Section: Appointment and Dismissal

ʻĀṣim related, from Dharr, from ʻAbdallāh ibn Masʻūd, from the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, that he said: "God sustains the religion by the profligate man." One of this sort is put to use by a provision that keeps him supplied and an attentiveness that keeps him satisfied, for he is like a rapacious beast of prey: if you starve it, it rages; and if you feed it full, it grows tame — so that he may be kept in store against need. For time has its calamities that are repelled only by the worst of its people, as Ḥudhayfah ibn al-Yamān said to a man: would it please you to overcome the worst of people? He said: yes! He said: you will never overcome him until you are worse than he. So keep him in readiness for the calamities of evil when they come knocking, for he is better informed of them, more able to repel them, and more masterful over the people of them; for iron is cleft by iron. And alongside that he is held in check by what repels the outbreak of his malice and cuts off the mischief of his guile; for though addiction to evil draws the harder, the natures of souls prevail the more. Some of the sages have said: mixing with the wicked is a danger, and patience in their company is like going to sea, in that he who comes out of it safe in body does not come out safe in heart from the wariness of it. So if you find in this cunning fellow a slackness in his resolve (himmah) and a shortfall in his vigour, the spread of his guile will be the scantier and his effect in calamities the slighter; and if he is high in resolve and strong in vigour, stretching out toward the heights of affairs, the spread of his guile will be the fuller and his effect in calamities the greater. So give him in every case, of your two courses of wariness and quiescence, according to what his resolve requires and what his vigour urges him to, so that your rule may be straight and safe from the cunning of his guile, and no weakness from excess may reach you and no slackness from falling short. God has appointed a measure for everything. This, then, is the detail of what binding and loosing (al-ʻaqd wa-al-ḥall) comprise, and God knows best

Section

(Appointment and Dismissal)

As for the detail of what appointment (taqlīd) and dismissal (ʻazl) comprise — and that is the second half: appointment is of two sorts, appointment for establishment (taqrīr) and appointment for administration (tadbīr). As for appointment for establishment, it concerns that whose foundations are newly laid down and whose regulations are set in place from the beginning, and it falls into three divisions

The first is that it be in something particular which the vizier is able to take in hand himself; then the vizier is the most particularly fitted to establish it and has the better right to execute it, because these are lasting foundations belonging to the particulars of his own oversight. If he appoints another over them and deputes someone in them, that is a falling short on his part in what is weighty, though he is excusable in it if it is slight. And the one he appoints has no right to execute his establishment of it except by his permission; otherwise it would be a hidden dismissal, since he becomes bound where he had been the one binding, and adjudicated over where he had been the one adjudicating

The second division: that the appointment be in something remote from him in which the seeking of his orders (istīmār) is possible; then it is permissible for him to depute someone in establishing it, and it remains suspended upon the vizier's ratification and execution. And the deputy is not to combine the two matters, so that the appointment may be confined to establishment and execution; he was in that taking a liberty, unless he be ordered to it, so that the matter becomes a liberty taken, save for a necessity with which the rule of free choice falls away

The third division: that the appointment be in something remote from him in which the seeking of his orders is impracticable; then it is permissible for him to depute in it one who combines its establishment and its execution, provided three conditions are complete in him. The first is the competence (kifāyah) that rises to what is involved in establishment. The second is the awe (haybah) by which he is obeyed in execution. The third is the trustworthiness (amānah) that holds him back from taking bribes and from treachery. This after the completion of the conditions held to apply in all offices, which are three: intellect, religious observance, and manly virtue (murūʼah). There is no latitude in appointing one who is defective in one of these, since he falls short of its due and stands outside the people of it. What lies beyond these differs with the difference of the offices, although these are required in all of them. Kisrā Abrawīz said: whoever relies upon bad officials will not be free of an unsound judgement, a lying surmise, and a promise, and a prevailer. Some of the sages have said: never employ for competence a man beguiled out of his reason; and the beguiled is he whom a rank he does not deserve has carried, and who has been rewarded with a reward he does not merit

