Second Discourse: The Acquired Propositions

Second Discourse

The Acquired (al-muktasabāt)

First Section: On Conceptions (al-taṣawwurāt)

Acquired conceptions are, as has preceded, those simple terms (mufradāt) whose conception requires clarification and a characterisation (taʻrīf) in which the states of the thing characterised and its essential attributes are stated. These attributes and states are expressed by expressions (alfāẓ) or by signs that signify them. Expressions, however, differ in clarity, for among them are those that yield a meaning that is obscure, or equivocal, or merely resembling, so that using them in characterisations and definitions (ḥudūd) leads to hesitancy and confusion. For this reason they must be well chosen. Good arrangement and skill in the imparting of the conception (taṣwīr) are likewise required; otherwise muddle leads to muddle and obscurity. So we shall set out for you the manner of signifying the intended meaning and its kinds, that you may perform well and choose well; then we shall set out for you the better arrangement for skill in imparting the conception and for easing conception.

First Inquiry: On Signification (dalālah) of the Meaning

Every expression or sign issued deliberately must have had some meaning intended by it; it was brought forward only to signify that meaning. Now either it signifies precisely the very thing sought and answers to it in every respect, with neither excess nor deficiency — and this is called (signification by correspondence) (muṭābaqah), as with the simple terms: stone, tree, ʻAlī, horse, notebook; and as when you say, “Aḥmad came” and “al-Ḥusayn was killed”

Or the word signifies only a part of the thing sought, and this is (signification by containment) (taḍammun): as with “house” in your saying, “I demolished so-and-so's house”, when you mean one of its walls, or its roof, or one of its rooms; and as with “carpet” in our saying, “the carpet burned”, although nothing of it burned but a portion; and as with “chair” in our saying, “the chair broke”, although nothing of it broke but one of its pieces of wood; and as with “I wounded my finger”, or “my pen broke”, or “the garment was soiled”, or “the book”

Or the word is brought forward to signify what belongs to the concomitants (lawāzim) of its true meaning, or to its attendants, or to its properties (khawāṣṣ), and this is (signification by concomitance) (iltizām): as in your saying, “his speech is pearls”, “his knowledge a sea”, “his bounty a raincloud”, “his face the moon”, “long of sword-belt”, “abundant of ashes”, and “his house was robbed” — and all that is of this sort among metaphors and metonymies

These abound in poetic and rhetorical speech, whether to entice or to deter: as in your saying, in praise of the intellect, “the intellect is the mother of the virtues and the wellspring of letters”; and as in your saying of the sun, “the sun's brow appeared”, “everything put on its shadow for a sandal”, “it shook out gold-dust upon the late afternoon”, “it bound its saddle for departure”; and your saying, in praise of a man, “a bough of the leafy tree of lineage, a branch of the tree of merit, the delight of nobility's eye, the gladness of the forefather's heart”; and as in the poet's saying:

He is the sea: from whatever quarter you come to him — its deep is beneficence and its shore generosity

Further, the signifier, whether it be an expression or a sign, may signify by correspondence a single meaning, and this is called (determinate signification) (dalālat ʻayn)

Or it may signify many things, or matters, or individuals, the concept of the signifier not preventing partnership in what is meant, so that the hearer hesitates over two conceptions of the meaning intended, and therefore conceives from it a general meaning covering many individuals. This signification is called (unrestricted signification) (muṭlaqah), as with simple expressions to which the article of definition has been prefixed so as to take in the whole genus — such as your saying in the proverbs: “Misfortune is one for the patient man and two for the man who frets.” For you have included all misfortunes, of whatever kind, in the word “misfortune”, and likewise “the patient man” and “the man who frets”. And as in your saying, “Man is the enemy of what he does not know.” And as in al-Jāḥiẓ's saying: “The book — what an excellent hoard, what a bond, what a boon companion, what a mainstay; what excellent good cheer and what an excellent pleasure-ground; what an excellent occupation and trade; what an excellent intimate in the hour of solitude; what excellent acquaintance in the lands of exile; what an excellent consort, familiar and colleague; what an excellent vizier and lodger . . .” And as in the poet's saying:

The attaining of hopes lies in the warrant of the keen blades ( 1 ) — and the winning of high things in plunging into the wastes ( 2 ) When the branding-iron ( 3 ) of abasement has risen upon a man — then for him there is but the mounting ( 4 ) of the withers ( 5 )

