Chapter Five: On the Proofs of Each Claimant

As for the secret (sirr), it is the degree of those of whom He said “My servants,” where He said (So enter among My servants). For when the soul (nafs) was at peace He said to it, Enter among My servants; and the entering indicated that it had not been among them, and that it entered among them only when it was at peace.

Then the soul is in the Blaze, the spirit (rūḥ) in bliss, the heart (qalb) among the loftiest heights, and the secret with an Omnipotent Sovereign — that is, the possessor of the heart and the possessor of the secret.

Gate Five: On the Proofs of Each Claimant

As for the physicians, they said: we have found that when the humours (akhlāṭ), the organs and the spirits are sound, the faculties and the acts are right; and the elements (arkān) and the temperament (mizāj) must be as they ought to be. So the soundness of the humours, the organs and the spirits is followed by the soundness of the faculties and the acts, and that follows upon the soundness of the elements and the temperament. These, then, are the whole of what we see in the body; so there is here no other spirit, and no soul outside what we have mentioned.

This is unsound, for the utmost the matter comes to is that they did not find anything; and not everything they did not find is thereby non-existent.

As for the philosophers, they have three matters. The first: they argued by considering the beginning of bringing-into-existence, and said: God is one in all respects, and from the one only one proceeds. So the first thing originated cannot be an accident (ʻaraḍ), because the accident comes after the substance (jawhar), and so it would not be the first of possible existents. Nor can it be a body, because every body has parts and multiplicity in it, whereas the first existent from God is one. Nor can it be a soul, because the soul acts only by a bodily instrument, and so it must have an instrument in order to act. For if the soul were the first of possible things, the second would be from it, and so it would have acted upon the second without there being an instrument, which is not admissible. It remains, then, that the first possible existent is a separate spirit (rūḥ mujarrad), which needs nothing but its bringer into existence — in its existence, its subsistence, and its acting. The other way they took from the terminus. They said: there is no doubt that in us there is that which knows what is indivisible; and what knows the indivisible cannot itself be divisible, for if it were divided, then each of its parts either knows that known object, or the knower is some of its parts and not others, or no part of it is a knower at all. If every part is a knower, then there are knowing souls, like the soul of Zayd and ʻAmr and Khālid — whereas our discourse is of a single knower and a single knowing of the known. And if some part is the knower and not the rest, by the perfection of the soul, then that is the knower and the remaining part is not needed. And if no part of it is a knower in the state of separation, then in the state of conjunction either something has come to be that was not, or not. For if nothing has come to be that was not, then in conjunction it is just as it is in separation, and so knowing must be impossible in conjunction just as it is in separation, or else necessary in separation just as it came to be in conjunction — otherwise the preponderance of a possible thing without a preponderating factor would follow.

And if something has come to be, then what has come to be either subsists in every part — and that is impossible, since the subsistence of one thing in many substrata is a great impossibility — or else it subsisted in some parts and not in others, and that is preponderance without a preponderating factor.

And we say: in that case the soul is that in which the newly arisen configuration of conjunction subsists. Or else it subsists in none of them, and that is impossible, since what comes to be in a thing subsists neither by itself nor in another. Nor is it possible to say that each part of the knower knows a part of the known, because the known is of that which does not divide.

As for the third way, they took it from the middle. They said: the noblest of things is that which has no need in any respect whatever, and the basest is that which has many needs. Now most things are incapable. As for the accident, it needs a bringer into existence and it needs a substratum; and its substratum needs a bringer into existence and a place; and in its acting it needs its substratum — for heat, for example, acts only while it is in a substratum. So these are four needs: the need for a bringer into existence, for a substratum, for a place, and for a bodily instrument in acting. Then the body needs a bringer into existence and a place, and in its acting it needs an instrument, for the body performs its act only by a bodily power or an instrument; and it is nobler than the accident, because it does not need a substratum to subsist in, whereas the accident does need that.

Then the soul has two needs, for it needs a bringer into existence and it needs an instrument by which it acts; and it is nobler than the body, because it does not need a place, whereas the body must have a place.