As for appointment for administration: it is the oversight of that whose regulations are settled and whose foundations are laid, and it is shared between the vizier and the one who oversees it, except that the vizier is particularly charged with watching over it and the overseer with taking it in hand. It is of two sorts: the one, the administration of the troops; the second, the administration of the monies

As for the administration of the troops, the vizier cannot do without appointing an intermediary (safīr) in it — even though they do meet him — so that by the intermediary the dignity of his vizierate may be preserved, and so that he may not be brought to a stand by the demands of his troops, being thus guarded from the clamour of their talk and the roughness of their natures. What prevails in their administration is judgement and governance, and so six conditions are held to apply in the man chosen for this appointment. The first is the awe that leads them to obedience to him, since he undertakes the administration of men of force and so has need with them of the strength of awe. The second is that he be a man of judgement and governance, so that he may lead them by his judgement to what is right and his governance may hold them to uprightness. The third is that he be able to win the affection of hearts and to gather the word into one, so that they may be safe from discord and mutual estrangement. The fourth is that between him and the troops there be a kinship in natures and a likeness in characters, by which they may mingle in concord and not fall out in mutual opposition. The fifth is that he be sound within and correct in belief, since he becomes the closest of men to them and they become the most obedient of men to him. The sixth is what differs with the difference of the situation: if it is in a time of peace, deliberateness and quiescence are looked for in him; and if it is in a time of war, boldness and force are looked for in him, so that he may be formed by nature after the likeness of the state of his time. For it has been said: the best of dispositions is the one that suits the need. So when he has lighted upon a man in whom these are complete — and it is far off that he should light upon such a one unless he be helped by divine accord — his appointment becomes obligatory, and it becomes incumbent to deal evenly with him in the rights that are his and that are owed by him, so that he may endure and remain upright. It has been said in the scattered sayings of wisdom (manthūr al-ḥikam): the man whose due you have discharged — his side you are safe from. And it has been said: make the man you put in office independent of treachery, for he whom you have not made sufficient will not suffice you

As for the administration of the monies: the vizier is kept from taking it in hand himself; rather he guards its income by awe and by vigilant support, and he controls its outgo by need and by necessity. And for appointment over each of the two there are conditions

As for the conditions of appointment over the taking in hand of its income, they are five conditions. The first is that he be formed by nature for justice, so that he may deal justly and obtain justice. The second is that he hold trustworthiness as a matter of religion, so that he may exact in full and pay in full. The third is that he be competent, so that by his competence he may keep control and not let things go to waste through his incapacity. The fourth is that he be experienced in his work, knowing the sources of its revenues and the means of its increase. The fifth is that he be gentle in his dealing, neither oppressive nor clumsy. It is told that Alexander wrote to his teacher to consult him about his officials, and he wrote back to him: whoever has slaves and governs them well, put him over the troops; and whoever has an estate and manages it well, put him over the land-tax (kharāj). And ʻUmar ibn ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz described Ziyād and said: he would gather as the ant gathers and bend tenderly as a dutiful mother bends. This is the best conduct for an official and the most delicate condition for one who deals with men: the man who appointed him is fortunate in him, and the man over whom he is appointed is happy in him. And by the like of it soundness becomes general and uprightness complete

As for the conditions of appointment over the taking in hand of its outgo — after trustworthiness, which is a condition in every office — they are held to correspond to the states of the outgo, and it divides into three divisions. The first is what is fixed by settled regulations, such as the stipends of the armies; for appointment over this there are two conditions: knowledge of their measures, and knowledge of those entitled to them. The second division is what arises incidentally out of matters that preceded it, the overseer being commanded in them, such as gifts and contingent outlays; for appointment over this there are two conditions: that they depend upon the commands, and knowledge of the purposes of the one who commands. The third division is what arises incidentally and is committed to the judgement of the overseer and left to his determination, such as the public interests and the outlays; and appointment over it has the fullest of their conditions, since they depend upon his own discretion and estimation. So along with trustworthiness three conditions are needed: the first, knowledge of the heads of the outgo, so that it may not be spent upon what is not due; the second, moderation in it, so that it may not lead to extravagance or to falling short; the third, the setting right of prices and wages, without encroachment and without fraud