And another's saying:

Let not an enemy's tear deceive you — and have mercy on your youth against an enemy who shows mercy High nobility is not kept safe from harm — until blood is poured out about its flanks

And an expression may signify things utterly different, between which there is no partnership at all, as in the words ybn, ʻayn, khāl, kitāb, raʼs, khaṭṭ, and the like; and this is (equivocal signification) (mushtarakah)

Or there may be between the things signified a kind of partial partnership, as with the word nūr, which is used to signify light as commonly known, and fire, and radiance, and the intellect; and this is called (signification by resemblance) (mutashābihah)

Further, one and the same meaning may have different expressions applied to it without hesitation or distinction, and these expressions are called (synonymous): as qaṭana and istawṭana; and as imraʼah, zawjah, ḥalīlah, ʻirs, qarīnah

Or it may have different names according to the difference of its attributes, the difference between them being plain, or else so very fine that the matter may be confounded in them — so one ought to attend to that: as when we say “keen blade”, “sword”, “Indian-wrought blade”; and as “right hand”, “oath”, “swearer”; and likewise “epithet” and “attribute”; and among the verbs, “glanced”, “glimpsed”, “eyed”, “stared”; and likewise “became” and “came to pass”; or “smiled”, “laughed”, “guffawed”. These are called (disparate) (mutabāyinah)

So be zealous to choose the expression that signifies your intent determinately, corresponding to it with complete correspondence. Do not use the genus to signify the species, for it is more general than the species and its signification is one of containment; nor the species to signify the genus, for it is more specific than the genus and does not fall under any of the kinds of signification, so that using it is idle. Rather, let the expression be exactly equal to the meaning. For example, if you wish to signify an individual essence, state its proper name, the one that marks it off from others that resemble it and share with it; and if you wish to signify an attribute, express it by the expression coined for it, the one that casts not the least doubt or partnership, even if the difference be slight. And if the matter defeats you and you have need of signification by concomitance, then let the metaphor or the metonymy be closely suited to the purpose

And know that if an expression signifies a particular thing it is called (a name of an essence), whether it be simple or compound; and if it signifies one of the attributes of the essence it is called (an accident), and this is either a mark or a proper one, as has preceded. It is well known that some properties are not always needed in imparting the conception of a thing or in conceiving it, even though they are attached to it inseparably: as if we knew that among the properties of the radish is that it is of benefit in such-and-such an illness, and we wished to characterise the radish for one who does not know it and to impart its conception to him — we are not obliged to state this property. Nevertheless it may be stated for added clarity, according to the aspect intended in the characterisation, and especially in poetic and literary attributions

It must by now have become clear to you, from what has preceded, that one needs must know the secrets of the language and grasp the true sense of every word, so that the resembling may be told from the equivocal and the disparate from the synonymous, and the difference between every word and the rest be known, and the place in which each one of them is used

Second Inquiry

On setting out the better arrangement for skill in imparting the conception and for easing conception

That is

The statement of definitions, characterisations and descriptions

Every utterance that is strange to the hearer requires clarification. Failure to understand comes either from the strangeness of the utterance that signifies what is intended, or else the cause of it is the obscurity of the thing signified and its being confounded for the hearer, or his having no acquaintance with it at all. If it is the first, then what is needed is to set out the meaning intended by that utterance in terms clearer and more evident to the hearer, and this is called (explication) (tafsīr)

The strange expression is explicated by stating a synonym of it known to the hearer. Most works on the language, such as the Qāmūs and others, are on this pattern. And beware of explicating the unknown by what is likewise unknown, lest you be like the man who, after much labour, explicated water by water. Expressions signifying attributes, or properties, or states of the soul are explicated by stating them in construction with that in which they are found, or by stating their cause and ground, or their concomitants and results: as your saying, “pungency is the taste of pepper and onion and the like”; and in characterising fear, “it is the soul's being affected by a hidden or imagined harm whose occurrence is awaited”; and your saying in characterising character (khulq), “it is a state by which a man performs his acts without deliberation and without choice” — and it is in some men an instinct and a nature, and in others the result of practice and training, or of familiarity and habit

And if it is the second, then you state for him its definitions and its attributes, putting the more general before the more specific and the higher before the lower, in a form that gathers in all the individuals of the thing characterised and its parts and bars what is not of it from entering into its conception, while observing brevity and confining yourself to what is necessary of them

