is stronger and more awe-inspiring, or to join to him one by whom strength and awe are made complete — and his choice in this is judged by what is more salutary. And after his removal he may be appointed to what his weakness will do no harm in. ʻAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, may God ennoble his face, said: there is no good in a contemptible helper, nor in a paltry friend. The fifth aspect is that its cause is the surplus of his competence and the manifest need of him in something greater than his office; this is the fairest of the modes of dismissal, and in truth it is no dismissal at all, but a transfer from one office to an office more exalted than it, so that by this dismissal he becomes increased in rank. One of the eloquent said: men in office are two men — a man by whom the office is made great, for his excellence and his capacity to lead, and a man who is made great by the office, for his deficiency and his baseness. He by whom the office is made great grows in humility and easiness, and he who is made great by the office grows through it in honour and arrogance. The sixth aspect is that its cause is the existence of one more competent than he, and here the condition of the more competent men is to be considered. If the surplus of his competence has an effect in increasing the work through him, then this is among the requirements of governance, and it is not permissible therein to confirm the man in his office. But if it has no effect in increasing the work, then the officeholder's dismissal is by way of preference in advancing the more competent and choosing out one's aides. And if it is permissible in governance to confirm the officeholder in his office because he discharges it. It has been said: when the discerning man is gone, the outstanding man perishes. The seventh aspect is that its cause is that one of the competent men solicits his office, offering an increase upon it; his dismissal upon the offering of the increase is not permissible until the cause of that offer has been uncovered, for the one who offers may be seeking by it to drive him out, whether from desire for the office or from enmity toward its holder. If, after the uncovering, no ground for it appears, his dismissal upon this lying offer is not permissible in governance, and the one who made the offer deserves to be put far off for having begun with such deeds. But if a ground for the increase does appear, it cannot but fall under three divisions: the first of them, that it is due to a shortfall on the part of