Then the spirit, which is the intellect (ʻaql), has a single need, namely the need for the bringer into existence; and it is nobler than the soul, since in its acting it needs nothing, whereas the soul does need. Then God, exalted be He, is the absolutely Self-sufficient, the true King, who needs nothing in anything and of whom nothing is independent in anything.

As for our own proofs, they are what we have mentioned of deriving from the Book of God and eliciting from the speech of the Messenger of God; and the intellect agrees with it, for we have no doubt of the admissibility of there being a body described by the attributes we have mentioned. And when the truthful one gives report of something possible, its acceptance is obligatory, without interpretation (taʼwīl).

Then the proofs of the philosophers are not complete. As for the first, their saying that from the one only one proceeds, it is false: for the body is many, as they themselves said, and so on their doctrine it proceeds only from something many; and that many thing is God, because God has no multiplicity in Him, by agreement. So that many thing proceeds from something: if it proceeds from one, the contrary of their own statement follows; and if it proceeds from something many, the discourse is transferred to that many thing, and we say there must be a possible thing proceeding from a bringer into existence that is many. It cannot be said, as they said, that the first thing to proceed is many but that not all of it proceeded from God — for the first has existence from God and possibility from itself, and so it apprehends its existence from its bringer into existence and its possibility from itself, and thus many things result: existence; possibility; the apprehension of existence; the apprehension of a bringer into existence; the apprehension of possibility; and the apprehension of itself. So, in virtue of its apprehending a bringer into existence, it brought an intellect into existence, as God brought it into existence, taking on the character of its originator’s creating; and in virtue of its apprehending itself it brought a soul into existence; and in virtue of its apprehending its possibility from itself it brought the matter of a body into existence; and in virtue of its apprehending its existence from a bringer into existence it brought a form into existence. We say: there is no need of this forced contrivance, and you might just as well say that God, exalted be He, apprehended His own necessary self, and knew things, and knew His own necessity, and knew the possibility of what is other than He; so that in virtue of His apprehending Himself He brought into existence something separate, and in virtue of His apprehending things other than Himself He brought into existence something

And this statement is the more fitting to them, for they said that God’s knowledge, exalted be He, is not passive: so when He apprehends a thing in the fair order, it comes to be as He apprehended it, without any intending of it on His part

Then, were you to hear their proof that from the one only one proceeds, you would marvel at their intellects. For one of their proofs is their saying: if a thing came to be from the one, and then another thing besides it came to be from it, then in the respect in which this came to be, that did not come to be; and in the respect in which that came to be from it, this did not come to be. This is one of their proofs — measure the rest by it. And from this you come to know that the mentioning of their sayings and the reciting of their arguments is a thing that requires strength of faith and perfection of mastery, inasmuch as one comes to know that no demonstration equals the Qurʼan and that there is no certainty for him who opposes the religion.

As for their saying that in us there is that which knows the indivisible, we say: yes — but why should the knowing not belong to all the parts together in the state of conjunction? Just as the body, in their view, has two parts, matter and form, and the conjunction between them is not found in either one of them; and likewise the form of the house does not subsist in the roof alone nor in the wall; and likewise the city is separate houses, and its being a city does not subsist in each house but in the whole.

As for what was mentioned of the ranks, we say: what you have mentioned yields the possibility of a possible existent not in a place; but not everything possible is actual — for it lies within possibility that a house of gilded ornament should come down from heaven, and that has not occurred.

Once you know this, we say first: how do you say that what you have mentioned is possible, when some needs entail others? For the need for a place entails the need for a bringer into existence: for everything that needs a place needs a bringer into existence, needing a place. And for this reason most of the theologians said that independence of place is among the properties of the attributes of God, exalted be He.

And if we wish to bind them by their own admission, we say: if there could be a possible existent that needs nothing but its bringer into existence, then that existent is either temporally originated — and you do not hold that — or eternal, and that is not admissible, because every possible thing is originated, by the proof of origination, which is well known. Then we say: we grant the admissibility of its existence; but what is the proof of its occurring? And as for what you have mentioned, its falsity has become plain; so what you have mentioned is not established so long as its demonstration is not made plain.