The manner of this is: that we divide the things among whose sum your object falls, and order the chain of universals, then look to see in which of them the object is confined; and you state it, and state all that comes before it, or one of them. Accordingly, if it is a genus you state that genus and the one before it, and if it is a species you state that species and the genus — and this is called (a complete definition); and if you leave aside the genus before it and state the remote one, it is called (a deficient definition)

And if the object sought is an individual having a proper name, you state its species and the property that marks it off from others, and this is called (a characterisation)

The foundation in all of them goes back to division and to the ordering of the chain of universals, since many existing things resemble one another in every respect, and we distinguish them from one another only after looking with the utmost exactness — as by viewing them with magnifying instruments, or examining them by other methods with the aid of certain chemical agents or the like, so that there appears to him the fine difference between them which had been hidden from him. And for this reason you see what was a species become a genus, and what fell within one of the species split off from it and become an independent species — all of this with the advance of the sciences and the arts and the abundance and perfecting of the means. So one ought to guard against error in ordering the chain when enumerating the parts and ranging them; and this arises on the side of gathering in and barring out, because of the confusions that come about through outward resemblance together with inward disparity, or resemblance to a surface glance together with disparity under exactness

And so that you may be safe from error in gathering in and barring out, you ought to divide every genus into two species and no more, such that one species is qualified by an attribute by which the other species is not qualified. On this pattern order the chain

An example of this: if you wished to characterise man, order the chain of his universals as you see: Body organic | non-organic animal | non-animal rational | non-rational

You see here that your object falls under “rational”, so you say in its definition: a rational animal

Likewise, if you wished to characterise fired brick (ājurr), you would order the chain as follows:

Stone artificial | not artificial of earth | of something else baked | not baked prismatic in shape | otherwise appointed for building walls and the like | appointed for other things ( ḥ )

And since your object falls under the number ( ḥ ), you say in its definition:

Fired brick is an artificial stone, of earth, baked, prismatic in shape, appointed for building walls and the like

Likewise, if you wished to characterise the ṭarbūsh, you would divide the chain on this pattern: Apparel for the head | for something else without a brim | with a brim of wool | of something else coloured | not coloured red or black | otherwise having at its crown a place for the tassel | not having that ( ʻ )

And your object falls under the number ( ʻ ). So you say in its characterisation:

The ṭarbūsh is apparel for the head, without a brim, of wool, coloured red or black, having at its crown a place for the tassel

It is not without profit that I set out for you what the Imām al-Ghazzālī has said on this subject:

He said —: As for that about whose quiddity the question has been asked, when you wish to define it with a real definition, you have duties in the matter, and the definition is not real save by them; and if you leave them aside we call it descriptive or verbal, and it ceases to be expressive of the thing's reality and to impart the core of its meaning in the questioner's soul

The first — that you gather the parts of the definition from the genus and the differentiae. So if it is said to you, pointing to what grows from the earth, “What is it?”, you must say “a body”; but if you confined yourself to that, it would be refuted against you by the stone, and so you have need of an addition, and you say “growing”, thereby guarding against what does not grow. This guarding is called a differentia, since by it you have marked off the thing defined from what is other than it

The second — that you state all its essentials, even if they be a thousand, and do not mind the length; but you ought to put the more general before the more specific, so do not say “growing body”, but the reverse. Were one to leave this aside, the order would be thrown into confusion, yet the reality would not cease to be stated, though with disorder in the wording; and the objection against you in that is less than in the first case, which is that you confine yourself to “body”

And the third — that when you have found the proximate genus, beware of stating the remote one along with it, for then you would be repeating yourself, as when you say “a fluid drink”; or of confining yourself to the remote one, for then you would be going far afield, as when it is asked, “What is wine?” — do not say “an intoxicating body taken from the grape”. For if you state this, you have stated what is essential and constant and convertible, yet it is defective, falling short of imparting the core of wine's reality. Indeed, were you to say “an intoxicating fluid”, it would be nearer than “body”, and it too is weak! Rather you ought to say “an intoxicating drink”, for that is the nearest and the most specific, and you will find after it no genus more specific than it. So when you have stated the genus, seek after it the differentia, since “drink” takes in all the other drinks; and strive to differentiate by the essentials, unless that be hard for you — and so it is in most definitions — and then, after stating the genus, turn to stating the concomitants, and strive that what you state be of the manifest, well-known concomitants, for by the hidden one nothing is made known: as when it is asked, “What is the lion?” and you say, “a beast of prey with foul breath”, it being distinguished by foul breath from the dog — for foul breath is among its properties, but among the hidden properties; whereas if you said “courageous, broad in the upper parts”, these concomitants and accidents would be nearer to understanding, because they are more evident. And most of the definitions one sees in books are descriptive, since the real one is a rare thing; and the observance of order, so that one does not begin with the more specific before the more general, is hard, and the search for the nearer genus is hard — for you may well say of the lion that it is a courageous animal, and the word “beast of prey” does not occur to you; and so kinds of hardship come together. And the best of descriptive definitions is one in which the nearest genus has been set down and completed by the well-known, familiar properties

And the fourth — that you guard against strange, outlandish expressions, and far-fetched figurative ones, and equivocal, wavering ones; and that you strive after brevity as far as you are able, and after the express expression as far as is possible for you. But if the express expression defeats you and you have need of metaphor, then seek out of the metaphors what is most closely suited to the purpose, and state to the questioner what you mean by it; for not every intelligible matter has a plain expression coined for it. And if one who lengthens has lengthened, or one who borrows has borrowed a metaphor, or has brought an equivocal expression and made his meaning known by plain statement or made it known by a contextual indication, then his deed ought not to be thought monstrous, nor he to be blamed excessively, if he has uncovered the reality by stating all the essentials; for that is the aim, and these niceties are embellishments and arrangements, like spices to the aim. It is only the disputants who think such a thing monstrous and reject it with the utmost rejection, because their natures, falling short of the original aim, incline to the accessories. . . . And the expression is not itself intended in the real definition, save with the formalist, who hovers about the wordings, so that his objection is to them and his passion is for them. End of quotation

And appended to this inquiry is (description), which is the sketching of the object in the hearer's imagination by stating enough of its accidental features — of attributes and of properties

And this may be adorned and embellished, stating in it many attributes of the thing described, and its peculiarities and the effects in which it stands alone, so that its reality may be revealed and gain in clarity, with due regard for the requirements of eloquence and letters in that. This is called literary, or poetic, or historical description, and in it one confines oneself to stating what suits the aspect you intend, since a person, or a place, or a time, or something else may be described from different aspects — as that one may intend thereby to set out its beauties and to attract to them, or its faults and to repel from them. And a town is described from the side of its craftsmen, or its men of letters, or its buildings, or its natural and geographical situation, or its military situation and its importance for war, or from the side of what abounds in it of good or evil matters and of acceptable or detested conditions, and the like. So the writer chooses of the attributes what his taste desires and handles them so as to clarify his purpose, setting out its states and the epithets that represent it, until the hearer all but sees it with his own eyes

And the condition of description is that it be gathering in and barring out, possessed of lustre and charm, and that it not go so far in it as exaggeration and prolixity, contenting itself with what suits the aspect intended. And the better course in this is that you begin your description of the subject with a general view, then take up the detail of the particulars one by one, according to the sequence in which they come, or putting the more important among them, in view of what you intend, before the rest. And in this you are nothing but a painter depicting with colours and brush, or one who displays the various scenes by the cinematograph. And therefore you must first know what you wish to describe with a true knowledge, and study it with exactness and close attention, so that not the finest of its states escapes you, and take note of the manner of their placing and ordering; then lend your spirit all attention, so as to catch the scent of the impressions and meanings it breathes into you, and clothe them in a garment of expressions that suits them, and reveal them to the hearer ordered and arranged, bound one to another according to the affinity whose effect you have felt in yourself, passing from the weak impression to the strong, and then to the stronger, so as to set the thing described before him until he does not doubt that he sees it with his own eye. And you ought to take care not to swerve from the aspect you intend by the description; and let this aspect be your chief mark in the attributes you employ. For if you wished to describe a garden, say, then either you intend to set out the beauties of nature and the loveliness of its figuring and the soundness of its making, or you intend to anatomise the impressions that arise in you from what you behold and to bring about their like in the hearer's spirit — or something else. And do not forget that eloquence lies in economy

And description has many kinds: as the description of a town, or of a battle, or of a scene among the scenes of nature, such as a meadow, or a sunrise, or a sunset, or a tempest, or the like; and as the description of an animal in its make, and its nature, and its dispositions; or of a person, in his make or his character, or in both. And as a historical account of a great man, in which are stated his make and his character, his upbringing and his compositions, and what he spread abroad in them of thoughts and opinions, and his bent and his method, and the degree of profit drawn from those traces or works or inventions, and what has resulted from them of good or evil effect upon thoughts and inclinations, or upon civilisation, or upon the crafts; and a summary of what has been said of them and of him on their account; and his last days and his death; and the like

Second Section

On the acquired assents (al-taṣdīqāt)

It has already been said that the primary judgements (al-awwalīyāt) are conceded judgements, in whose soundness no one doubts and of whose truth none hesitates to be convinced. On this footing they were, without doubt, fit to be a measure for us in the judgements and assents that are sought; so whatever we found to answer to them with complete correspondence we accepted, and whatever exceeded or fell short we rejected. And this operation is the measuring-against (muqāyasah), or the syllogism (qiyās). The setting out of this is that the judgement whose extraction is sought is included within the other, conceded judgements; the aim is merely to bring it out and make it appear, and to set out that it is one with the judgements within which it falls, being the very same as they in meaning, though the expression differ. And no judgement can be inferred from another so long as it is not included in it and among its contents and its individuals. So if you wish to set up a proof for a judgement, you first bring a primary judgement conceded by the hearer which contains what you wished to infer; then you bring after it another judgement to signify that the conclusion is included in it, and then you judge that the conclusion is true — and that is a syllogism upon this primary judgement, namely: that what entails something which entails another thing entails that other thing as well; or what amounts to it, as your saying: what entails the denial of one thing of another likewise entails the denial, of that other, of whatever is proper to that thing; or your saying: what contains a thing which contains another, contains that other

And the matter may run on in a chain with you, so that you bring the primary judgement and then bring after it several judgements, each one of which is such as to signify that the one after it is included in the one before it, and so on until you arrive at the conclusion

And in negative judgements you bring the primary judgement, then bring after it a judgement, or several judgements, to signify that the subject of the conclusion is not included in the content of the subject of the primary judgement. And on this pattern act in all your syllogisms and demonstrations. And if you are the questioner, then whatever is so, or can rightly be brought back to this form, you accept; and otherwise you turn it back and reject it. Examples of this:

Man walks — the judgement meant to be established Man is an animal — a primary judgement (and it is called the minor proposition) And the animal walks — a judgement conceded by the hearer, brought to signify that the conclusion is included in the first (and it is called the major proposition) Therefore man walks — the conclusion

Your statement is not true — the judgement meant to be established If your statement were true it would have to correspond to the fact — a primary judgement And we have found it not to correspond to the fact — a judgement conceded by the hearer, brought to signify that the conclusion is included in the first. Therefore your statement is not true — the conclusion

And the statement of the major proposition may be passed over, either for its evidentness or for brevity. An example:

A dialogue between a policeman and an accused man

The policeman — Follow me A — And how am I to follow you? P — Because I command you in the name of the government

And the underlying form of that is:

My command is the government's command — and the government's command is obeyed — therefore my command is obeyed And I command you to follow me, so obey and follow me

And in matters of assent we have two other ways, namely (induction) (al-istiqrāʼ) and (deduction) (al-istintāj). That is, if you find some attribute or property in many instances of a single kind, and after exacting search do not find an instance of that kind devoid of it, there arises in you from that the assent that this property is general to those instances. And this is (induction)

And since this is built upon the resemblance among the instances, so that they may be judged by a general judgement, the matter may be confounded and error may enter in — as that the resemblance be not complete and this not be noticed, because the difference is fine and the cause hidden, or because of a deficiency or an error in the assigning of the cause. But if it is complete and the cause one, the results must be one; and if they differ, we understand that there is some other matter there, and an impeding accident, such that were it to disappear the difference would disappear

As for deduction, which is also called inference (al-istidlāl), it is the reverse of induction; that is, if you know a general judgement, you judge by it of a thing you are certain is one of its individuals. And if you know a law of nature (nāmūs ṭabīʻī), you infer by it what must inevitably come about by reason of that law.

— Notes —

[32] ( 1 ) al-qawāḍib — sharp-cutting swords

[32] ( 2 ) al-sabāsib — trackless deserts and far-stretching level lands

[32] ( 3 ) maysam — the branding-iron

[32] ( 4 ) iqtiʻād — riding

[32] ( 5 ) al-ghārib — the withers